


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HISTORY OF
OUR WAR WITH SPAIN
INCLUDING
THE STORY OF CUBA

Henry O. Russell



WITH INTRODUCTIONS BY
HON. REDFIELD PROCTOR

UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM VERMONT


AND

HON. JOHN M. THURSTON


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
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Yours Very Truly
Wm. H. Hurler



PREFACE.

PERIODICALLY, in the history of every nation there comes a crisis; questions having their small beginnings far back in the past develop to a fruition, the natural result of antecedent events, the legitimate offspring of all that has gone to make up a nation's character and relative position in the world. These questions must be settled sooner or later, in accordance with the demands of progress; they may be softened for a time by diplomacy or obscured by indifference and attention to other affairs, but the inevitable settlement is only postponed, the eventual crisis but gathers new force, and, in time, it must result in bloodshed or a backward step. Placed as Cuba was, belonging to a nation whose star has been for three centuries setting, close to the shores of a free people, whose course has for more than a century been ever upward, the issue could not be avoided. The war came.

This event, like all in history, being inseparably linked with the past, it has seemed to the author that the developing causes were too important to a proper understanding of the conflict to remain unnoticed; and this must be the apology, if any is needed, for the opening pages of this history, dealing not simply with the Spaniard and the Cuban and the reasons for the bitter hatred which grew up between them, but with the part that both Spain and Cuba have played in the constitutional history of the United States. This long story is replete with many dramatic and romantic incidents, which take on a new color in the light of the war that has closed

so gloriously for American arms, and which give the conflict its true setting in the history of the world's progress.

But, while briefly placing the causes before the reader, no space required for a full narration of the incidents of the war has been sacrificed. Though brief, the conflict has abounded in deeds of heroism, some of them without a parallel in military or naval history, and the character of the American people has been revealed in stronger colors not simply to other nations of the world, but to the Americans themselves. The last vestige of old sectional feeling disappeared in the inspiring unity with which all, North and South, fell in behind the flag; and, as the war closed, our eyes were open to a wider vision, the promise of a grander destiny than we have been wont to consider in store for us. For the war has brought new questions and new responsibilities; in the future are suggestions of new experiences, possibly requiring a new policy. The Stars and Stripes now float in the Antilles and over rich islands of the Pacific. Whatever comes, it has been shown that the people of the United States do not shrink in the face of duty to themselves and to humanity.

In relating the incidents of the war it has been the constant aim in these pages to make use only of the most reliable authorities and the available official reports and records. Many of the illustrations of battles and naval and army life are from photographs made by photographers at the imminent risk of their lives, and they have been reproduced for this volume with the utmost fidelity to the originals. Others are from drawings and sketches made by eminent artists on the spot. Acknowledgments are due to *Leslie's Weekly* and *Harper's Weekly* for permission to use some of the copyrighted illustrations that have appeared in those papers.

Henry B. Russell.



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BY

HON. REDFIELD PROCTOR

United States Senator from Vermont

CUBA

ITS CONDITION AT THE BEGINNING OF 1898

IT has been suggested that I make a public statement of what I saw during my visit to Cuba and how the situation there impressed me. This I do on account of the public interest in all that concerns Cuba, and to correct some inaccuracies that have, not unnaturally, appeared in reported interviews with me.

My trip was entirely unofficial and of my own motion: not suggested by anyone. The only mention I made of it to the President was to say to him that I contemplated such a trip and to ask him if there was any objection to it; to which he replied that he could see none. No one but myself, therefore, is responsible for anything in this statement. Judge Day gave me a brief note of introduction to General Lee, and I had letters of introduction from business friends at the North to bankers and other business men at Havana, and they in turn gave me letters to their correspondents in other cities. These letters to business men were very useful, as one

of the principal purposes of my visit was to ascertain the views of practical men of affairs upon the situation.

Of General Lee I need say but little. His valuable services to his country in his trying position are too well known to all his countrymen to require mention. Besides his ability, high character, and courage, he possesses the important requisites of unfailing tact and courtesy, and, withal, his military education and training and his soldierly qualities are invaluable adjuncts in the equipment of our representative in a country so completely under military rule as was Cuba. General Lee kindly invited us to sit at his table at the hotel during our stay in Havana, and this opportunity for frequent informal talks with him was of great help to me.

In addition to the information he voluntarily gave me, it furnished a convenient opportunity to ask him the many questions that suggested themselves in explanation of things seen and heard on our trips through the country. I also met and spent considerable time with Consul Brice at Matanzas, and with Captain Barker, a staunch ex-Confederate soldier, the consul at Sagua la Grande. None of our representatives whom I met in Cuba are of my political faith, but there is a broader faith, not bounded by party lines. They are all three true Americans, and have done excellent service.

There are six provinces in Cuba, each, with the exception of Matanzas, extending the whole width of the island, and having about an equal sea front on the north and south borders. Matanzas touches the Caribbean Sea only at its southwest corner, being separated from it elsewhere by a narrow peninsula of Santa Clara Province. The provinces are named, beginning at the west, Pinar del Rio, Havana, Matanzas, Santa Clara, Puerto Principe, and Santiago de Cuba. My observations were confined to the four western provinces, which constitute about one-half of the island. The two eastern ones were practically in the hands of the insurgents, except the two fortified towns. These two large provinces were spoken of as "Cuba Libre."

Havana, the great city and capital of the island, is, in the eyes of the Spaniards and many Cubans, all Cuba, as much as Paris is France. But having visited it in more peaceful times and seen its sights, the tomb of Columbus, the forts — Cabaña and Morro Castle, etc.— I did not care to repeat this, preferring trips in the country. Everything seemed to go on much as usual in Havana. Quiet prevailed, and except for the frequent squads of soldiers marching to guard and police duty, and their abounding presence in all public places, one saw few signs of war.

Outside Havana all had changed. It was not peace nor was it war. It was desolation and distress, misery and starvation. Every town and village was surrounded by a "trocha" (trench), a sort of rifle pit, but constructed on a plan new to me, the dirt being thrown up on the inside and a barbed-wire fence on the outer side of the trench. These trochas had at every corner and at frequent intervals along the sides what are there called "forts," but which are really small blockhouses, many of them more like large sentry boxes, loopholed for musketry, and with a guard of from two to ten soldiers in each.

The purpose of these trochas was to keep the reconcentrados in as well as to keep the insurgents out. From all the surrounding country the people had been driven into these fortified towns and held there to subsist as they could. They were virtually prison yards, and not unlike one in general appearance, except that the walls were not so high and strong; but they sufficed, where every point was in range of a soldier's rifle, to keep in the poor reconcentrado women and children.

Every railroad station was within one of these trochas and had an armed guard. Every train had an armored freight car, loopholed for musketry and filled with soldiers, and with, as I observed usually, and was informed was always the case, a pilot engine a mile or so in advance. There were frequent blockhouses inclosed by a trocha and with a guard along the railroad track. With this exception there was no human life

or habitation between these fortified towns and villages, and throughout the whole of the four western provinces, except to a very limited extent among the hills where the Spaniards had not been able to go and drive the people to the towns and burn their dwellings. I saw no house or hut in the 400 miles of railroad rides from Pinar del Rio Province in the west across the full width of Havana and Matanzas provinces, and to Sagua la Grande on the north shore, and to Cienfuegos on the south shore of Santa Clara, except within the Spanish trochas.

There were no domestic animals or crops on the rich fields and pastures except such as were under guard in the immediate vicinity of the towns. In other words, the Spaniards held in these four western provinces just what their army sat on. Every man, woman, and child, and every domestic animal, wherever their columns had reached, was under guard and within their so-called fortifications. To describe one place is to describe all. To repeat, it was neither peace nor war. It was concentration and desolation. This was the "pacified" condition of the four western provinces.

West of Havana is mainly the rich tobacco country; east, as far as I went, a sugar region. Nearly all the sugar mills were destroyed between Havana and Sagua. Two or three were standing in the vicinity of Sagua, and in part running, surrounded, as were the villages, by trochas and forts or palisades of the royal palm, and fully guarded. Toward and near Cienfuegos there were more mills running, but all with the same protection. It is said that the owners of these mills near Cienfuegos were able to obtain special favors of the Spanish government in the way of a large force of soldiers, but that they also, as well as all the railroads, paid taxes to the Cubans for immunity. I had no means of verifying this. It was the common talk among those who had better means of knowledge.

All the country people in the four western provinces, about 400,000 in number, remaining outside the fortified towns

when Weyler's order was made, were driven into these towns, and these were the reconcentrados. They were the peasantry, many of them farmers, some landowners, others renting lands and owning more or less stock, others working on estates and cultivating small patches; and even a small patch in that fruitful clime will support a family.

It is but fair to say that the normal condition of these people was very different from what prevails in this country. Their standard of comfort and prosperity, measured by ours, was not high. But according to their standards and requirements their conditions of life were satisfactory.

They lived mostly in cabins made of palms or in wooden houses. Some of them had houses of stone, the blackened walls of which are all that remain to show the country was ever inhabited.

The first clause of Weyler's order read as follows:

I ORDER AND COMMAND. First, all the inhabitants of the country or outside of the line of fortifications of the towns shall, within the period of eight days, concentrate themselves in the towns occupied by the troops. Any individual who, after the expiration of this period, is found in the uninhabited parts will be considered a rebel and tried as such.

The other three sections forbade the transportation of provisions from one town to another without permission of the military authority, directed the owners of cattle to bring them into the towns, prescribed that the eight days should be counted from the publication of the proclamation in the head town of the municipal district, and stated that if news were furnished of the enemy which could be made use of, it would serve as a "recommendation."

Many, doubtless, did not learn of this order. Others failed to grasp its terrible meaning. Its execution was left largely to the guerrillas to drive in all that had not obeyed, and I was informed that in many cases the torch was applied to their homes with no notice, and the inmates fled with such clothing as they might have on, their stock and other belongings being appropriated by the guerrillas. When they reached the towns they were allowed to build huts of palm

leaves in the suburbs and vacant places within the trochas, and left to live, if they could.

Their huts were about ten by fifteen feet in size, and for want of space were usually crowded together very closely. They had no floor but the ground, no furniture, and, after a year's wear, but little clothing except such stray substitutes as they could extemporize; and with large families, or more than one, in this little space, the commonest sanitary provisions were impossible. Conditions were unmentionable in this respect. Torn from their homes, with foul earth, foul air, foul water, and foul food or none, what wonder that one-half had died and that one-quarter of the living were so diseased that they could not be saved? A form of dropsy was a common disorder resulting from these conditions. Little children were still walking about with arms and chests terribly emaciated, eyes swollen, and abdomen bloated to three times the natural size. The physicians said these cases were hopeless.

Deaths in the streets were not uncommon. I was told by one of our consuls that many had been found dead about the markets in the morning, where they had crawled, hoping to get some stray bits of food from the early hucksters, and that there had been cases where they had dropped dead inside the market surrounded by food. Before Weyler's order these people were independent and self-supporting. They were not beggars even then. There were plenty of professional beggars in every town among the regular residents, but these country people, the reconcentrados, had not learned the art. Rarely was a hand held out to you for alms when going among their huts, but the sight of them made an appeal stronger than words.

Of the hospitals I need not speak. Others have described their condition far better than I can. It is not within the narrow limits of my vocabulary to portray it. I went to Cuba with a strong conviction that the picture had been overdrawn; that a few cases of starvation and suffering had inspired and stimulated the press correspondents, and that they had given

free play to a strong, natural, and highly cultivated imagination.

Before starting I received through the mail a leaflet, with cuts of some of the sick and starving reconcentrados, and took it with me, thinking these must be rare specimens, got up to make the worst possible showing. I saw plenty as bad and worse; many that should not be photographed and shown.

I could not believe that out of a population of 1,600,000, 200,000 had died within these Spanish forts, practically prison walls, within a few months past, from actual starvation and diseases caused by insufficient and improper food. My inquiries were entirely outside of sensational sources. They were made of medical officers, of our consuls, of city alcaldes (mayors), of relief committees, of leading merchants and bankers, physicians, and lawyers. Several of my informants were Spanish born, but every time the answer was that the case had not been overstated. What I saw I cannot tell so that others can see it. It had to be seen with one's own eyes to be realized.

The Los Pasos Hospital, in Havana, has been recently described by one of my colleagues, Senator Gallinger, and I cannot say that his picture was overdrawn, for even his fertile pen could not do that. But he visited it after Dr. Lesser, one of Miss Barton's very able and efficient assistants, had renovated it and put in cots. I saw it when 400 women and children were lying on the floors in an indescribable state of emaciation and disease, many with the scantiest covering of rags — and such rags! — sick children, naked as they came into the world; and the conditions in the other cities are even worse.

Miss Barton needs no indorsement from me. I had known and esteemed her for many years, but had not half appreciated her capability and devotion to her work. I specially looked into her business methods, fearing that there would be the greatest danger of mistake, that there might be want of system and waste and extravagance, but found she could teach me on

these points. I visited the warehouse where the supplies were received and distributed; saw the methods of checking; visited the hospitals established or organized and supplied by her; saw the food distribution in several cities and towns, and everything seemed to me to be conducted in the best manner possible. The ample, fine warehouse in Havana, owned by a Cuban firm, was given, with a gang of laborers, free of charge to unload and reship supplies.

The Children's Hospital, in Havana, a very large, fine private residence, was hired at a cost of less than \$100 per month. It was under the admirable management of Mrs. Dr. Lesser of New York, a German lady and trained nurse. I saw the rapid improvement of the first children taken there. All Miss Barton's assistants seemed excellently fitted for their duties. In short, I saw nothing to criticise, but everything to commend. The American people may be assured that their bounty reached the sufferers with the least possible cost and in the best manner in every respect. If our people could have seen the small fraction of the need they would have poured more "freely from their liberal stores" than ever before for any cause.

General Blanco's order of November 13th somewhat modified the Weyler order, but was of little or no practical benefit. Its application was limited to farms "properly defended," and the owners were obliged to build "centers of defense." Its execution was completely in the discretion of the local military authorities, and they knew the terrible military efficiency of Weyler's order in stripping the country of all possible shelter, food, or source of information for an insurgent, and were slow to surrender this advantage. In fact, though the order was issued four months before, I saw no beneficent results from it worth mentioning.

I wish I might speak of the country — of its surpassing richness. I have never seen one to compare with it. On this point I agree with Columbus, that this is the "most rich and beautiful that ever human eye beheld," and believe every

one between his time and mine must be of the same opinion. It is indeed a land—

“Where every prospect pleases
And only man is vile.”

I had little time to study the race question, and have read nothing on it, so can only give hasty impressions. It is said that there were nearly 200,000 Spaniards in Cuba out of a total population of 1,600,000. They lived principally in the towns and cities. The small shopkeepers in the towns and their clerks were mostly Spaniards. Much of the larger business, too, and of the property in the cities, and in a less degree in the country, was in their hands. They had an eye to thrift, and as everything possible in the way of trade and legalized monopolies, in which the country abounds, was given to them by the government, many of them acquired property. I did not learn that the Spanish residents of the island had contributed largely in blood or treasure to suppress the insurrection.

There were, before the war, about 1,000,000 Cubans on the island, 200,000 Spaniards (which means those born in Spain), and less than half a million of negroes and mixed bloods. The Cuban whites are of pure Spanish blood, and, like the Spaniards, dark in complexion, but oftener light or blonde, so far as I noticed. The percentage of colored to white has been steadily diminishing for more than fifty years, and is not now over twenty-five per cent. of the total. In fact, the number of colored people has been actually diminishing for nearly that time. The Cuban farmer and laborer is by nature peaceable, kindly, gay, hospitable, light-hearted, and improvident.

There is a proverb among the Cubans that “Spanish bulls cannot be bred in Cuba”—that is, the Cubans, though they are of Spanish blood, are less excitable and of a quieter temperament. Many Cubans whom I met spoke in strong terms against the bull fight; that it was a brutal institution, introduced and mainly patronized by the Spaniards. One thing

that was new to me was to learn the superiority of the well-to-do Cuban over the Spaniard in the matter of education. Among those in good circumstances there can be no doubt that the Cuban is far superior in this respect. And the reason of it is easy to see. They have been educated in England, France, or this country, while the Spaniard has such education as his own country furnishes.

The colored people seem to me by nature quite the equal mentally and physically of the race in this country. Certainly physically they are by far the larger and stronger race on the island. There is little or no race prejudice, and this has doubtless been greatly to their advantage. Eighty-five years ago there were one-half as many free negroes as slaves, and this proportion slowly increased until emancipation.

It was said that there were about 60,000 Spanish soldiers in Cuba fit for duty out of the more than 200,000 that had been sent there. The rest had died, had been sent home sick, or were in hospitals, and some had been killed, notwithstanding the official reports. They were conscripts, many of them very young, and generally small men. One hundred and thirty pounds is a fair estimate of their average weight. They were quiet and obedient, and, if well drilled and led, I believe would have fought fairly well, but not at all equal to our men. Much more would depend on the leadership than with us. The officer must lead well and be one in whom they have confidence, and this applies to both sides alike. As I saw no drills or regular formation, I inquired about them of many persons, and was informed that they had never seen a drill. I saw perhaps 10,000 Spanish troops, but not a piece of artillery or a tent. They lived in barracks in the towns, and were seldom out for more than the day, returning to town at night.

They had little or no equipment for supply trains or for a field campaign such as we have. Their cavalry horses were scrubby little native ponies, weighing not over 800 pounds, tough and hardy, but for the most part in wretched condition, reminding one of the mount of Don Quixote. Some of the

officers, however, had good horses, mostly American, I think. On both sides cavalry was considered the favorite and the dangerous fighting arm. The tactics of the Spanish, as described to me by eyewitnesses and participants in some of their battles, was for the infantry, when threatened by insurgent cavalry, to form a hollow square and fire away *ad libitum*, and without ceasing until time to march back to town.

It did not seem to have entered the minds of either side that a good infantry force can take care of itself and repulse anywhere an equal or greater number of cavalry, and there were everywhere positions where cavalry would be at a disadvantage.

Having called on Governor and Captain-General Blanco and received his courteous call in return, I could not with propriety seek communication with insurgents. I had plenty of offers of safe conduct to Gomez's camp, and was told that if I would write him, an answer would be returned safely within ten days at most.

I saw several who had visited the insurgent camps, and was sought out by an insurgent field officer, who gave me the best information received as to the insurgent force. His statements were moderate, and I was credibly informed that he was entirely reliable. He claimed that the Cubans had about 30,000 men then in the field, some in every province, but mostly in the two eastern provinces and eastern Santa Clara, and this statement was corroborated from other good sources. They have a force all the time in Havana province itself, organized in four small brigades and operating in small bands. Ruiz was taken, tried, and shot within about a mile and a half of the railroad and about fifteen miles out of Havana, on the road to Matanzas, a road more traveled than any other, and which I went over four times.

Arranguren was killed about three miles the other side of the road and about the same distance, fifteen or twenty miles from Havana. The Cubans were well armed, but very poorly supplied with ammunition. They were not allowed to carry

many cartridges; sometimes not more than one or two. The infantry, especially, were poorly clad. Two small squads of prisoners which I saw, however, one of half a dozen in the streets of Havana, and one of three on the cars, wore better clothes than the average Spanish soldier.

Each of these prisoners, though surrounded by guards, was bound by the arm and wrists by cords, and they were all tied together by a cord running along the line, a specimen of the amenities of their warfare. About one-third of the Cuban army were colored, mostly in the infantry, as the cavalry furnished their own horses.

Their field officer, an American from a Southern State, spoke in the highest terms of the conduct of these colored soldiers; that they were as good fighters and had more endurance than the whites; could keep up with the cavalry on a long march and come in fresh at night.

The dividing lines between parties were the straightest and clearest cut that have ever come to my knowledge. The division in our war was by no means so clearly defined. It was Cuban against Spaniard. It was practically the entire Cuban population on one side and the Spanish army and Spanish citizens on the other.

I do not count the autonomists in this division, as they were so far too inconsiderable in numbers to be worth counting. General Blanco filled the civil offices with men who had been autonomists and were still classed as such. But the march of events had satisfied most of them that the chance for autonomy came too late.

It fell as talk of compromise would have fallen the last year or two of our war. If it succeeded it could only be by armed force, by the triumph of the Spanish army; and the success of Spanish arms would have been easier by Weyler's policy and method, for in that the Spanish army and people believe.

There is no doubt that General Blanco acted in entire good faith; that he desired to give the Cubans a fair measure of autonomy, as Campos did at the close of the Ten-Years War.

He had, of course, a few personal followers, but the army and the Spanish citizens did not want genuine autonomy, for that meant government by the Cuban people. And it was not strange that the Cubans said it came too late.

I have never had any communication, direct or indirect, with the Cuban Junta in this country or any of its members, nor did I have with any of the juntas which exist in every city and large town of Cuba. None of the calls I made were upon parties of whose sympathies I had the least knowledge, except that I knew some of them were classed as autonomists.

Most of my informants were business men, who had taken no sides and rarely expressed themselves. I had no means of guessing in advance what their answers would be, and was in most cases greatly surprised at their frankness.


I inquired in regard to autonomy of men of wealth and men as prominent in business as any in the cities of Havana, Matanzas, and Sagua, bankers, merchants, lawyers, and autonomist officials, some of them Spanish born but Cuban bred, one prominent Englishman, several of them known as autonomists, and several of them telling me they were still believers in autonomy if practicable, but without exception they replied that it was "too late" for that.

Some favored a United States protectorate, some annexation, some free Cuba; not one has been counted favoring the insurrection at first. They were business men and wanted peace, but said it was too late for peace under Spanish sovereignty. They characterized Weyler's order in far stronger terms than I can. I could not but conclude that you did not have to scratch an autonomist very deep to find a Cuban.

I have endeavored to state in not intemperate mood what I saw and heard, and to make no argument thereon, but leave everyone to draw his own conclusions. To me the strongest appeal was not the barbarity practiced by Weyler nor the loss of the *Maine*, terrible as were both of these incidents, but the spectacle of a million and a half of people, the entire native population of Cuba, struggling for freedom and deliverance

from the worst misgovernment of which I ever had knowledge.

I am not in favor of annexation; not because I would apprehend any particular trouble from it, but because it is not wise policy to take in any people of foreign tongue and training, and without any strong guiding American element. The fear that if free the people of Cuba would be revolutionary is not so well founded as has been supposed, and the conditions for good self-government are far more favorable. The large number of educated and patriotic men, the great sacrifices they have endured, the peaceable temperament of the people, whites and blacks, the wonderful prosperity that would surely come with peace and good home rule, the large influx of American and English immigration and money, would all be strong factors for stable institutions.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Redfield Proctor". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned in the lower half of the page.



BY

HON. JOHN M. THURSTON

Senator from Nebraska

INTERVENTION IN CUBA

REASONS WHICH APPEALED TO THE HEARTS OF
AMERICAN PEOPLE

A SHORT time ago, in company with several Senators and Representatives in Congress, I accepted an invitation to make a trip to Cuba and personally investigate and report upon the situation there. No conditions or restrictions were imposed upon us; we were left free to conduct the investigation in our own way, make our own plans, pursue our own methods, take our own time, and decide for ourselves upon the best manner of laying the result of our labors before the American people. I went to Cuba firmly believing that the condition of affairs there had been greatly exaggerated by the press, and my own efforts were directed in the first instance to the attempted exposure of these supposed exaggerations.

There had, undoubtedly, been much sensationalism in the journalism of the time, but as to the condition of affairs in Cuba there had been no exaggeration, because exaggeration was impossible.

After three years of warfare and the use of 225,000

Spanish troops, Spain had lost control of every foot of Cuba not surrounded by an actual intrenchment and protected by a fortified picket line.

She held possession, with her armies, of the fortified seaboard towns, not because the insurgents could not capture many of them, but because they were under the virtual protection of Spanish war ships, with which the revolutionists could not cope.

The revolutionists were in absolute and almost peaceful possession of nearly one-half of the island, including the eastern provinces of Santiago de Cuba and Puerto Principe. In those provinces they had an established form of government, levied and collected taxes, maintained armies, and generally levied a tax or tribute upon the principal plantations in the other provinces, and, as was commonly believed, upon the entire railway system of the island.

In the four so-called Spanish provinces there was neither cultivation nor railway operation, except under strong Spanish military protection or by consent of the revolutionists in consideration of tribute paid.

Under the inhuman policy of Weyler not less than 400,000 self-supporting, simple, peaceable, defenseless country people were driven from their homes in the agricultural portions of the Spanish provinces to the cities and imprisoned upon the barren waste outside the residence portions of these cities and within the lines of intrenchment established a little way beyond. Their humble homes were burned, their fields laid waste, their implements of husbandry destroyed, their live stock and food supplies for the most part confiscated. Most of these people were old men, women, and children. They were thus placed in hopeless imprisonment, without shelter or food. There was no work for them in the cities to which they were driven. They were left there with nothing to depend upon except the scanty charity of the inhabitants of the cities and with slow starvation their inevitable fate.

It was conceded upon the best ascertainable authority, and

those who have had access to the public records do not hesitate to state, that upward of 210,000 of these people had already perished, all from starvation or from diseases incident to starvation.

The Government of Spain had never contributed one dollar to house, shelter, feed, or provide medical attention for these, its own citizens. Such a spectacle exceeded the scenes of the *Inferno* as painted by Dante.

There had been no amelioration of the situation, except through the charity of the people of the United States. There had been no diminution in the death rate among these reconcentrados except as the death supply was constantly diminished. There could be no relief and no hope except through the continued charity of the American people until peace should be fully restored in the island, and until a humane government should return these people to their homes and provide for them anew the means with which to begin again the cultivation of the soil.

Spain could not put an end to the existing condition. She could not conquer the insurgents. She could not re-establish her sovereignty over any considerable portion of the interior of the island. The revolutionists, while able to maintain themselves, could not drive the Spanish army from the fortified seacoast towns.

The situation, then, was not war as we understand it, but a chaos of devastation and depopulation of undefined duration, whose end no man could see.

I will cite but a few facts that came under my personal observation, all tending to fully substantiate the absolute truth of the foregoing propositions. I could detail incidents by the hour and by the day, but I have no desire to deal in horrors. If I had my way, I would shield the American public even from the photographic reproductions of the awful scenes that I viewed in all their original ghastliness.

Spain had sent to Cuba more than 225,000 soldiers to subdue the island, whose entire male population capable of

bearing arms did not, at the beginning, exceed that number. These soldiers were mostly boys, conscripts from the Spanish hills. They were well armed, but otherwise seemed to be absolutely unprovided for. They had been without tents and practically without any of the necessary supplies and equipment for service in the field. They had been put in barracks, in warehouses, and old buildings in the cities where all sanitary surroundings had been of the worst possible character. They had seen but little discipline, and I could not ascertain that such a thing as a drill had taken place in the island.

There were less than 60,000 then available for duty. The balance were dead or sick in hospitals, or had been sent back to Spain as incapacitated for further service. It was currently stated that there were then 37,000 sick in hospitals. I reached the conclusion that the entire Spanish army in Cuba could not stand an engagement in the open field against 20,000 well-disciplined American soldiers.

As an instance of the discipline among them I cite the fact that I bought the machete of a Spanish soldier on duty at the wharf in Matanzas, on his offer, for three dollars in Spanish silver. He also seemed desirous of selling me his only remaining arm, a revolver.

The Spanish soldiers had not been paid for some months, and, in my judgment, they, of all the people on the earth, would most gladly welcome any result which would permit them to return to their homes in Spain.

The pictures in the American newspapers of the starving reconcentrados were true. They could all be duplicated by the thousands. I never saw, and please God may I never again see, so deplorable a sight as the reconcentrados in the suburbs of Matanzas. I can never forget to my dying day the hopeless anguish in their despairing eyes. Huddled about their little bark huts, they raised no voice of appeal to us for alms as we went among them.

There was almost no begging by the reconcentrados them-

selves. The streets of the cities were full of beggars of all ages and all conditions, but they were almost wholly of the residents of the cities and largely of the professional-beggar class. The reconcentrados — men, women, and children — stood silent, famishing with hunger. Their only appeal came from their sad eyes, through which one looked as through an open window into their agonized souls.

The autonomist governor of Matanzas (who spoke excellent English) had been inaugurated in November, 1897. His records disclosed that at the city of Matanzas there were 1,200 deaths in November, 1,200 in December, 700 in January, and 500 in February — 3,600 in four months, and these four months under the administration of a governor whom I believe to be a truly humane man. He stated to me that on the day of his inauguration, which, I think, was the 12th of November, to his personal knowledge fifteen persons died in the public square in front of the executive mansion. Think of it, oh, my countrymen! Fifteen human beings dying from starvation in the public square, in the shade of the palm trees, and amid the beautiful flowers, in sight of the open windows of the executive mansion!

The governor of Matanzas told us that for the most part the people of the city of Matanzas had done all they could for the reconcentrados; and, after studying the situation over, I believed his statement to be true. He said the condition of affairs in the island had destroyed the trade, the commerce, and the business of the city; that most of the people who had the means assisted the reconcentrados with food just as long as they could, but he said to us that there were thousands of the people living in fine houses on marble floors who were in deep need themselves, and who did not know from one day to the other where their food supply was coming from.

The ability of the people of Matanzas to aid was practically exhausted. The governor told us that he had expended all of his salary and all that he could possibly afford of his private means in relief work. He was willing that the reconcentrados

shall repass the picket line and go back to seek work in the interior of the island. He expressed his willingness to give them passes for that purpose, but they were no longer physically able to take advantage of that offer. They had no homes to return to; their fields had grown up to weeds; they had no oxen, no implements of husbandry with which to begin anew the cultivation of the soil. Their only hope was to remain where they were, to live as long as they could on an insufficient charity, and then die. What was true at Matanzas was true at all the other cities where these reconcentrados were gathered.

The Government of Spain had not appropriated and would not appropriate one dollar to save these people. They were being attended and nursed and administered to by the charity of the United States. Think of the spectacle! We were feeding these citizens of Spain; we were nursing their sick; we were saving such as could be saved, and yet there were those who still said it was right for us to send food, but we must keep our hands off. I said that the time had come when muskets ought to go with the food.

We asked the governor if he knew of any relief for these people except through the charity of the United States. He did not. We then asked him, "Can you see any end to this condition of affairs?" He could not. We asked him, "When do you think the time will come that these people can be placed in a position of self-support?" He replied to us, with deep feeling, "Only the good God or the great Government of the United States can answer that question." I hoped and believed that the good God by the great Government of the United States would answer that question.

I shall refer to these horrible things no further. They were there. God pity me; I have seen them; they will remain in my mind forever — and this is almost the twentieth century. Christ died nineteen hundred years ago, and Spain is a Christian nation. She has set up more crosses in more lands, beneath more skies, and under them has butchered more people than all the other nations of the earth combined.

Europe may tolerate her existence as long as the people of the Old World wish. "God grant," said I, "that before another Christmas morning the last vestige of Spanish tyranny and oppression will have vanished from the Western Hemisphere."

I counseled silence and moderation in the Senate when the passion of the nation seemed at white heat over the destruction of the *Maine*, but it seemed to me the time for action had finally come. No action in the *Maine* case! I hoped and trusted that this Government would take action on the Cuban situation entirely outside the *Maine* case.

What should the United States do?

I believed that recognition of belligerency on our part would have enabled the Cuban patriots to have achieved independence for themselves; that it would have given them such a standing in the money markets of the world, such rights on the sea, such flag on the land, that the independence of Cuba would have been speedily secured, and that without cost or loss of blood or treasure to the people of the United States. But that time had passed; it was too late to talk about resolutions according belligerent rights; and mere resolutions recognizing the independence of the Cuban republic would have availed but little. The platform of my party demanded that the United States should actively use its influence for the independence of the island.

I yield to no man living in my respect, my admiration for, and my confidence in the judgment, the wisdom, the patriotism, the Americanism of William McKinley. When he entered upon his administration he faced a difficult situation. It was his duty to proceed with care and caution. At the first available opportunity he addressed a note to Spain, in which he gave that Government notice, as set forth in his message to the Congress of the United States, that the United States "could be required to wait only a reasonable time for the mother country to establish its authority and restore peace and order within the borders of the island; that we could not

contemplate an indefinite period for the accomplishment of this result."

The President further advised us: "This government has never in any way abrogated its sovereign prerogative of reserving to itself the determination of its policy and course according to its own high sense of right and in consonance with the dearest interests and convictions of our own people should the prolongation of the strife demand."

This was the proper, the statesmanlike beginning of the performance of the promise of the Republican platform. It was in accordance with the diplomatic usages and customs of civilized nations. In the meantime the whole situation apparently changed. In Spain the liberal ministry of Sagasta succeeded that of Canovas; the cruel and inhuman Weyler was recalled, and succeeded by the humane Blanco, who, under the Sagasta ministry, had unquestionably made every effort to bring about peace in the island of Cuba under the promise of autonomy — a decided advance beyond any proposition ever before made for the participation of the Cubans in their own domestic affairs.

It was the plain duty of the President of the United States to give to the liberal ministry of Spain a reasonable time in which to test its proposed autonomy. That time was given. Autonomy was conceded the wide world over to be a conspicuous failure. The situation in Cuba had only changed for the worse. Sagasta was powerless; Blanco was powerless to put an end to the conflict, to rehabilitate the island, or to relieve the suffering, starvation, and distress.

The time for action had come. Every hour's delay only added another chapter to the awful story of misery and death. Only one power could intervene — The United States of America. Ours was the one great nation of the New World, the mother of American republics. She holds a position of trust and responsibility toward the peoples and the affairs of the whole Western Hemisphere.

It was her glorious example which inspired the patriots of

Cuba to raise the flag of liberty on her eternal hills. We could not refuse to accept this responsibility which the God of the universe has placed upon us as the one great power in the New World. We must act! What should our action be? Some said the acknowledgment of the belligerency of the revolutionists. As I have already shown, the hour and the opportunity for that had passed away.

Others said, "Let us by resolution or official proclamation recognize the independence of the Cubans." It was too late even for such recognition to be of great avail. Others said, "Annexation to the United States." God forbid! I would oppose annexation with my latest breath. The people of Cuba are not our people; they cannot assimilate with us; and beyond all that I am utterly and unalterably opposed to any departure from the declared policy of the fathers which would start this republic for the first time upon a career of conquest and dominion utterly at variance with the avowed purposes and the manifest destiny of popular government.

Let the world understand that the United States did not propose to annex Cuba, that it was not seeking a foot of Cuban soil or a dollar of Spanish treasure. Others said, "Let us intervene for the pacification of the island, giving to its people the greatest measure of autonomy consistent with the continued sovereignty of Spain." Such a result was no longer possible. It is enough to say that it would have been resisted by all classes of the Cuban population, and its attempt would simply have transferred the putting down of the revolution and the subjugation of the Cuban patriots to the armies of the United States.

There was also said to be a syndicate organization in this country, representing the holders of Spanish bonds, who were urging that the intervention of the United States should be for the purchase of the island or for the guaranteeing of the Spanish debt incurred in the attempted subjugation of the Cuban revolutionists. It was idle to think for a single moment of such a plan. The American people would never con-

sent to the payment of one dollar, to the guaranteeing of one bond, as the price paid to Spain for her relinquishment of the island she had so wantonly outraged and devastated.

There was only one action possible: that is, intervention for the independence of the island; intervention that would mean the landing of an American army on Cuban soil, the deploying of an American fleet off Havana; intervention which would say to Spain, "Leave the island, withdraw your soldiers, leave the Cubans, these brothers of ours in the new world, to form and carry on government for themselves." Such intervention on our part would not of itself be war. It would undoubtedly lead to war. But if war came it would come by act of Spain in resistance of the liberty and the independence of the Cuban people.

There had been a time when "jingoism" was abroad in the land; when sensationalism prevailed, and when there was a distinct effort to inflame the passions and prejudices of the American people and precipitate a war with Spain. That time had passed away. "Jingoism" was long since dead. The American people had waited and waited and waited in patience; yea, in patience and confidence — confidence in the belief that decisive action would be taken in due season and in a proper way. All over this land the appeal came up to us; it reached us from every section and from every class. That appeal was for action.

The administration had been doing its whole duty. With rare foresight and statesmanship it had hastened to make every possible preparation for any emergency. If it were true that the report in the *Maine* case was delayed, it had been delayed in order that we might be prepared at all points for defensive and offensive action. There were some who said, but they are mostly those who had procrastinated from the beginning, "Let Congress hold its peace, adjourn, go home, and leave the President to act."

I for one believe that the Congress of the United States is an equal and co-ordinate branch of the Federal govern-

ment, representing the combined judgment and wisdom of the many. It could more safely be depended on than the individual judgment and wisdom of any one man. I, a senator of the United States, would not consent to abdicate my right to participate in the determination as to what is the solemn duty of this great Republic in such a momentous and fateful hour. We were not in session to hamper or cripple the President; we were there to advise and assist him. Congress alone could declare war; Congress alone could levy taxes; and to this Congress the united people of this broad land, from sea to sea, from lake to gulf, looked to voice their wishes and execute their will.

Against the intervention of the United States in this holy cause there was but one voice of dissent; that voice was the voice of the money-changers. They feared war! Not because of any Christian or ennobling sentiment against war and in favor of peace, but because they feared that a declaration of war, or the intervention which might result in war, would have a depressing effect upon the stock market.

I did not read my duty from the ticker; I did not accept my lessons in patriotism from Wall street. I deprecated war. I hoped and prayed for the speedy coming of the time when the sword of the soldier would no longer leap from its scabbard to settle disputes between civilized nations. But it was evident, looking at the cold facts, that a war with Spain would not permanently depreciate the value of a single American stock or bond.

War with Spain would increase the business and the earnings of every American railroad, it would increase the output of every American factory, it would stimulate every branch of industry and domestic commerce, it would greatly increase the demand for American labor, and in the end every certificate that represented a share in an American business enterprise would be worth more money. But in the meantime the specter of war would stride through the stock exchanges, and many of the gamblers around the board would

find their ill-gotten gains passing to the other side of the table.

I said, "Let them go; what one man loses at the gambling table his fellow-gambler wins." It was no concern of yours, it was no concern of mine whether the "bulls" or the "bears" had the best of these stock deals. They did not represent American sentiment; they did not represent American patriotism. Let them take their chances as they could. Their weal or woe was of but little importance to the liberty-loving people of the United States. They would not do the fighting; their blood would not flow; they would keep on dealing in options on human life. The time had come when the men whose loyalty was to the dollar should stand aside while those whose loyalty was to the flag went to the front.

There were some who lifted their voices in the land and in the open light of day insisted that the republican party would not act, for they said it had sold out to the capitalists and the money-changers at the last national election. It was not so. God forbid! The 7,000,000 freemen who voted for the republican party and for William McKinley did not mortgage the honor of this nation for a campaign fund, and if the time ever comes when the republican party hesitates in its course of duty because of any undue anxiety for the welfare of the accumulated wealth of the nation, then let the republican party be swept from the face of the earth and be succeeded by some other party, by whatever name it may be called, which will represent the patriotism, the honesty, the loyalty, and the devotion that the republican party exhibited under Abraham Lincoln in 1861.

There were those who said that the affairs of Cuba were not the affairs of the United States, who insisted that we could stand idly by and see that island devastated and depopulated, its business interests destroyed, its commercial intercourse with us cut off, its people starved, degraded, and enslaved. It might be the naked legal right of the United States to stand thus idly by.

I have the legal right to pass along the street and see a helpless dog stamped into the earth under the heels of a ruffian. I can pass by and say that is not my dog. I can sit in my comfortable parlor with my loved ones gathered about me, and through my plate-glass window see a fiend outraging a helpless woman near by, and I can legally say this is no affair of mine — it is not happening on my premises; and I can turn away and take my little ones in my arms, and, with the memory of their sainted mother in my heart,* look up to the motto on the wall and read, “God bless our home.”

But if I do I am a coward and a cur unfit to live, and, God knows, unfit to die. And yet I cannot protect the dog nor save the woman without the exercise of force.

We could not intervene and save Cuba without the exercise of force, and force meant war; war meant blood. The lowly Nazarene on the shores of Galilee preached the divine doctrine of love, “Peace on earth, good will toward men.” Not peace on earth at the expense of liberty and humanity. Not good will toward men who despoil, enslave, degrade, and starve to death their fellow men. I believe in the doctrine of Christ. I believe in the doctrine of peace; but men must have liberty before there can come abiding peace.

Intervention meant force. Force meant war. War meant blood. But it would be God’s force. When has a battle for humanity and liberty ever been won except by force? What barricade of wrong, injustice, and oppression has ever been carried except by force?

Force compelled the signature of unwilling royalty to the great Magna Charta; force put life into the Declaration of Independence, and made effective the Emancipation Proclamation; force beat with naked hands upon the iron gateway of the Bastille and made reprisal in one awful hour for centuries of kingly crime; force waved the flag of revolution over Bunker Hill, and marked the snows of Valley Forge with


* AUTHOR’S NOTE.—Mrs. Thurston, who accompanied her husband on his journey, was taken ill and died in Cuba.

blood-stained feet; force held the broken line at Shiloh, climbed the flame-swept hill at Chattanooga, and stormed the clouds on Lookout heights; force marched with Sherman to the sea, rode with Sheridan in the valley of the Shenandoah, and gave Grant victory at Appomattox; force saved the Union, kept the stars in the flag, made "niggers" men. The time for God's force had come again. The impassioned lips of American patriots once more took up the song:


"In the beauty of the lilies Christ was born across the sea,
With a glory in His bosom that transfigures you and me;
As He died to make men holy, let us die to make men free,
For God is marching on."

Others might hesitate, others might procrastinate, others might plead for further diplomatic negotiation, which meant delay, but for me, I was ready to act then, and for my action I was ready to answer to my conscience, my country, and my God.

In the cable that moored me to life and hope the strongest strands were broken. I had but little left to offer at the altar of Freedom's sacrifice, but all I had I was glad to give. I was ready to serve my country as best I could in the Senate or in the field. My dearest wish, my most earnest prayer to God was, that when death came to end all I might meet it calmly and fearlessly as did my beloved, in the cause of humanity, under the American flag.




 John M. Thurston



SPANISH CHARACTER AND HISTORY—DISCOVERY OF CUBA
—ATTEMPTS AT COLONIZATION—EXTERMINATION OF
THE NATIVES—COMING OF THE BLACK MAN.

Spain's Domain in the Eighteenth Century — The Decadence of a Hundred Years — Spanish Character — Heroism and Fanaticism — The Hand of the Inquisitor — The Jews and the Moors — Warriors Unfit for War, and Colonists Unfit to Colonize — Columbus Hears of Cuba — Taking Possession for Spain — Characteristics of the Natives — Ideal Conditions of Living — Extirpating the Natives — "A Ton of Gold" — Spanish Outrages and a Ruined Colony — Indians Bound in Slavery — Killed out of Pure Wantonness — Native Suicides — A Long Story of Rapine, Brutality, Waste, and Insult — A Bishop's Testimony — Beginning of African Slave Trade — Coming of the Black Man.



THE latter part of the eighteenth century beheld Spain the proud mistress of a domain upon which she could boast that the sun never set. At the close of the nineteenth hardly a vestige of that great empire remains. She found a new world and, little by little, in a hundred years has lost it all. Into the Europe of the sixteenth century she poured such a stream of golden treasure as had never before been seen, the rich stores of the Incas and the Montezumas, but it all slipped from her hands, and she is now practically bankrupt, loaded with a debt she can never pay. Through her was possible the renaissance of the sixteenth

century, the great reawakening of mediæval Europe; but Spain remained mediæval. Those very human forces which she set in action by the great discoveries of her intrepid mariners and by the distribution of her newly-found treasures,—forces which gave birth to modern history, she strenuously resisted. Upon that expansion of thought and action, following naturally the accomplishments of her daring explorers, she set her iron heel. Upon the unfolding possibilities laid at her feet by Columbus, Cortez, Pizarro, Ponce de Leon, Balboa, and others on the sea, she placed the blight of her Torquemadas and a line of bigoted rulers at home. She strangled her own magnificent creations, and set about destroying her own colonies by as heedless and as cruel a policy as was ever conceived by barbarian of old.

They who discovered the Gulf of Mexico, the Mississippi, the Amazon, and the Pacific — those who first went around the world, were Spaniards. Three-fourths of North and South America were Spanish before England had acquired a little spot of land on the nearest shores of America, and to-day Spain withdraws from the last foot of land which once constituted her gigantic Western domain.

It would be absurd to say that this has been brought about without a reason. Sufficient reason exists, and it must to a great extent be found in the character of the nation. The foundation for the Spanish character, as in the case of other peoples, must be largely found in the history of the nation, which forms no part of the purpose of this book. For a full understanding, however, of Spain's relation to Cuba and to the United States, a brief glance at the general features of Spanish history up to the nineteenth century will be useful.

Under Roman sway Spain became, more than any part of the empire of the Cæsars, a Roman province, and its traces remain to this day in language, laws, and customs. The Italian language preserves less of the qualities of the old Latin than the Spanish, and certainly no more striking trace of lingering Roman habit need be sought than in the Spanish

bull-fight. In the great amphitheaters erected by the masters of the Roman world, money was lavished and victims were slain to gratify the appetite of the masses. The proud Roman maids and matrons watched with delight the fierce gladiators hewing each other to pieces, and in later and more degenerate days looked on with equal interest while helpless Christians were torn by savage beasts. But cruelty had still the glamor of heroism.

In Spain the gladiator has become the picador and the matador. In place of the Roman maids and matrons are found the Spanish señoras and señoritas of Madrid, Seville, and Havana, watching with keen delight the slow irritation and laceration of the bulls, and the disemboweling of gallant horses by the enraged beasts. But in this Roman inheritance a modification has taken place too indicative of Spanish character to pass unmentioned. There is the same passion of cruelty in the bull-ring as in the old amphitheater, but the real heroism has gone. From the moment the bull steps into the ring he is doomed; it is no longer a contest of strength, but of persecution. The banderilleros are supplied with weapons to tease the animal and means to escape his onslaughts. Whichever way the tortured animal turns he is met by a fresh enemy, and he rushes at him only to see him spring aside. The purpose is not to give the animal a fatal wound, but a hundred bleeding, torturing ones. It is cruelty from which all heroism is stripped; cruelty only for the love of cruelty — the key to a great deal in the Spanish character.

But there are other traces than the Roman in this Spanish character. As a part of the political débris resulting from the fall of the Roman empire, Spain fell to the Visigoths, whose history there embraces three centuries of debauchery, intrigue, and murder, tainting the blood of the people. In time, guided by the spirit of the age, Spain became a hierarchy, in which the influence of the church became all-powerful, the best of the Gothic kings, Wamba, who resisted this tendency, falling a prey to ecclesiastical treachery. The absorption of the state

by the church became more and more complete under the centuries of Moorish warfare, and left its indelible stamp upon the nation. For, in fighting for his faith, the Spaniard, unlike the Crusader, was fighting for his home. He became a fierce fanatic, naturally enough, no doubt, and, when Grenada fell, Spain at last became a nation, but a nation of fanatics. It was an age of Spanish heroism, but a heroism which went hand in hand with extravagant religious zeal. In the latter were the seeds of the ruin of the greatness of her heroism, and as soon as the vast Spanish empire was created it began to disintegrate. If it was Ferdinand and Isabella who sent Columbus forth, it was they also who expelled the Jews, and sent two hundred thousand Spaniards to death in exile. So blind was Spanish fanaticism that it was not enough to light the fires under the Jews; heresy must be stamped out. The Spaniard who thought and was so brave as to tell what he thought became a victim. The hand of the Inquisitor fell upon the philosopher and inventor who came forth with the reawakening of the renaissance, and while other nations advanced slowly towards modern ideas, Spain proudly clung to mediævalism.

The economic effects of this bigotry were unmistakable. The persecuted Jews were the financiers, and, because of the improvidence of rulers and the simplicity of the people in financial matters, they possessed all the ready money. The hated Moors were traders who brought rich merchandise from the east. In her religious zeal, therefore, Spain exterminated her mercantile classes and left none but warriors, priests, and peasants. The main wheel was taken out of her economic structure. The new wealth from America slipped into the hands of those she persecuted, and thus her wars of persecution impoverished her at the very time when she might have become the richest nation in Europe, while her further oppression of her thinkers increased her bigotry and sapped her enterprise. When there was no war on hand for the warriors, and no more heretics for the priests to burn, there was nothing left for this class but intrigue. Under the various rulers of the

houses of Hapsburg and Bourbon, this policy continued, until, after nearly two centuries, Spain was wellnigh exhausted. She had planted her colonies all over the new world, but had neither the ability nor the resources to develop them. The rest of Europe had finally begun to profit from the reawakening, and the downfall of Spain in America at once began, in the closing years of the eighteenth century. The peculiar exigencies of their history had made the Spanish people warriors unfitted for war, and colonists unfitted to govern colonies.

With this brief generalization of Spanish history and character, we may enter understandingly upon the story of Spain in America, and particularly in the Antilles. In his conversations with the friendly natives whom Columbus found on the island of San Salvador, where he first set foot in the new world, he sought with eagerness to learn whence came the gold ornaments they wore. They pointed to the south, and he made out that in that direction lay a land of great extent called Cuba, and, self-deceived as he constantly was by his maps and previously-formed ideas, he immediately concluded that this Cuba must be the country of the Grand Khan of Asia. Accordingly, he set sail, and in three days, or on October 28, 1492, he touched the Cuban shore not far from the present site of Nuevitas. He was dazzled by the beauty of the landscape before him and declared it to be "the goodliest land he ever saw." "As he approached this noble island," wrote Irving, "he was struck with its magnitude and the grandeur of its features; its high and airy mountains, which reminded him of those in Sicily; its fertile valleys, and long, sweeping plains watered by noble rivers; its stately forests; its bold promontories and stretching headlands which melted away into the remotest distance. He anchored in a beautiful river of transparent clearness, free from rocks and shoals, its banks overhung with trees." Here landing and taking possession of the island, he gave it the name of Juana, in honor of Prince Juan, the son of his sovereigns.

At the time of their discovery the islands of the Caribbean

Sea were inhabited by two distinct Indian peoples, the Arawaks and the Caribs. The greater Antilles, Cuba, Haiti, Jamaica, and Puerto Rico, were inhabited almost exclusively by the former, and the lesser islands by the latter, who were, however, the more warlike and venturesome. The Arawaks, by all accounts, were a simple, kindly people, given to useful employments and leading a happy life. "So loving, so tractable, so peaceable are these people," wrote Columbus to his sovereigns, "that I swear to your majesties there is not in the world a better nation nor a better land. They love their neighbors as themselves; and their discourse is ever sweet and gentle and accompanied with a smile; and though it is true they are naked, yet their manners are decorous and praiseworthy." Peter Martyr also wrote of them, "It is certain that the land among these people is as common as the sun and water; and that 'mine and thine,' the seeds of all mischief, have no place with them. They are content with so little that in so large a country they have rather superfluity than scarceness; so that they seem to live in the golden world, without toil, living in open gardens, not intrenched with dykes, divided with hedges, or defended with walls. They deal truly one with another, without laws, without books, and without judges. They take him for an evil and mischievous man who taketh pleasure in doing hurt to another; and albeit they delight not in superfluities, yet they make provision for the increase of such roots whereof they make their bread, contented with such simple diet, whereby health is preserved and disease avoided." To these artless people, living a life so plainly consistent with the Christian gospel in many essential respects, the Spaniards resolved, in all sincerity and with the most labored devotion, to carry the true faith. The natives naturally looked upon Columbus and his followers as superior beings, and, when their timidity had been removed, they rendered their visitors every service in their power and placed before them the best they had; the cotton which they had learned to rudely spin, their fruits, and everything they considered of value. Columbus

carried his faith conspicuously before him, planting the cross wherever he landed, and, of course, he regarded the natives, kindly as they were, as heathen. Once after he had set up a cross and celebrated mass, a ceremony watched by the natives with the closest attention, one of the group, an old man, came forward and made a speech in the Indian tongue, which was then translated to Columbus by an interpreter. The Arawak said that the ceremony he had witnessed seemed to be a method of giving thanks to the Great Spirit, and, after stating that he had heard how the white people had come in large numbers and conquered many islands, he warned him in the following words: "If, then, thou art mortal and dost expect to die, and dost believe that each man shall be rewarded according to his deeds, beware that thou wrongfully hurt no man nor do harm to those who have done no harm to thee." Columbus replied that they might have confidence in the white men who had come to teach them the true faith.

Yet, in a few years, the Spaniards, with bloody hands, had swept these simple, kindly people from the face of the Antilles! Columbus himself did not hesitate to slaughter Caribs or to send them to Spain to be sold into slavery, when he found that they had no gold; for he must do something to replenish the empty treasure chests of his sovereigns. If these daring Spaniards carried the cross ever in front of them, what they most sought was treasure. It should be said for Ferdinand and Isabella, however, that they deprecated these acts and actually prohibited the deportation of the Caribs for servitude. They desired gold. Columbus urged, in justification of Carib slavery, that they were enemies of the Spaniards and also of the gentle Arawaks, and the deportation continued.

It was not Cuba, but Haiti, which was chosen for the first Spanish settlements in the Antilles. There Columbus left a small colony under Diego de Arana, and under the protection of a friendly cacique, or native chief. He prayed that on his return he should find a ton of gold and spices, with the proceeds of which his sovereigns might drive the infidels out of

Jerusalem. But the colonists quarreled among themselves and with the natives. While they hunted the country for gold, they expected that the Indians would supply them with provisions. This the natives did freely at first, but the Spaniards demanded more and more, and when supplies were not forthcoming, they deliberately seized them. The Indians saw their fields wasted by those whom they had befriended, and, observing that it did no good to cultivate them when the product was all taken from their hands, they fled to the interior and left the settlers face to face with the necessity of starving or cultivating the fields themselves, work which they scorned. This led them to wreak new outrages upon the Indians, who combined to resist them, and, when Columbus returned he found, not a ton of gold, but a ruined colony. Then the home government adopted the policy of giving individual grants of land and allotting a certain number of Indians as slaves, and so arose the system which ultimately depopulated the islands. The natives, accustomed for generations to a measure of independence and freedom which is seldom enjoyed except by peaceable savages, could not endure the harsh slavery to which they were subjected. Hundreds committed suicide rather than work under the lash, and finally the settlers began to kill them out of pure wantonness. But slaves being more and more in demand as the native population decreased, the practice of kidnapping them from the smaller islands came into use.

We need not dwell upon the story of the cruelty of the early Spanish settlers, or tell of the thousands of defenceless people murdered and thousands carried away as slaves, of the stealing of gold ornaments, and the sacking of provisions. It is a long story of rapine, brutality, waste, and insult. The natives were exterminated. We may judge from the words of a prelate of those days, Bishop of Chiapas, who was brave enough to protest against the abuses practiced by the Spanish colonizers. It throws light upon the real Spanish character. "To these quiet lambs," he wrote, "endued with such blessed

qualities, came the Spaniards like most cruel tygres, wolves, and lions, enraged with a sharp and tedious hunger; for these forty years past, minding nothing else but the slaughter of these unfortunate wretches, whom with divers kinds of torments, neither seen nor heard of before, they have so cruelly and inhumanely butchered, that of three million people which Hispaniola [Haiti] itself did contain, there are left remaining alive scarce three hundred persons. And for the island of Cuba, which contains as much ground in length as from Valladolid to Rome, it lies wholly desert, untill'd and ruin'd."

Such, then, was the condition of Cuba fifty years after that bright day when it burst upon the vision of Columbus, "the goodliest land" he ever saw.

In this situation the idea of importing slaves from Africa was naturally suggested. It had been noticed that the Africans who had been brought to the new colonies continued robust under the blazing sun and in the hard labor of the mines, and thus, from a small beginning, an extensive slave trade grew up, much more lucrative than the working of the mines. But it was not the Spaniard who prospered most in this enterprise, for soon after the discovery of America the danger that the Spanish discoveries might conflict with those of that other Catholic people, the Portuguese, Pope Alexander VI., while confirming the right of the Spanish crown to all the lands discovered, designated a line to be drawn due north and south a hundred leagues west of the Azores from one pole to the other. All pagan lands to the east of the line were confirmed to Portugal and all to the west of the line was to be the exclusive property of Spain. Ferdinand and Isabella were commanded to appoint upright, God-fearing, skillful, and learned men to instruct the inhabitants in the Catholic faith, and all unauthorized persons were forbidden to traffic on or even approach the territories, under penalty of incurring "the indignation of Almighty God and of the Blessed Apostles Peter and Paul." According to this offhand arrangement no other power could have anything. This simple division of the world, therefore,

gave Africa to the Portuguese, and, so far as a Papal bull could, carried with it the slave trade. But in view of its lucrative character, it soon attracted adventurous spirits of other nations, who, increasing in number and boldness, found after a few years a vast field of enterprise in all sorts of piratical undertakings. In time the Spanish islands and Main became a swarming nest of adventurers of several nations, and as the native Indians disappeared from the Antilles, the black man took his place, a fact which accounts for the character of the population of the islands, and the black republics of Haiti and San Domingo.

CHAPTER II

SETTLEMENTS OF CUBA—DAYS OF THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH CORSAIRS—RISE OF THE ROVING BUCCANEERS—STIRRING ADVENTURES AND ROMANTIC INCIDENTS.

Diego Velasquez Establishes the First Cuban Settlement—The Resistance of Chief Hatuey—Efforts to Christianize Him before Burning Him at the Stake—The Spirit of the Indians Broken—Cuba Begins to Flourish—Maritime Adventurers—A Remarkable Fight at Santiago between French Corsairs and Spanish Crew—Three Days of Hand-to-Hand Combat—Fortifying Havana—Destroyed by the French and Plundered by Pirates—Building of Morro Castle and the Bateria de la Punta—Orders to Gibbet and Behead all Protestants—Spain Beset by Enemies on the Sea—The Rise of the Buccaneers—Futile Efforts to Exterminate the Freebooters—Romantic Incidents—How Olonois Captured a Spanish Fleet—Beheading His Intended Executioners—Flinging Spanish Crews into the Sea—Havana Taken by the English—Brighter Times for Cuba.

THE native population of Haiti had become nearly exhausted before the settlement of Cuba was attempted, and it was because of the unsatisfactory condition of the former island that Don Diego Columbus, son of the great discoverer, determined, in 1511, to secure a footing in the "Pearl of the Antilles." He chose for the enterprise Diego Velasquez, one of his father's companions, who with about three hundred men landed near the eastern end of the island and founded Baracoa. The harmless Indians offered little resistance, though one chief, named Hatuey, who had been in Haiti and knew something of the Spanish practices there, attempted some opposition. He was quickly captured and his followers were dispersed. As a high chief among his people he deserved to be treated as an honorable captive, but his death may be cited as the first instance of Spanish methods upon the island. As the story goes, when Hatuey was tied to the stake and the fagots were piled around him, a Franciscan friar stood

by and besought him to abjure the heathen gods of his ancestors and accept the true faith so that, as the flames consumed his body, his soul might be wafted to that heaven of rest and happiness prepared for the faithful. He saw that his acceptance of the new faith would not save him from the flames, and so he asked if there were any Spaniards in that place of eternal bliss. Of course the friar promptly answered in the affirmative.

"I will not go," he said, "to a place where I may meet one of that accursed race."

Parties from the new colony pushed out and explored the island thoroughly, and in 1514 the towns of Santiago and Trinidad on the south coast were formed, largely for the purpose of facilitating communication with the Spanish on the island of Jamaica. The next year another settlement was made at the spot now known as Batabano, and it was named, after the great discoverer, San Christobal de la Habana. Four years later the settlers removed both the town and its name to a more attractive place just across the island on the north shore, and here, in time, grew up the present capital. Within ten years also Velasquez had founded the towns of Bayamo, Puerto Principe, and St. Spiritus.

But the Spaniards had profited little, if any, by the experiences following the cruel policy of extermination on adjacent islands. Diego Velasquez, who was the first governor, appears to have endeavored to administer affairs with intelligence, and he was certainly energetic, but his treatment of the aborigines was cruel and short-sighted in the extreme. Although the Indians were mild and inoffensive, the story of the Haitian settlement was repeated. The native population dwindled away under the slavery by which they were subjugated; the abuses to which the women were subjected by the lascivious Spaniards broke the spirit of a people who seemed to have a marked development of domestic honor. In a short time only a few remnants of the more barbarous mountain tribes remained. The soil of the isle was further enriched by

the blood of a million aborigines who, up to the coming of the Spaniards, had lived lives of peace and contentment, practicing the golden rule more consistently than those who so faithfully set up the cross in these virgin regions.

It is true that the Anglo-Saxon can say very little when it comes to the point of discussing mercy to the natives of America, for the spirit of the age was intolerant and relentless. The fanaticism of men was so intense that it made them ruthless, particularly when woven into the texture of the character of the Spaniards, who certainly surpassed all others in cruelty, though in the milder climates of the tropics they had a timid and yielding race to deal with.

Notwithstanding this, Cuba flourished. The soil was rich and yielded plentifully. The energy of the early governors rendered the mines profitable, instituted agricultural pursuits, and created a large trade with the neighboring islands and the home ports. The island was, moreover, used as a sort of depot by the Spanish in their operation against the mainlands. Here it was that Cortez embarked for the conquest of Mexico, where "the star of the Aztec dynasty set in blood."

But the waters of the West Indies soon became the rendezvous of all the maritime adventurers of that ruffianly age. The other nations had never accepted the Pope's straight-cut division of the world whereby Spain was generously given the whole Western Hemisphere, and England openly disputed it. Little was done by the governments themselves, however, so long as they were at peace with Spain, but the continued stories of treasure shipped from the new lands stirred up a host of individual corsairs who cared nothing for papal boundaries nor for the rights of discovery.

In 1516 the capital of Cuba had been moved from Baracoa to Santiago, and Spain began to take precautions against the new marauders of the sea, who, however, became more bold and numerous, at times actually forcing their goods upon the Spanish settlers under threats of pillage. In 1536 the people at Havana paid a large sum to a French corsair to save the

city, and a battle which took place at Santiago in 1538 well illustrates the spirit of those times.

A French corsair came into that port and a Spanish vessel gave fight. They fought the first day till sunset, when they declared a truce for rest and refreshments while the captains exchanged civilities. Over their wine and fruit they mutually agreed to fight each other only by day and only by swords and lances; for artillery, they agreed, was for cowards, and they preferred to show their mettle in a square contest, whichever conquered taking the other's vessel. In this way they fought the whole of the second day, neither conquering, and again the captains exchanged civilities. The Spanish captain, Diego Perez, asked the inhabitants of Santiago that night if they would compensate him for the loss of his ship in case the Frenchman got the better of him, for he said he was a poor man and could not afford to lose his ship. If he could be sure of compensation, he would keep up the fight to the end, and, if victorious, it would be of advantage to the city as well as to him. The people declined to pledge themselves, doubtless thinking that the Spaniard would not mar his reputation by withdrawing, and they were right. The battle continued the next day with renewed ferocity, many falling in the fierce hand-to-hand conflict; and so again on the fourth day, on the evening of which the Frenchman promised to continue it the next morning. But he evidently thought better of it during the night, for he slipped his cable and retired.

But in spite of such instances of bold resistance the English and French corsairs inflicted great damage upon Spanish trade; and a French privateer captured Havana and burned it to the ground. One raid followed another till the Spaniards were at their wits' end. They began to build forts and fortifications. De Soto, who had returned with plunder from Peru, was commissioned as governor of Cuba and Florida with the title of Captain-General, and with instructions to build a fortress at Havana. He began the erection of the Castillo de la Fuerza, though it was finished by his lieutenants while he

was away searching for gold in Florida, and tracing the course of the Mississippi, in which he found his grave.

But English, French, and Dutch raiders continued to swarm about the islands, and by this time the Spaniards saw, or should have seen, one of the disastrous results of their cruel treatment of the Indians, for the hostility of such natives as were left was intense, and they freely welcomed to the small islands and even to Cuba any piratical comer who threatened the Spanish settlers, and they offered to assist the corsairs in every way possible. In 1551 the capital of Cuba was transferred to Havana, which had been growing in importance because of its commanding situation, good harbor, and fertile surroundings. But it was the object of continued attack, and in 1554 was partly destroyed by the French, and in the following year was plundered by pirates. In the wars of Charles I. of Spain and his son Philip II., the English under Drake again seriously threatened the port, and the Spaniards determined to increase the fortifications. This gave rise to the famous Morro Castle and the Bateria de la Punta, which for a long time made Havana one of the best fortified ports in the world. They were begun the year after the destruction of the famous Armada and completed in 1597, and from that time Havana was the commercial center of the Spanish dominions, being the stopping place for the treasure ships bearing gold and silver from Mexico and other colonies.

But the destruction of the Armada had seriously crippled the maritime power of Spain. That great expedition, chiefly undertaken to bring England back to the Catholic faith, was but an incident in that determined purpose of Spain to establish the power of the Pope while maintaining her exclusive right to the commerce of the new Western world as granted by the bill of partition. The fanatical religious fervor of the Spaniards is illustrated by an incident which took place on the coast of Florida, where a party of French Huguenots settled in 1567. Soon there came a Spaniard sailing under orders to "gibbet and behead all Protestants in those regions." The

settlement was surprised and massacred, and another party from the same settlement, which the Spaniards afterwards found, were hanged, over the dangling bodies being placed the superscription: "Not as Frenchmen, but as heretics." But that same year the Spanish who were trying to settle St. Augustine were surprised and hanged by an expedition of Frenchmen, "Not as Spaniards, but as murderers."

While religious wars exhausted Spanish resources and rendered the mother country unable to sufficiently protect her colonies, her commercial policy of exclusiveness only brought new troubles upon them and a greater horde of piratical enemies at the very time her naval strength was at a low ebb. More liberal commercial views were beginning to prevail in other parts of Europe, but when Cromwell asked that Spain should abolish the Inquisition and admit the free navigation of the western seas, the Spanish ambassador replied that for his king to relinquish those prerogatives would be to "give up his two eyes." Spain not only continued the Inquisition but massacred with a ruthless hand the men, women, and children of such English and Dutch settlements as she could find and overpower in the West Indies, and she strenuously endeavored to maintain an exclusive trade with her colonies by restricting all their commerce to the port of Seville and selling the monopoly of that. This naturally hampered the growth of the colonies and drew into the waters fresh hordes of smugglers, with whom the Spanish colonists gladly traded. These smugglers made their headquarters near Haiti, which, on account of the greater attraction of Cuba, had been practically deserted by the Spanish. The few people who remained there lived mainly from the herds of cattle which, having greatly multiplied, roamed wild over the island. They prepared the meat for preservation in smokehouses, which were called *bucans*, and the smugglers, adopting this method of preserving their meat, became known as buccaneers. Little by little they multiplied and grew in importance till they were in constant conflict with the Spanish on land and water and preyed upon Spanish commerce

everywhere. During this period Cuba, as the headquarters of the Spaniards, suffered severely. The buccaneers were the real masters of the situation. They feared no enemy and spared none, and regarded the Spaniards with a bitter hatred while they emulated their acts of cruelty. As a matter of fact Spain had drawn upon herself the hatred of all Europe by her arrogant religious and commercial pretensions, and had aroused the cupidity of every ruler by the treasures she had brought to Europe.

The Spaniards found the buccaneers made out of entirely different stuff from the gentle natives they had so ruthlessly massacred, for, banding together, they maintained themselves against every Spanish assault and generally won the victory. After many Spaniards had bitten the dust, fresh troops were sent, but the buccaneers were also constantly recruited from the adventurers and roving criminals of all nations. So matters continued till 1663, when Spain undertook to overcome all opposition by sending a superior force of trained men under Van Delmof, a veteran officer. He attacked the buccaneers' headquarters on the island of Haiti, but, although they numbered only a fifth of the Spaniards, they drove the latter into the sea with great loss. The Spaniards kept up the struggle by lying in wait for small parties and butchering them to a man, but they were always worsted when encountering a considerable body. Then the Spaniards foolishly thought to exterminate the buccaneer by exterminating his cattle, upon the abundance of which he was supposed to depend, but this only made him the fiercer plunderer of Spanish commerce. He became a freebooter — the freebooter of the Spanish Main. He attacked Spanish ports, plundered Spanish vessels and put the crews to death. Havana was threatened, and with this danger and that of an invasion of the English and Dutch, the Captain-General began the erection of a new defensive wall across the projecting neck on which the city is laid out. But the depredations of the adventurers continued in spite of the treaty of peace between Spain and England in 1670, and declined only

for a time when towards the end of the seventeenth century the war between France and England led to dissensions among the freebooters themselves.

Volumes would be required to tell of the remarkable incidents of this warfare in the West Indian seas. History has few more romantic pages. A single incident may be given as an example. A native of Sable d'Olonne, Olonois by name, having in a Spanish attack lost his ship and narrowly escaped with his life, managed to arm two small vessels with twenty-one men; then he started off to pillage the city of Los Cayos in Cuba. Hearing of the expedition, the Governor-General at Havana despatched a six-gun frigate manned by ninety men to the assistance of the inhabitants. Four other smaller ships were also sent to join the frigate, and it looked like a formidable expedition against two small vessels with but about a score of men. The Spanish governor of Havana was so certain of capturing the freebooters that he exacted a promise from the commander of the expedition that he would cut off the head of every man of them, and he sent along a negro to act as executioner. Olonois somehow learned of the plan and at once started to meet the frigate before she was joined by the smaller vessels. He had the good fortune to come upon the Spaniard in the night, and bringing his vessels one on each side, at day-break his twenty-one men boarded her, and, after a desperate engagement, overcame the ninety of the Spaniard. He beheaded all the prisoners but one, not sparing the negro who had been sent as his executioner. The remaining one he sent back to Havana with the threat that a similar fate awaited the governor. Olonois then set out in pursuit of the four intended consorts, captured them and flung the crews into the sea. "Yet, depraved as they were," says one writer, "the freebooters made a great profession of religion, which in some of their number was doubtless real. They prayed fervently on all occasions and never commenced a meal without a long grace. Before going into action they humbly sought God to grant them the victory, after which the Catholics sung

the *Magnificat* and the Protestants repeated a hymn." It was well into the eighteenth century and after the English, French, and Dutch had firmly established themselves in the West Indies that the freebooters were driven from the seas.

Notwithstanding the complicated relations of the European powers during the war of the Spanish Succession with which the eighteenth century opened, Cuba was left comparatively free from strife, but it was not long before there came the first serious trouble between the Cuban colonists and the mother country. By the time of the Treaty of Utrecht, by which the Hapsburg rule in Spain was ended, the island had become well settled and the agricultural products of the interior made a large showing beside the gold and silver of the other Spanish-American colonies. Up to 1717 the main revenue from Cuba came through the commercial monopolies of Seville and Cadiz, but that year a new policy was inaugurated by which the growing tobacco trade was made a government monopoly. Its enforcement was violently resisted and resulted in many collisions between the government forces and the people. It was but another incident in the restrictive policy of Spain which finally entirely undermined her power over her colonies. The magnificent harbors of Cuba could be entered only by stealth or force except by the monopoly vessels. As Spain was in no condition to be a large purchaser, the production of the island was strangled and the farmers barely more than lived on what they produced. But Spain would not and did not learn the lesson. Owing to unwise measures at home Spain's own industries declined, and those of her people who could purchase bought foreign products which were smuggled in, and paid for them with gold from America. The result was the collapse of her own industrial system and the loss of the precious metals which she had made so many bloody sacrifices to secure.

The monopoly restrictions imposed upon the Cuban trade gave rise to systematic smuggling by British traders in Jamaica, and the constant friction finally resulted in the

Anglo-Spanish war of 1739, which ended with a general European war in 1748. In the decade that followed, the smuggling trade in Cuba grew out of all control of the tobacco monopoly, and a system of farming out the revenues to private monopolists was substituted. But this only led to further trouble. The expansion of British trade in the Indies led to the Bourbon compact to put a check to it and war began in 1762. An English fleet consisting of forty-four men-of-war and 150 other vessels under Admiral Pocock took Havana in June of that year, and an army of about 15,000 men under Lord Albemarle began the siege of the Spanish garrison numbering 27,000 under Governor Porto Carrero. The resistance was stubborn, but Morro Castle surrendered on July 30th and the city on August 13th. The treasure which fell to the English was enormous. Over three and a half million dollars was divided among them. The English continued to hold the city till early the following year, when, under the terms of the treaty of Paris, the island was restored to Spain in return for the cession of Florida to England.

On the whole, the eighteenth century was a much brighter one for Cuba, although the blight of Spain's colonial policy was not wanting. During their occupation of Havana the English had opened the port to free commerce, and when the Spanish again took hold of the island they found it impossible to safely reimpose the old restrictions in all their rigor. Many of the former limitations of the commerce of the island with the home country were removed, and the island made a rapid material advance. In 1777 Cuba was given a more independent colonial government under the control of the Captain-General, whose power was, however, practically absolute and fraught with the seeds of the woes of the Cubans in after years. So long as these officers were intelligent and humane the island prospered greatly and its wonderful resources became apparent.

At the time this change was made England was engaged in a struggle with its American colonies, and the Bourbon

monarchies of France and Spain availed themselves of the opportunity to get even with their old enemy. France joined the American colonists and Spain took up a campaign in her own behalf, regaining the island of Minorca and several smaller West Indian isles which had been wrested from her. Other European powers maintained an attitude favorable to Spain, though looking out for themselves, and by the treaty of Versailles in 1783 Spain regained Florida. England had lost her American colonies, with the exception of Canada and some of her West Indian possessions.

CHAPTER III

SPAIN AT THE FEET OF NAPOLEON—EXPLOITS OF SIMON BOLIVAR AND SAN MARTIN—SPAIN'S DISASTROUS AND DISGRACEFUL FAILURES.

Napoleon's Ambition to Make Spain a Subject Kingdom—Ferdinand's Intrigues—Joseph Bonaparte on the Throne—Fall of Napoleon and Restoration of Ferdinand—Revolt against Spain—Conditions in Mexico—Raising the Standard of Rebellion—Ignominious Death of Hidalgo and Morelos—First Struggles in Venezuela—Simon Bolivar and His Vicissitudes—Napoleon's Feat Surpassed—Defeats the Spainards—O'Higgins Becomes Dictator—The War in Peru—Defeat of the Spanish Fleet at Callao—San Martin Enters Lima—His Interview with Bolivar—Farewell to the Peruvians—Buenos Ayres the Storm Center—Paraguay's Dramatic Chapter—Spain's Weakness and Cruelty—Always Failed to Restore Her Flag When Once Torn Down—A Policy Culminating in Disaster and Disgrace.

THROUGHOUT the eighteenth century Spain and France, under Bourbon rulers, had regarded themselves as natural allies, but this alliance in the end had much to do with the ruin of Spain. The revival which promised so much for Spanish industry and commerce under the wise and enlightened rule of Charles III. was quickly suppressed in the inglorious reign of Charles IV. In 1796 a war broke out with Great Britain which was productive of nothing but disaster to the Spaniards. By pressure of France another arose in 1804 which was attended with similar ill-success, and in the battle of Trafalgar Spain lost a great part of that fleet which she needed for the maintenance of her American colonies. Napoleon had already conceived the idea of making Spain a subject kingdom with one of his own family on the throne, and he had nothing but contempt for its Bourbon ruler, although he pretended to be a faithful ally. Meanwhile, Ferdinand, the presumptive heir to the Spanish throne, was

weakly intriguing to displace his father. He became subservient to Napoleon, who cultivated his intrigues without having the least idea of making him King. Finally, Ferdinand, who was liked by the people, compelled his father to abdicate, but, lured over the border at this critical moment by Napoleon's agents, he found himself a prisoner and compelled by Napoleon to renounce all claims to the Spanish throne before he had had an opportunity to occupy it. The same year Joseph Bonaparte was prevailed upon by his brother to take the crown, and he was declared King of Spain and the Indies. But before he had reached Madrid the country had arisen, the various provinces electing *juntas* or councils to administer affairs and resist Napoleon's purposes.

That mighty struggle during which Napoleon overran Spain, and which he acknowledged to have been one of the main causes of his ultimate downfall, is a thrilling page of history, but it concerns this story only as it affected Spain's relations to her American colonies. In 1812 a constitution had been devised by the *Cortes*, or legislative body, of Cadiz, apparently liberal, though Wellington considered it good only to be looked at. "I have not met," he said, writing of the *Cortes*, "one of its members or any person of any description who considers it the embodiment of a system by which Spain is or can be governed. The *Cortes* have in form divested themselves of executive power and appointed a regency for that purpose, but the regency are, in fact, the slaves of the *Cortes*, and neither regency nor *Cortes* have any constitutional communication with each other, nor have they any authority beyond the walls of Cadiz."

Napoleon's fortunes declined, and, pressed by his enemies, he again negotiated with Ferdinand, who still seemed subservient, though the French Emperor had so recently and so cruelly deceived him. Napoleon believed that Ferdinand, as King, might be a pliant tool, for Joseph had left Spain in disgust. But the imperial prestige was broken, and early in 1814 Napoleon was compelled to abdicate. Ferdinand had

already returned to Spain, where he was welcomed by the people, who hoped that he would resume the throne and take up the reins of power under the constitution of 1812. But Ferdinand quickly abrogated that apparent guarantee of liberal government, together with all the acts of the Cortes, and proceeded to set up an absolute monarchy on the old lines, recalling the Papal nuncio and re-establishing the Inquisition. With astonishing ingratitude he broke his most solemn pledges and fell under the direction of priests and nobles and of a set of vulgar flatterers and favorites.

These domestic affairs of Spain had an important effect upon the American colonies. There were two Spanish vice-royalties in South America — that of Lima, which comprised the countries now known as Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and the Guianas, and that of Buenos Ayres, which included, besides the present Argentine Republic, Uruguay, Chile, Paraguay, Bolivia, and the untraversed wastes of Patagonia. Mexico, which was known as New Spain, and comprised a large territory extending to what is now the southern limit of Oregon, was also a vice-royalty. The revolts and revolutions in each of these provinces had many features in common. It has been said that the history of one is the history of all; and it is true that from 1808 to 1821 all were in revolt against Spain, their revolutions following each other in rapid succession.

It is not strange that their history had so much in common, for all had been the victims of a long oppression of the mother country, and the political aspirations of their people were simultaneously stirred when Spain lay at the feet of Napoleon, and liberal ideas were everywhere noticeable as a result of the revolutions in America and France. Ferdinand's restoration of absolutism and oppression, therefore, naturally led to their revolt.

Mexico ranked first among all the Spanish colonies in respect to population, material riches, and natural products, though the intolerant spirit of the clergy and military rulers

had led to the obliteration of almost every trace of the Aztec nationality and civilization, while the strict system of sequestration of commerce crippled the resources of the country. But the people endured the system till 1810, when discontent broke into open rebellion under the leadership of a country priest named Hidalgo.

In Mexico, as in all the colonies, the Spaniards who were born in Spain held all the offices under the government. The Creoles, though of Spanish extraction, were treated as an inferior race, while the Indians and half breeds were trampled under foot. In defiance of the expanding liberalism, the plain tendency of the times, Ferdinand continued to fill Mexican offices with Spanish favorites, to garrison Mexican forts with Spanish soldiers, and to exclude from Mexican markets all wares not made in Spain. This stubborn resistance of all civilizing tendencies was a feature of Spain's dealings with all her colonies and the sufficient cause of discontent.

Priest-ridden at home, her policy of throttling her colonists in Mexico eventually raised opposition among the Mexican clergy. Hidalgo and a fellow priest named Morelos kept the banner of revolt afloat for ten years, and although it was an article of faith among Spaniards that the priests were not to be punished for their actions, Hidalgo, when caught in arms, was shackled hand and foot, carried on a mule to Chihuahua, thrown into irons, and taken out in the gray dawn to be shot by clumsy bunglers who could not hit the old man's heart at ten paces. Morelos was stripped of his robe, set on his knees with his back to the soldiers, and shot ignominiously from behind. Such acts of cruelty but added fuel to the fire of revolt, and new heroes took the place of the murdered.

Indeed, the cause of the Spanish monarch in Mexico was really lost before Iturbide took command of the patriots. He was a frivolous trifler, maintaining almost an imperial rule over Mexico for a time, and when he fell the independence of Mexico was assured and was recognized in 1824 by every foreign power except Spain.

The same foolish policy which alienated Mexico compelled the Central American states to follow her example. The history of Venezuela reveals the same general reason for her independence. When Napoleon sent Joseph to Madrid to play King, Venezuela refused to recognize him and stood out stoutly for the old dynasty, but when the old dynasty was restored and idiotic measures of absolutism were enforced, the Venezuelans were loyal Spaniards no more. Simon Bolivar went to England, bought arms, and when he returned made the Spanish soldiers prisoners and locked them in the strong fortress of Puerto Cabello.

Spain had but one policy for colonists — oppression, and for those who protested, torture and death. From 1813, when the struggle of the Venezuelans for liberty began, till 1820, when it ended, the Spanish adhered to this policy, which always led to the further exasperation of the people and eventually made reconciliation impossible. After the reunion of New Grenada and Venezuela in 1819 the Spanish cause was hopeless, but General La Torre insisted on fighting a battle with Bolivar, in which he lost everything, six thousand men, artillery, honor, reputation, and hope.

But the epidemic of freedom could not be confined to any one locality in South America. Everywhere the people were rising against Spanish wrongs. While Bolivar was fusing the northern colonies into the republic of Colombia, José de San Martín, at Buenos Ayres, was maturing plans for the liberation of Chile. He had been well educated at the College of Nobles in Spain, and had fought with distinction at Baylen, where Napoleon met his first serious reverse at arms. With 180 recruits which he picked up in the streets of Buenos Ayres he formed the nucleus of an army, to which were added the forces under Bernardo O'Higgins, son of the viceroy of Chile.

With this army he crossed the Andes at Uspallata pass, which is 12,500 feet above the sea, over 4,000 feet higher than the pass of the great St. Bernard, thus surpassing the feat

which contributed so much to the glory of Napoleon. At the foot of the mountains a considerable body of Spaniards was met, but O'Higgins fell upon them with his cavalry and routed them. Pushing rapidly on, San Martin, on February 15, 1817, with hardly a coin in his pocket, no military chest, and no stores, entered Santiago with his wild *gauchos* at his back, and was well received. A junta of the leading citizens of the capital was summoned and the post of supreme dictator of Chile was offered him. He declined it, nominating Bernado O'Higgins in his place. It cannot be said that San Martin accomplished the liberation of Chile by the capture of Santiago, for the Spaniards held Valdivia, a much stronger place, for three years longer, but the possession of the capital city by the insurgents was a vast moral advantage.

At the time of San Martin's victory Guiana had been converted to the side of independence by a man of color named Piar, and on the very day of San Martin's entrance into Santiago, Bolivar defeated the Spaniards at Barcelona.

At this time Peru was a more important division of South America than Chile, and San Martin felt that his task was only half accomplished so long as Peru remained in Spanish hands. He saw that the possession of Lima and of its seaport Callao would depend upon control of the sea, and he, therefore, bestirred himself to create a navy for the Chileans. He induced them to buy two old East Indiamen, which were converted into fighting ships, an old English corvette, and three brigs. Of this fleet he induced Lord Cochrane to take command as chief admiral, and the squadron sailed for Callao in January, 1819. Admiral Cochrane approached the Spanish fleet of twelve vessels and a few gunboats, which lay under the guns of Callao castle, and, after several ineffectual attacks, he captured the *Esmeralda*, a forty-four gun frigate, and added her to their squadron. In the meantime San Martin landed a body of infantry and horse seventy miles north of Lima and threatened the city from that side.

The Spanish general, Vezuela, had under his order an army

of 23,000 men, but his officers were disaffected, and, after much quarreling, they forced him to resign. His successor had no disposition to continue the struggle, and without firing a shot, San Martin entered Lima on July 28, 1821, hastened to proclaim the independence of Peru, and accepted the title of Protector.

Bolivar had just arrived at Guayaquil after a decisive victory at Quito and San Martin hastened to meet him there. What passed between them has never been fully known. But Bolivar remained at the head of his army, while San Martin, the pure patriot, returned to Lima and issued a farewell address, in which he said: "The presence of a fortunate soldier is dangerous to newly-constituted states. Peruvians, I leave your national representation established. If you repose confidence in it you will triumph. If not, anarchy will overthrow you. May success preside over your destinies."

On San Martin's departure, Bolivar was chosen dictator of Peru, and a new state was created under the name of Bolivia, of which he was made perpetual protector. He was also chosen president of Colombia, and the congress of that state refused to accept his resignation. The administration of Venezuela was in the hands of Vice-President Paez, but he took his orders from Bolivar. Thus all the northern portion of South America was at this trying time under the control of one man, who practically had absolute power.

Buenos Ayres had constituted herself a republic in 1810. The city was a storm center for several years, indeed, from 1810 to 1817 it underwent fourteen revolutions, suppressed two rebellions, was twice blockaded and once bombarded, but peace came when General Rosas trampled all constitutions under foot and declared himself a military dictator. The dramatic chapter which Paraguay bore in the long struggle has been described by Thomas Carlyle in his most vivid manner.

In all these struggles Spain showed her weakness, her cruelty, and her stupidity. From the time of Philip II. to the

present day Spanish fleets have taken the sea only to be beaten, and Spanish ships have seldom opened fire except to be sunk. The overwhelming disaster which overtook the Armada was but the beginning; Trafalgar was but an incident in the long history of Spain's downfall. When the colonists rose in insurrection, she threw her fleets upon all the seaports in turn — Vera Cruz, Caracas, Buenos Ayres, Valparaiso, Valdivia, Callao. In not a single instance did her squadrons accomplish anything, nor did they retard the progress of the insurgents for a single day. By spiteful bombardments she occasionally destroyed some lives and property, but never could she restore the Spanish flag to the forts from which it had once been torn, nor could she inspire among the rebels any terror of the Spanish name. The whole record of her colonial management is an unbroken chronicle of imbecility, cruelty, injustice, and truculence, culminating in disaster and disgrace.

With this brief review of the Spanish loss of Mexico and the South and Central Americas, we will now trace the movements by which the young republic of the United States became possessed of the richest portion of that great domain which in the sixteenth century Spain's daring discoverers had laid at her feet. It marks the beginning of those relations between the United States and Spain which have culminated in the recent war.

CHAPTER IV

EARLY RELATIONS BETWEEN SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES — THE PURCHASE OF LOUISIANA — DISPUTES AND CONFLICTS OVER THE FLORIDAS.

Spain's Possessions in Washington's Time — Owning Over Two-Thirds of What Now Constitutes the United States — Napoleon's Ambition to Establish a Latin Empire West of the Mississippi — An Old Song of Defiance to the Spaniard — Pickering's Savage Retort — English Support — Spain Secretly Cedes Louisiana to Napoleon — Jefferson's Diplomacy — Napoleon Offers to Sell Louisiana — The Treaty Signed — Spain's Angry Protest — Dispute over Florida Boundaries — Spain's Perfidious and Exasperating Conduct — Stirs the Indians to Massacre — Lawless Expeditions — Spain Threatens the United States with War — Andrew Jackson's Radical Ideas — Spain Advised by Europe to Sell — The Treaty — End of a Long Struggle.

D OUBTLESS many of the people of the United States are not aware that when George Washington was President more than two-thirds of that great domain which now constitute our Union belonged to Spain. Because the government of the United States acquired the larger part of this vast territory in a peaceful manner the fact does not occupy a conspicuous place in our histories. But in a study of the previous relations of this country with Spain, and of the gradual decline of Spain's power on this side of the Atlantic, the fact becomes interesting and important.

During the administration of Washington, and also of John Adams, the great territory west of the Mississippi from its mouth to its headwaters was Spain's. Originally settled by France, it fell to Spain through the treaty of 1763, following the Seven-Years War. England laid some claim to that part of it which now comprises the States of Washington and Oregon, but it was not deemed valid, and the whole region

was an unknown wilderness waiting for the nineteenth century to unfold its wonderful resources. In addition to this Florida belonged to Spain, together with a strip of land extending along the gulf coast to the mouth of the Mississippi, and known as West Florida.

The career of Napoleon played a part not usually appreciated in shaping the destinies of the new American republic. His ambition to bring Europe under his sway was but a portion of a magnificent scheme which also comprehended the establishment of a great Latin empire on the Western continent. In the later exigencies of his career, the necessities imposed upon him by antagonistic European alliances enabled the young but sturdy government of the United States by a master stroke to extend its domain to the Pacific. A brief survey of the relations of the United States to Spain at the period following the Revolution is essential to the proper understanding of the *dénouement* which took place at the century's close.

During the struggle of the American colonies for their independence, Spain held aloof for some time, though largely out of revenge upon the English she rendered us some material assistance on the Mississippi, allowing us in the first stress of the war to obtain powder from her stores at New Orleans. But soon after the war was over Spain became so arrogant over the Florida boundaries and caused so much interference with our navigation of the Mississippi that the people of the United States clamored for redress in war. The following verses from a song, found in a very old book, clearly shows the feeling in the States at that time, while they were in a condition of loose federation under the Continental Congress:

“AMOR PATRIA INCITAT.”

1785.

COLUMBIA TO HER GENUINE SONS ON THE PROSPECT OF A SPANISH WAR.

Awake, O my sons! and to glory repair,
The prospect is noble, the object is fair;
The Spaniards have dared to infringe on our right;
Are ye freemen and not bring the matter to light?

These Dons will grow proud by insulting our flag ;
 O suffer them not of such meanness to brag,
 In peace let your stripes round the globe be display'd,
 From nation to nation establish your trade ;
 In the language of freemen enforce your decrees,
 Make the ocean your empire, and sail where you please ;
 On the basis of freedom establish your fame,
 And the slaves of each despot will crouch at your name.

Ye had courage to face the bold Briton in war,
 And the Spaniard, ye know, is inferior by far.
 Demand satisfaction ; if that be denied,
 The aggressor the consequence then must abide :
 'T would be worthy, by heaven ! and your annals adorn
 The standard of freedom to bear to Cape Horn.
 Unshackle the slaves that to royalty bow,
 And o'er plains quite neglected establish the plow !

In October, 1795, or during the second administration of Washington, Thomas Pinckney arranged a treaty with the Madrid government establishing as boundaries of the United States, East and West Florida on the south at 31° North latitude, and on the west the middle of the Mississippi River above that latitude. What was regarded as the most important and advantageous part of the instrument was a recognition by Spain of the right of the United States to navigate the Mississippi, with a privilege of deposit at the port of New Orleans, free of duty. About two years later, President Adams, in a message to the Senate, complained that the Spanish officers in Louisiana were constantly interfering with the work of running the southern boundary line under the above treaty. The Spanish minister, D'Yrujo, sought to justify the action of the Spanish authorities on the theory that there were designs against the Spanish territory, the evidence for which was a letter addressed to one Carey, a Cherokee interpreter, by Senator Blount of Tennessee, urging him to stir up the Cherokees and Creeks for the purpose of abetting a scheme, in which the English were also said to be concerned, for invading Spanish territory. This letter seemed to give some validity to the Spanish minister's statement, and the House took steps to impeach

its author, an effort which eventually failed. The British minister, when called upon to explain, said that while such a scheme had been proposed to him he had not countenanced it, and Pickering, then Secretary of State, retorted savagely upon the Spanish minister. Fisher Ames congratulated Pickering upon his reply to "the Spanish Don," adding, "You have not left a whole bone in his skin." Pickering constantly imputed dishonorable motives to the Spanish minister, and many of his letters express his contempt for "the Spanish puppy." The statesmen of those times did not hesitate to use plain and even harsh English.

The conviction that the Mississippi River and 31° North latitude were not the natural boundaries of the new republic began to manifest itself soon after peace was restored with Great Britain, and this feeling was expressed in occasional propositions for invading Spanish territory. The decadence of Spain was already well under way. The colonists in her territories everywhere were misgoverned and oppressed, and dissatisfaction prevailed. By a treaty in 1796, France and Spain had allied themselves to guarantee each other's dominions in both the Old and New World. This alliance led the English government to look with favor upon propositions for enabling the Spanish colonists to throw off the Spanish yoke at the very time that the feeling in this country was tending in the same direction. Moreover, the relations between France and the United States had become greatly strained through the disingenuous and sometimes rather insolent diplomacy of Talleyrand.

In this situation Francisco Miranda, a South American revolutionist, secretly worked upon the British ministry to promote a joint expedition for a movement upon Louisiana, Great Britain to furnish the navy, and the United States the army. Our relations with France went from bad to worse, and war seemed at hand, and, after the failure of our special mission to Paris, Hamilton became committed to the scheme of liberating Spanish America if the United States could

be the principal agency and furnish the whole land force. Miranda wrote to Hamilton that England would co-operate as soon as the United States was prepared. "All is ready," he said, "for your President to give the word." But President Adams was not inclined to favor the project, as, like Washington, he disliked forcible conquests or foreign alliances. "At present," he wrote, "there is no more prospect of seeing a French army here than there is in heaven," and gradually the danger of a war with France and the possibility of a conquest of Spanish America faded away.

When Thomas Jefferson became President, Napoleon, who had just been proclaimed First Consul, had begun to trail his sword over Europe and had defeated the Austrians at Marengo. Spain was still a faithful ally of France. It was a part of Napoleon's design to re-establish French influence in American territory, and thus make a Latin counterpoise to Anglo-Saxon influence here, partly for the greater security of the French possessions in the West Indies. In October, 1800, in a secret treaty by which he promised to secure for Spain the recognition of the King of Tuscany by all the powers of Europe, he obtained from her the cession of Louisiana, and soon took steps to send an expedition to take possession of the colony.

Meanwhile, the United States, being outraged by Spain's repeated violations of her treaty as to free navigation of the Mississippi, made preparations to attack New Orleans, but soon after Jefferson's inauguration information concerning Napoleon's secret treaty reached our government through our minister at London, and the project was abandoned. The new treaty was anything but agreeable to the people of the United States. The administration felt that under the control of Spain, which was on the road to decay, the United States might confidently await the time when the territory could be easily secured. But with the French, under a ruler who contemplated universal empire, in control of Louisiana, the case was different. The possessor of the mouth of the Mississippi, Jef-

erson wrote to Livingston, our minister at Paris, would of necessity become the natural and habitual enemy of the United States. "We must turn all our attention to a maritime force, for which our resources place us on very high ground; and having formed and connected together a power which may render reinforcement of her settlements here impossible to France, make the first cannon which is fired in Europe the signal for the tearing up any settlement she may have made and for holding the two continents of America in sequestration for the common purposes of the United British and American nations."

Livingston's instructions in taking the French mission were to dissuade France from acquiring Louisiana if possible, and, if not, to procure a cession to the United States of the Floridas and New Orleans. Meanwhile, the King of Spain informed the Intendant of Louisiana of its cession to France, and he was instructed to make arrangements for its delivery to the French government. In pursuance of this order, or, perhaps, upon some misconception of his duties, he ordered the port of New Orleans closed as a place of deposit for merchandise, a privilege which our treaty with Spain had guaranteed. As a result the product of a large part of the United States could find no outlet. The people in the western section of the country were greatly stirred by this act, and Hamilton was in favor of seizing New Orleans and the Floridas at once and negotiating afterwards. But Jefferson was disposed to continue his diplomatic efforts, though they were not succeeding well. Livingston strove in vain to gain the favor of Napoleon, who was rapidly fitting out a large expedition to take possession of the new territory. Jefferson appointed Monroe a special minister to act with Livingston, but by the time he had reached France a great change suddenly came over Napoleon. The order for the sailing of the expedition was countermanded, and Livingston was surprised to find himself in high favor in the court.

The cause of this was a sudden threatening of a renewal of

hostilities of France with Great Britain. Napoleon had charged the British with perfidy, and George III. had retorted in kind. The English ambassador was openly affronted at the Tuileries, and both governments prepared for war. Napoleon saw that if he continued in his scheme for Louisiana, the United States would become an ally of Great Britain, and, moreover, he needed money. The result was that he at once authorized the sale not only of New Orleans but of Louisiana. In this situation the sale was quickly arranged, and the famous treaty was signed May 2, 1803, the United States ministers dining amicably with the Consul who but a short time before would hardly recognize them. By this treaty the United States became a vast empire with immunity from dangerous neighbors, securing for about three cents an acre a domain which has yielded almost incalculable wealth. Thus Spain lost her hold on the richest part of the American hemisphere.

But it was not without a protest from Ferdinand, who thought Napoleon had again played him false. Spain's flag still floated at New Orleans. The French had not yet taken possession under the cession of 1800, and while preparations were being made for the formal transfer of the territory to the United States, the Spanish minister, at the direction of his King, protested that France could not cede it because she had promised not to alienate the territory to another nation, and because she had not fulfilled the conditions of the treaty, the King of Tuscany being still unrecognized by the courts at London and St. Petersburg. To this the United States responded that any such question must be settled by France and Spain alone.

The Spaniards were so loath to believe that the United States could secure the territory that they continued to remain in New Orleans after the formal transfer, though the treaty required them to leave in three months. While the soldiers of the United States slept in tents and fell sick of fever, the Spanish soldiers continued to occupy the barracks and storehouses, and regularly every day mounted guard.

Furthermore, in the arrangements for the government of the new territory we became embroiled in a boundary dispute with Spain, and her arrogant claim to West Florida was now secretly encouraged by France. Jefferson seriously thought of accepting war with Spain, for West Florida appeared essential to the United States on account of Mobile and its bay, and our ministers had undoubtedly understood when making the purchase that this territory was included. As the European war was still protracted, and France could not afford to have this country throw its influence on the side of Great Britain, Jefferson thought he would try again for a peaceful settlement, for Spanish affairs seemed to be under the complete control of Napoleon.

Congress appropriated \$2,000,000 for another diplomatic effort to acquire the Floridas, and commissioners were sent to Madrid for the purpose, stopping at Paris in an unsuccessful endeavor to secure French support. The conduct of Spain meanwhile was perfidious and exasperating, and the administration would have borne less had it not been for the fear that France would sustain the declining Spanish kingdom in case of an open rupture; moreover, by this time we were drifting into difficulties with Great Britain.

After the breaking out of the war of 1812, Spain, which had been a pliant ally of France in the conflict with England, now united with England in secretly stimulating the Indians on the southern border to make war against the United States, which feared that unless East and West Florida were seized they would become a base for offensive operations by the English. One result of the Spanish and British efforts to stir up the Indians was the massacre of Fort Mims, where out of the 550 Americans surprised in this slaughter pen, 400 were slain or roasted to death, an act which was quickly punished by General Jackson, and West Florida practically became ours through the surrender of the Spanish fortress at Mobile.

After our war with England, Spain alone of all the European powers remained in vexatious relations with this govern-

ment. Our troubles with her related to two topics — the negotiations to secure a cession of East Florida to the United States, and the revolutions in the Spanish-American colonies of South America. Our negotiations for Florida made no progress in spite of our moderation and forbearance. Spain was either disingenuous or perfidious, or both. After his restoration, the bigoted and despotic Ferdinand did not conceal his hatred of free institutions. He would have liked to defy the United States, but the resources of his country were at low ebb and he failed to secure the support of England, Russia, and France in his plans. He was forced, therefore, to adopt that common feature of Spanish policy, a profession of conciliation and friendship while instructing his agents to use underhanded means against us. In this way his agents fomented disturbances on the Florida frontier and endeavored to poison the minds of the people at New Orleans. The instructions to the Spanish minister at Washington appeared to be to keep the negotiations in a state of suspension. The arrangement which the government of the United States desired was the full cession of East and West Floridas with a fixing of the disputed boundary lines of Louisiana. On our part it was proposed to relinquish the accumulated spoliation claims against Spain.

Over this territory which we were trying to peacefully secure by purchase, Spain exercised hardly the shadow of authority, a fact which was sufficiently manifest from the ease with which little troops of irresponsible invaders defied Spanish authorities. The only pretence of Spanish occupation of the Floridas consisted in the retention of small garrisons at Pensacola and St. Augustine. In 1817 a few lawless recruits from Savannah and Charleston passed over to Amelia Island, near the present site of Fernandina, and took possession of it, at the same time proclaiming a blockade of St. Augustine. The Spanish governor made a futile effort to dislodge this band of not more than 150 buccaneers, and they held their ground for months. Spain then filed various pro-

tests at Washington, and even threatened war with the United States if the occupation were allowed to continue. It was no wonder that many people in the South were disgusted with the consideration the government showed to the complaining Spaniards, who were so utterly incapable of defending themselves from any little roving band that located itself right in the face of the Spanish garrison. And when the United States sent a force to Amelia Island to disperse their own filibustering subjects, and, to preserve order, remained temporarily in possession, the Spanish also protested against this occupation, protested both against the filibusters and the presence of the soldiers sent to drive them out.

The Seminole war again brought Andrew Jackson to the front, and he fully believed in seizing the Floridas and holding them as indemnity for the outrages Spain had committed on the property of citizens of the United States. His eager spirit resented the mild diplomacy used with the Spaniards, and he thought that a government which could not maintain its authority over territory it professed to own had no right to continue the pretence. He was strengthened in this belief by the fact that the Spanish authorities had countenanced rather than restrained the uprising of the Seminoles in our territory. His theory was that self-defense compelled the United States to take control of points which the Spanish authorities could not keep in order, and when once in the field he made quick work in capturing the Spanish garrison of Pensacola, much to the perplexity of the administration, which had cautioned him against going too far into Spanish territory.

When the fall of Pensacola became known in Madrid, the perfidious King sent orders to suspend treaty negotiations, which he himself had kept in suspension, and made explicit demands for satisfaction. In Monroe's cabinet, John Quincy Adams, the Secretary of State, was the only one to defend Jackson's conduct in acting contrary to orders, and it is quite possible that his course was directed by a fuller understanding of the Spanish character and diplomacy.

But Jackson's unauthorized action was disavowed, and that which a few American troops had seized with so little effort was formally restored. It was another case of honest forbearance on the part of the United States. In presenting the case of this government in reply to the demands of Spain, John Quincy Adams put the blame for the invasion directly upon that country, and the Cortes of Madrid was silenced. Europe thereupon suggested to Spain the speedy sale of the Floridas to the young republic, which had shown that it could take possession of the Spanish territory at any time, without any trouble, and upon any provocation which the treacherous character of Spanish diplomacy might easily afford.

The chapter of Spanish intrigue and American diplomacy concerning the Floridas was soon thereafter closed. In February, 1819, a treaty was signed by Adams and the Spanish minister in behalf of their respective governments, whereby Spain ceded to the United States all territory east of the Mississippi known as East and West Florida, with adjacent islands, for five million dollars. West of the Mississippi the new boundary began at the mouth of the Sabine River, now the eastern boundary line of Texas, running north by that river to 32° North latitude, thence north to the Red River, thence west along that river to 100° West longitude, thence north to the Arkansas River, thence westerly along this river through what is now Kansas and Colorado to 106° West longitude, thence north to 42° North latitude, and thence westerly on the line which is now the northern boundary of Utah, Nevada, and California, to the Pacific. It was well known that this government would have pressed further in the effort to secure the ceding of Texas but for the feeling then beginning to manifest itself that the balance of slave and free states would be disturbed. All the territory left to Spain, including what are now Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, and California, with parts of Kansas, Colorado, and Wyoming, were in open revolt against a country whose tyranny was rapidly despoiling her of all the gains of the sixteenth century.

The treaty was at once ratified by the United States government in anticipation of its speedy ratification by the Cortes, but the unreliability of Spanish character again manifested itself. In view of the natural sympathy of the people of the United States for the rebellious colonists of South and Central America, it became difficult for the government of the United States to preserve a strict neutrality in these revolutions. Ferdinand feared that if he ratified the Florida treaty the United States would recognize the belligerents, and so he held off, though France, England, and Russia urged him to approve. Pressed for a decisive answer, Ferdinand only offered various mysterious excuses. Congress was disposed to require the executive to take possession of the Floridas at once, but the administration still treated Spain with undeserved forbearance. Finally, in February, 1821, when Ferdinand's throne was threatened by his own people, and South America had thrown off the yoke, the treaty was ratified and the long series of negotiations as to Spanish America was brought to a close. It had been almost the exclusive feature of American diplomacy during Monroe's administration. At any time a handful of United States volunteers could have taken and held the great territory for which the future held so rich a destiny, but we dallied with Spain, put up with her shuffling and treachery, and treated her with a consideration which no power in Europe would have granted her under the circumstances.





From this time forward our relations with Spain chiefly concern the history of Cuba.

CHAPTER V

"THE EVER-FAITHFUL ISLE"—PROGRESS OF CUBA DURING FERDINAND'S DISASTROUS REIGN—THE HOLY ALLIANCE AND THE FAMOUS MONROE DOCTRINE.

Cuba's Peculiar Position — Importance of Havana — An Early Cause of Ill-feeling — Excitement during Toussaint L' Ouverture's Struggle — Cubans Remain Faithful to Ferdinand — Aponto's Uprising — Agitation for the Suppression of the Slave Trade — Favorable Influence of English Intervention in Cuba — First Struggle with the Spanish Authorities — The People Divide — Origin and Purposes of the Holy Alliance — "A Softer Word for Despotism" — Help for the Bigoted Ferdinand — Discord in Cuba — Smouldering Fires — Adams's Advice to President Monroe — The Famous Monroe Doctrine — Retreat of the Holy Alliance — United States Attitude towards Cuba Influenced by Slavery — The Panama Congress and its Failure — Attitude of Southern States — The United States Uses Its Influence to Insure Spain's Domination of Cuba — Words of Henry Clay.

DURING the troublous years of the disastrous reign of Ferdinand, the island of Cuba maintained a position peculiarly her own, and it will be necessary to return to the time when the people of the United States won their independence and trace upward the history and condition of that province which, because of the failure of all efforts to plant the seed of liberal government in her soil, obtained the title of "The Ever-faithful Isle." During the last years of the eighteenth century Cuba, under the rule of a few wise governors, advanced rapidly in material resources, and the ports of Havana and Santiago were opened to free commerce, excepting the slave trade, and a few minor productions. At the close of the century Havana was the most important city in America. Of the governors, none were more wise and progressive than Luis de las Casas, who imparted a new impulse to commerce and agriculture, and inaugurated a series of important public works. He took an active interest not only in



EMINENT AMERICAN CIVIL LEADERS.

Hon. WILLIAM R. DAY, Secretary of State.

Hon. RUSSELL A. ALGER, Secretary of War.

Hon. STEWART L. WOODFORD, Ex-Minister to Spain.

Hon. JOHN D. LONG, Secretary of the Navy.

relieving the remnant of the native Indians from slavery, but in developing the military defenses of the island. A great navy yard grew up at Havana, though in accordance with Spain's short-sighted policy, it was closed in 1776 on the demand of the shipbuilders of Spain that such work should be done only in the mother country. By this time Spain had become the servant of France; reforms in church and state, which stubborn Spain would not have dreamed of had she had her own way, were introduced, and in Cuba the development was marked. In 1776 Spain was forced into a further alliance with France, and when the Spanish naval power was broken the following year at Cape St. Vincent, her communication with her colonies was so interrupted and feeble that Cuba was left practically to her own devices. When Spain lay at the feet of Napoleon she had no recourse but to leave the colonies to defend themselves, and it was only the increased defenses which saved Cuba from attack.

It was with some difficulty, even under the prudent measures inaugurated by Las Casas, that serious disturbances could be avoided when the excitement of the negroes was intensified by the remarkable campaign of Toussaint L'Ouverture in Haiti, and there were several bloody uprisings; still, as a whole, the island greatly benefited by the Haitian revolution, for it led to a large immigration of white settlers driven out of San Domingo, the number taking refuge in Cuba in the decade ending in 1808 having been estimated at fully 30,000. Encouraged by Governor Las Casas, they contributed largely to the development of the eastern section of the island, where they mainly settled, and where they introduced the cultivation of the coffee plant, the product soon becoming a large element in the commerce of the island. The cession of Louisiana also resulted in a large immigration of Spaniards, who found that they must quit New Orleans or live under the flag of the United States.

When Napoleon placed his brother on the throne of Spain, and the Spanish, seeing themselves cheated and humiliated,

rose in a sort of helpless frenzy, the condition of affairs in Cuba was greatly changed. England, which had long been an enemy of Spain, now became her ally. English fleets, instead of threatening Cuban waters, now aided in extending its commerce. When the news of the captivity of Ferdinand reached Cuba, the colonists, irrespective of any party divisions, refused to recognize Joseph Bonaparte. The divisions between the Cubans and the Spaniards were for the moment lost sight of, and the people contributed men, money, and material to assist the Junta of Seville, which proclaimed equal rights for all Spaniards, both at home and in the colonies. The hopes of the Cubans rose high, but the Junta proved itself too closely bound to the colonial monopolies to allow of a liberal consideration of colonial rights, and the Cubans were greatly disappointed. The authorities in the island, however, met the crisis by boldly modifying the orders of the home government and thus maintaining the freedom of commerce under other than Spanish flags. During the years when Spain was losing her colonies in South America, many loyal Spaniards took refuge in Cuba, and, while the population was increased and the island became the most important of Spain's colonies, the presence of so many Spaniards naturally contributed to strengthen the reaction which followed the restoration of the despotic Ferdinand.

When, after the capture of Seville, the Spanish constituent Assembly was called to frame a constitution for the Spanish monarchy, the colonies were invited, and Cuba was represented by three deputies, the small proportion being the cause of considerable discontent. The Constitution of 1812 became only another factor in the discontent, for though the pleas of the Cuban planters prevented the adoption of the clause for the abolition of slavery in Cuba after ten years, the rumors of the failure led to serious uprisings among the slaves, led by José Aponto, a free negro. But the insurrection was quickly put down and the leaders executed as usual.

However, during that brief period of constitutional gov-

ernment Cuba enjoyed many new advantages. As one Cuban writer expresses it, "A division of civil and military powers was effected; provincial deputations and constitutional municipal councils were established; liberty of the press was accorded; educated judges were appointed, and the fetters of centralization were materially relaxed." There was at this time a population of about 600,000 on the island, an increase of about 330,000 in twenty years. Of the total, 274,000 were whites, 114,000 free blacks, and 212,000 slaves. The proportion of increase in twenty years had been $45\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of whites; 19 per cent. of free blacks; and $35\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of slaves.

The revolt in South American provinces undoubtedly inclined the home authorities for a time to a more favorable policy towards the faithful isle, and it was partly for this reason that when Ferdinand restored despotism in 1814, and trampled the constitution under his feet, Cuba at first suffered less than Spain herself, though Cuban deputies were not admitted to the Cortes. But Ferdinand then dissolved the Cortes and undertook to restore absolutism in all its ancient rigor. In July, 1814, the Captain-General of Cuba, Apodica, was ordered to restore the old system, and he made the formal attempt to do so, but liberal ideas had obtained so much headway that it was impossible at once to restore the old order of things with safety.

In 1817 arose the agitation for the suppression of the slave trade in Cuba. The importation of negroes into slavery had been interdicted by Denmark in 1792, by England and the United States in 1807, by Sweden in 1813, and by Holland and France in 1814, and as England had performed for Spain the service of saving her from Napoleon, that government used its influence to bring about the suppression of the slave trade in the Spanish colonies. The result was the conclusion of the treaty at Madrid in 1817, by which the deportation of negroes to Spanish colonies was made illegal after 1820, and Ferdinand, who was greatly in need of money, received for this concession \$2,000,000, Portugal being paid a million and

a half for a like concession. The change was violently opposed, not so much by the Cuban planters as by the slave-trading interests, and for years after the interdiction shiploads of slaves were either smuggled in or their entrance connived at by the Spanish authorities.

To compensate Cuba for the supposed loss of commerce from the interdiction, and in the hopes that it might have a beneficial effect upon the revolting South American provinces, which Spain expected then to recover, she consented to have Cuban ports opened to unrestricted commerce, and encouraged immigration to the islands. In short, owing to the favorable influence of English intervention, Cuba made a distinct gain at this time. But it was the forerunner of that long and troubled period in which the Cubans and the Spaniards stood face to face in an attitude of bitter hatred and hostility. For a proper understanding of recent Cuban history, it is necessary to mark closely the distinction to which this period gave rise.

It was in 1820 that the standard of revolt was raised in Spain by Riego and Quiroga against the cruel absolutism of Ferdinand. The movement quickly spread, and in a short time the constitution of 1812 was again proclaimed and Ferdinand was compelled to accept it. But the Captain-General who had been sent out to Cuba two years before attempted to delay its re-establishment in the island. He was overborne by the garrison of the city, a part of which at once pronounced for the liberal order of things, and they were joined by the Cubans. A conflict was for the time avoided by the yielding of the Captain-General. Political prisoners were liberated from the fortresses and the work of again establishing a constitutional *regime* proceeded. The succeeding governors of the island endeavored to restrain the new tendency, and to unite the civil and military power in the hands of the Captain-General in opposition to the constitution, and thus a bitter feeling was gradually aroused between the Spanish troops under his immediate command, and the local militia who supported the Cubans. Secret societies began to take root in the

island, and thus the two elements of the population, those supporting the constitution and mostly native Cubans on the one hand, and the adherents of absolutism on the other, gradually took sides in opposing organizations. But while these forces were arraying themselves in Cuba the constitution was again broken down in Spain, this time by France under the behest of the Holy Alliance.

The great ruling houses of Continental Europe, strong upholders of absolute monarchical institutions and the divine right of kings, had naturally become alarmed over the sudden unfolding of free institutions in the Americas and the developing weakness of the Bourbon throne of Spain. In 1815, or shortly after Waterloo, the sovereigns of Russia, Austria, and Prussia had formed the Holy Alliance, its avowed purpose being to maintain as a Christian doctrine that sovereign right of legitimacy which Henry Clay in one of his speeches expressed as "a softer word for despotism." In 1821, when Napoleon had breathed his last at St. Helena, and after Ferdinand had been temporarily set aside and carried off to Cadiz by his subjects a prisoner, this Alliance issued a joint manifesto declaring that "useful or necessary changes in legislation and in the administration of states, ought only to emanate from the free will and well-weighed conviction of those whom God had rendered responsible for power." The Alliance then proceeded to put its foot upon liberal ideas in government wherever they were found. Naturally, it turned to help the bigoted Ferdinand, and the country was handed over to ten years more of tyranny from the worthless Bourbon, released from Cadiz. This was Spain's last great effort to escape the thralldom of superstition.

The weight of renewed despotism soon fell upon Cuba. Marshal Vives was sent to Havana with instructions to save it from the possible dangers of a liberal government. He began his work in May, 1823, and the island was soon in discord. An attempt at open revolt was made by an association known as the "*Soles de Bolivar*," the plan of which was to

establish a Cuban republic, but it was frustrated by the vigorous Spanish officials, and the leaders who did not escape were severely punished.

In October of that year Ferdinand, now more arrogant than ever, set about to carry out the plan of the Holy Alliance, which was to use Cuba as an arsenal and vantage point for the subjugation of the newly-established South American republics. But at this point our ministers in Europe became aware that the Holy Alliance had a much more ambitious and sweeping project in mind than the assistance of Ferdinand. It was, in fact, a plan for the combination of monarchial Europe to throttle independence of spirit in South America. In this situation England and the United States drew closer together for the time, though the former had not yet recognized the new South American republics. John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State, strongly advised President Monroe not to join with England in a protest against the projects of the Alliance in South America, but to make his annual message to Congress a declaration of what would be the position of the United States if the Alliance undertook to carry out its plans. Monroe acted on the advice, though with some reluctance, it is said, and inserted those passages which were destined to become famous as "the Monroe doctrine." After referring in the first part of his message to certain negotiations then in progress between Russia and this government concerning rights in the far northwest, he said:

"The occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, *that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power.*"

That is the gist of the Monroe doctrine. Monroe continued with some forcible words in explanation of this position and plainly intimated that any attempt on the part of the European governments to interfere with the independence of the new republics would be considered as an unfriendly act,

dangerous to our peace and safety. In England, where the purpose of the Holy Alliance was understood, the Monroe declaration was applauded as a bold assertion of American spirit. Spanish-American securities at once rose on the market. The Alliance drew back and its interference with the new republics was thus prevented.

The natural result of all this was to increase the bitter feeling between the Cuban people and the military government of the Spanish-born, and as a result of several small and unsuccessful attempts at revolt the military despotism was strengthened, many of the soldiers originally intended for the renewal of hostilities in South America remaining in Cuba, no doubt because of an intended Congress of Representatives of the American republics, the general motive for which was concerted action in opposition to the apparent purposes of the Holy Alliance.

It was from this point that our attitude towards Cuba was largely influenced by her connection with slavery. It was proposed to have this Congress meet at Panama in 1826, and the United States was naturally invited to send a representative. In his first message President John Quincy Adams endorsed the plan and announced that representatives would be sent, but the plan was strongly opposed in the Senate upon various pretexts, though the real reason evidently was the fear of the slaveholding states that this Congress threatened the institution of slavery. The republics of South America had abolished slavery, in this being much more consistent with the demands of liberty than the United States, and it was clear that the representatives of the slaveholding states would prefer a Spanish Cuba with slavery and an illegitimate slave-trade, to an independent Cuba without them. There is little doubt that the relations of our government to Cuba and Puerto Rico would have formed a feature of the discussion in the Congress, for the President announced that one of the purposes of the Congress was to consider the "indirect influence which might be exercised upon any projects or purposes origi-

nating in the war in which the southern republics are still engaged and which might seriously affect the interest of this Union."

The Panama Congress having failed, largely because of the inadequate support given by the United States, the movement against Cuba which had been planned by Cuban refugees in Mexico and Colombia and was to be led by the great liberator, Simon Bolivar, was abandoned. That it was the policy of the United States government at this time to ensure the continued Spanish control of Cuba is clear from the statements of Henry Clay and others, though the slave states began to look with favor upon its annexation to strengthen the slaveholding side of the country.

CHAPTER VI

SPAIN'S SECRET ATTEMPTS TO SELL THE ISLAND OF CUBA TO FRANCE—NEGRO OUTBREAKS AND THE TRAGIC DEATH OF THE MULATTO POET, VALDEZ.

The Captain-General Endowed with Extraordinary Authority — Powers Misused and Unrest Fostered — The "Black Eagle" — Discord among the Planters — Inauguration of Spanish Venality in Cuba — The Irrepressible Conflict in the United States — Death of Ferdinand — No Reforms for Poor Cuba — Spanish Treasury Depleted — The Queen's Plan to Secretly Sell Cuba to France — A Monstrous Proposition — Meeting in the King's Cabinet — Louis Phillippe Demands a Reduction in the Price of the Philippines — Throwing an Important Contract into the Fire — Class Hatred Grows in Cuba — Cuba Granted Representation in the Cortes — The Slave Trade — Outbreaks among the Negroes — Execution of a Mulatto Poet — His Prayer Recited on the way to Execution — His Heroic Death.

I N May, 1825, Ferdinand endowed Captain-General Vives with those extraordinary powers which for years remained the supreme law of Cuba. Threatened by a revolution of the natives, and by attacks from Mexico and Colombia, and fearing the designs of the United States, he resolved, "for the important end of preserving in that precious island his legitimate sovereign authority," to give to the Captain-General all the powers which by the royal ordinances were granted to the governors of besieged cities. He, therefore, granted "the most ample and unbounded power, to send away from the island any persons in office, whatever their occupation, rank, class, or condition, whose continuance therein" the Captain-General might deem injurious, replacing them with persons faithful to his majesty. He was also granted the power to suspend the execution of any order whatsoever. From that day the Captain-General was, in effect, the absolute ruler of the island, the one essential being that he please his

king. He became a military dictator, and the degree of his despotism depended only upon his character and disposition. Naturally, the sovereign appointed none but those whom he believed to be thorough Spaniards, and thus it happened that many of the governors misused their enormous powers, widening the breach between the islanders and the peninsulars, and causing that very unrest which the grant of authority was intended to repress.

As under strict military supervision, with a large army constantly on hand, uprisings had little chance of success unless operated from outside, Cuban exiles everywhere became constant conspirators. In Mexico and Colombia they organized, in 1827, a secret society called the "Black Eagle," and in a short time its ramifications extended into many Cuban cities and towns. The watchful military forces had no difficulty in finding the main conspirators on the island, and a large number of them were condemned to death, the rest to exile, though the Captain-General was wise enough, in view of the growing discontent, to mitigate these sentences in many cases. Vives used his powers with much discretion, but under his successor, Mariano Ricafort, venality and corruption became more and more manifest, large sums of money wrung from the Cubans by taxation finding their way into the pockets of minor officials instead of into public works or into the Spanish treasury.

While the opposition of the slaveholding class in Cuba was one cause of the failure of attempts to shake off the Spanish yoke, the slave interests in the United States led the South to take a position decidedly unfriendly to Cuban independence, but distinctly favorable to our acquisition of the island. Early in the constitutional history of the United States, the acquisition of Cuba had been regarded as desirable if only as a strategic point.

"I candidly confess," wrote Jefferson to President Monroe in 1823, "that I have ever looked at Cuba as the most interesting addition that could be made to our system of States. The

control which, with Florida Point, this island would give us over the Gulf of Mexico and the countries and the isthmus bordering it, would fill up the measure of our political well being." This theory grew naturally out of the consideration of the geographical position of the island. "Our safety from this danger," that is, the control of the Gulf by a hostile power, wrote Alexander Hill Everett, our Minister to Spain from 1825 to 1829, in a letter to President Adams, "has, I believe, long been considered as resulting wholly from the feebleness and insufficiency of Spain; and it has been viewed by all as a settled point that the American government would not consent to any change in the political situation of Cuba other than one which would place it under the jurisdiction of the United States." He proceeded to argue that in consequence of the internal state of the island, the obstinate adherence of Spain to the colonial system, and the growing strength of the new South American states, the island could not long remain in its existing condition, and as the whites were too few to make an independent government possible, it must eventually fall into the hands of some other power or become a republic of blacks, like Haiti. For these reasons he considered it highly important that the United States should at once endeavor to obtain possession of the island in a peaceable way. "If they do not succeed in this," he said, "it is morally certain that they will be forced, at no very distant period, to effect the same object in a more invidious manner and at the risk of embroiling themselves with some of the great powers of Europe."

He then asked that he might be favored with instructions with a view to negotiations on the basis he proposed, which was, in effect, to offer Spain, then in desperate straits financially, a considerable loan on condition of a temporary cession of the island as security. If the loan was not repaid within a specified time, the United States should assume entire and undisputed ownership of Cuba. He closed by saying: "Should this government (Spain), however, attempt to proceed upon its usual plan of delay, after all that has already passed, I can-

not but hope that Congress will resort to vigorous measures. The mere demonstration would in this case be effectual and would be unattended by any danger or inconvenience whatever. Nevertheless, violence is always unpleasant, even when necessary, politic, and safe, so that I should prefer an early termination of these vexatious disputes in an amicable way."

But as Henry Clay, then Secretary of State, said in a letter to Everett that same year, the United States were satisfied with the existing condition of Cuba and Puerto Rico in the hands of Spain and with their ports open to free commerce, but he intimated that if war should continue between Spain and the new South American republics, or there should be danger of Cuba falling into other hands, the United States would not be disinterested spectators.

While this was the position of the administration, it was not the position of the inhabitants of the Southern States. How completely slavery dominated the sentiments of the South can be judged from the fact that, much as it would have liked to have the United States acquire Cuba as new slave territory, nothing would have been more hateful to it than Cuban independence. In writing to Van Ness, minister to Spain in 1829, President Van Buren said that "other considerations connected with a certain class of our population make it the interest of the Southern section of the Union that no attempt should be made in that island to throw off the yoke of Spanish dependence, the first effect of which would be the sudden emancipation of a numerous slave population, the result of which could not but be very sensibly felt upon the adjacent shores of the United States."

The State Department also warmly protested in communications to the government of Mexico against any attempt to disturb Cuba by putting arms in the hands of one portion of its population to destroy another, "which in its influence would endanger the peace of a portion of the United States." Thus it was that because of the growing predominance of pro-slavery control, even then threatening disunion, the govern-

ment of the United States threw its influence in favor of the Spaniards. While boasting of our freedom, our interests in slavery made us partisans of Spanish oppression.

When the ignoble Ferdinand died in 1833 and his infant daughter Isabella was proclaimed Queen under the regency of her mother Christina, the latter was forced to turn to the Spanish Liberals for help against Ferdinand's brother Carlos, who, claiming the throne by Salic law, took up arms against the regency, thus beginning the Carlist wars, which have ever since disturbed the Spanish nation. The Liberals demanded reforms, and the revival of the Cortes, which Christina, from necessity, granted, but this had no effect upon poor Cuba. The following year General Tacon was appointed Captain-General, and instead of adopting a policy of conciliation and fair treatment to bridge the ever-widening gap between the Cubans and the Spanish-born, he used his unlimited powers arbitrarily, and enforced a rigid proscription of all who opposed his will.

In 1836, when the Spanish treasury was sadly depleted, there occurred a bit of history not known at the time except to the three or four parties engaged in it. The Queen conceived the idea of selling to France the turbulent island which had ceased to be "ever faithful," and even the Philippines, so pressing were her financial needs, and she commissioned a Spanish banker at Paris to sound Prince Talleyrand upon the subject. The banker in his note to the Prince spoke mysteriously of a plan which might bring fortunes to those engaged in the transaction, but which, if unsuccessful, must forever remain a secret to the rest of the world. The Queen then despatched Campuzano to Paris to represent the crown in the business, but he was heartily ashamed of his mission; an attempt to deprive Spain of what he considered her brightest jewel, nearly all that remained of her once great American empire. He undertook the office, he said afterwards, because he feared that if he declined it, it might fall to some of the Queen's favorites, who would seek nothing but the personal

pecuniary advantage to be derived from it. Campuzano had a meeting with Talleyrand. When the secret agreement to be signed by the King of France and the Queen Regent of Spain was being read, Campuzano is described by Talleyrand's secretary as being deeply affected. The proposition from the Spanish ruler was so monstrous and base that he struck the table a heavy blow with his fist and muttered a curse. Cristina proposed for a consideration of 30,000,000 *reals* (about \$3,500,000) to hand Cuba over to France, and for 10,000,000 *reals* more to give up Puerto Rico and the Philippines.

The Queen's plan would make it necessary for France to raise a loan, and this was to be floated on the Bourse. Out of the loan the banker would receive large commissions, while 1,000,000 francs was to be offered to Prince Talleyrand, and 300,000 francs was to be distributed as bribes and commissions to other people whose support might be essential. When, a few days later, the parties met in the King's cabinet to sign the contract, Campuzano could hardly control himself, so disgusted was he with the business which seemed to be working to a successful conclusion. The article on Cuba hardly provoked any discussion, but when it came to the Philippines, Louis Philippe thought he saw an opportunity for driving a bargain. He remarked that the cession of the Philippines to France would be so obnoxious to England that serious complications, if not war, might result. He therefore demanded a lower price on the Philippines, and pushing the contract across the table to Campuzano, exclaimed imperiously:

"The reduction of price *must* be accepted. The terms are too onerous. Seven million *reals* is my offer, or else the contract must be thrown into the fire."

Talleyrand, who knew how disgusted Campuzano was with the whole business, and who feared that the King's move might spoil the lucrative job, stretched out his hand to pick up the paper and was about to speak, when Campuzano, starting up so quickly that his chair fell backward, leaned over the

table, seized the contract, crumpled it in his hand, and looking at the astonished King, said:

“Your majesty is right. The contract is worthless, only fit to be thrown into the fire.”

He flung the paper on the blazing logs of the fireplace, and with the tongs beat it down until nothing remained but the blackened fragments. And thus ended Spain's only proposition for the sale of Cuba.

Meantime the condition of the Cubans upon the unhappy island became worse and worse under the despotism of Tacon. The Captain-General was surrounded by corrupt and greedy office-holders from Spain, while the Creoles were under ban, though they were the children of peninsulars, many of them well educated and wealthy. Their misfortune consisted solely in having been born outside the peninsular, and the period was at hand when class hatred was to manifest itself in an antagonism never to end till Cuba should be free. In considering this period we should not lose sight of events in Spain.

Pressed almost to the point of defeat by the armies of Don Carlos, Christina, upon her failure to secure money by the sale of Cuba and the Philippines to France, resolved upon desperate measures, and a new levy of 100,000 men was made without a *real* to pay them. But her minister adopted the policy of confiscating nearly the entire mass of church property. While this seemed to open up boundless resources to a nation so devoured with forced loans, heavy taxes, and administrative robbery, it was found to be entirely inadequate. In an effort to realize something from indemnities, the independence of the South American republics was at last acknowledged (December, 1836), and that chapter of Spanish decadence was closed, but the Spanish coffers remained empty and the general misery culminated in an outbreak, on account of which Christina was forced to sign a decree recognizing the Constitution of 1812 till the will of the nation should be made known in the Cortes. This was eventually done in the revised Constitution of 1837.

It would have been natural to suppose that in such an ascendancy of liberal ideas in the peninsula, Cuba would at last be enabled to secure some small share of her rights as an "ever-faithful isle." Soon after the death of Ferdinand, and in an evident effort to increase Cuba's contributions to the treasury of the home government faced with a Carlist war, the Queen had issued a decree again allowing Cuba a small representation in the Cortes, though the unlimited powers of the Captain-General remained in all their rigorous force, and the concession really amounted to no more than the paper it was written on. When, two years later, the Queen, under compulsion, again promulgated the Constitution of 1812, the despotic Tacon ignored the decree, and suppressed its proclamation in Santiago de Cuba, where General Lorenzo had attempted to promulgate it in spite of the Captain-General. Tacon sent a large military expedition to Santiago and imprisoned or exiled all who had joined in the effort. Under the Constitution Spain was allowed one representative for each 50,000 inhabitants, but Cuba was put off with four, although on the basis of the white population alone the island would have been entitled to nine.

But even this alleged concession was but the forerunner of a new display of despotism. Speaking in open parliament, a representative of the Cortes said: "The government has *never* held the opinion that deputies should be sent from America; it has been considered as an evil which it was necessary to cut short. Their advent was a calamity." A select commission at this time drew up a report which was accepted by the Cortes, and by which it was resolved no longer to admit deputies from Cuba. The Cuban deputies protested in vain, and from that date the political constitution of Cuba became established in accordance with the Queen's decree of April 25, 1837, a decree which stripped the "ever-faithful isle" of all voice in its own affairs.

This decree announced that the provinces should no longer be represented in the Cortes, and that,

First, as this decision might be "distasteful to the wicked," active malcontents should be "subject to the judgment of competent tribunals."

Second, that the provinces should continue to be governed by the laws of the Indies, and by ordinances and royal orders issued for their observance; that the Captain-General should see that these laws were rigidly enforced, and that no measures adopted in the peninsula be promulgated in the colonies unless communicated to the Captain-General by the proper minister.

Third, that the higher authorities should assist Her Majesty by adopting such measures as are necessary to enforce the special laws.

Fourth, that the liberty of the press should not be permitted, and that vigilant censorship should be exercised upon pamphlets, newspapers, and writings printed in other countries.

The years which followed this order made bloody pages in the history of Cuba. Spain was deaf to the complaints of a people devoid of a free press, of the right of assembly, and of the security of the law. The military system gave rise to many excesses, and the infamous contraband slave trade was carried on and openly tolerated in violation of treaties by which, for a money consideration from England, Spain had formally forbidden it. The government of Spain had declared that all negroes brought from Africa subsequent to the treaty should be at once set free, and that the ships on which they had been transported should at once be confiscated, while the captains and crews and others concerned should be punished with ten years servitude. Yet the statistics show that for the twenty-five years following this treaty an average of fifteen thousand slaves annually arrived in Cuba from Africa. It is asserted that in the four years that Tacon was Captain-General he made no secret of receiving a doubloon, or seventeen dollars, per head on every slave landed, and the home government secretly fostered the trade for the sake of the revenue which went into the pockets of its members.

Naturally, the inhabitants of African descent were continually restive, and many of the mulattoes showed a genius for leadership, which was often to characterize later Cuban history. Small insurrections were frequent and conspiracies were constant. In dealing with them the government was ruthless, and it was simply necessary for someone to whisper to an official that a conspiracy was being hatched to lead to the execution of those who might under any circumstances be connected with it. Plans for an insurrection were laid in 1844 among the slaves of the sugar plantations about Matanzas. As the officials discovered the plot early and acted at once, the real guilt of the arrested parties was largely a matter of suspicion. The difficulty of obtaining satisfactory evidence was such that the Spaniards resorted to the method of examining witnesses under torture. How many testified to suit the government, simply to escape further torture, could not be known, but the result was the conviction of 1,346 persons, of whom forty-eight were shot and the others subjected to lesser forms of punishment. Of the guilty ones only fifty-nine were slaves; 1,242 were free blacks of all shades, and fourteen were white.

One of those condemned to death, largely because of having sung in his poems of the liberty of his country and his race, was the mulatto poet, Gabriel Concepcion de la Valdez. This martyr, of whom the world knows but little, possessed in a marked degree the true poetic spirit. He began his career as a foundling — the poverty-stricken descendant of a race of slaves. His childhood was that of a poor laborer with no means of securing an education except such as he himself could gather with difficulty. Had he received the stimulus of a government encouraging letters he might have made himself better known in the history of literature, but his works would have been no more immortal than they became, condemned as he was to spend upon his native soil a life of misery and insult, ending in death by Spanish bullets.

While waiting for his execution he wrote a prayer,

“Plegaria a Dios,” beautiful in its rhyme and meter, pathetic, yet brave, in sentiment, and worthy of a place beside the classics of the Spanish language. The following excellent translation has been made by Louis Edward Levy in his notes to Cabrera’s “Cuba and the Cubans”:

“Being of boundless good ! Almighty God !
To Thee I turn in my most poignant grief ;
Extend Thy hand omnipotent to hold
This odious veil of calumny from me,
And tear away the ignominious seal
With which the world would harshly brand my brow.

“Kings of Kings ! Thou God of my forefathers !
Thou art my sole defender, Oh, my God !
All may He do who to the somber sea
Its waves and fishes gave, to heaven its light,
Fire to the sun, and to the North its ice,
Life to the plant, and movement to the rills.

“All things canst Thou accomplish ; all things die
And live again but through Thy holy word.
Apart from Thee, O Lord, all things are naught
And lost in fathomless eternity ;
Yet doth obey Thee this same nothingness,
For thereof didst Thou humankind create.

“I cannot Thee deceive, Thou God of Truth,
And since it is that Thy omniscient eye
Doth through my body see this soul of mine
As through the clear transparency of air,
Do Thou prevent that innocence be crushed
And wicked slander triumph undisturbed.

“But if in Thy omnipotence Thou wouldst
That I shall perish like a Godless wretch,
And that men may my cold and lifeless corse
Abase and outrage with malignant joy,
Then let Thy voice be heard and end my life,
And let Thy will, O Lord, be done in me !”

These lines he repeated as he was led forth to his execution on the Plaza de Armas in Matanzas. The first volley fired at him by the soldiers failed to hit a vital part, and the heroic victim, bleeding from many wounds, turned to his executioners.

"Aim here!" he shouted in a clear, calm voice, pointing to his heart.

The order for another volley came, and the brave mulatto dropped dead upon the ground, his blood mingling with that soil into which has run so much of the life current of those who have died for "Cuba Libre."

When we consider the deliberate efforts of Spain to withhold educational advantages from the natives of Cuba, and especially the poorer classes, we cannot but be surprised at the wealth of good Cuban literature and art during the nineteenth century. To some extent, doubtless, this is due to the practice of the richer Cubans of sending their sons to the United States or to Europe to be educated, but some of the finest examples of genius must be traced to the humblest conditions of Cuban life. Many of these men have been exiles from their native land — like the mulatto musician, José White, at the head of the Conservatory of Music of Brazil.

CHAPTER VII

FILIBUSTERING EXPEDITIONS AND THE DEATH OF LOPEZ —THE *BLACK WARRIOR*—THE FAMOUS OSTEND CON- FERENCE—A CUBAN WARNING.

Buchanan's Efforts to Buy Cuba — Spain Refuses to Sell — Lopez and His Uprising — His Filibustering Attempts — Capture of Colonel Crittenden and His Men — Lopez Killed by a Spanish Garrote — Private Filibustering — A Change in Party Government — A Sympathizer with Filibusters — Duels of the Soulés — An Affair of Honor with the French Minister — The *Black Warrior* Case — Feeling against Spain Intensified — Soulé Threatens Spain — Conference of American Ministers at Ostend — Fixing a Price on Cuba — The Manifesto — Soulé Throws up His Commission in Disgust — Effort to Secure Cuba — Increasing Burdens of Cuba — Arrogance of Spanish Authority — Burdens Only Increased — A Cuban Warning.

IN the agitation which led to the annexation of Texas in 1845, the proposition to acquire Cuba by purchase or otherwise was widely discussed in the United States, and during the Mexican war which fixed the boundary of Texas and brought California into the Union as a free state, the strength of the Cuban idea increased rapidly. The slaveholders had become greatly concerned over the anti-slavery agitation, and they looked to Cuba as a means of establishing the equilibrium of sectional strength. In 1848, therefore, Buchanan, Secretary of State under President Polk, proposed negotiations for the purchase of the island to the Spanish government through the American Minister at Madrid, who was instructed to point out to Spain that she was in danger of losing Cuba by revolution, and that it might be wrested from her by Great Britain if a rupture came in their relations. The minister was authorized to pay as much as \$100,000,000, and the treaty should be modeled upon that of the Louisiana purchase.

But the refusal of Spain to entertain the proposition put an end to the project, and the growth of the anti-slavery sentiment led many of the slaveholders to lend support to violence in the shape of filibustering expeditions.

The Cuban liberals, unable to carry on their revolutionary movements at home because of the military vigilance of the Spanish authorities, turned to the United States as a place to organize their movements. In May, 1847, Narciso Lopez, who had formed a conspiracy for a rising in central Cuba, was detected and fled to the United States. During the following year he formed an association of Cuban fugitives in New York, and in 1849, after the failure of Buchanan's negotiations, Lopez organized a military expedition and induced many prominent southern citizens to become interested in it. The attempt was frustrated by the vigilance of President Taylor, who had succeeded Polk, and who issued a warning proclamation. The second and third attempts were more serious. In April, 1850, Lopez sailed from New Orleans with about three hundred Southerners under his command, and, after baffling one of our naval vessels which was sent to intercept the expedition, he landed at Cardenas, overcame the Spanish guards, and took possession. But the spirit of revolution was not at that moment ripe in the cities of Cuba, and so Lopez, finding himself unsupported and unable to reach the rural districts, was soon driven from the island by the government troops. He took refuge in Savannah, where he was arrested for violating our neutrality laws, but he was quickly discharged.

Lopez was not in the least daunted and he saw that he had the sympathy of a large portion of the southern people. Encouraged by some revolutionary manifestations in Cuba in 1851 he hastened to New Orleans and organized a new force of about 450 men, draining as before upon the purses of zealous politicians in the cause of slavery and disunion. He sailed away on the steamer *Pampero* intending to land on the southern coast. But learning at Key West of a revolt at a favorable point on the north coast he made for that place, but missed

it and disembarked on a lonely portion of the coast about thirty miles from Havana. Colonel Crittenden of Kentucky, second in command, with a hundred men, was left in charge of the stores and baggage, while Lopez, with the remainder of his command, advanced inland to the town of Pozas, whose inhabitants, instead of lending their enthusiastic aid, fled at once. The separated forces never reunited. Crittenden's band finally put out to sea in small boats to escape the Spanish soldiers, and were soon captured by a Spanish war vessel, which took them to Havana, where, after a summary trial, they were shot on the 17th of August. Lopez had advanced but a short distance into the interior, suffering greatly and finding the simple inhabitants of that section indifferent to the cause, when he was attacked by government forces, and after a severe loss he fled to the mountains. But here he was surprised on the 24th of August by an overwhelming force, and his scattered men, after wandering about, were gradually caught and taken to Havana. Lopez was executed at dawn, September 1st, by the Spanish garrote, an instrument by which the victim is clasped fast in an iron chair while an iron screw is pierced through a brass collar to the spinal marrow. The newspapers of the day record that this execution was publicly performed in the midst of an approving crowd.

President Fillmore had by proclamation stigmatized all such hostile adventures from our shores as violations of both national and international law, and had warned citizens of the United States who aided such projects that they would forfeit all claims to the protection of the government. The French and English governments had also issued orders to their West Indian fleets to prevent, by force if need be, such invasions of Cuba. But as a result the Spanish authorities in Cuba became very suspicious of American designs, especially when the South showed such unmistakable signs of irritation at the failure of the filibustering schemes, for a mob at New Orleans attacked the Spanish residents and tore in pieces a flag on the building of the Spanish consulate. But a little diplomacy

soon secured a better feeling between Spain and this government, and the Southern spirits who still dreamed of securing Cuba were for the time occupied with the more serious aspects of the slavery question at home. Henceforth the designs of the slave party were mainly confined to attempts to purchase the island. Still, there were some attempts at filibustering of a private character. In 1853, General Quitman of Mississippi headed a movement in which extensive enlistments were made and considerable money was collected, but the government interfered, and the leaders in Cuba who promised to work with Quitman were captured, and eventually several of them were shot.

Early in 1852 the French and English governments, influenced by the efforts of the South to acquire Cuba, made a joint proposition to the government of the United States for a tripartite convention for disclaiming severally and collectively all intention of obtaining possession of the island, and binding themselves to discountenance all attempts to that effect on the part of any power or individuals whatever. In December, 1852, Edward Everett, Secretary of State, replied to the proposition in a letter which is an important landmark in our relations with Spain as to Cuba. The French minister had stated that France could never see with indifference the possession of Cuba by any other power than Spain, and explicitly declared that she had no wish or intention of appropriating the island to herself. Lord Malmesbury made a similar avowal on behalf of the English government, but Mr. Everett stated that this government could not, for various reasons which he proceeded to enumerate, enter into an agreement to pledge itself for all time, no matter what the circumstances, not to consider the possibility of the acquisition of Cuba. One of the reasons was that such a convention would be an entangling alliance contrary to the oldest traditions of the government; another, that such an agreement, though equal in terms, would be very unequal in substance. Cuba lay close to our shores, commanded the approach to the Gulf and to the entrance of

the Mississippi. "If," he said, "an island like Cuba, belonging to the Spanish crown, guarded the entrance of the Thames and the Seine, and the United States should propose a convention like this to France and England, those powers would assuredly feel that the disability assumed by ourselves was far less serious than that which we asked them to assume."

Mr. Everett said further that while opinions differed as to the desirability of the United States acquiring Cuba, there might come a time when it would be essential to our safety. "Still," he added, "the President thinks that the incorporation of the island into the Union at the present time, although effected with the consent of Spain, would be a hazardous measure; and he would consider its acquisition by force, except in a just war with Spain (should an event so greatly to be deprecated take place), as a disgrace to the civilization of the age." He pointed out how, in spite of annoyances to which the United States had been subjected by acts of the Captain-General in Cuba, the President had thrown the whole force of his constitutional power against all illegal attacks upon the island. "A respectful sympathy," he added, "with the fortunes of an ancient ally and a gallant people, with whom the United States has ever maintained the most friendly relations, would, if no other reason existed, make it our duty to leave her in the undisturbed possession of this little remnant of her mighty trans-Atlantic empire. The President desires to do so; no word or deed of his will ever question her title or shake her possession. But can it be expected to last very long? Can it resist this mighty current in the fortunes of the world? Is it desirable that it should do so? Can it be for the interest of Spain to cling to a possession that can only be maintained by a garrison of 25,000 or 30,000 troops, a powerful naval force, and an annual expenditure for both arms and service of at least \$12,000,000? Cuba at this moment costs more to Spain than the entire naval and military establishments of the United States costs the Federal government. So far from being really injured by the loss of the island, there is

no doubt that were it peacefully transferred to the United States a prosperous commerce between Cuba and Spain, resulting from ancient associations and common language, would be far more productive than the best contrived system of colonial taxation. . . . I will but allude to an evil of the first magnitude: I mean the African slave trade, in the suppression of which France and England take a lively interest — an evil which still forms a great reproach upon the civilization of Christendom, and perpetuates the barbarism of Africa, but for which, it is to be feared, there is no hope of a complete remedy while Cuba remains a Spanish colony.”

Thus were France and England a half century ago given to understand that, while we could not consent to any other European power than Spain occupying Cuba, we might under certain contingencies feel compelled to take it to ourselves; but not for the aggrandizement of slave power.

But in the following year the Whig administration, whose sentiments Everett had expressed, ended, and the party whose politics were largely dominated by the defenders of slavery came into power. An ardent Southern expansionist, Pierre Soulé, a Frenchman by birth, was sent to the Madrid mission. Marcy, the new Secretary of State, sent him instructions which went much further than the judicial argument of Everett, and which indicated how closely bound up in Cuba and its illegitimate slave trade was the cause of slavery in this country. This fact is more forcibly and less diplomatically expressed in the private letters of General Quitman of Mississippi, who could boast for his filibustering schemes many sympathizers in Congress and even in the administration. “Our destiny is intertwined,” he said, “with that of Cuba. If slave institutions perish there, they will perish here. Thus interested, we must act.” Marcy wrote to Soulé that, under certain circumstances, the United States would be willing to purchase, but he did not believe that Spain would entertain negotiations, and he felt convinced that Spain was under obligations to Great Britain and France not to transfer the island to the

United States. "Independent of any embarrassment of this nature," he added significantly, "there are many other reasons for believing that Spain will pertinaciously hold on to Cuba, and that the separation, whenever it takes place, will be the work of violence."

The selection of Soulé for a mission which had been graced by such distinguished Americans as Washington Irving, showed to what straits the slave party were reduced to carry out their plans. Soulé was an exile from France for being a conspirator against the French Bourbons, and Napoleon III. heartily disliked him. He was a sympathizer with the filibusters, and not long before his departure for Spain had made a speech in public praising Lopez and his deeds, but he was formally received at Madrid, though he quickly involved himself in difficulties. Not long after his arrival, with his wife and son he attended a ball at the house of Admiral Turgot, the French ambassador, in honor of the Empress Eugénie, whose sister had married the Duke of Alva. During the evening the Duke innocently enough remarked that Mrs. Soulé, who was dressed in green velvet, looked like Mary of Burgundy. Young Soulé heard it, and at once challenged the Duke of Alva, and although the latter disclaimed any intention of being rude to Mrs. Soulé, the duel took place and no one was hurt. But the elder Soulé, having heard that the remarked had first proceeded from the mouth of Turgot, at whose house the ball was given, immediately challenged the French ambassador, and they fought the next morning with pistols, Turgot receiving a ball in his knee, which for a long time impaired his health. These affairs made Soulé's personality anything but pleasant to Spain and France.

Shortly after this duel the sentiment against Spain in the United States was greatly intensified by the case of the *Black Warrior*, a steamer owned in New York and plying regularly between that port and Mobile. She was the largest steamer in the coasting trade, and possessed accommodations for 200 cabin passengers. In going and returning, she touched at

Havana to deliver and receive mail and passengers, but not for the purpose of discharging or taking on any freight. The custom laws at Havana were very strict, and under them she should have exhibited each time a manifest of her cargo. This, of course, would have been to no purpose as no cargo was to be moved, so she usually entered Havana and cleared as "in ballast" to save time and trouble. She had so entered and cleared thirty-six times in succession, with the full knowledge and consent of the Spanish custom officers, and in accordance with a written general order given by the authorities seven years before. Stopping at Havana as usual in February, 1854, the steamer was held in the harbor for having an undeclared cargo. The cargo was confiscated and taken on shore, and a fine of more than twice its value was imposed on the captain and his vessel. The captain refused to pay, protesting against the whole proceeding as wrongful. He declared it a forcible seizure, and, hauling down his colors, left his vessel as a Spanish capture and made his way back to the United States, where the owners preferred a claim for \$300,000 indemnity.

Soulé meanwhile had applied every art of menace and cajolery to induce Spain to cede Cuba to the United States, and in accordance with his instructions from Marcy protested against any interference from other European powers in the negotiations. Spain proudly spurned all negotiations on the subject. The minister declared in the Cortes that such a sale would be "the sale of Spanish honor itself." Then came from Washington a demand for redress for the *Black Warrior* seizure.

In order to impress the governments of Europe as well as their own, the ministers to England, France, and Spain, Buchanan, Mason, and Soulé, respectively, all eager to add Cuba to our slave territory, at the suggestion of Secretary Marcy called a conference of themselves at Ostend in October, 1854. They conferred three days, and then transferred their deliberations to Aix-la-Chapelle, where they drew up the re-

port which became known as the Ostend Manifesto. It was proposed that our government should make a bold strike for Cuba, and that an immediate and earnest effort should be made to purchase it from Spain at a price not exceeding a certain maximum, which was between themselves and the administration fixed at \$120,000,000. They declared that our proposal to Spain should be open and frank, so as to challenge the approbation of the world, and such a transfer, they urged, would be beneficial to Spain and to all the commercial nations of Europe. What with her own oppression and the danger of insurrectionary troubles, they said, Spain, unless she sold, might lose Cuba and the price as well. Finally, supposing a price should be refused, the question would remain, they declared, whether Cuba in the hands of Spain did not endanger our internal peace and the existence of our Union; and if so, we should be justified by every law, human and divine, in wresting it from her.

But this remarkable manifesto did not produce the desired effect. President Pierce was too prudent to at once follow such reckless advice, and the Kansas-Nebraska trouble soon furnished him with enough to attend to, especially as it made the North determined to allow of no more territorial acquisitions till the slavery question was settled. The impetuous Soulé, observing the hesitation of the government, threw up his commission and returned home in disgust. Thereupon, Spain made compensation for the *Black Warrior*, and both nations exhibited a more peaceful and amiable disposition.

When Buchanan became President, however, the slaveholders thought that the policy of "territorial expansion" would be vigorously prosecuted. His message certainly gave promise of such a policy, and Cuba played a conspicuous part in it. But by this time the anti-slavery sentiment had become strong enough to hold the South in check. Still, Buchanan did his best to keep the Cuban project to the front, even after the elections of 1858 showed that the verdict of the people was against him. When Congress met in December, he spoke

much of Cuba, Mexico, and Central America. He held that if Spain would not sell, self-defense would compel us to annex it by force. Slidell, one of the President's most intimate friends, presented in the Senate a bill proposing to place in the hands of the Executive \$30,000,000 for negotiating the purchase of Cuba, and he made a long report describing in glowing language the advantages to be derived, and strongly reiterating the threat that if Spain would not listen to negotiations, the government of the United States would, by themselves or in assisting the Cubans, drive Spain from the island. But Congress would do nothing in times of such domestic excitement, and Buchanan's advice went unheeded. The position of the parties would have been quite different had Cuba been wanted for the sake of freedom, but the island was an open market for slaves, and was desired for just this reason.

In writing to Tocqueville in 1858, Charles Sumner said: "Why will not Spain follow the example of other European powers — and now of Russia — and declare emancipation in her colonies? This would do more to settle the slavery question than any blow ever before struck. It would at once take Cuba from the field of Mr. Buchanan's lawless desires and destroy the ailment of the filibusters; besides, it would be an act of noble justice as well as of wise statesmanship." He considered that the neck of slavery was in Cuba, and if it could be severed there it could not last longer in the United States. But the question was to be settled in another way, and when the war broke out this unpleasant chapter in the relations of the United States to Cuba was closed.

During this decade Cubans bore the ever-increasing weight of oppression in a spirit of hopefulness, and every attempt to throw it off was impotent, so extensive and thorough was the military espionage. It is not strange that their valor was unequal to the situation when, living in an island smaller than the State of New York, they were under the constant watch of an army larger than was necessary in the whole of the United States. The Spanish government constantly added to the

burden of taxation, and thus the discontent of the people continued to increase. Commerce with the United States was almost destroyed by prohibitory restrictions, and that with the mother country was subjected to a heavy tax.

An American observer in Cuba in the fifties wrote: "Every kind of judicial enormity prevails and every description of imposition is practiced upon the helpless Creole. If he commits a wrong, he is punished without an opportunity of being heard in his own defense; or, what is the same thing, he is tried before a prejudiced tribunal. If he has suffered an injury he finds the means of redress so tedious that endurance is preferable to the formidable task of obtaining justice. There is but one means of avoiding persecution, but one way to escape when persecuted, but one method to obtain justice when seeking ordinary redress — it is bribery. Gold will open prison doors; procure dispensation for falsely imputed crimes; obtain a tardy degree of long-sought justice. Thus personal security is only to be enjoyed at the expense of the right of property."

The effect of these regulations were sometimes minimized by the good fortune to secure as Governor-General a man of more than ordinary honesty and discretion. This was the case under the moderate sway of Serrano and Dulce during our Civil War. The tact of the former did much to allay the irritation caused in the Northern States when Spain recognized the belligerency of the Southern forces over a month before the first battle of the war. This fact kept in mind will offer an interesting comparison to the forbearance shown upon several occasions later by the United States government when Cuban insurgents sought belligerent rights. Though it was the South which really tried to force Spain to give up Cuba, by force of arms if necessary, the moment the South took up arms against the Union, Spain recognized it. It was a feature of Castilian policy which has not been forgotten, even if we have had the wisdom to show no signs of revenge in our own diplomacy towards Spain.

Unquestionably, the abolition of slavery in the United States as a result of the Civil War and the re-establishment of the power of the republic on firm grounds strengthened the liberal sentiment in Cuba and gave rise to renewed movements for its expression. The pleas of the Cubans had so much effect even upon the Spanish government that a liberal ministry which happened to be in power in 1865 accepted a project for a Commission of Inquiry to consider and devise reforms for the Cuban administration. The project was duly set forth in a royal decree and the Cubans formed extravagant hopes upon the results. But the whole scheme was emasculated by the opponents of reform, the devotees of the old system. According to the royal decree the election of the commissioners was to take place in the manner provided for municipal councilmen, that is, by the higher taxpayers composed in three classes, landed property, commerce and industry, and professions. But the Captain-General modified this classification for the occasion by organizing four groups, commerce and industry being divided. It had the effect and doubtless the object of diminishing the number of native voters and doubling the number of Spaniards in whose hands the commerce and city industries were. The commission was further backed by the government which appointed one-half of the commission itself. The result was what might have been expected, and it is needless to dwell upon the efforts of the Cuban reformers who endeavored to impress the Spanish government with the necessities for reform. Instead of a general plan for colonial reform being considered, the commission, whose deliberations were guided by a president appointed by the government, restricted itself to the proposal of certain regulations for slave-labor about which the Cubans cared but little. Their own propositions the commission declined to entertain. They demanded a constitutional system in place of the autocracy of the Captain-General, freedom of the press, the right of petition, cessation of the exclusion of Cubans from public office, unrestricted industrial liberty, abolition of restrictions on the transfer of landed prop-

erty, the right of assembly and association, representation in the Cortes, and local self-government. But none of these proposals would the home government consider. Even the moderate demands of the Cubans for the abolition of slavery were temporized with and nothing was done. The result was that the new Captain-General, Lersundi, tightened the screws on the reformists so that they were worse off than before. To cap it all, a little later an additional 10 per cent. on the direct taxes of the island was imposed.

One of the Cuban deputies to the Cortes, in a speech delivered in 1866, said: "I foresee a catastrophe near at hand, in case Spain persists in remaining deaf to the just reclamations of the Cubans. Look at the old colonies of the American continent. All have ended in conquering their independence. Let Spain not forget the lesson; let the government be just to the colonies that remain. Thus she will consolidate her dominion over people who only desire to be good sons of a worthy mother, but who are not willing to live as slaves under the scepter of a tyrant."

CHAPTER VIII

REVOLUTION IN SPAIN AND INSURRECTION IN CUBA — BEGINNING OF THE TEN-YEARS WAR — CONDITION OF CUBA AT THE TIME.

The Revolution at Cadiz — Wretched Condition of Spain — Flight of Isabella — Her Vain Appeal to Napoleon — Fires of Discontent Break out in Cuba — Promoters of the Insurrection — High Standing of the Leaders — The Proclamation at Yara — Beginning of the Ten-Years War — Condition of Cuba at the Time — Spanish Policy of Exploiting the Island — A System of Robbery by Spanish Officials — Revenues of the Island — Principal Industries — Cities Hopelessly Bankrupt — Immense Salaries of the Officials — Perquisites and how they were Collected — Iniquitous and Unjust Trade Regulations — Taxing Everything the Cuban Produced or Consumed — The Wrongs Admitted by the Spaniards Themselves — Vital Energies of the Island Destroyed — Cuban Hatred of the Spaniard — The Burden no Longer to be Endured — The People Ready to Rise.

MEANWHILE, affairs in Spain had been going from bad to worse. The treasury was well-nigh empty. The air was full of intrigue and conspiracy. At last, on September 19th, the revolution broke out at Cadiz, and a *pronunciamento* was issued setting forth the causes of disaffection in the mother country. It was a long array of charges, all justified. The truth was that the Spanish rulers, still priest-ridden, were clinging to the customs of the middle ages, and the people were at last awakening, but without any adequate training for governing themselves. A provisional government was established, and Isabella fled to France, where she pleaded in vain for Napoleon's help. Napoleon was beginning to have troubles of his own, and it was the Spanish throne which was eventually to form the issue of war leading to the French collapse at Sedan.

While these events were being shaped at home, the Cubans were planning another outbreak of their own, for, disappointed

over the failure of the Commission of Inquiry, and goaded almost to a frenzy by the high-handed methods of Captain-General Lersundi, nothing was left them but another break for liberty. The movement was fast ripening when the news of the Queen's overthrow reached the island, but the change in Spain made no difference with Lersundi's policy. He became even more watchful and oppressive. The plans for insurrection were quietly matured in the eastern provinces of the island by Francisco Aguilera, Manuel Aguilera, and Francisco Osorio at Bayamo, Carlos Céspedes in Manzanillo, Belisario Alvarez in Holguin, Vincente Garcia at Las Tunas, Donato Marmol in Jiguani, and Manuel Fernandez in Santiago. These men were not low-born conspirators. Francisco Aguilera, for example, though born in Cuba, had been highly educated both in the United States and Europe, and was a millionaire when he liberated his slaves and threw himself into the cause of the rebellion against Spanish tyranny. Céspedes had graduated in law at Madrid, and was a man of literary attainments. He had been imprisoned during the conspiracy of Lopez, but since his release had been practicing his profession in Bayamo. It was at his plantation at Yara that the revolution was proclaimed. The leaders had planned to have a simultaneous outbreak on October 10th, but the movement having been discovered by the authorities, Céspedes at once placed himself at the head of 100 poorly-armed men and 200 slaves whom he had liberated. Two days later he was joined by about 4,000 men, and the entire province rose in sympathy with the movement. By the middle of November he had an organized army of 12,000 men, who, though poorly equipped, were united in purpose and of determined will. Thus, in brief, began the Ten-Years War.

It will be well before following the events of this struggle to make an examination of the social and economic condition of Cuba at that time, and of the results of Spanish government, for it will not simply throw light upon the causes of the rebellion but make clearer the later course of events.

In a general way we have seen that the Creoles or white people born on the island were allowed no voice in affairs, and the reason why the Spanish government persistently kept the control in peninsular hands will appear from the method by which revenue was extracted from the island. Spain's improvident monarchs had not merely run the home government heavily into debt, but had by an unwise, short-sighted policy destroyed the industries of the peninsula. Spain's debt being out of all proportion to her diminished resources, it became necessary for her Bourbon majesties to find money to pay the interest and keep up appearances. Cuba was the richest portion of the domains and had no power to protect herself. The problem was, therefore, to squeeze all possible out of the island by Spanish agents.

But if Cuba had been compelled to furnish only so much as would satisfy the home government, her yearly contribution for this purpose being \$7,000,000 or \$8,000,000, her burden would have been very much easier. Unfortunately, to this was added the support of the municipal and provincial government, and the still greater burden of enriching the venal Spanish officials. The office of Captain-General was a brilliant prize for which many aspirants were eagerly struggling, and under the prevailing conditions it followed that the very means calculated to insure success presupposed dishonorable motives. To win influential supporters the candidate was obliged to promise a subsidy to them, and this he expected to obtain by peculation when he reached Cuba. There were no inducements for him, even had he the ability, to study the needs or gain the good-will of those over whom he presided. The princely salary which he received was but a part of his income, and generally coming to the island a poor man, he nearly always returned a rich one, no matter how brief his term of office.

The annual revenue raised in the island in 1868 was approximately \$26,000,000, and preparations had been made to increase it. The revenue in the island in 1857 had been

\$17,790,000, but during Spain's wars with Morocco, Santo Domingo, Mexico, Chile, Peru, and Cochin China, the exactions upon Cuba had been so great that the revenue had nearly doubled, the increase being all out of proportion to the increase in the value of the productions. Early in the sixties Spain adopted the practice of issuing Cuban bonds, pledging the revenues of the island to pay the interest. This plan increased the interest account, and caused a deficit, therefore new methods of taxation were devised. It was estimated that while the people of Spain were paying \$3.23 *per capita* of interest on the national debt, the Cubans, who had had no part nor interest in the contracting of that debt, were paying \$6.39 *per capita*.

It is difficult to obtain satisfactory statistics of Cuba for that period or for any period, for the Spanish officials have little fondness for them, but Cuban writers say that shortly before the war broke out there were in a state of production the following estates:

Stock farms,	2,712
Sugar plantations,	1,521
Coffee plantations,	782
Cattle ranches,	6,175
Cocoa plantations,	18
Cotton plantations,	35
Produce farms,	22,748
Truck farms,	11,738
Tobacco plantations,	11,541
Apiaries,	1,741
Country resorts,	153
Distilleries,	243
Tile works,	468
Lime-kilns,	504
Charcoal furnaces,	63
Cassava-bread factories,	54
Tanneries,	61

The value of this property, together with its appurtenances, was estimated at about \$380,000,000, with a net income of about \$38,000,000.

The cities were hopelessly in debt and were unable to pro-

vide for such necessary improvements as drainage and street cleaning, and it was even said that in Santiago, a city where custom revenues were largely absorbed by official speculation, the municipal gas bills were months in arrears. Education was neglected and the schools were closed. Little was done for the maintenance of hospitals, and there was but one asylum for the insane on the island, and that was at Havana. Elsewhere such unfortunates were kept in the common cells of the jails. Nor should it be supposed that the greater part of the revenue found its way to Spain. The general expenses of the Spanish method of governing an island of 1,500,000 people, less than half of them white, must be considered.

The following were a few of the salaries paid the Spanish officials of Cuba at a time when the President of the United States was receiving \$25,000:

Captain-General,	\$50,000
General Manager of the Treasury,	18,500
The Archbishop of Cuba,	18,000
The Bishop of Havana,	18,000
The Chief of the Arsenals and Dock Yards,	18,000
President of the Court,	15,000
Lieutenant-General,	15,000
Governor of Havana,	8,000
First Secretary of the Governor-General,	8,000
A Field Marshal,	7,500
A Brigadier,	4,500
A Colonel,	3,450
A Collector of Customs,	4,000

There was a whole retinue of other officials, chiefs of bureaus, and subordinates with large emoluments for their services. But beyond this were what we call "perquisites," incident to all offices, civil and ecclesiastical, from the highest to the lowest. These were not fixed by ordinance, but by custom, and they varied according to the character of the men. They might be obtained in various ways. Just a little to a customs official would make the greatest difference in his behavior as to baggage or cargoes. How nicely it might be arranged can be seen from the usual way of collecting the in-

come tax. A planter, for instance, would hand in a return putting his income at \$10,000. The collector let the planter know that he was greatly dissatisfied, and that the figure should be at least \$15,000. The planter, of course, knew what the collector meant, and that it might be worse for him if he did not take the hint, so he would offer to split the difference and make it \$12,500. The collector, with much politeness and many assurances of his desire to be obliging, would accept the compromise. But the tax on the extra \$2,500 went into the collector's pocket and the original assessment of \$10,000 remained on the books. It has been estimated that the peculations in various ways at the custom house at Havana amounted to 40 per cent., and at Santiago 70 per cent. of the entire receipts.

All this, of course, amounted to a tax on industry and commerce which could thrive only in spite of such obstacles. Even if the customs laws had not been subject to these abuses they would have operated heavily against the industry and commerce of the people. The Spanish officials were not blind to the injustice of the laws, but as they profited by them and gathered all they could in anticipation of returning shortly to Spain and maintaining that splendid appearance so dear to the Spanish heart, they usually remained quiet. Only occasionally was there an officer who had the conscience or the courage to complain to the home government. Captain-General Dulce, whose sway was so moderate and whose efforts to remedy abuses so energetic that the other officials forced his recall, said in a letter to the Minister for the Colonies in 1867: "The cause of the trouble and inquietude which appears in the island of Cuba should be sought to a great extent in the tariff laws, which, under the pretext of protection, make impossible a commerce carried on in good faith. . . . The custom house system is very expensive, overloaded with formalities which do not prevent fraud but which embarrass and annoy honest trade."

Spain managed to retain almost a monopoly of the trade of

Cuba through differential duties, while making the Cubans pay extremely high for articles received from the mother country. The duty on flour was so heavy that only a small portion of the people indulged in wheat bread. In Spain the annual consumption of bread was 400 pounds *per capita*, while in Cuba it was fifty-three pounds nine ounces. A barrel of flour could be bought in New York and carried to some port in Spain, whereby it became Spanish flour; then it could be reshipped across the ocean and sold in Havana for \$8.25, while if the barrel had been shipped direct from New York to Havana it would have cost the dealer \$10.46. A similar state of things pertained to the postal regulations. A letter from Europe, although prepaid, could not be taken from the post-office till twenty-five cents had been paid. If it were delivered, the charge was thirty-seven and a half cents. All sorts of mail matter was treated in the same way.

If anyone carried firearms for his personal safety or kept them for defense, he had to pay a heavy license, and a strict search was regularly made for unlicensed firearms. The Civil Guards cost nearly \$3,000,000, and the maintenance of the troops, without counting the chief officials who received large salaries and allowances, or the commissions, buildings, and supplies, cost about \$4,000,000 more.

With such a climate and such a soil Cuba should have been one of the richest portions of the earth. Nature had been bountiful with her, and it was no wonder that the Abbé Raynal had pronounced her the boulevard of the new world, and that the Spanish historian had called her the fairest emerald in the crown of Ferdinand and Isabella. Could she have fallen to almost any other government in Christendom, the island could have been a vast, smiling garden, but from the first to last it had been the unvarying policy of the government to oppress and rob the people, to extort the last possible *peseta*. Finally, it became impossible for legitimate business to sustain itself in the face of the increased exactions. Coffee and cotton planting were practically driven from the island,

where they might have proved an enormous source of revenue. In every way Spain had carried her system to the utmost of audacity and severity.

One who made some observations in Cuba before the insurrection wrote: "It has been my lot in life to mix a good deal with discontented people — rebels, revolutionists, reformers, and, in fact, all categories of men who look upon themselves as oppressed. . . . But until I listened to Cubans giving vent to their hatred of Spain, I never had any conception with what diabolical hatred one nation can look upon another. There is no use in attempting to paint the feelings of the Cubans still under the power of Spain for the race from which they have sprung, because all painting would be a weak and ineffectual representation of the reality. In all probability, if the present disturbed state of affairs continues in Spain, the pent-up rage of this much-oppressed people will find vent in a new Sicilian vespers; and, if it were not for the fear of exposing their families to a renewal of the insults and outrages to which they were subjected after the first reverses of the revolution, the attempt would have long since been made."

The underlying principle of Spanish law as applied to the Cubans was that every accused Cuban is guilty until he proves himself innocent. The result was an endless number of arrests and few trials. Arrested persons were led to Morro Castle, and, when the doors closed, hope was left behind. Few ever came out, and still there seemed always to be room for more. Executions thinned out some, starvation some. It was not considered safe to inquire after details. Persons arrested for complicity in some supposed conspiracy simply disappeared; no one knew whether they had a trial or not, and their friends feared to press their defense lest they, too, might be incarcerated.

Cuba had not failed to ask for justice and redress. The people, before shouldering the rifle, pleaded for their rights. Far-sighted men had denounced the cancer of slavery, the

horrors of the traffic in slaves, the corruption of the office-holders, the abuses of the government, the discontent of the people with their forced state of political tutelage. No attention was given to them, and this brought on the first armed conflicts.

Before the insurrection of 1868 the reform party, which included the most enlightened, wealthy, and influential Cubans, exhausted all the resources within their reach to induce Spain to initiate a healthy change in her Cuban policy. Having succeeded in leading the Spanish government to make an inquiry into the economical, political, and social condition of Cuba, they presented a complete plan of government which satisfied public requirements as well as the aspirations of the people. The Spanish government disdainfully cast aside the proposition, increased taxation, and proceeded to its exaction with extreme severity.

If any further justification were needed for the uprising, it could certainly be had from the lips of the Spaniards themselves. A few months after the war broke out the minister of transmarine affairs at Madrid said in an official paper: "A change of system, political as well as administrative, is imperatively demanded." When a Spanish official was willing to concede so much respecting the state of affairs in Cuba, no further evidence is required concerning the outrageous tyranny to which the Cubans were subjected.

CHAPTER IX

COURSE OF THE STRUGGLE—FORMATION OF THE REPUBLIC—OUTRAGES BY SPANISH VOLUNTEERS—HEROISM OF CUBAN WOMEN—MYSTERIES OF MORRO CASTLE.

Rapid Growth of the Insurrection—Forced to Adopt Guerrilla Methods—Cuban Leaders Refuse to Consider More Spanish Promises—They Declare the Abolition of Slavery—Meet to Form a Government—Successful Landing of Arms and Ammunition—Spain Increases Her Forces—Obtains Her Supplies in the United States—Treats the United States Insolently—The Spanish Volunteers—Excesses of Cruelty—Cuban Successes—Arrest of University Boys—Their Sentence and the Execution—Guerrilla Tactics—Diminution of Spanish Forces—Heroism of Cuban Women—Mysteries of Morro Castle—Further Efforts to Secure Peace—Disagreement among the Insurgents—The Rebellion Nearly at a Standstill—A Typical Engagement—Terrible Destruction of Property—Campos Sent to the Island—An Armistice—The Treaty of Zanjón.

WITHIN a few weeks Céspedes had gathered about him nearly fifteen thousand men, all resolute and eager, but, unfortunately, poorly armed and equipped. The plans of the revolutionists having been discovered while still immature, war began before arms could be smuggled into the island, and, as the Spanish held all the sea-ports, the insurgents were forced to rely almost entirely upon guerrilla methods. Still, for the first two years they were victorious in many engagements, and were generally successful, hostilities being mainly confined to the two eastern provinces. During the winter of 1868-69 the struggle centered along the railway from Nuevitas to Puerto Principe, and the Cubans became the masters of the country. One after another of the important towns of the interior were captured in the guerrilla campaign under the leadership of Manuel Quesada, and the Spanish forces, which included 40,000 regulars and 70,000 volunteers, were repeatedly beaten off

by a Cuban force which could not have consisted of more than 30,000. Hundreds were ready to flock to the rebel standard, but it was useless to increase the army faster than it could be armed. To do this, the leaders were compelled to depend mainly upon what arms and ammunition they could capture from the Spanish. The coast was continually patrolled by a Spanish squadron of light-draught gunboats, so that little help from outside could be gained. Nothing but these ships, however, prevented the Cubans from capturing some of the seaports.

At this stage the Spanish ministry recalled Lersundi, and returned the former Captain-General, Domingo Dulce, who had stood well with the Cuban people because of his moderate policy. Dulce at once issued a proclamation appealing for peace, offering a general amnesty and promising a consideration of grievances when order was restored, but the Cuban leaders were bent upon absolute freedom and refused to listen to proposals to lay down their arms. They had been tricked by such Spanish promises before.

One of the two great questions at issue between the Cubans and Spain was understood to be the future condition of the negroes. A Cuban assembly meeting on February 26, 1869, in the district of Las Villas, declared for the immediate abolition of slavery "in the name of liberty and the people," but the act met with no response from Spain, though many of her wisest statesmen were in favor of such abolition. This declaration was the cause of an uprising in the Las Villas district, led by a Polander named Roloff, who succeeded in driving out the Spanish soldiers and holding them in check.

On April 10th, while the Cubans were gaining ground, a Constituent Assembly of Cuban representatives met at Guaimaro, framed a constitution for the Republic of Cuba, and elected Céspedes as President, Francisco Aguilero as Vice-President, and Manuel Quesada as military commander. In a short time rights of belligerency were accorded them by Chile, Bolivia, Guatemala, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.

In May two expeditions were successfully landed under the command of Rafael Quesada and Colonel Thomas Jordan, but the supplies of arms and ammunition thus introduced were insufficient for the hundreds of fighting men who were eager to flock to the insurgent standard. Meanwhile, the Spanish navy had been reinforced by about thirty vessels purchased in the United States and converted into gunboats, and these, in addition to the large fleet already patrolling the coast, made the landing of filibustering expeditions a very difficult matter. Thus it was that the United States afforded more help to Spain than to the Cubans, with whom most of our people were in sympathy. This had been the case in all revolutionary movements in Cuba, the requirements of international law being upheld by our government. Spain, whose supremacy was thereby recognized, was enabled to carry in stores of all kinds from the United States, and by this means to keep her army in the field. Spain's industries were in an impoverished condition, and but for what the Spaniards in Cuba were enabled to purchase in the United States, the Cubans would probably have pushed on to victory in spite of their small supplies of ammunition and arms. Yet Spain treated us this time in an insolent and haughty manner, simply because, notwithstanding the vigilance of the United States officials and of the Spanish consuls and spies, attempts were made by private parties to fit out expeditions in aid of the Cubans.

As the war progressed, the people of the United States could not restrain their indignation at the Spanish operations on the island. In the first place the Cubans continued to win victories in the face of obstacles. The yellow fever made havoc with the conscripted Spanish soldiers, and they were utterly untrained for the guerrilla tactics by which, at the end of 1870, the Cubans had gradually strengthened their hold on the eastern half of the island. In the second place, the conduct of the Spanish soldiers in the western part of the island, where, according to Spanish reports, peace reigned, was sufficient to rouse the anger even of those friendly to Spain.

One of the measures adopted by Spain while in a state of civil disturbance was the formation of volunteer battalions or home guards. Their officers found it almost impossible to enforce discipline among them, and they were responsible for many outrages and excesses of malicious cruelty. They were placed on duty in the cities, which they were supposed to defend, but which they terrorized much after the manner of brigands. So uncontrollable were they that they practically made and unmade their own officers, and, in June, 1870, they actually arrested and deported Captain-General Dulce because they considered him too lenient against the insurgents. The Spanish government tamely submitted to the excesses of the Volunteers, and this outrage was followed by a similar deposition of General Lopez-Pinto, commander of Matanzas.

The new Captain-General, Rodas, proved to be a man after their own heart, shooting prisoners of war without restraint. He made a great show of putting down the rebellion, called for reinforcements, and received them on his assurance that he would quickly bring the rebellion to an end; but, as a matter of fact, his forces were invariably worsted in the field by the Cubans, who would lay in wait for the Spanish detachments and slaughter them by a murderous fire from ambush. The result was that in six months Rodas was recalled, and in December, 1870, Balmaceda took his place. He could do little against the insurgents, whose guerrilla warfare continued to baffle the regular troops, but the outrages of the home guards in the cities of the west became more and more fiendish. Some 20,000 of these forces were concentrated in Havana, and about twice as many more in other parts of the island.

In November, 1871, a glass plate at the public tomb of Havana, where the body of one of the home guards had been placed, was found to have been defaced by some obnoxious writing. Suspicion pointed to some of the students of the University of Havana, and forty-three of these boys were arrested and put on trial. So arbitrary was the act that an officer of the regular army voluntarily defended them before

the military tribunal, and they were acquitted for lack of evidence. But the Volunteers were not satisfied, and they demanded of the cowardly Governor-General a second court-martial composed of their own officers. The Captain-General partly acceded to their request, and appointed to the court nine Volunteers, five regular army captains, and a major, with a colonel as judge advocate. The Volunteers thus had the majority of the court, and were at once the accusers and the judge. The result was that eight were sentenced to be shot, thirty-one were sentenced to imprisonment, and four were acquitted. The next morning, November 27th, 15,000 of the Volunteers paraded to the scene of the execution; the occasion was a sort of fête for the bloodthirsty guards, and the boys were cruelly and unjustly shot. Naturally, the affair sent a thrill of horror through the civilized world. The Spanish Cortes, to keep up appearances, passed a vote of censure, but nothing was done to punish the movers in the outrage.

During the campaign of 1871 the insurgents were enabled to secure considerable stores of ammunition and arms, largely from the Spanish, and the campaign of 1872 was practically a repetition of its predecessor. The insurgents, compelled to be very saving of their ammunition, confined their open attacks to such small bodies of Spaniards as they could overcome, eluding the larger ones, which were nevertheless continually harrassed by sharp attacks and retreats, while exposure and disease killed more of the unacclimated than artillery in the hands of the rebels could have done. Some of the Cuban forces under General Agramonte in the district of Camagüey, in Central Cuba, were so short of supplies and weapons that they offered to lay down their arms if their lives would be spared. The Captain-General accepted the proposition, offering it as evidence to the outside world that the rebellion was near its end. But General Agramonte, who refused to yield and was left with only thirty-five men, organized a body of cavalry and maintained the war with considerable success.

The authorities were determined to prevent supplies

from falling into the hands of the insurgents, and they not only maintained the strictest watch of the coasts to intercept expeditions but instituted a most severe espionage over the Cuban families, who naturally sympathized with the patriot forces, and whose patriotism was far from being crushed by danger. The Cuban women even found ways to give their most valuable jewels as a contribution to the cause of liberty.

Very heroic were some of their efforts. In 1872, some ladies in Havana put their diamonds and other valuable jewels together to realize money with which to assist the Cuban leaders. The jewels were given to a young brother of one of the ladies to sell, a very difficult proceeding without raising the suspicion of the authorities. But he finally succeeded in realizing something over \$4,000 for the jewels and in forwarding the money to Céspedes through a safe channel.

Hardly had he accomplished this before he was denounced as a suspicious person, and was at once arrested and thrown into Morro Castle, where he was subjected to the closest examination in the effort to discover his accomplices. It was never discovered how his complicity was divulged, though it was supposed that one of the Jewish pawnbrokers had informed the authorities in order to make himself safe. In spite of tortures, the young man refused to disclose anything as to his accomplices, though he was finally offered his freedom and permission to leave the island if he would confess all, the idea being that he was a mere tool, and that a dangerous combination of conspirators remained to be discovered.

One of the sisters of the accused determined to assume the whole guilt of the transaction in order to free her brother, but her friends convinced her that such an act would simply lead to the death of both. The young Cuban maintained his silence and suffered all the indignities of imprisonment. He was, in time, it is said, brought before a military tribunal. What the sentence was no one knew. His fate remains a mystery, like that of hundreds of others who entered the gates of the castle prison.

In the fall of 1872 Balmaceda was compelled to relinquish his command provisionally to Ceballos, and, in the following year, definitely to General Pieltan, who thought to bring the war to a close by negotiations. He made repeated efforts to induce the Cuban leaders to accept peace without independence, but always without success.

The skirmishing of the insurgents was carried on vigorously in 1873, and the war really reached its climax. But in the fall of that year disagreements arose among the Cubans themselves. The Cuban Congress met at Bijagual in December, and a majority being hostile to the policy of President Céspedes, he was deposed. He retired to San Lorenzo, where he was surprised by a detachment of Spanish troops, and though he escaped, he was mortally wounded, and died on March 22, 1874. He had given up everything for the cause of Cuba's freedom, and at the time of his death was practically homeless and deserted.

Much difficulty was found in selecting his successor, but Cisneros, a scion of the old Spanish nobility, and a man of high social rank and abilities, was provisionally elected. In joining the revolution he had renounced his title, and his estates had been confiscated. But the disagreements among the Cuban leaders caused widespread disaffection, and for a time the rebellion was nearly at a standstill. It might have ended but for the fact that the Spaniards themselves were in discord. As the campaign in the field had given the Spaniards no advantage, Jovellar, who had succeeded Pieltan as Captain-General, determined to take vigorous measures. He declared the whole island in a state of siege, conscripted every able-bodied man into the military service, and drafted ten per cent. of them into the field. This raised a storm of protests from the citizens and brought down upon him the hatred of the Volunteers. The outcome so utterly disgusted him that he asked to be relieved, and he was succeeded in the summer of 1874 by General Concha. With him came more reinforcements and he entered upon an energetic field campaign, de-

feating in September a large body of insurgents at Yarayaba. His own forces were, however, so crippled and demoralized by the engagement that the victory was practically fruitless.

After six years of this desultory fighting the end seemed as far off as ever. Without a navy there seemed to be no possibility of the Cubans ejecting the Spaniards from the island, while the Spaniards were able to do no more than drive the insurgents from one place to another. Meanwhile, it was costing Spain an immense amount of money and was well-nigh ruining Cuba. "The marvel is," wrote one who was in Cuba in 1873, "that such skirmishing should go on from day to day for four years without more decisive results. There can be little doubt about the ruthless character of these Cuban hostilities. Printed reports of massacre and torture may be wildly exaggerated; but there can be no doubt that there is a vast deal of shooting in cold blood; and property fares no better than life in the belligerent's hands. I know from the very best authority that in the district of Trinidad de Cuba, one of the oldest settlements in the center of the island, about two-thirds of the sugar and coffee estates and of the grazing farms were either destroyed or abandoned before the end of 1871. That magnificent valley was turned into a state of desolation from which it will need years of peace to recover. The same has been the fate of many settlements in the central districts."

Up to this time Spain had been regularly sending fresh levies of Spanish youths to the island, only to fall by disease, or in skirmishes with an enemy which came upon them suddenly and as suddenly disappeared to await another opportunity. The Volunteers were never brought into the field to any extent, being allowed to play the bandit in the cities. But when the Carlist wars came on it became impossible for Spain to spare recruits, and the constantly diminishing forces gradually fell back before the insurgents.

In 1876, the Carlist uprising in Spain having been subdued and Alfonso XII. placed upon the throne, General Martinez de Campos, who had won distinction in putting an end



FURIOUS CHARGE OF CUBAN INSURGENTS AGAINST SPANISH INFANTRY.

to the republic and restoring the Bourbon dynasty, was sent to Cuba with 25,000 veterans of the Carlist wars to end the insurrection. He had had experience in Cuban warfare, yet notwithstanding his experience and energy, and that of his veterans and recruits, and in spite of the dissensions among the insurgents, he made little headway. The latter easily eluded the larger forces sent against them, and overpowered smaller detachments. The hot season was again coming on, and the Spanish troops were weakening under the effects of the climate, when Campos determined to undertake negotiations for a peace. Early in 1878, both sides being well-nigh exhausted, he succeeded in obtaining an armistice.

The headquarters of the insurgents were then in Camagüey, and there the insurgent leaders met to consider the overtures. A commission of nine generals, with Garcia, who had succeeded Cisneros as president, were appointed to meet General Campos and a number of his officers at the camp of St. Augustin near Zanjón. This they did on February 10th, and there they signed the compact known as the peace of Zanjón, by which the Cubans gave up their struggle for independence, and the Spaniards promised the reforms which it had refused to grant in 1867 after the Commission of Inquiry. By the articles of this agreement Spain conceded to the island of Cuba the same political privileges, organic and administrative, enjoyed by the island of Puerto Rico, and granted complete amnesty as regards political offences. Those remaining under trial or sentence would be given their liberty, and a general pardon was given to deserters from the Spanish army.

Freedom to slaves in the insurgent ranks was granted, and no insurgent should be compelled to render military service to the Spanish government till peace should have been established, while the government would lend aid and protection to all desiring to leave the island. Insurgents were publicly to lay down their arms, railroad and steamship facilities being afforded to all sections of the insurgent army repairing to the place appointed for the surrender of their arms.

CHAPTER X

SPAIN'S STRAINED RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES DURING THE TEN-YEARS WAR—THE *VIRGINIUS* AFFAIR —A RACE FOR LIFE—EXECUTION OF CAPTAIN FRY AND HIS COMPANIONS.

Situation Changed after the American Civil War—Spanish Fears—President Grant's Pacific Tenders—Significant Reply of Spain—Remarkable Decree of the Captain-General of Cuba—To be Shot Like Pirates—Methods of Spanish Warfare—The *Virginius*—Circumstances of Her Departure—Sighted by the Spanish Cruiser *Tornado*—A Lively Chase—Burning Hams to Keep up Steam—Horses and Arms Thrown Overboard—A Race on the Moonlit Caribbean—Captured and Taken to Santiago—The First Execution of Prisoners—The American Consul's Messages Delayed—He Asks for an Explanation—An Impudent Note in Reply—Further Executions—Captain Fry's Death—His Pathetic Letter to His Wife the Night before His Death—Arrival of a British Gunboat.

LEAVING now the Cubans who, supposing that they were to receive at last some measure of that for which they had been so long pleading and fighting, were about to lay down their arms, it will be necessary to return to the beginning of the war of 1868 and observe the manner in which it affected the United States and its relations with both the island and Spain. The importance of this struggle consists not so much in what the Cubans gained, for they really gained nothing, as we shall see, nor in what the Spaniards learned, for they learned nothing, as will also be apparent, but it consists in the position which the United States felt obliged to assume in the struggle, and which, when understood, will make clearer the reasons for intervention in 1898, twenty years after the close of the war. Public and political interest in the United States during the struggle was largely confined to the question of the recognition of the Cubans and to what is known as "the *Virginius* affair."

The Civil War had well-nigh swept out of the public mind the frantic efforts of Buchanan, Marcy, and others to secure Cuba, and the situation was greatly altered. Slavery had been destroyed in this country and retained its foothold in this hemisphere in Cuba alone. Castellar and others had said in the Cortes that they wished slavery abolished in Cuba. When the standard of insurrection was raised at Yara a Spanish minister had spoken to our representative at Madrid of "the common interests shared by the United States and Spain in Cuba," and had added, "that whatever retarded the prosperity of the island was injurious alike to both countries; the welfare of Cuba was of more commercial importance to the United States than to the mother country." Doubtless, the Spanish minister was haunted by a fear that the United States might, in a spirit of revenge which would have been so natural to a Spaniard, recognize the belligerency of the Cubans before hostilities were well begun, as Spain had recognized the confederacy eight years before; and it required uncommon assurance for him to speak of the commercial interests of the United States and Spain in Cuba when Spain did everything it could by discriminating duties to injure Cuban commerce with the United States. The Spanish minister might have added that the interest of the United States in Cuba was heightened by a desire that the struggle just beginning might end in its acquisition of self government and in the abolition of slavery.

General Grant, who became President in March, 1869, tendered the good offices of the United States for the purpose of restoring peace in the island, and General Prim, as the representative of the Spanish government, had replied: "We can better proceed in the present situation of things without even this friendly intervention. A time will come when the good offices of the United States will not only be useful, but indispensable in the final arrangements between Cuba and Spain." But that time did not come, and the struggle had not proceeded far before it was apparent that the United States must become very seriously interested in the way the Spanish

authorities were conducting the war, and in the manner in which the rights of American citizens and of American commerce were being violated.

President Grant, with some members of his cabinet, was decidedly in favor of recognizing the belligerency of the Cubans. Senator Sumner, chairman of the committee on foreign relations, was strongly opposed to it. The one was a man of war, the other a student of international relations. Grant looked at it as a practical problem in warfare; he, doubtless, reasoned that we were under no moral obligations to Spain which, with such undue haste, had recognized the belligerency of the confederates and still defended that slave power against which he had worked out his great campaigns and won such magnificent victories. Sumner hoped that Spain would herself abolish slavery and grant self-government to the Cubans, and he had the further reason, which was certainly a good one, that he did not wish our standing in the case of the *Alabama* claims against England to be weakened by a hasty recognition of insurgents in Cuba. In one of their interviews Grant asked Sumner how it would do to issue a proclamation with regard to Cuba identical with that issued by Spain with regard to us?

"I advised against it," wrote Sumner to Motley. "He is very confident that the Cubans will succeed. On the same day I had a call from two Cubans — one of whom was Aldama, the richest man of the island and an old friend of mine — who had come to solicit the concession of belligerency, saying that with it success was certain, and that without it the island would become a desert. I gave them no encouragement."

Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State, was very close to Sumner, and Sumner's will dominated. But for him, doubtless, Grant would have done his utmost to concede the right of belligerency and the Cubans might have been successful. Spain, with her own wars and that in the island on hand, could hardly have gone to war with us at the time, and belligerent rights would have enabled the Cubans to better secure arms, and,

whereas, we were bound to intercept, if possible, all expeditions with supplies and arms fitted out in our ports for Cuba, Spain was freely buying both ships and supplies from us.

The manner in which Spain repaid us for this consideration of her interests may be seen from the decree of the Captain-General of Cuba, a copy of which arrived at the state department in April, 1869. One portion of this decree was as follows:

“Vessels which may be captured in Spanish waters or on the high seas near to the island, having on board men, arms, and munitions or effects that can in any manner contribute, promote, or foment the insurrection in this province, whatsoever their derivation or destination, after examination of their papers and register shall be *de facto* considered as enemies of the integrity of our territory and treated as pirates, in accordance with the ordinances of the navy.

“All persons captured in such vessels, without regard to their number, will be immediately executed.”

In other words, if an American citizen were caught by Spain near the island with *anything* calculated to contribute to the insurrection, he would be *shot like a pirate!*

Our government at once protested that this was not only a violation of its treaty with Spain of 1795, but a violation of the laws of nations. Secretary Fish added:

“Under that law and treaty, the United States expect for their citizens and vessels the privilege of carrying to the enemies of Spain, whether those enemies be claimed as Spanish subjects or citizens of other countries, subject only to the requirements of a legal blockade, all merchandise not contraband of war. Articles contraband of war when destined for the enemies of Spain are liable to seizure on the high seas, but the right of seizure is limited to such articles only, and no claim for its extension to other merchandise or to persons not in the civil, military, or naval service of the enemies of Spain will be acquiesced in by the United States.

“This government certainly cannot assent to the punishment by Spanish authorities of any citizen of the United States for the exercise of a privilege to which he may be entitled under public law and treaty.”

Almost simultaneously with the receipt of the knowledge of this order of the Captain-General, the Spanish minister at Washington made a complaint “that piratical expeditions are in preparation against the legitimate government of Spain in

Cuba," and requested the President to issue a proclamation to restrain the same. The minister furnished no evidence of any such expeditions and none really existed at that time. No proclamation was then issued, but the regular officers of the United States were instructed to keep a close watch for such expeditions, and, later, several were stopped. But the objectionable decree of the Captain-General was quickly followed by one which concerned the United States quite as much. The course of trade and social intercourse had carried many citizens of the United States into Cuba. They and their property were subject to protection by the United States. But the commander at Bayamo issued a proclamation to the effect that: "Every man, from the age of fifteen years upward, found away from his habitation, who does not prove a justified motive therefor, will be shot; every habitation unoccupied will be burned by the troops; every habitation which does not float a white flag, as a signal that its occupants desire peace, will be reduced to ashes; women that are not living at their own homes or at the house of their relatives will collect in the town of Jiguani or Bayamo, where maintenance will be provided. Those who do not present themselves will be conducted forcibly."

Here was Spain, who would not admit that a state of war existed in Cuba, for that would have given us ample justification for recognition of the Cubans as belligerents, making decrees in Cuba just as if war existed and ordering the confiscation of goods, the shooting of seamen and the destruction of private property, whether the persons involved were citizens of the United States or not. Meanwhile, she was obtaining ships and other supplies from us. She was really attempting to fight the poor Cubans under cover of the United States, and at the same time decreeing an indiscriminate slaughter, which might extend to our citizens and to the destruction of their property.

Under the circumstances, it required a great amount of self-control on the part of our administration to keep

its hands off Spain's neck. When Secretary Fish vigorously protested, the Spanish minister endeavored to justify the outrageous decrees by the code of instruction to our armies in the Civil War, but the Secretary promptly reiterated that these instructions were issued when the country was in a state of war, which Spain would not admit as to Cuba; but even so, throughout the whole Civil War not a prisoner had been shot in cold blood and not a political crime, however grave, had been visited by capital punishment. There were many instances in which the property and rights of American citizens who had no connection with the insurrection in Cuba were interfered with, and although Spain made many promises, restitution was being continually postponed on various pretexts, which our government did not consider as evidences of good faith.

The Spanish minister kept complaining to the State Department of alleged expeditions which were being fitted out for the insurgents, but when the United States officers caught the suspected parties, Spain could bring forth no evidence. "The characteristics of vagueness, indefiniteness, and absolute uncertainty," wrote Secretary Fish, "have marked all the information furnished or proposed to be furnished by Spanish agents, attorneys, or counsel, since the outbreak of the insurrection, as a foundation for proceedings at law against the parties complained of." In the case of most of the expeditions which were intercepted, the United States gathered the information through the vigilance of its own officers, the Spanish agents furnishing none till after the expeditions had been captured and broken up. Yet Spain was continually complaining of our lack of diligence! and she harshly blamed our government for prolonging a war which her best generals were unable to put down.

On the 4th of October, 1870, there sailed from the port of New York the steamer *Virginus*, which had been built in England for use as a blockade runner during the civil war, and which, having been captured, had been brought to the navy

yard at Washington. There she had been purchased at auction by one John F. Patterson, who had taken her to New York and made oath that he was a citizen of the United States, and the sole owner of the vessel. Her custom house bond was in the regular form, there was nothing in her manifest or papers or in the circumstances connected with her departure from New York to attract attention or excite suspicion, and she left, like any of the other hundred vessels leaving the same week, without attracting the attention of the Spanish consul or of the officers of the United States. Her ostensible destination was Curaçoa, in the Dutch West Indies, and it appears that she went there. For three years, indeed, she cruised about the Caribbean Sea, recognized as a vessel of the United States at different ports. The watchful Spanish minister, in a communication to our government several months after the *Virginius* had sailed, enumerated several vessels of which he thought he had cause to complain, but he made no mention of the *Virginius*.

But, while it was not known then, it afterwards appeared that the vessel was in the service of the insurgents. Captain Fry was strongly advised by some of his friends not to take the risk of the venture of landing arms on the island, but he replied that it was easy enough to run around the Spaniards, and he considered it a righteous thing to work for the patriots. "At any rate," he said, "the whole question is one of bread for my family."

On the 23d of October, 1873, or more than three years after she left New York, she regularly cleared from the port of Kingston, Jamaica, for Puerto Limón, Costa Rica. It was the intention of the expeditionists on board to sail direct for the coast of Cuba, but a slight damage to the machinery obliged the vessel to put in at a port of Haiti. This she shortly left, and, after touching at other ports on the same island, the captain concluded on the 30th to attempt a landing on Cuba.

On this day the Spanish consul at Kingston, having heard of suspicions against the *Virginius*, advised the governor at

Santiago that the vessel had recently been seen between Jamaica and Cuba. The Spanish cruiser *Tornado* had that very morning arrived at Santiago, and Governor Burriel at once communicated his information to the commander, who set out to find the alleged filibuster. On the following day the *Tornado*, which was proceeding under sail while work was being done on her engines, came in sight of the *Virginius* cruising close to the Cuban coast. All possible steam was at once put on the *Tornado*, and she was soon running for the *Virginius* with fourteen-knot speed, while Captain Fry, discovering his peril, headed at once for Jamaica. Unfortunately for him, the supply of coal was short and he was soon obliged to burn petroleum, then grease, and fat of any kind; even hams had to be thrown in to keep up steam for speed.

When night closed in both vessels were running at their best, and were in the same relative position, though the *Tornado* seemed to be gaining. It was one of those clear nights when the full moon falling on the Caribbean makes objects visible for long distances, and the *Virginius* was easily kept in sight, especially as the greasy combustibles which she was using caused a thick black smoke to pour continuously from her funnel. Captain Fry saw that he was falling behind in the race and that he might not be able to reach neutral waters in time, and so, to lighten his vessel, horses, cannon, and cases of arms were thrown overboard. It was said afterwards that fully two thousand Remington rifles, a mitrailleuse, and much powder was thrown into the sea to facilitate the flight. But it did not avail.

Although the coast of Jamaica was but a few leagues away, the *Tornado* had come within range, and three shots flew over the *Virginius*, then a shell burst near by, bringing the fugitive to. She was boarded by the Spanish officers and crew, who hauled down her American flag and run up the Spanish ensign. The captain showed his papers and the Spaniards appropriated them. At midnight they turned about for Santiago.

The *Tornado* and her prize were welcomed at the port November 1st by a great crowd of people. The authorities, both civil and military, immediately visited Governor Burriel to felicitate him upon the news, and that evening the governor gave a brilliant reception; the palace was illuminated, the vessels were surrounded by boats filled with bands of music and cheering Volunteers, who made coarse jeers at "the Yankees." The festivities were continued late into the night. The next day a court-martial was held on the *Tornado*, and all but four of the prisoners were sent to jail with an escort followed by a great rabble of the people cheering and jeering.

The *Virginus* had in all 155 persons on board, most of them of Spanish extraction, but the names of at least forty-five indicated that they were either citizens of the United States or of Great Britain. The four upon whom sentence was immediately passed were three Cubans, including General Verona and a brother of the insurgent leader Céspedes, and one American named Ryan. Their execution was fixed for the 4th, and on that day they were marched to a place made famous by the number of executions there. The whole Spanish population of Santiago followed and witnessed the act with great rejoicing. The men were shot in the usual manner, kneeling close to the slaughter-house wall. Two of them were killed at the first shot, but the other two had not been mercifully hit, and a Spanish officer walked up and ran his sword through their hearts. Then the crowd ran in and picked up the bodies, still warm with life, severed the heads, placed them upon pikes, and marched about the city.

Just before the execution an interesting incident took place. There were in Santiago fifteen Spanish officers who at one time had been captured by General Verona, and generously released. They pleaded with the authorities that this act should entitle him to mercy, but no heed was given the appeal. The Spaniards demanded blood, they had had a taste and they demanded more.

As the *Virginus* had cleared as an American vessel and dis-

played the American colors she at least had an apparent claim to protection until it should be proven otherwise, and at least the American and British citizens on board were entitled to the opportunity of acting with the consuls of their countries in the defense of any rights which they might have. Our vice-consul at Santiago, Mr. E. G. Schmitt, therefore, had promptly demanded access to the prisoners, but the provincial governor replied discourteously and to the effect that it was none of the American consul's business, as the prisoners were all pirates and would be treated as such. Mr. Schmitt was even refused the use of the marine cable to communicate with the United States consul at Kingston, where the *Virginus* had cleared. Our consul protested, and meanwhile the form of a court-martial was gone through with, and the three Cubans and one American were shot. On the same day the consul received a reply from the governor, from which the following extract, indicating the character of the Spanish disposition and methods, is made:

"I have received your communications, one dated the 2d inst., and the remaining two the 3d inst.; the first inquiring if it was true that a telegram had been detained by my orders which you had addressed to the United States consul in Kingston, Jamaica, asking information as to the nationality of the steamer *Virginus* seized on the high seas as a pirate by the Spanish cruiser *Tornado*. In my desire to correspond duly to the exquisite zeal which you show in this matter, I would have replied at once to your communication, but, as I received it precisely at the moment of important and peremptory affairs, to which I had to devote myself exclusively; and further, as the past two days were holidays, upon which the officials do not come to the offices, being engaged as well as everyone else in meditation of the divine mysteries of All Saints and the commemoration of All Souls' day, as prescribed by our holy religion; it was impossible for me until early this morning to comply to your wishes. . . .

"Neither could I foresee your desire to repair with such haste to the jail where the prisoners were incarcerated; much less that you desired to do so, showing an officiousness so marked, when you had received from none of them any remonstrance whatever, which they would have made at once through my conduct if their conscience had permitted them to even suppose that they were innocent and worthy of the protection of your vice-consulate, undoubtedly impelled thereto on this occasion for unknown and suspicious purposes. . . .

“Such conduct, especially after you were advised by the fiscal that Mr. O’Ryan was an Englishman, obliges me to apply to the government and propose that your exequatur to perform the duties of your vice-consulate be withdrawn, as an officer who addresses protests so slightly founded, and who after that attempts to surprise the intention of the Spanish authorities, accustomed to act with the rectitude and loyalty known to all, cannot help compromising the honor of the country he represents.”

Having written this reply, the governor seems to have proceeded to the execution of a few prisoners, and the pretended trial of others. Our consul bore himself with dignity and honor. In his reply he said:

“I should have been the last person to disturb the important duties of your Excellency, and the religious meditations which your Excellency’s subordinates were indulging in, had it not been that I consider the case a pressing one and imagined that, where there was sufficient time to censure and detain my telegram, there might have been also time for a few lines of explanation, with the additional motive of my second dispatch, that I observed that the circumstances which your Excellency enumerates were no hindrance to the despatch of other business connected with the steamer. . . .

“I shall therefore abstain from saying anything further on this point, than that it seems to me, considering that the *Virginus* was flying the United States flag at the time of her capture, that she claimed to be a United States merchant steamer, and her papers as such were surrendered by her captain to the boarding officer of the steamer *Tornado*, it would have been a delicate attention on the part of your Excellency to have informed me thereof, and that the use of such flag and papers was an abuse of the goodness of the country which I represent, in order that I might have brought the same to the notice of my government. . . .

“Finally, I note your Excellency’s intention to apply for the revocation of my exequatur, and while ignorant of any cause given therefor, I can only assure your Excellency that my conscience being perfectly clear in the question, and having acted honorably, and as I consider for the best, the result of your Excellency’s application is to me a matter of profound indifference.”

On the 6th there were further court-martial proceedings and thirty-seven more were sentenced to be shot the next morning, including Captain Joseph Fry, the commander of the vessel. Of this man’s indomitable courage in the face of death, and his intense affection for those for whose sakes chiefly he had undertaken this hazardous adventure, the pathetic let-

ter written to his wife the night before his execution bears sufficient testimony.

ON BOARD THE SPANISH MAN-OF-WAR "TORNADO."

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, November 6, '73.

"Dear, dear Dita — When I left you I had no idea that we should never meet again in this world; but it seems strange to me that I should to-night, and on Anne's birthday, be calmly seated on a beautiful moonlight night in a most beautiful bay in Cuba, to take my last leave of you, my own dear sweet wife! And with the thought of your own bitter anguish — my only regret at leaving.

"I have been tried to-day, and the President of the Court Martial asked the favor of embracing me at parting, and clasped me to his heart. I have shaken hands with each of my judges, and the secretary of the court and the interpreter have promised me as a special favor to attend my execution, which will, I am told, be within a few hours after my sentence is pronounced.

"I am told my death will be painless. In short, I have had a very cheerful and pleasant chat about my funeral, to which I shall go a few hours from now; how soon I cannot say yet. It is curious to see how I made friends. Poor Bambetta* pronounced me a gentleman, and he was the brightest and bravest creature I ever saw.

"The priest who gave me communion on board this morning put a double scapular around my neck, and a medal which he intends to wear himself. A young Spanish officer brought me a bright new silk badge with the Blessed Virgin stamped upon it, to wear to my execution for him, and a handsome cross in some fair lady's handiwork. They are to be kept as relics of me. He embraced me affectionately in his room with tears in his eyes.

"Dear Sweetheart, you will be able to bear it for my sake, for I will be with you if God permits. Although I know my hours are short and few, I am not sad. I shall be with you right soon, dear Dita, and you will not be afraid of me. Pray for me, and I will pray with you. There is to be a fearful sacrifice of life, as I think, from the *Virginius*, and, as I think a needless one, as the poor people are unconcious of crime, and even of their fate up to now. I hope God will forgive me if I am to blame for it.

"If you write to President Grant, he will probably order my pay, due when I resigned, to be paid to you after my death. People will be kinder to you now, dear Dita; at least, I hope so. Do not dread death when it comes to you. It will be God's angel of rest,—remember this. I hope my children will forget their father's harshness and remember his love and anxiety for them. May they practice regularly their religion and pray for him always. Tell ——— the last act of my life will be a public profession of my faith and hope in Him of whom we need not be

* A Cuban rebel general, passenger on the *Virginius*.

ashamed; and it is not honest to withhold that public acknowledgment from any false modesty or timidity. May God bless and save us all! Sweet, dear, dear Dita, we will soon meet again. Till then, adieu for the last time."

Your devoted husband,

JOSEPH FRY.

The next morning, with thirty-six others, he was executed. The next day twelve more shared his fate, and probably all the remaining 102 would have been shot but for a sudden interruption. The interest of the British and French consuls and of the authorities in Jamaica had been aroused, for some of the prisoners were British subjects. The British sloop of war *Niobe*, commanded by Sir Lambton Lorraine, left Kingston on the 6th, and on the 8th came flying into Santiago harbor. The commander hastened to land, and at once demanded that the massacre be stopped.

"But Señor," protested the commanding Spanish officer, "what affair is it of yours? There are no countrymen of yours among them. They are all dogs of Americans."

"It makes no difference," replied the gallant captain. "I forbid you to put another one of these men to death."

"But, Señor," returned the Spaniard, haughtily, "permit me to remark that I take my orders from the Captain-General, and not from you."

"Permit me also to remark," replied the captain, "that the *Niobe* is lying in this harbor, with her guns double-shotted, and I am her commander. And, so help me God! if you so much as harm a hair on the head of another one of those prisoners, I will lay your town in ruins." And he went back to his ship.

The Spaniard looked at the *Niobe*, saw the big black muzzles of her guns trained squarely upon the city, and — there were no more *Virginus* prisoners massacred in Santiago.

A few days later a United States man-of-war reached the port and then began the negotiations during which the United States government was brought to the point of ceasing all further temporizing and declaring war.

CHAPTER XI

EFFORTS TO INDUCE SPAIN TO SETTLE—GENERAL SICKLES ASKS FOR HIS PASSPORTS AND SPAIN YIELDS—UNITED STATES INSISTS ON PACIFICATION OF THE ISLAND.

Minister Sickles Visits Castelar upon Hearing of the *Virginus* Affair—Curious Break-down of the Cables at a Critical Moment—Some Impolite Replies—General Sickles Demands his Passports—The Spanish Government Quickly Comes to Terms—The People Impatient to Recognize the Cubans—Remarkable Attitude of Senator Sumner—Fall of the Spanish Republic—America Insists that the Cuban War Must Cease—Intervention Threatened—Spain Makes Another Promise—Forbearance at Washington—Campos Ends the War by the Agreement at Zanjón—Canovas Refuses to be Responsible for the Cuban Settlement—Resignation of Canovas—Campos Forms a Ministry—Disagreements—A Reform Act Passed—Great Cost of the War to Spain—The Emancipation Act—Cuba Still in a State of Insurrection—Exactions of the Government Increased.

THE first intimation of what was taking place reached General Daniel E. Sickles, our minister at Madrid, on the 6th, or the day before Captain Fry's execution, and he hastened to call at the Ministry of State. Spain had meanwhile become a republic, under President Castelar, whom Sickles saw in the evening. Concerning the interview he wrote: "President Castelar received these observations with his usual kindness and told me confidentially that, at seven o'clock in the morning, as soon as he read the telegram from Cuba, and without reference to any international question, for that, indeed, had not occurred to him, he at once sent a message to the Captain-General admonishing him that the death penalty must not be imposed upon any non-combatant without the previous approval of the Cortes, nor upon any person taken in arms against the government without the sanction of the executive."

As not infrequently happens in Spanish diplomacy, this

order failed to get further than Havana, at least, in time to do any good. There were two telegraphic lines between Havana and Santiago, one by the coast and one overland. One of them had been out of repair for some time. Significantly enough, the other failed to work the day that the *Virginus* was brought into port, though it suddenly resumed operations in perfect working order as soon as the *Niobe* came into port. Public feeling was running high in Spain. The press, violent and abusive, advised the government to order General Sickles out of Spain. One night a mob collected to attack and sack the legation, but the authorities interfered. Meanwhile the Spanish in Cuba were threatening all Americans, and in Havana they gave a great fête and bullfight in honor of Governor Burriel, who had ordered the outrage.

General Sickles pressed his remonstrances insistently, and Carvajal, the Spanish Minister of State, thereupon began to couch his replies in the rather insolent language adopted by the governor of Santiago, while Sickles retorted with some very sharp but thoroughly dignified communications. He had been instructed by the Secretary of State to protest most solemnly against the barbarities perpetrated at Santiago, and in communicating with the Spanish government adopted as near as could be the words of the instructions from Washington. To this Carvajal made an exceedingly ill-tempered reply in which he used the expression: "The protest being thus rejected with serene energy." General Sickles, after restating the case firmly and correcting some misconceptions, concluded his reply by saying: "And if at last under the good auspices of Mr. Carvajal, with the aid of that *serenity* which is unmoved by slaughter and that *energy* that rejects the voice of humanity, which even the humblest may utter and the most powerful cannot hush, this government is successful in restoring order and peace and liberty where hitherto, and now, all is tumult and conflict and despotism, the fame of this achievement, not confined to Spain, will reach the continents beyond the seas and gladden the hearts of millions who believe

that the New World discovered by Columbus is the home of freemen and not of slaves." Secretary Fish used strong expressions in his instructions to Sickles. Mere condemnation, disavowal, and depreciation of the act would not, he said, be accepted by the world as sufficient to relieve Spain from participation in a just responsibility for the outrage. There must be punishment of those concerned.

Unable to make any headway in bringing the Spanish government to some agreement as to the settlement of the question, Secretary Fish cabled Sickles to make formal demands. If these were not complied with within twelve days he should leave Madrid. General Sickles did so, and, obtaining no satisfactory response, on the 26th of November he asked for his passports. Spanish bravado at once withered. Carvajal within a few hours sent a note, conceding upon some conditions the demands of the United States that the *Virginius* and the survivors should be given up, the perpetrators of the massacre tried and punished, and the flag of the United States saluted. One condition was that a salute of the flag should not be deemed essential if the Spanish government could bring forward sufficient proofs that the *Virginius* had no right to fly the American flag. A conference was held at Washington between the Secretary of State and the Spanish minister, Don José Polo, and the arrangements were completed. Meanwhile the antecedents of the *Virginius* were inquired into and it was proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that she had no right to carry the American flag. Patterson was not the legal owner of the vessel, the money for her purchase having been furnished by a junta of Cuban sympathizers; her registry, therefore, had been obtained by perjury. This did away with the necessity of Spain's saluting our flag and made it incumbent upon the United States to prosecute the proper persons for violation of navigation laws. The *Virginius* and her survivors were surrendered to the authorities of the United States on December 15th, and while being conveyed to the appointed port she was lost in a storm off Cape Fear.

Then followed a long correspondence over conflicting claims, Spain setting up many counter claims for alleged injury done to Spain by filibustering expeditions. An extract from a long letter by Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State, to Admiral Polo, dated April 18, 1874, will show the feelings of the administration. After reviewing the whole case, Mr. Fish concluded in these words:

“For five years the policy of repression, of confiscation, of summary execution of political prisoners, of refusal of reforms, of denial of self-government, of maintenance of slavery, in short, the policy of violence and force, has held sway in Cuba. It is understood that the insurrection calls to-day for as many troops to keep it in restraint as were necessary in 1869.

“During these five years this government has watched events in Cuba, perhaps, not always patiently, but certainly always impartially. It has seen vessels sailing under its flag intercepted on the high seas and carried into Spanish ports. It has seen the property of its citizens embargoed and their revenues sequestered, and when it has complained it has been met by promises of restoration; but the official assurances of Spain in that respect have in most cases not been complied with. It has seen its citizens condemned to death under the form of military law and executed in violation of the treaty obligations of Spain. It has seen other citizens of the United States mobbed in the streets of Havana for no other reason than that they were citizens of the United States, or the accidental circumstance of the color of the dress. It has stretched its powers and interfered with the liberties of its citizens in order to fulfill all its duties as a sovereign nation toward the power which in Cuba was tolerating the evil influences of reaction and of slavery and of the ‘deplorable and pertinacious tradition of despotism’ referred to by the minister of transmarine affairs, all of which made the things complained of possible. It has refrained from the assertion of its rights under the hope, derived from the constant assurances from the government of Spain, that liberty and self-government would be accorded to Cuba, that African slavery would be driven out from its last resting place in Christendom, and that the instruments of the *Casino Español* would be restrained in their violence and made to obey law and to respect the treaty obligations of Spain.

“But while so doing it expected and still confidently expects the time not to be far distant when Spain will make reparation for the wrongs which have thus been inflicted upon their citizens.”

While those who considered it wise to refrain from a recognition of the belligerency of the Cubans were thus strongly impressed by the conduct of the Spanish government, it may be imagined that among the mass of the people, sym-

pathizing as they did with the Cubans in their hard struggle for freedom, the bitterness towards the Spaniards was great and the excitement caused by the *Virginus* affair intense. Soon after the outrage there was a great public meeting at Steinway Hall. William M. Evarts, the leader of the New York bar, and soon to be Secretary of State, was in the chair and made a strong speech in behalf of free Cuba. Senator Sumner had been invited to be one of the speakers, but he declined, and instead sent a letter in a spirit directly opposed to that of the meeting, insisting on a considerate treatment of the Spanish republic and discountenancing the belligerent preparations then underway in the navy yard. President Grant fully anticipated war, and with his thorough knowledge of military affairs perfected plans for attacking Spain. But Sumner's policy prevailed with the administration, and it continued to tolerate the repeated promises and shifting tactics of the Spanish government. Meanwhile, the claims of American citizens for spoliation in Cuba continued to accumulate. General Sickles was so impatient under the temporizing policy of his government that he resigned, and he was succeeded early in 1874 by Caleb Cushing.

A number of British subjects had been among those executed from the *Virginus*, and Great Britain, also wearied with delay, early in 1874 insisted upon a decisive answer as to indemnity, and with her Spain hastened to settle. As the claims for executed citizens of the United States rested practically upon the same basis, late the same year our government, after much difficulty, reached a settlement. Considerable sums were eventually paid by Spain to the families of the American and British citizens, but the governor who ordered the executions was never punished. Secretary Fish demanded that that part of the treaty should be carried out, but Spain calmly replied that it considered Governor Burriel's conduct justified, and he was even promoted from the rank of brigadier to major-general. The United States swallowed the insult out of love for peace.

While England and the United States were urging to a speedy conclusion the *Virginian* claims, the weak Spanish republic, from which Sumner and others in this country had looked for great results, fell, and the Bourbons returned to the throne in Alfonso XII. But it seemed to make no difference with Cuban politics. The war dragged on, as related in a previous chapter, and late in 1875, when the end seemed as far off as ever and property of American citizens in Cuba was going up in smoke, the administration began to feel that patience had at last ceased to be a virtue.

On the 5th of November, 1875, Secretary Fish addressed a note to our minister at Madrid, in which he reviewed the question and practically stated that the United States had come to the conclusion that the state of things in Cuba must cease. "Our relations with Spain," he said, "are in that critical position that another seizure similar to that of the *Virginian*, other executions of citizens of the United States in Cuba, other wrongs of a less objectionable character even than many which have been already suffered by our citizens with simple remonstrance, or possibly some new act of exceptional severity in Cuba, may suddenly produce a feeling and excitement which might force events which this government anxiously desires to avoid. The President hopes that Spain may spontaneously adopt measures looking to a reconciliation and to the speedy restoration of peace, and the organization of a stable and satisfactory system of government in the island of Cuba. In the absence of any prospect of a termination of the war, or of any change in the manner in which it has been conducted on either side, he feels that the time is at hand when it may be the duty of other governments to intervene."

The secretary restated, with clearness and force, the reasons which had led the administration to this conclusion, and instructed the minister to lay them before the Spanish government. The statement was also to be read in confidence to the proper members of the cabinets at Paris, London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Rome, in the hope that some, if not

all, of those governments might use their friendly powers for pacification. Spain made another promise, a favorite method in meeting such emergencies, and just before our Congress met submitted to Minister Cushing certain proposals which it was hoped might be used as a basis for a settlement of differences. These proposals had not reached this government by the time President Grant submitted his annual message, but he reviewed the whole question, stated the reasons why he had not deemed it wise to accord the Cubans belligerent rights, and explained why he believed that the time for intervention had come. As Spain was then, however, disturbed by the Carlist wars at home, and as proposals had been submitted, he deferred any positive recommendation till the situation could be more perfectly understood. Shortly before leaving office General Grant proposed to European powers a joint intervention, but soon other matters began to absorb public attention. As a result of the conference between Minister Cushing and Calderon, the Spanish Minister of State, a protocol, often insisted upon during the recent Cuban war and as often violated by Spain, was signed. It was intended to guard against any repetition of the *Virginus* affair and secure to American citizens a civil trial on the charge of sedition or conspiracy, except when taken in arms, and even in that case they were to be allowed attorneys and make their defense in public trial. Spain agreed to command the strictest observance of the terms of this protocol in all her dominions, especially in Cuba. It was dated January 12, 1877. During 1877 the three sailing vessels, *Ellen Rizpah*, *Rising Sun*, and *Edward Lee*, while pursuing their legitimate business under the American flag outside of Cuban waters, were fired upon, captured, and detained for days under circumstances of peculiar hardship and brutality. The United States government, under President Hayes, carefully investigated the cases and asked an aggregate indemnity of \$19,500, but again giving Spain all the consideration possible, the sum was finally compromised for ten thousand dollars.

After the Carlist war the Spanish government sent out General Campos with the results already related. Thus was our intervention at that time avoided by the promises made by Spain, promises, the fulfillment of which the treaty of Zanjón seemed to speedily assure.

But the promise proved hollow and, indeed, in the first instance was not kept. Upon the pacification of the island, the rebels having laid down their arms according to agreement, General Campos, evidently intending that the promise should be kept in good faith, returned to Madrid and submitted the plans for reforms in Cuba before the cabinet of Canovas, who at once declared his unwillingness to lay them before the Cortes with his recommendation, saying that that body would feel and always feel that Spanish honor required the complete subjection of Cuba. General Campos insisted that he had made this agreement with the rebels in good faith, that, trusting in it they had laid down their arms, and that it must be submitted to the Cortes. Canovas replied that in that case Campos must do it on his own responsibility. This and other causes led to the resignation of the Canovas ministry, and Campos, as the leader of the Liberals, formed a cabinet, but his ministers could not be made to agree to the Cuban agreement, and so Campos quickly resigned. An act was passed, however, in January, 1879, whereby Cuba was to have representation in the Cortes. Under this the province of Havana should send three senators to Madrid and each of the other provinces two. The archbishopric of Santiago should send one, the University of Havana one, and the Society of the Friends in the Country one. Thirty deputies, allotted according to population, were to be sent to the House of Deputies. They were to be elected by ballot in the ratio of one deputy to each 50,000 inhabitants. But the peninsulars practically controlled the elections and more than three-fourths of the deputies proved to be natives of Spain, so that the Cubans really gained no voice even in the small representation temporarily allowed them.

The Campos ministry fell in December, 1879, Canovas resumed the reins of government, and the promises made concerning reform in Cuban government were practically ignored. Spanish methods in Cuba continued very much as they had for years. The bitter hatred between the insulars and peninsulars was only intensified. The island of Cuba had been laid waste, thousands of the sons of Spain had found their graves, millions of money had been spent, and still Spain had not learned the lesson. The Cuban was still oppressed and waited only for the next opportunity to take up arms.

The loss of life and treasure in this war was enormous. Two years before its close, in a debate on Cuban affairs in the Cortes, it was said that Spain had up to that time sent 145,000 men and her best commanders to Cuba. The number in the field in the last year of the war was given as 81,700, while the records of the Madrid War Office show that over 73,000 of the land forces had been lost. The minimum total of Spanish soldiers who fell in Cuba must have been, therefore, nearly 160,000, for of those who had gone out not enough ever came back to make a full regiment. Adding to this total of Spanish forces the Volunteers, about 80,000 in number, the Captain-General must have had at his disposal, from the beginning to the end of the war, over 230,000 men. Thousands fell victims to the guerrilla tactics of the Cubans, but more died of fever and other diseases incident to the climate and changed conditions of diet. The young men who were conscripted and sent to Cuba were thoroughly unfitted for campaigning in such a country, and discipline was so strict in the army that many of them deserted to the rebels rather than suffer hardships in camp only to be killed in some Cuban ambushade. The loss of the Cubans has never been known, for no account was kept. It was small compared with that of the Spaniards, for the army was small and scattered in little bands. The loss has been estimated at 50,000 for the ten years, but this is probably an exaggeration.

The cost of the war to Spain was about \$300,000,000, and

certainly not less than that was lost in Cuba from the destruction of property and the loss of commerce and trade.

In the years succeeding the war some reforms were made, though the nature of the government did not improve; indeed, as will appear later, tyranny was increased under the cloak of concessions. The one step in advance was the abolition of slavery. Back in 1870, at the beginning of the provisional Spanish republic, the Cortes had passed what was known as the Moret Bill, by which freedom was decreed to every child born of a slave mother after July 4th of that year; also to such slaves as had helped or would help the Spanish against the insurgents. But the Spanish forces derived little help from this source, for the Volunteers were so opposed to it that they prevented its publication in Cuba for two years, and it practically remained a dead letter till after the war, when it was enforced by the Liberal Ministry. Under the same law freedom was to be given to every slave when becoming sixty years of age. In January, 1880, as a partial concession of the Zanjón treaty, a further measure was passed, providing for the gradual extinction of slaves, so that in 1887 the institution practically ceased to exist. The slaveholders, realizing that it must come, made little objection, but gradually adapted themselves to the new conditions.

During the sixteen years from the close of the ten-years war to 1895, Cuba, if not in a state of insurrection, was seldom quiet. When the people saw that they had been again deceived, it was difficult for them to restrain their disposition to revolt. But a general rising was out of the question so soon after the long struggle, for they had laid down their arms and the Spaniards had taken them. There were several local and spasmodic uprisings in the eastern province, however, generally because of some fresh outrage. In some cases Cubans who had shortly before laid down their arms would mysteriously disappear. This was the cause of an uprising in 1879 in Tunas de Bayamo. One of the outrages following the war was the strangling of General Arcadio Vidal in September,

1879. He resided at Mayari, in the province of Santiago de Cuba, under a solemn assurance of the commander-in-chief of that region that he would not be molested. During one of the local uprisings, or shortly after, he went to Nipe, and was invited by the commander of the gunboat *Alarma* to take dinner on board. Vidal went, but never returned. It was said that he was strangled in a boat by three sailors and his body thrown into the sea. It was asserted also that the deed was committed in compliance of orders of the Spanish General Polavieja.

The exactions of the government were continually increased as the industries of the island began to regain strength after its long interruption. In 1882 came a Captain-General, Prendergast, who was another Balmeceada. That year a form of legalized murder was instituted. Political arrests were frequent and prisoners were shot in transit under the pretence that they intended to escape. The Cubans saw everything going from bad to worse, and again conspiracies began to thrive. As long as they held their peace the outside world knew little of what they were suffering, but when the next great outbreak came, the world settled down to the conviction that something would have to be done.


CHAPTER XII

CUBA AFTER THE TEN-YEARS WAR—CONDITION OF THE PEOPLE—THE CAPTAIN-GENERAL AND HIS EXTRAORDINARY POWERS—SPAIN'S CRAFTY POLICY.

Area of Cuba and Its Population—Percentage of Blacks and Whites—The Government Liberal Only on Paper—The Captain-General and His Extraordinary Authority—The Council of Administration—The Officials All Spanish—Provincial Government—Representatives Who Did Not Represent—The Judicial System—The State Religion—A Charge against the Revenues of the Island—Backward School System—Remarkable System of Censorship—No Meetings or Social Gatherings without a Permit—Object of the Electoral System—Cubans Have Little Chance to Vote and Less to Elect—Cuban Representation in the Spanish Parliament—Hardly a Dozen Cubans Eligible to the Senate—Discriminations in Provincial and Municipal Government—Spain's Deceitful and Crafty Policy.

A BRIEF account of the political, social, and economic condition of the island of Cuba, just between the Ten-Years War and the late struggle for freedom ending in hostilities between Spain and the United States, will enable the reader to better appreciate the reasons for the outbreak and the real character of the patriots.

Cuba has an area a little larger than that of the State of Virginia, but fully one-fifth of the land is either unreclaimed, covered with forests, or unexplored. Its population in 1894 was also about that of Virginia, from which it is apparent that the habitable portions of the island were fairly well settled. The population at that time consisted of about 1,200,000 white people and 500,000 blacks, among the latter being commonly reckoned those having one-half and even three-fourths white blood in their veins. After 1868 the black population decreased both relatively and absolutely, and it is now probably not more than 25 per cent. of the total population. It



MAP OF CUBA
Showing its Provinces, population of each, principal points, etc.

has been estimated that of the white people of the island about one-fifth were Spanish-born: that is, peninsulars, as distinguished from the insulars, or those born on Cuban soil. The peninsulars were found principally in the western provinces, and especially in and about Havana, where the population is densest. According to the official census of 1887 the population of each of the provinces and number of people per square kilometer, or 250 acres, was as follows:

Provinces.	Inhabitants.	Density.
Havana,	481,928	52.49
Matanzas,	359,578	30.59
Santa Clara,	374,122	15.34
Pinar del Rio,	225,891	15.09
Santiago de Cuba,	273,379	7.76
Puerto Principe,	67,789	2.10

The government of Cuba after 1879 showed evidences on paper of some liberality, but the evidences were misleading. The head was still the Captain-General, appointed by the crown usually for a term of from three to five years, and who was *ipso facto* the Governor-General. In his military capacity, which was not easily distinguished from his civil capacity, he had an army during peace of from 13,000 to 20,000 men sent from Spain and maintained out of the Cuban budget. He was assisted by a sub-Inspector-General, who was also governor of Havana, but in time of disturbances the military divisions were rearranged to suit the emergency. Notwithstanding all the alleged reforms granted after the treaty of Zanjón, the Governor-General practically retained all the powers granted him in 1825 by Ferdinand, powers which possessed all the absolute qualities of the Turkish Sultan without the restrictions imposed by the exigencies of European politics.

The Governor-General was assisted by a Council of Administration, which was charged with the duty of preparing the budget and estimating expenditures for submission to the Cortes. It was the Captain-General's duty to enforce these acts, but he had the power to suspend them and adopt his own course, merely notifying the home government if he thus acted

contrary to the administrative council. There was also a body known as the "Council of Authorities," which consisted of the Archbishop of Santiago, the Bishop of Havana, the commanding officers of the army and navy, the chief justice of the Supreme Court, the attorney-general, the head of the finance department, and the director of the local administration. They were called together only when the Captain-General, usually as a matter of form, wished to consult them, and their advice had no binding effect. These officials were all Spanish.

Each province was in charge of a governor appointed by the Crown, who was an officer of the army, and directly responsible to the Governor-General. There was supposed to be in each province a representative assembly of not less than twelve and not more than twenty members, according to the population. They were elected for four years, and sessions were held twice a year. Upon meeting, the assembly balloted for three candidates for speaker, and from this list the Captain-General appointed one, but he could disregard the names presented and appoint any other member. The provincial governor, if he desired, might preside and vote, and if he thought best he might prorogue the assembly and report to the Captain-General. The governor also nominated five members of the assembly to act as a sort of cabinet, but the Captain-General appointed them, and the powers of this cabinet were so restricted that the Cuban was never given a voice in affairs.

The Captain or Governor-General had a string tied to everything, even the municipal government. A board of aldermen might consist of any number from five to thirty, inclusive, according to population, and they elected one of their number as mayor, but the Captain-General might substitute any other member. The concentration of ultimate authority was equally noticeable in the judicial system, which included two superior courts, one sitting at Puerto Principe for the two eastern provinces, and the other at Havana for the four western provinces. Under these were many district and local magistrates, but the Governor-General could overrule any decision

of any court and even suspend, at discretion, any order or law from the government at Madrid. It is unnecessary to examine this system of government further to determine its character. The Governor-General was absolute, except in two respects. He could be recalled, and he had little to say about the management of religious affairs.

As in Spain, no other religion was tolerated but Roman Catholicism. There were no Protestant or Jewish places of worship, though a person could hold to either of those faiths provided he did not promulgate views contrary to those of the established church. The ecclesiastical government was under the Archbishop of Santiago and the Bishop of Havana, and its maintenance, amounting to about \$400,000, was a charge against the general revenues of the island.

Until well into the eighteenth century, or after the death of Ferdinand, there was practically no place on the island where a Cuban could have his children taught to read and write, though Pope Innocent XIII., with the consent of Spain, had established the Royal University of Havana, and the Franciscan friars had given some instruction in their monasteries upon theology and philosophy. This led some of the wealthier people of Cuba, early in the century, to send their children to the United States to be educated, but this was opposed by the government and finally prohibited, though no attempt was at once made to provide for such education in Cuba. Thus many private schools were established. It was not until 1841 that the right of the poorer classes to a primary education was recognized by the government. Even then it was brought about largely by individual efforts, country school-houses being erected by individuals or by popular subscription and donated to the district authorities on condition that free schools should be maintained. The Spanish element on the island were inclined to oppose all steps for the education of the lower classes on the ground that it might endanger Spanish supremacy. But in 1889 there were 720 public and 537 private schools with an average attendance of about 40,000.

The children attending the common schools were at the ratio of about one to forty-five of the population, or, if the students in the universities and higher institutions are included, those receiving instructions outside of the private schools were one to every forty. In Spain, at the same time, the ratio was one to nine; in the northern States of the United States, one to four and two-tenths. By a law in 1880 education was made compulsory in Cuba, but law had little to do with fact when the schools did not exist.

An examination of the conditions on the island would not be complete without a glance at the system of censorship. Anonymous publications, however innocent, were not permitted. Everything must bear the author's name and the place of publication, and the publication of anything offensive toward the sovereign or his government, or having a tendency towards a change in government, was an offense punishable by fine and imprisonment. Very strict obligations were imposed upon all editors and publishers, and neglect to comply with them was a penal offense. No publication could be started without due notice to the proper authority. Three copies of every issue must be presented to the governor or the mayor, who stamped and returned one, retained one, and sent the third to the district attorney to examine for seditious or otherwise objectionable matter.

All mutual benefit associations, also, were under strict supervision. Notice must be given of any meeting, and the governor could break it up if he wished to. The supervision of the authorities extended into all the relations of life, and it was necessary even for a private reception to have a permit. Otherwise it might fall under suspicion and be the cause of much trouble to the entertainers and their guests.

Bad as the system of government and of commercial policy was upon paper, it was in its practical application that the Cuban was oppressed. He had little understanding of the laws of government and of trade, but he saw concrete results. To him the one trouble was Spanish misrule, and his

one ambition became "Cuba Libre." He saw that the changes in law were not changes in fact. Concessions had really taken the form of new oppressions. Names, not the things themselves, were changed. The Captain-General was called the "Governor-General." The royal decrees took the name of "authorizations." The commercial monopoly of Spain had been named the "coasting trade." The right of banishment had been transformed into the "law of vagrancy." Brutal attacks upon defenseless citizens went under the term "compote." The abolition of constitutional guarantees had become the "law of public order." Taxation without the knowledge or consent of the taxed had been changed into the "law of estimates," the budget being voted by the representatives of peninsular Spain. Instead of inaugurating a redeeming policy which would have allayed public anxiety, and quenched the thirst for justice felt by the people, Spain, while lavish in promises of reform, continued its old and crafty system, which was to exclude the Cuban from every office that could give him any effective influence and intervention in public affairs.

In order to render the Cuban powerless, Spain had, when smilingly offering reforms, but to give him an electoral law so artfully framed as to accomplish two objects — to reduce the number of voters, and to provide a purely Spanish majority, although the Spaniards were less than 10 per cent. of the total population. For this purpose the electoral right was made dependent upon the payment of a very high poll tax, which proved the more burdensome as the war had practically ruined many of the Cuban proprietors. In this way the right of suffrage was restricted to only 53,000 inhabitants; that is, to 3 per cent. of the total number.

The electoral law was also shaped so as to afford to industry, commerce, and public officials facilities to acquire the electoral privilege to the detriment of territorial property or the owners of real estate. It also sanctioned fraud by providing that the simple declaration of the head of a commercial

house was sufficient to consider all its employes as partners, having therefore the right to vote. Under this provision there were firms with as many as thirty partners. By this scheme alone almost all the Spanish residents in Cuba were turned into electors. In the municipal district of Güines, with a population of 13,000 people, only 500 of whom were Spaniards or Canary Islanders, the electoral list contained the names of only thirty-two Cubans to 400 Spaniards — only a quarter of 1 per cent. of the Cubans to 80 per cent. of the Spanish population.

But lest this should not be enough, a so-called Permanent Commission of Provincial Deputations, appointed by the Governor-General, was provided to decide every controversy as to who was to be included in the registry lists. It is unnecessary to say its majority was always devoted to the government. In case any elector considered himself wronged by the decision of the commission, he could appeal to the "Audiencia," or higher court of the district, but these were almost entirely made up of Spanish magistrates, were always subject to the authority of the Governor-General, and mere tools in his hands.

Thus it may be easily understood why on some occasions the Cuban representation in the Spanish Parliament was made up of only three deputies out of the thirty allotted to the island. In the most favorable times the number of Cuban representatives did not exceed six in a body of 450 members. The genuine representation of Cuba was sometimes less than one per cent. of the members of the Spanish Congress. The overwhelming majority of the Cuban deputation always consisted of Spanish peninsulars. In this manner the ministers of colonies, whenever they desired to give a decent appearance to their legislative acts by an alleged majority of Cuban voters, could always command it, for they were peninsulars, as Spanish as the Spanish at home.

As regards representation in the Senate, the qualifications were practically prohibitive to the Cubans. To take a seat in the higher house under the law it was necessary for one to

have been president of that body, or of Congress, or a minister of the Crown, or a bishop, or a grandee of Spain, a lieutenant-general, a vice-admiral, an ambassador, a minister plenipotentiary, a counselor of state, a judge or an attorney-general of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Accounts, and so on. No Cuban had ever been permitted to fill any of these positions, and there were not more than two or three grandees who were natives of Cuba. The only natives who could become senators were those who had been deputies in three different Congresses, or who had held for four years a university professorship, provided that they had an income of \$1,500; or those who had a title of nobility, or had been provincial deputies or mayors in towns of over 20,000 inhabitants, if they had in addition an income of \$4,000 or paid a direct contribution of \$800 to the treasury. There were few native Cubans who could have met these conditions, but, even so, they could hardly have been elected under the electoral laws. Such was the farce of representation which Spain gave to Cuba in her boasted reforms. The various governments in Spain legislated for the island as they pleased, and often the representatives of the peninsular provinces did not take the trouble to attend when Cuban affairs were being discussed. There was one instance in 1880, when the Cuban budget was considered in the presence of less than thirty deputies and the minister of the colonies. In 1887 there was created a council under the minister of the colonies, but not a single Cuban was ever found among its members.

Through similar contrivances in the law and irregularities committed in its application, Cubans were also deprived of representation in the provincial corporations; in many cases they were entirely excluded from them. When, despite the legalized obstacles and the arbitrary acts of those in power, the Cubans succeeded in obtaining some temporary majority, the government always succeeded in making their triumph null and void. Only once did the home rule party obtain a majority of the provincial deputation of Havana, and then the

Governor-General appointed from among the Spaniards a majority of the members of the permanent commission. Until that time the commission had always been of the same political complexion as the majority of the deputation. By similar methods the Cubans were gradually expelled from even the municipal bodies. The majority, consisting of Spaniards, always took good care to make the burden of taxation fall heaviest upon the Cuban proprietor, so that he really bore a heavier taxation while enjoying less representation. One year not a single Cuban had a seat in the "Ayuntamiento," or board of aldermen of Havana, and in 1891 the Spaniards predominated in thirty-one out of thirty-seven of the "Ayuntamientos" in the province of Havana. In that of Güines, with a population of 12,500 Cubans, not one of them was found among its councillors; at the same time there were only three Cuban deputies in the provincial deputation of Havana, two in that of Matanzas, and three in that of Santa Clara, the most populous regions in the island of Cuba.

From 1878 to 1895 there was but one native Cuban acting as governor in the province of Havana, Rodriguez Batista, who had spent nearly all his life in Spain, where he had made his administrative career. The predominance of Spain extended down to all the local corporations. The powers of the deputations in the provinces were not simply restricted and their resources scanty, but the Governor-General appointed their presidents and members of their permanent commissions. He appointed mayors who might not belong to the corporation, and the governor of the province appointed the secretaries. The government reserved, moreover, the right to remove the mayors, of replacing them, and of suspending the councillors and the "Ayuntamientos," partly or in a body. It frequently made use of this right for electoral purposes, to the detriment always of the Cubans.

CHAPTER XIII

SPAIN A PARASITE UPON CUBA — METHODS OF TAXATION AND EXPENDITURES — ENORMOUS FRAUDS — A SWARM OF SPANISH VAMPIRES — “CUBA IS UNDONE.”

Replenishing the Treasury at Home and Enriching the Functionaries — Enormous Increase of Taxation — Remarkable Growth of Cuba's Debt — Pledging Cuban Revenues for Spanish Interest Payments — Not a Cent of It Spent to Improve Cuba — Taxes on Everything — Killing the Goose that Laid the Golden Egg — Enormous Import Duties — Methods of Spanish Trade Monopoly — Treating Tobacco as an Enemy and Loading Sugar with Imposts — Regulations of the “Coasting Trade” — Frauds Committed upon the Cuban Treasury — Embezzlements Larger Than the Revenues of the Island — No One Ever Punished — Officials Protected by Influential Patrons at Home — The Prey of a Swarm of Vampires.

WE may now turn to observe what use Spain made of her power over Cuba, and we are at once met with the fact that Spain had had no colonial policy except that from what she had subdued by force she sought immediate riches, and these she had remorselessly wrung from the labor of the natives, even of Spanish blood. For years she had been simply a parasite upon Cuba, and had exploited the island through a fiscal regime, a commercial regime, an a bureaucratic regime. Her thought from the beginning had been to draw from the island all that could be squeezed out of it. Nothing was consecrated to the development of the island. Whatever was done was solely to replenish the exhausted treasury of Spain and to enrich Spanish functionaries. Having saddled Cuba with debt, and reached that point where increased taxation reduces rather than increases revenue, the island was of little further value except to the Spanish bondholder and the official who came to Cuba with but one aim —

to draw a fortune from resources which should have been devoted to the native population. When he had amassed all the money he could hope to draw from his position, he invested it, not in Cuba but in Europe, returning home to enjoy the income he had gained at the expense of the Cuban.

When the Ten-Years War came to an end, two-thirds of the island was completely ruined. The other third, the inhabitants of which had remained peaceful, was abundantly productive, but it had to face the great economic change involved in the impending abolition of slavery. Evidently it would have been a wholesome and provident policy on the part of Spain to have lightened as much as possible the fiscal burdens of a country in such a condition. But instead, Spain was bent upon making Cuba pay the entire cost of the war. She at once overwhelmed the colony with enormous budgets reaching as high a figure as \$46,000,000! And this only to cover the obligations of the State, to fill the gulf left by the wastefulness and plunder of the civil and military administration during the years of war, and to meet the expenses of the military occupation of the country. For the first two years after the war the budget was over \$46,000,000; in 1882 it fell to \$35,000,000, and from then till 1886 it remained at about \$34,000,000. Then it dropped to \$26,000,000, where it remained until the outbreak of the recent insurrection.

This reduction was not occasioned by Spain's desire to diminish the burden resting upon the country, but the limit had been exceeded. The taxes simply killed the source of revenue. Before the expenditures were reduced a new burden was added in the shape of an accumulating deficit. At first the revenue was \$8,000,000 short of the budget; in 1880 it was \$20,000,000 short; in 1883, \$10,000,000, and although the expenditures were reduced, the accumulated deficit had by 1895 reached \$100,000,000, which amount was, of course, added to the already heavy debt.

The debt of Cuba was created in 1864 by the simple issue of \$3,000,000; in 1868 it had risen to \$25,000,000; in 1891,

according to a statement made by Perez Castaneda in the Spanish Senate, it had increased to the extraordinary sum of \$175,000,000, and by the middle of 1895 it stood at \$300,000,000! Thus, by the time of the recent outbreak the debt of the little island, considering its population, exceeded that of all the other American countries, including the United States.

This enormous debt, that ground the country down and did not permit its people to capitalize their income, or foster its improvements, or even to advance its industries, constituted one of the most iniquitous forms of the Spanish spoliation. In it were included a debt of Spain to the United States; the expenses incurred by Spain when she occupied San Domingo; those for the invasion of Mexico, and for her hostilities against Peru; the money advanced to the Spanish treasury during the later Carlist wars; and to cover the lavish expenditures of its administration following 1868. Not a cent of this enormous sum had been spent in Cuba in the advancement of civilization. It had not contributed to build a single mile of highway or of railroads, to erect a single lighthouse nor deepen a single port; it had not built one asylum nor opened one public school. This heavy burden was left to future generations without a single compensation or benefit.

"Why must Cuba pay the debt?" asked a senator in the Spanish Senate in 1891. "Are not these matters for the peninsula? Certainly they are matters for the whole of Spain."

But the debt was left on Cuba. A Madrid paper said that same year that from 1878 to the 30th of June, 1891, the sum of \$115,336,304 had been paid for interest and redemption on the Cuban debt, and yet it had gone on increasing. The estimates for expenditures for the fiscal year 1893-94 were given as follows:

Interest on the public debt,	\$10,435,183
Salaries and expenses of the colonial ministry, ..	155,125
Regular army,	4,128,616
Navy,	1,055,136
Military and naval pensions and retired pay, . .	1,746,829
Civil pensions and retired pay,	442,223

Judiciary,	\$317,595
Religious establishment,	385,583
Volunteers,	1,768,125
Treasury department,	708,125
Police force,	2,664,923
Executive government, omitting police,	1,371,165
Department of the interior,	771,125
Other expenditures,	87,636
Total,	<u>\$26,037,389</u>

Turning now to the other side of the account to discover where the money was to come from, the estimates for the same year furnish the following:

Tax on real estate,	\$1,711,000
Import duties,	9,620,000
Export duties,	1,220,000
Port dues,	535,000
Ten per cent. tax on passenger fares,	240,000
Excise on liquors, sugar, tobacco, petroleum,	2,580,000
Tax on trades and professions,	1,680,000
Stamp tax, including postage and telegraph,	2,174,660
Lotteries,	3,104,000
Rents and sales of public property,	399,000
All other sources,	1,377,000
Total,	<u>\$24,640,660</u>

If the people of the United States were taxed at the same rate *per capita* for their federal expenses, it would mean squeezing out a revenue of \$1,425,000,000 a year; or, to put it the other way, if the Cubans raised a revenue for general expenses at the same rate *per capita* that we do for the maintenance of the general government, she would have been taxed only about \$9,000,000 instead of \$26,000,000.

The Spanish system of taxation in Cuba had always been analogous to the killing of the goose which laid the golden egg. For example, there were the once famous Cobre copper mines situated among the mountains about three leagues from the city of Santiago. They are of such superior richness that as much as \$4,000,000 worth of ore was exported in 1841. As late as 1867, 6,000 tons were shipped in ten months. But

the government was not content with raising a very large sum by the taxation of the product; it increased the excise charge till it no longer paid to work the mines, and so they remained practically undisturbed, yielding little or no revenue.

The budget showed that nearly 40 per cent. of the revenues were expected from duties upon imports. Everything that was imported was taxed as heavily as possible, unless it came from Spain. Nearly every class of articles paid a much heavier duty than was paid by the sister isle of Puerto Rico. In very many cases the duty on imports was placed at twice what they were for Puerto Rico. The effects of such a tax were not only injurious to Cuba but to the United States, and this latter fact should be considered when coming to the question of the reasons for United States intervention. In the year 1890 the exports from Cuba to Spain were about \$8,000,000, to the United States over \$58,000,000. The exports of Spain to Cuba were about \$25,000,000, and from the United States only about \$17,000,000. Though Cuba was close to our doors and sent us over seven times as much of her products as she did to Spain, we could not send to Cuba of our products but about 70 per cent. of what Spain could send 3,000 miles across the ocean.

The Cuban budget burdened the people in the proportion of about sixteen dollars *per capita*, or about eighty-five *pesetas*, while the Spaniards in Spain were taxed by the home budget only at the rate of forty-two *pesetas*. The defense of the country against its own people, the cost of the army, the navy, the civil guard, and the guardians of public order, consumed 36.59 per cent. of it. The debt consumed 40.89 per cent. more, and this left but 22.52 per cent. for all other expenditures required for civilized life and advancement. But of this remnant but 2.75 per cent. was set aside for the future and to develop the resources of the country. And as there was a deficit none of this could be used.

Bent upon exploiting the island, Spain strangled that vitality by which alone exploitation could continue profitable.

The economical situation in Cuba was such that she produced for export and imported largely of what she consumed. Wisdom would, therefore, have naturally suggested to Spain that Cuba could be most prosperous when her commercial relations were least hampered, but she adopted a contrary policy. Tobacco and sugar were loaded with excessive imposts; the cattle-raising industry was shackled with heavy excise duties, and the mining industry practically ruined.

The district which produced the best tobacco in the world, the famous Vuelta Abajo, lacked every means of communication by which the value of the product could have been greatly increased. No roads, bridges, or ports were to be found there. And while other governments were taking steps to foster their tobacco industry the Spanish government loaded the exportation of Cuban tobacco with an export duty of \$1.80 on every 1,000 cigars. The same was true of the sugar industry. While Spain was paying bounties for sugar produced in the peninsula, she exacted a heavy import duty upon all Cuban sugar, so that a hundredweight of Cuban sugar was overburdened, when reaching the Barcelona market, with 143 per cent. of its value. The Cuban producer was oppressed with every kind of exaction; the introduction of indispensable machinery was heavily taxed, transportation was obstructed by taxes on the railroads, a direct tax or industrial duty was exacted, and still another, equivalent to an export duty, for loading and shipping, while always and everywhere were the illegal exactions of corrupt and thieving officials.

Besieged by complaints of such destructive discrimination, Spain made great promises of reform. Cuban products were to be admitted to the peninsula free of duty, excepting, however, tobacco, rum, sugar, cocoa, and coffee, which remained "temporarily" burdened. Duties on the importations from Spain to Cuba were to be gradually reduced through a period of ten years, till, in 1892, they were to be entirely extinguished. But, like other Spanish reforms, this was a new oppression in a fresh disguise. The temporary duties, which

were upon the principal and almost the only products of the island, were left undisturbed. Spanish products paid no duties in Cuba, but Cuban products paid heavy duties in Spain.

In order to present an idea of how far the monopoly of Spain went, it will suffice to point out the fact that the duties on many foreign articles exceeded 2,000 per cent. as compared with those borne by Spanish products. One hundred kilograms (220 pounds) of knitted goods paid, if from Spain, \$10.95; if from a foreign country, \$195. One hundred kilograms of cassimere, if a Spanish product, paid \$15.47; if foreign, \$300. The evil, however great, would have been less had Spain been a flourishing industrial country, and had produced the principal articles required by Cuba for the consumption of its people and the development of its resources. But Spanish industries were backward, and Cubans were thus compelled to use inferior goods or pay exorbitant prices for foreign articles, while Spanish merchants gained further profit by importing foreign wares into Spain, there to be naturalized for exportation to Cuba. This device had been in force a long time and was one cause of the uprising of 1868.

The salaries of the various Spanish officials in Cuba were in no way curtailed, while the perquisites and peculations continued to grow, and it was one of the most exasperating of all the oppressions to which the Cuban was subjected. The minister of colonies at Madrid was regularly assigned \$96,800 for use from the Cuban treasury. One minister took in 1892 \$1,000,000 belonging to the treasury of Cuba from the vaults of the Bank of Spain, and lent it to the Transatlantic Company, of which he was a stockholder, without any authorization whatever. When he was threatened with prosecution he haughtily replied that in that case all his predecessors from every political party would have to accompany him to court. Nothing was done. In June, 1890, the subject of Cuban defalcations came up in the Chamber of Deputies, and it was openly stated that under false vouchers and fictitious bills during the Ten-Years War, there were defalcations amounting to

over \$22,000,000. The same year General Pando affirmed that the robberies committed through the issue of warrants by the board of public debt exceeded the sum of \$12,000,000, and he furnished a series of other embezzlements which footed up more than \$40,000,000. An article in the *Ateneo de Madrid*, early in 1895, stated that the custom house frauds in Cuba from 1878 to that date amounted to \$100,000,000. These peculations represented but a part of the hidden venality of the administration. Falsification of documents, bargains with delinquent debtors, exactions of higher dues from simple peasants, delays in judicial or other business in order to obtain a gratuity, all combined to divert the money of the Cubans into the pockets of the functionaries. And while these evils were brought to light from time to time, no one was ever punished. In 1887, General Marin entered the custom house of Havana with a military force, occupied it, and after investigating the operations which had been carried on there, discharged every official, but they were never punished, nor did they expect to be. It has been stated that every official who went to Cuba regularly paid some influential patron at the Court for protection. Indeed, the officials were really protected by the royal decree of 1882, which provided that the ordinary courts could not take cognizance of such offenses as defalcations, abstraction, and maladversion of public funds, forgery, etc., committed by the officials of the administration, unless their guilt were first established by an administrative investigation. The administration, therefore, became the judge of its own offenses. Naturally, corruption grew apace. Said Rafael de Eslava in his *Judicio Critico de Cuba en 1887*: "Granted the correctness of the points I have just presented, it seems to be self-evident that a curse is pressing upon Cuba, condemning her to witness her own disintegration and converting her into a prey for the operation of those swarms of vampires that are so cruelly devouring us, deaf to the voice of conscience, if they have any; it will not be rash to venture the assertion that *Cuba is undone; there is no salvation possible.*"

CHAPTER XIV

CUBAN EXILES, SECESSIONISTS, AND LEADERS—PREPARATIONS FOR AN INSURRECTION—THE BANNER RAISED AT LAST—FIRST RESULTS UNPROMISING.

Exile of Many of Cuba's Best Citizens — José Marti and His Early Life — Imprisoned When a Boy — Deported to, Spain — He Vows to Free Cuba — Becomes the Leader of the Secession Party — His Impassioned Address and Eloquence — Many Rebuffs and Disappointments — His Trusted Friends in Cuba — General Llaet — A Fierce Hater of Spain and a Strong Secessionist — Constantly Watched by the Spanish Militia — His Visit to Santiago — Surrounded by Spanish Troops — An Abortive Movement — Relaxation of the Vigilance of the Captain-General — Sagasta's Plan of Reform — Radical Cubans Received it with Antagonism — An Empty Reform — Marti Starts for Cuba — Stopped by United States Authorities — The Outbreak in Matanzas — Manuel Garcia, "the King of the Cuban Country" — An Apparent Failure.

THE vigilance with which the officials followed persons suspected of entertaining plans against the Spanish government, and the cold-blooded manner in which political prisoners were treated, naturally led to the exile of many of the better educated Cubans. They were scattered through the other West Indian islands, through Europe, and especially the United States. While as peaceful citizens they had many opportunities to prosper in the United States, they did not and could not forget Cuba where others of their nationality were still suffering, and thus there were active juntas of Cuban sympathizers everywhere. Spain was continually complaining that they menaced the peace of the island, but their exile she alone was responsible for.

One of these exiles was José Marti, who was living at New York. He was the son of a Spanish colonel, who had learned to sympathize with the Cubans, and who, upon José's birth, threw up his commission, saying that no son of his should be

brought up a servant of Spain. It is not surprising that with such a father José, at the age of fourteen, should be attacking the Spanish government in an amateur newspaper he had established. The little paper was suppressed and the young editor sentenced to ten years imprisonment in Havana. Afterwards he was condemned to the chain for life, and obliged to work with gangs of convicts under conditions which killed strong men. The powerful influence of his family finally secured a mitigation of his sentence to deportation to Spain, where he was confined to the limits of the country. He there received a university education and began to show his remarkable talents. But while the amnesty gave him his freedom, it did not appease his indignant resentment for Spain's broken promises and continued oppressions in the island of Cuba. He resolved to act. At first he went to Central America, thence to the United States, where he was in constant communication with the promoters of the insurrection of 1868, and it was not long before he became the leader of the revolutionary party.

At this time there were four distinct parties in Cuba — the Conservatives, the Progressive Reformers, the Autonomists, and the Secessionists. The Conservatives were, in general, uncompromising Spaniards, the enemies of all reforms, bitterly hostile to the idea of secession, and with an indignant disbelief in the possibility of Cuban emancipation. They regarded the Cubans as a conquered people, and maintained that there was but one way to hold them in subjection — to treat them with extreme harshness and to refuse pitilessly all the ameliorations which leniency, if not foresight, might have suggested. The aim of the Progressive Reformers was ultimately to attain autonomy by successive reforms, obtained legally and with moderation. Those Cubans who adopted this idea were mostly those who had been allowed to take subordinate positions under the government. The more numerous Autonomists were reformers of a more radical type, and they were backed by some of the more enlightened classes in Spain, who

had come to the opinion that the superannuated regime under which Cuba had so long suffered must be in some way changed or improved. The Secessionists were the great body of the Cubans who had sickened of Spanish promises and were determined upon independence or death. There could be no active propaganda of such ideas as this, and its supporters could have little shape as a party.

It was of this class of radical Cubans that José Martí became, in 1892, the uncontested chief. He gave himself to the interests of this party, and there was not a moment when he was not devoted to the effort to realize his dream of independence for his country. Through the United States, San Domingo, everywhere, he traveled, preaching his holy war. He was a man of charming and captivating personality, yet with audacity and perseverance. His impassioned address; his eloquence, at the same time exalted and simple; his hatred of Spain, from which each day he drew some new grievance, and his energetic and magnetic oratory gave him the aspect of a modern Peter the Hermit, preaching a new crusade.

Martí gathered here and there a few contributions which he sent to trusty agents in Cuba for the purchase of arms and ammunition. But his work was often painful for one of his nature; he met many rebuffs and disappointments, yet when all the world ridiculed and doubted his mission, he remained confident. He attracted the attention of the late Charles A. Dana, who was an admirer of sincerity and energy, and was quick to appreciate talent. Dana believed with Martí that Spanish despotism in Cuba was a wrong that cried to heaven, and therefore could not endure; he became a strong advocate of Cuban independence, and his influence gradually brought the cause to notice and helped to shape events.

The dreams of Martí in those days seemed so far beyond the possibility of reality that even among the people who had been won over to his cause by his convincing and impassioned words, there were those who looked upon him as the victim of hallucinations. He had friends in Cuba who thought with

him that the hour was fast ripening, but they were few. There were not then more than 500 who were ready for the word to take up arms, and nearly all of them were young men. The old generals had not forgotten the failure of 1878, and looked upon another effort then as rash, if not foolish. But Marti faithfully corresponded with his few trusted friends, and in secret nourished the spirit of revolution, while in his hands he held the threads of the developing conspiracy. He knew that if too many Cubans were at once concerned, the Spanish would become alarmed and balk his efforts; and he believed that when the standard of revolt was raised thousands would flock to it, while those in exile would soon find their way into the insurgent ranks. This being the purpose in view, February 24, 1895, was fixed as the date for raising the cry of "Cuba Libre!" all over the island.

But in the latter part of 1894 there were indications that the Spanish government proposed to make another attempt at reform, and the secessionists feared that the Cubans might be quieted by this pretense of progress. They thought that the true policy for a reform would be to deal a blow impelled by a strength rendered desperate by repeated abuse, and that the blow should be struck while the whole country was irritated and watchful. Encouraged by some deceptive improvement in their condition, the mass of the people would relapse into supineness, and in a so-called "reformed" Cuba there would be no spot in which the seed of rebellion might thrive, till the people were again undeceived. Marti, therefore, determined to fire his mine at once, imperfect as were the preparations.

There had been for some time in Havana an ex-rebel general, the son of French parents from San Domingo, whose name was Lacret. He was a picturesque, gray-haired gentleman, who looked much like an old French general of the second empire. He had many pieces of property on the island, and many invested interests, but he was a secessionist, a fierce hater of Spain, and a veteran of the Ten-Years War, in which he had given the Spaniards no end of trouble. He had not

been exiled, but the government kept its eyes on him, and when he moved on to Santiago in 1894 the police shadowed him by instructions of the governor of the province. The ostensible reason for Lacreť's journey was to visit a tract of property called Santana, a few miles from Santiago. In charge of this property, either as administrator or as tenant, Lacreť kept a mulatto named Alfonzo Goulet, who was also an ex-rebel, and had fought side by side with Lacreť in the Ten-Years War.

One day Lacreť left Santiago surreptitiously and went to Santana, where he met a handful of men who had for a long time been under the tutelage of Goulet; in all, about fifteen persons, armed with rifles and Remington guns. They proclaimed the freedom of Cuba and retired into the woods of Santana to await developments. But almost immediately a company of Spanish troops, about 200 strong, came filing through the country. At about the same time Lacreť received from the revolutionary committee of New York, of which Martí was the head, an order to postpone his attack. Lacreť had another good reason for deferring his enterprise — an old wound in his foot reopened — and he could not walk. It was with great difficulty that Goulet succeeded in carrying him to the coast and getting him on board a ship. All this passed quietly without a shot being fired. The conspirators returned to their homes unmolested, though they were under the vigilant eyes of the police.

Apparently, from the time of this outbreak until the revolution really broke out four months later, no one believed in the possibility of an insurrection. Many who, a few months later, were leaders in the insurgent party, at that time spoke in unqualified disapproval of the outbreak, and with apparent sincerity. The disfavor with which the public received the project of Lacreť's little band of insurrectionists contributed much towards the relaxation of the vigilance of the government. The Captain-General, Calleja, became less watchful, and this favored the designs of the secessionists.

In the last days of 1894 Sagasta laid before the Cortes his project for reforms in Cuba. It was adopted, but the autonomists and secessionists received it with outspoken antagonism, claiming that the adoption of such deceptive measures would suppress none of the abuses under which the island groaned.

The project to which the Spaniards later endeavored to give much importance in order to condemn the revolution as the work of anarchy really left intact the political régime of Cuba. It did not alter the electoral laws nor curtail the power of the bureaucracy; it increased the power of the general government, and left the same burdens upon the Cuban taxpayer. The reform was mainly confined to the changing of the council of administration into a partially elective body. One-half of its members was to be appointed by the government, but the other half were to be elected by the qualified electors. The Governor-General had still the right to veto all its resolutions, and to suspend at will the elective members. This council was to make up a kind of special budget, while the general budget would, as before, be made up in Spain; the tariff laws would be enacted by Spain, the debt, militarism, distribution of revenues, and bureaucracy would continue to devour Cuba. Such was the self-government which Spain promised at the very moment when the island was over a volcano of revolution.

The immediate effect of the passage of these alleged reforms by the Cortes was to hurry the revolutionary party into revolt before their organization had been completed, before they had a fair supply of arms, and while the leaders were still scattered in various parts of the hemisphere.

Martí chartered three vessels, the *Lagonda*, the *Amadis*, and the *Baracoa*, and sailed from New York with men and war materials in January, 1895. Arrangements had been made for landing the recruits and arms in Santiago, Puerto Principe, and Santa Clara, but the expedition was stopped at Fernandina, Fla., by the United States authorities, and Martí left for San Domingo to join Máximo Gómez, who had been

a military leader in the former war. Meanwhile, the Cuban secessionists clamoring for the revolution to proceed immediately, the banner was raised on February 24th as had been arranged.

The authorities were aware of the project, and martial law was proclaimed throughout the island the day before, and in the province of Puerto Principe a rigorous search was made for arms and ammunition, which were confiscated. For a similar reason the revolutionists in Pinar del Rio did not at once respond. The rising was confined to Santiago, Santa Clara, and Matanzas, and in the two latter provinces the leaders and many suspected persons were quickly imprisoned. The attempt in Matanzas was of peculiar interest because of the person who directed it. He was known by the title of *El Rey di los Campos de Cuba* — "the king of the country of Cuba."

This king was none other than the celebrated bandit, Manuel Garcia. His *modus operandi* was perfectly simple. Placing himself at the head of a few followers, he would present himself at the home of some rich landed proprietor, usually a Spaniard, and make him an offer something like this: "You will give me before the expiration of the sum of In order to assure myself that you will comply with my request, I shall take your wife or your son or daughter as a hostage." Protestations were useless; it was prudent to obey.

But justice should be done to the memory of this remarkable bandit. He did nothing worse than many Spanish officials were doing every day. Doubtless, Manuel Garcia thought that if Spanish extortion from the Cubans was justifiable, so also would be a little Cuban extortion from the Spaniards. His demands were calculated with great accuracy, and the taxes which he levied never exceeded the actual resources of the taxpayer. In this respect he was rather more lenient than the Spanish collectors. Then, too, he always returned the hostage in good condition. This line of conduct indicated that he possessed a certain amount of relative honesty.

Moreover, this king of the country was kind and charitable to the poor. At times a price was set upon his head. Spain mobilized against him legions of gendarmes, but he laughed at such a display of forces, passed across their lines, and went to and from Havana whenever his interests there demanded his presence. It has been said that the contributions he extorted were devoted to the use of the revolutionary committee. On the 24th of February, with a few companions, twenty-four in all, he raised the standard of revolt in Matanzas. For ten years he had lived under a shower of bullets, frustrating at every turn the strategic movements made against him; but he fell mortally wounded in the first engagement of his troops with the Spaniards. Immediately after his death his men dispersed, and order was restored for the time in that part of the island.

The Governor-General on the 27th issued a proclamation declaring the provinces of Matanzas and Santiago in a state of siege, and fixed a period of eight days within which all who surrendered would be pardoned. Under these conditions, one man surrendered on the 3d of March, was brought to Havana, and set at liberty. He was very soon after arrested on the ground that he had bought arms for the movement, and was subsequently court-martialed and sent in chains to the Spanish penal colony in Ceuta, Africa. Other Cubans were too wise to surrender themselves into such hands. The apparent failure of the uprising and the small number of the insurgents seemed to have deceived the Spanish officials, and there was little alarm as Spain had at that time an army of over 19,000 regulars in addition to so many of the 50,000 volunteers as might be called out. But the appearances of a Cuban revolution are deceitful.

CHAPTER XV

SPREAD OF THE INSURRECTION IN THE PROVINCE OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA—SOME OF THE LEADERS AND THEIR METHODS—EXPERIENCE OF A PLANTER.

Nature of the Province of Santiago de Cuba—Striking Personalities—The Problem of Securing Arms—Horses More Plenty Than Guns—Code of Honor among the Insurgents—A Visit to Gilard—A Camp in the Mountains—The *Machete*—The Government Becomes Anxious—First Efforts to Find the Insurgents—Real Effective Force of the Spanish Army—Its Strength as It Appeared on the Official Records—An Army Scattered All Over the Island—The Captain-General Acts—Seeking Goulet's Band—Goulet Draws the Enemy into the Hills—The Spaniards Surprised and Routed—Goulet Captures a Garrison—Effects on the Rural Population—Taking up Arms.

IT was in the province of Santiago de Cuba that from the beginning the insurrectionary movement assumed a dangerous importance. It was there that the revolution of 1868 had been strongest, and it was there always that the Cuban hatred of the Spanish was most marked. By reason of the mountainous configuration of the country it is admirably adapted for resistance, and much of its coast is difficult to protect from secret landings. The shore for mile after mile is characterized by long reaches of lonely snow-white beach or rugged brown rocks, and is apparently devoid of all human habitations, while a little distance back rise twisted hills showing evidence of former volcanic upheavals. But beyond these hills, and within the watershed of the Rio Cauto, are delightful valleys where nature can be enjoyed in unstinted measure, though the comforts of civilized life are rare. The fruits and vegetables render subsistence an easy matter to small guerrilla bands, and the temperature is

uniformly genial. Roving bands can camp almost anywhere among the hills or valleys in security; the water bubbles forth from springs of crystal purity, and camp life is burdened with the least amount of encumbrances. It had been called the "Garden of Cuba," and some of the earlier colonists were so delighted with the region that they imagined it to be the original garden of Eden. In the mountains along the shores is much mineral wealth, which generally remains untouched, while in the valleys are great plantations which, in times of peace, are very valuable and flourishing. The principal city is Santiago de Cuba on the south shore, situated at the head of a landlocked bay, and from it proceeds one of the two short railways in the great province, a distance of about twenty miles to the town of Euramada. About forty miles to the east of Santiago is Guantanamo, connected by a dozen miles of railway to a small port on the Bay of Guantanamo.

In the neighborhood of Santiago two revolutionary leaders at once sprung to eminence — Antonio Goulet, already mentioned in connection with the Lacret uprising, and Pedro Perez. In the northwestern portion of the province the movement was directed by Bartholome Masó, Jesus Rabi, Miro, and a negro general, Moncada. Masó had been the last to lay down his arms in 1878. He had been imprisoned for months without trial, but had finally been allowed to return to his estates. Having been a man of wealth and position before the first war, he had toiled against the obstacles of Spanish taxation until he had again brought his plantations to the point of returning a good revenue, and it might have been supposed that he would have hesitated to drop all he had gained for another assault upon Spanish authority. But when the call to arms swept over the island in 1895 he at once burned his plantation as an example to other patriots, and took the field with all his men.

In many ways General Jesus Rabi was one of the most interesting of the leaders. He was one of the very few descendants of the Carib aborigines. But he was a man of strong per-

sonality and well educated, and in the Ten-Years War had been considered one of the bravest as well as gentlest of the Cuban soldiers. He gave up a comfortable living to serve his country. It has been commonly supposed that the Cuban revolutionists were almost entirely from the poorer and the criminal classes; that they fought because they had nothing to lose and everything to gain. While in the rank and file there were many of this class, for the leaders were glad of any men who were able-bodied and brave, the leaders themselves were to a great extent of the island's aristocracy, living luxuriously upon large estates. They were proud and impatient of restraint, and seldom have the ablest and best-born citizens of a country struggled for independence more freely, or more unanimously sacrificed so much for their cause. In the revolution of 1895 these men came to the front again.

But while the Cuban leaders and their men abounded in warlike spirit, they had few of the means of warfare. The main problem was to secure arms and ammunition. An incident will show how the rebels went to work. Near Goulet lived a French planter, Jean Antomarchi, of the family of Dr. Antomarchi, the last physician of Napoleon I. at St. Helena, who afterwards settled upon a plantation in Santiago province. Jean Antomarchi maintained a somewhat neutral position in the insurrection, and yet was on friendly terms with the insurgent leaders. One morning soon after the uprising, one of Goulet's lieutenants came to Antomarchi's house, and, in the name of his chief, requested his repeating rifle, remarking that he would consent to allow him to retain his other weapons, a shotgun and a revolver. Antomarchi thanked him warmly for the generosity, but sent the remaining weapons to Santiago for safe-keeping. Whoever had a good rifle in those regions was compelled to give it up for Cuba Libre, unless he took the field with it.

A Cuban insurgent seldom neglected the opportunity to obtain a better horse than he had. If he met a man better mounted than himself, he would politely request the stranger

to exchange, and he always complied, no questions being asked. The rebels recognized a certain regularity in such a proceeding, but their distinctions were sometimes surprising. As an example, Antomarchi tells the experience of a friend of his, who owned important property in Cuba. "About the time the war opened," said Antomarchi in telling the story, "I met the count one evening as I strolled about the city.

" 'Listen to what has happened to me,' said he. 'Toward noon to-day, when I crossed the Plaza de Armas, I saw a horse that looked very much like my own, but it was mounted by a negro whom I did not recognize. The tail of the horse had been docked, as are only those of horses that are used in the army. I had just noticed this when the negro, coming up to me, asked me if I were the Count X. I answered in the affirmative, and he handed me this note.'

"The count held out a slip of paper and I read the following words:

" 'Senor Count: I return your horse because it has been brought into the ranks illegally.

(Signed) GILARD.'

"Gilard was one of the insurgent leaders in that neighborhood. This is what had happened: The servant of the Count had, without warning, left his service and joined the insurgent ranks, and he thought that his master's horse, which was a superb animal, might serve with profit in the war of the rebellion. On his arrival in camp he had offered it to Colonel Gilard, under whose orders he was to serve. The colonel questioned him as to the owner of the horse, and the negro confessed everything, and Gilard, who was an accomplished cavalier despite the fact that he was a mulatto, sent back the horse to its owner with the above note. The count entreated me to convey his warm thanks to the chief in acknowledgment of his amiability. A few days later, when I returned to my plantation, I made haste to do the count's errand. I knew that Gilard was in the neighborhood of a coffee plantation called La Felicite, which I had to pass on my route. When I reached

La Felicite, I stopped before the dwelling house, and inquired where I could find him. There were several armed men on the veranda, and they looked at me without uttering a word. I repeated my question, and then one of them asked, 'Are you French?' 'Yes,' I answered. 'Very good. Follow this road. It will lead you to a wood of mango trees and beyond that to a banana plantation. Follow the same path until you are stopped by a sentinel.' I thanked him and turned my horse into a path hardly a quarter of a yard wide, faintly traced along the side of a very steep mountain. Suddenly a challenge rang out from the crest of the mountain:

"*'Alto quien va?'* (Who goes there?)

"I answered 'Cuba,' which is the countersign of the insurgents. I was ordered to halt, and I obeyed. Then I saw a man carrying a Remington rifle coming toward me, springing from rock to rock. He saluted me, and asked what I wanted. I told him my name and errand, and he went to inform his chief, who came to meet me through the shade of the great banana leaves and the feathery shadows thrown by the towering cocoa trees. When he came up with me he affably invited me to go with him further on. I dismounted and went along with him, and after a time we reached his hut, or, rather, we went under a roof made of palm leaves which covered at the utmost no more than four square yards. This shelter was without walls; there was nothing of it but the roof of palm leaves. For furniture it had a hammock, three guns, and two empty tin cases which served as chairs. The colonel made some very polite excuses because he had no chair to offer me. When we were seated upon the tin boxes I delivered my message, and then I felicitated him on the judicious choice he had made in staking his camp and the superiority of the military position which he occupied. I saw almost immediately that this man was fully convinced of the right of the cause for which he hazarded his life, but I saw, also, that he lacked the energy which ought to be the predominating quality of a partisan. To be always in motion, to harass the enemy unceas-

ingly, to keep him constantly on the watch, to fatigue him, to attack isolated soldiers, to surprise sentinels; in a word, to be forever in the breach, without rest day or night, and that in all kinds of weather, these are the principal duties of guerrilla warfare, and these duties the kind and loyal Gilard often forgot in the quiet serenity of his green retreat. Dreamy and generous by nature, he let one day follow the other without any visible sign of war while he enjoyed the calm and the security of his mountain fastness. But there were found later in the ranks of the army of independence men of action who profited by every advantage and developed a superhuman energy and activity."

No man unaccustomed to the peculiarities of Cuban warfare would have given much serious attention to the little groups which located among the hills of Santiago; certainly, few would have dreamed that in a short time the cry of "Cuba Libre!" would be carried in the face of Spanish soldiers to Havana and beyond into Pinar del Rio. Goulet's band was typical of many others. His grade was that of lieutenant-colonel, and with his aide-de-camp, Palacios, and about fifteen men, he began marching over the country, procuring some recruits and a few arms. They had not more than twenty guns of all descriptions, and, what was worse, only a few hundred cartridges, but they had set out to wrest from the proud Spaniard the Pearl of the Antilles.

They began by an indiscriminate appropriation of all kinds of firearms. They accepted everything, from the repeating rifle to the old shotgun with a ramrod. Many of the men had only revolvers, while a still greater number carried only a knife about twenty inches long and known as the *machete* — an implement which should have a place upon the coat-of-arms of Cuba Libre, for it is one of the institutions of the island. In times of peace it is used in the cane fields, and in times of war, in the hands of mounted insurgents, it struck terror to the hearts of Spanish youth.

Notwithstanding the apparent insignificance of the revolu-

tionary movement, the government became anxious. Several decrees had been issued fixing the time in which the rebels might lay down their arms, and promising a pardon to those who should return to their homes, but the insurgents paid little attention to them, being too wise to put faith in a Spanish pardon. General Lachambre was appointed by Captain-General Calleja commander-in-chief of the Spanish forces in the province of Santiago de Cuba, and charged with the work of repressing the insurgents. With some difficulty Lachambre gathered together about two hundred men and set out for Guantanamo, where he showed himself in brilliant uniform, surrounded by staff officers, but a short time afterwards he departed, not even having had a glimpse of the insurgents.

A characteristic proof of the improvidence and the disorder of the Spanish government is that when the effective forces of the island should, for the safety of Spanish rule, have been 20,000 men, it was impossible to get together much more than 2,000 capable of efficient service. The Spanish Army List (*Anuario Militar de España*) for 1896 showed what would have been a formidable army for a territory about the size of Virginia; formidable as it might have been if massed to meet the enemy in open battle, the exigencies of warfare with the Cubans required the Spanish forces to be scattered over the island. Every little town had to be garrisoned, for the enemy might spring up anywhere at any moment. Moreover, there was always a large proportion of the regulars, or those who had come from Spain, who were unacclimated and were unfit to go into the field.

At this time Spain was characterizing the insurrection as a species of brigandage of trifling import, but gradually it began to be realized that it was a serious movement, rapidly gaining strength and breadth. While affairs seemed quiet for the time in the western provinces, it was not easy to realize the gravity of the conditions in Santiago, where even conservative people began to clamor loudly for autonomy — a sort of compromise with the new spirit of independence.

Finally, the Spanish government resolved to act, and its first effort illustrates so well the conditions of warfare in Cuba and the conditions which prevailed to a great extent throughout the whole contest that it is worth studying. One day a column of about 250 Spanish soldiers left Santiago and began operations from the little town of Cobre, about twenty miles away. The object was to disperse Goulet's little band, which was master of the country about Botijo, where the people generally sympathized with the insurrection. It was hardly more than a month since the insurgents had taken the field, and all who were interested in them were somewhat alarmed when they saw the prospect of an encounter between Goulet's followers and the royal troops. Warned of the approach of the Spanish, Goulet quietly retreated into the mountains, and then for some time he contented himself with secretly following the enemy, waiting till he should find a propitious place where he could give his followers the first baptism of fire. He realized fully how important it might be not to discourage them at the start. It was with joy, therefore, that he saw the Spanish advancing into the interior within a labyrinth of hills which few knew so well as he, and covered with forests and underbrush which were well adapted for his tactics. He pushed around and ahead to await them on the ground of an ancient sugar-mill near Botijo. At this place the highway led near the foot of a wooded hill of some height, the loose limestone making the hill inaccessible. As soon as the Spaniards had entered well into the ravine, the insurgents opened fire on them. The troops, which had marched without reconnoitering, were completely surprised by the bold attack and answered it only with a feeble fire. The Cuban fire was also badly aimed, though Goulet and a few of his followers aimed with calmness and skill. Several of the Spaniards were wounded, and the column retreated precipitately, leaving two of their wounded on the field. They returned to Cobre, routed, and in a condition approximating that of stragglers.

On the day following this event Goulet caused a note to

be written to the military commandant of Santiago de Cuba, informing him that he had picked up two wounded men and that he would agree to return them should he, the commandant, send for them. The only condition asked was that the soldiers sent to convey their wounded comrades must come unarmed. Goulet pledged his honor that they should come and go unmolested. The commandant sent for his men according to instructions, and Goulet kept his word.

From that hour the character of the war was transformed. On the side of the Cubans reason and pity held natural passions in check. During the previous insurrection bloody reprisals were the rule with both of the contending forces, and acts of unexampled cruelty and barbarity were freely committed. From the beginning of this insurrection the insurgents, as a rule, practiced moderation and profound respect for the rights of humanity. The watchword of mercy and humanity came from the revolutionary committee in New York. The instructions of the committee were formal and they were carried out to the letter by the leaders.

The echo of the insignificant skirmish ending in the defeat of the Spanish troops from Cobre reverberated throughout the rural districts, and from that hour the negroes believed that defeat for them would be impossible. Goulet passed on to the little village of Hongolosongo, which was defended by a feeble troop of Volunteers. He surprised the fort, and, without striking a blow, took possession of the ten or twelve guns of the garrison and of a case of cartridges. He gave full liberty to the Volunteers who had manned the fort, and a few of them enlisted at once under his orders. Farther on in the interior of the country, General Rabi met with a success similar to that of Goulet, though it was less brilliant. He fought at Los Negros with a Spanish column, the struggle ending without an accident to his men and with some loss to the Spaniards. Meanwhile, the insurrection was organizing in the rural districts. Some leaders of the former war recruited a few men, but as yet the movement was without a directing head.

CHAPTER XVI

POLITICAL TROUBLES IN SPAIN — GENERAL CAMPOS SENT TO CUBA — LANDING OF MACEO AND CROMBET — DEATH OF CROMBET AND NARROW ESCAPE OF MACEO.

Spain Beset Within and Without — Officers Refuse to Volunteer — Sagasta Ministry Resigns — Canovas's Ministry — Campos Sent to Cuba — Maceo and His Record in the Ten-Years War — The Terror of the Spanish — How He Learned to Read — His Exile and Travels — A Hostler at West Point — An Ideal Guerrilla Chief — Crombet and His Record — An Obstinate Captain — Crombet Blows Out the Captain's Brains — They Land on a Lonely Shore — Their Sufferings — Feasting on a Banana Plantation — Surprised — Crombet Surrounded and Killed — Maceo Escapes — Wanders Alone in the Woods — Betrayed by an Indian Guide — A Friendly Negro — In an Insurgent Camp at Last — His Presence Works a Marvelous Change — Recruit ing His Army — Drilling His Men While Carried in a Hammock.

DURING the weeks immediately following the outbreak of the insurrection Spain was beset with troubles within as well as without. The arrest and summary treatment of an American citizen in Havana and the seizure of an American vessel had placed the State Department at Washington in a position of diplomatic hostility, and it was becoming very evident that the authorities in Cuba were not suppressing the rebellion with that thoroughness required to uphold Spain's supremacy. The home government had treated the agitation as a recrudescence of the former so-called "brigandage," and, having fostered this impression, the sudden call for volunteers to go to Cuba not only opened the eyes of the incredulous but brought the government into a sharp contest with the militia. While it was apparently easy to recruit men from the ranks of the army, the officers, according to some of the Spanish papers, refused to volunteer to go to Cuba, and this forced the government to the unpleasant ex-

pedient of drawing lots. The fact was the subject of much comment in the press, and, in many cases, harsh criticisms of the army officials with imputations of cowardice and venality. The officers, furious under this criticism, on March 16th went in a body to the office of one of the newspapers, invaded the composing-rooms, and broke the printing-presses. The police contented themselves with a very feeble interference. Demands made by army officers upon the Liberal ministry that they suppress the newspapers daring to assail the army met with a refusal which, on the following day, caused the resignation of the ministry. Great excitement followed this step, and it was not till General Campos was made Captain-General of Madrid and given full authority that even a semblance of order was restored.

It seemed probable that Sagasta, the Liberal leader, had been rather glad of the opportunity to place upon the Conservatives the responsibility of regulating matters which were daily becoming more complicated. The quarrel between the journalists and the army officers served as a convenient pretext, and on the 23d of March the Conservatives, under Canovas del Castillo, took possession of the reins of the government. Immediately after his installation the president of the council made a very clear statement regarding the conditions prevailing in Cuba, and the people became aware of the seriousness of the insurrection. Public opinion changed, the danger was realized, and there arose a clamor for a strong hand to stay the insurrection. With one voice the people called for General Campos, and soon his appointment as Governor-General of Cuba and Commander-in-Chief was made known. Meanwhile, the first expedition, consisting of over 8,500 soldiers, had already landed in Havana.

The news of Campos's appointment was generally welcomed in Cuba. The insurgents knew that Spain's most famous general was a fair fighter, though severe, while those who still hoped for peace, even though they sympathized with the Cubans, had great confidence in the sagacity and skill of

the man who had happily brought to a close the Ten-Years War. Everyone agreed that Campos was the most honest man in Spain, the Spaniard of all Spaniards who knew Cuba, her needs and her aspirations best. Besides, there was a conviction that as soon as Campos had informed himself of the state of the country he would ask his government to make such concessions as would deprive the war of a rational basis.

The autonomist party were persuaded that Campos would bring with him the much-desired civic policy. Many of them think to this day that if he had at once offered the insurgent leaders a broad autonomy, the insurrection could have been quelled in a short time. But it is probable that the power vested in him did not enable him to settle the contention in this manner. Those who were well acquainted with the Cuban junta and its purposes believed that the secessionists would never have listened to further Spanish offers of plans of autonomy. They had been duped once, and they did not propose to experience another disappointment.

But, unquestionably, there was at that moment a good opportunity for Spain to make the proposition, for while the radical secessionists might have continued to struggle, there is no doubt that a fair proposition of self-government would have alienated from the insurgent cause many who were in a doubtful attitude at the time. It would also have made it extremely difficult for the insurgent leaders to have carried their campaign into the western part of the island. But while Campos was on his way to Cuba with reinforcements events were happening on the insurgent side which had the greatest influence upon the future of the war.

What the insurgent bands lacked at that time was a chief vested with the authority that comes of an unquestioned record, or that authority which by reason of a strong personality and magnetic power over men would stand for experience and a name. It was the common opinion that if some of the exiled generals of the former war could succeed in landing in Cuba, they could infuse the necessary strength into the cause.



In the province of Santiago the partisans of the insurrection prayed for the coming of Maceo and Flor Crombet.

They did not know that the old leaders were about to enter upon the scene and change in a short time the whole course of events. At that moment Maceo and Flor Crombet were in San Domingo, and they had but one arm of the sea to cross.

Antonio Maceo was born on July 14, 1848. His father had a little plantation near Barajagua, and there were eleven sons, of whom Antonio was the eldest. His skin was very dark, something between the negro and the mulatto, although he seemed much nearer the latter type. At the beginning of the Ten-Years War he did not know how to read or write. His father kept mules for hire and they were driven along the lonely mountain roads by Antonio. In this way the boy made trips to Baracoa, to Guantanamo, to Santiago, and even to Holguin.

He saw the slaves toiling their lives away in the fields, fettered and lashed by overseers. He saw the red and yellow Spanish flag floating above the fortified towns, and came to understand it as an emblem of rapacity, cruelty, and greed. One autumn day in 1868 Antonio returned to his father's plantation from Baracoa with the information that the Cubans had rebelled. The father, being a careful man, at once advised his family to remain strictly neutral. But they secretly exulted over the successes of their countrymen, and it may have been that the Spaniards obtained an inkling of their sentiments. At any rate, Spanish spies began to annoy them, and more than once they were threatened. The revolution had been in progress for some months, and the Spaniards were wild over a series of disasters, when there appeared at the Maceo plantation a band of Spanish guerrillas. Maceo and his older sons were away with a mule train.

They returned at nightfall. As the plantation came into view, a horrifying sight met the gaze of Maceo and his sons. Where his home had been there was nothing but a smouldering heap of ashes and embers. His barns were burned, his



FAMOUS CUBAN LEADERS.

Gen. MAXIMO GOMEZ.

Gen. DON JULIO SANGUILLY.

Gen. CALIXTA GARCIA.

Gen. ANTONIO MACEO.

crops destroyed, his mules, sheep, horses, and cattle driven off. But where were the members of his family? Out in the jungle a woman screamed. Father and sons rushed in the direction of the voice. Six young boys lay on the ground, bound, bleeding, and senseless. The gray-haired mother stood tied to a tree, moaning, with a broken arm.

On the following day the father called his sons about him, and exacted from each a promise that they would never lay down their arms until the invader was driven out and Cuba was free. A few days later Maximo Gomez, lying out in the mountains of Santiago with his little following, was confronted by a gaunt, haggard man, behind whom were half a dozen awkward boys. Little did Gomez know that in this gathering of raw recruits there stood his future lieutenant-general. He asked them if they could fight. They smiled and said "Perhaps." Soon afterward some Spanish troops were riding leisurely along with an ammunition train. Around the bend of the road, in front, swept a flying body of horsemen, with their machetes glittering. They were guerrillas of Gomez, and at their head rode the "awkward squad" of the Maceos.

Right into the heart of the Spanish troops they drove, pell mell, cutting, slashing, and striking right and left. When the fight was ended the elder Maceo lay dead on the ground. Before the expiration of two months, Manuel, Fermin, and Justice Maceo had been killed in battle.

Raphael was so cut up by wounds that he left the island to die as an exile in Costa Rica. For six months after this the survivors of the Maceo family seemed to bear charmed lives, and they became the foremost fighters under Gomez.

Next, Miguel was killed by a bayonet thrust at the capture of Une Vitas. Soon after Julio was shot dead at Nuevo Mundo. Felipe and Tomas were so badly wounded that they became helpless cripples in San Domingo.

Then, almost at the end of the war, Marcus was killed in a gallant machete charge, leaving Antonio, of all the "awkward

squad" of fighters, still in the field. His brother José was still too young to join his relatives. During the first twelve months of Maceo's service he received sixteen of the twenty-one severe wounds that marked his body at the close of the war. With great taciturnity and apparent gruffness, he combined a magnetism that drew men to him. Within a year he had been promoted through the various grades of sergeant, lieutenant, and captain to that of major. Soon after receiving this honor, Maceo was ordered to capture the upland town of Ti Ariba. With only 300 men he made a headlong attack on the forts, and after a desperate engagement succeeded in driving the Spaniards into Santiago. For this brilliant engagement he received the shoulder straps of a colonel. The more power accorded by Gomez to Maceo the more effective became the fighting of the Cubans. Maceo's following was a blindly devoted one, and his men would follow wherever he might lead. In 1870 Maceo with 400 men fiercely attacked the Spanish general at Ramos. Campos held his ground, and the fighting raged at intervals for thirty days. Near Monte Oscuro he was fiercely attacked by General Valera, at the head of 1,000 Spaniards. With only 400 men he made a stand in a strong position against the combined forces of Valera and Campos. Maceo quickly saw that he would have to retreat. Before doing so he lured the Spaniards into a dangerous position, and then raised his favorite cry of "Al machete!" The slaughter was terrible.

After Maceo's retreat Campos returned to Santiago with only a remnant of his former forces. He was met by Balmaceda, the Captain-General, who said, derisively:

"Oh, you pretend that all the glory was on our side. That may be so, but the losses were on our side also."

"Does your excellency suppose," retorted Campos, "that Cubans use cotton bullets?"

Maceo's next notable achievement was in the battle of Zarzai, where 2,500 Spaniards were utterly routed. Later, at the battle of Santa Maria de Holguin, he charged the Span-

ish line at the head of his followers, and many were cut down before they could fire a shot. It was at this time that Maceo first met General Weyler. The latter had been made a brigadier, and at the battle of Guaimaro was sent against Maceo.

Maceo had placed his men across a steep ravine in some heavy brush. The Spaniards came tumbling and running up to the edge of the ravine, and there they were slaughtered like sheep. Weyler fled, leaving five hundred dead on the field. He never stopped to look back until he was safe within the Spanish lines at Puerto Principe. Soon afterward, with 500 men, Maceo attacked the San Quentin battalion, 1,000 strong, under the command of Colonel Yoyer. The Spaniards lost 200 men, and would have been annihilated had it not been for the timely arrival of Lieutenant Tirso with reinforcements.

For these brilliant acts Maceo was made major-general. It seemed as if this new honor put additional spurs on his heels. He lost no opportunity to harrass the enemy, was in ambush and on guard everywhere, and he became the bugbear and terror of the Spaniards. He expected them at all points, even when he was far away, and his life seemed set upon a height beyond the reach of Spanish bullets. How to take Maceo became the one idea of the Spanish soldiers, and as he became the terror of the Spaniards he became equally the hero of the Cubans. In rapid succession he engaged the Spaniards in a series of brilliant and bloody fights.

In the battle of Cayo Rey, Antonio Maceo had a narrow escape from death. In the midst of the fight he saw the Spanish colonel in command cheering on his troops. In an instant Maceo had drawn his machete and rushed forward to engage the Spanish commander in a sword combat. The latter saw the Cuban leader coming, and flourished his sword in defiance. At that moment Maceo received a rifle bullet through his lungs. He reeled in the saddle and would have fallen had it not been for Lieutenant-Colonel Pacheco, who caught him as he fell and carried him to a place of safety. At the same time Colonel Rodriquez, perceiving Maceo's perilous plight, made

a gallant charge, and, under a sweeping fire, the Spaniards were checked.

For three months Maceo fought a battle for his life, with but meager attendance and but slim chances for recovery. At last his naturally rugged constitution triumphed, but his roaring and trumpet-like voice had vanished. Again in the saddle, Maceo began to adopt new methods of crippling Spain. He began to destroy Spanish property and to burn Spanish plantations. In company with his brother José, now grown to manhood, and 500 guerrillas, he invaded the Guantanamo district, spreading desolation with fire and sword.

While he was in the midst of his fiery crusade the Cuban and Spanish leaders met at Zanjón and signed a treaty of peace. The news was brought to Maceo by a messenger who was authorized to procure his signature to the treaty.

"Tell them," was Maceo's reply, "that I will never sign any compact with Spain other than a compact for the freedom of Cuba. I will not submit."

So Antonio Maceo kept on fighting. It soon became evident, however, that the backbone of the war had been broken. Ten years of starvation and exposure in all sorts of weather had broken the spirit of all but Maceo. Unable to obtain supplies, he was reduced to complete want. Then the capitulation came. He wrote Campos a haughty letter, agreeing to lay down his arms, disband his forces, and submit to exile on the condition that a Spanish man-of-war be placed at his disposal to convey him and his officers to Jamaica. This offer was readily accepted by Campos, who realized the impossibility of catching Maceo in a country where he knew every tree and bypath.

Maceo disbanded his men in the early dawn under a big tree near Guantanamo. There were men among that 500 who had fought under Maceo for almost ten years. They were ragged and half starved, but they had stood together in the brunt of many a hard-fought battle, and it was no wonder that tears were in their eyes as they bade their leader goodby.

For them it was a return to the blackened sites of their burned homes and their ruined plantations. For him it was exile forever to a foreign country — and Cuba still in chains. No wonder the thought maddened him. Yet he counselled patience, industry, and obedience to the laws. “As for me,” he said, “I will follow the will of fate that leads me blindly onward. Will I come again? *Quien sabe?*” Then there were handclasps and goodbys, and Antonio Maceo sailed away to Jamaica.

In the few moments of his leisure he had learned to read and write. At night, when the fighting was over, by such light as his straightened means could compass, he pored over his books as industrious and submissive as a child. General Lacret was his preceptor, and he suddenly acquired an amazing fondness for books relating to wars and military tactics, which he read early and late.

Early in 1879 Maceo arrived in New York. For a month or more he lived alone, without other companionship than that of books. In a few months he made his way to West Point, where he obtained employment as a hostler. Nobody in the academy dreamed that the broad-shouldered, dark-browed man who handled the horses so easily had ever smelled the smoke of battle, or heard the song of rifle bullets. Day after day, on the parade ground, he watched the evolutions of the cadets, listened to the commands of the officers, studied the discipline of the place, pored over volumes of military tactics that he had managed to borrow, and added to his natural genius the knowledge of other great generals.

At last the hostler, who was regarded as book-mad, gave up his position and returned to New York. From New York he went to Costa Rica, taking a hundred or more weighty volumes with him. Some wealthy Cubans had settled in Costa Rica during the war, and they now offered Maceo a tract of land on which to colonize his brave followers. Here for ten years the exile worked and studied and dreamed, instructed his veterans in the modern theories of war, and gave them practical lessons

in drilling and in cavalry evolutions. Never for a moment did he forget his purpose.

In 1888, ten years after the close of the war, he began to scheme for another uprising in Cuba. He took his former officers into his confidence, and the little band of revolutionists spent almost a year in making plans for the overthrow of Spain.

Finally, Maceo sailed for Jamaica, and from Jamaica to Santiago de Cuba, disguised as a laborer. Not for a moment, however, during the ten years that had elapsed since the war had the Spanish government lost sight of Maceo. Consequently, when he disappeared from Costa Rica there was a hue and cry. "Maceo has gone," was telegraphed to Madrid and Havana. Search was made throughout the island. Finally, the government got word of him. Under torture a Cuban confessed that he had seen Maceo in El Christo, disguised as a muleteer. In the meantime Maceo had become aware that his whereabouts had been discovered. A fisherman who had fought under him during the war sailed for Kingston one dark night with Maceo in his boat. For many weeks thereafter the Spaniards searched in vain for the Cuban leader.

Maceo returned to Costa Rica disappointed, but not discouraged. He entered into correspondence with prominent Cuban sympathizers in American cities, and with General Gomez in San Domingo. This was kept up until local juntas were formed in almost every prominent city in the United States. Then Maceo and his little band of patriots in Costa Rica had nothing to do but wait for events. The years between 1890 and 1895 were passed in hard work and in studying the possibilities of Cuba from a military standpoint.

One day in February, 1895, word came that the Cubans had risen. A week later Maceo, his brother José, Flor Crombet, Cabreco, and sixteen other veterans, sailed from Costa Rica for San Domingo. At this time Maceo was forty-seven years old. His hair and his beard were beginning to show threads of silver, but his strength and agility were sur-

prising. He was a sharpshooter and a horseman of incomparable finish and skill. Calm, imperious, and inflexible as he stood under the rain of bullets, he was the ideal of a guerrilla chief. In the march of events he was to display qualities which proved that he was as true a man and as masterful a general as he was keen and skillful in strategy. Springing from obscurity, he hewed out of the rugged history of Cuba a name that will be remembered while liberty endures. Unknown as he was and of a race of slaves, backed only by a small band of rebels, he met the soldiers of a European power and the head of an imposing army on the ground of man's equality, and for a moment the rebel held the safety of the royal army in his hands.

Flor Crombet was also a guerrilla of unquestioned valor. He fought side by side with Maceo during the greater part of the Ten-Years War; wounded many times, he seemed to bear a charmed life. He was a lion in battle, but he lacked Maceo's greatness of soul, and he had neither the noble instinct nor the generosity of Maceo. But he was whiter than his compatriot, his mother having been a mulatto, while the untainted blood of the Caucasian race ran in the veins of his father.

At San Domingo they chartered a little American boat in which to cross to the coast near Baracoa, the nearest port, taking with them a few arms and such equipments as they considered necessary. They crossed without attracting attention. The Spanish cruiser which patrolled the coast did not appear. On the morning of April 1st they sighted Baracoa, and the leaders then asked the captain, who was steering his boat towards the port, to land them farther along the coast at some distance from the city. The captain refused, urging that it had been agreed that they should land at Baracoa; he declared that he should land just as he had contracted to, and added that he had no wish to run upon the rocks which line the coast for the purpose of pleasing his passengers.

Maceo and Crombet insisted that he should not land in the port, and when the captain would not listen to their entreaties

they told him that to do so would be to thrust them into the jaws of death. They told him that they could not approach the port without being recognized, and that they would be arrested and shot. But nothing that they urged had any influence upon the captain. He steered steadily towards the city, and Crombet, beside himself, seized a rifle and blew out the captain's brains.

They then took the ship, put about, and steered for the coast, and shortly afterwards landed in a little bay situated some distance from Baracoa. It was a part of the country of which they knew very little, and they wandered for some time at random, and the few inhabitants whom they met, Indian guerrillas in the service of Spain, were hostile to them. Maceo and his band kept in hiding in the woods, where they were soon called upon to undergo serious privations. After a few days of trial and discomfort, however, they arrived at a plantation of banana trees laden with fruit. They were thankful for such a feast after their prolonged fast, but while they were busy with this harvest they were surprised by a troop of Indians commanded by Spanish officers. Maceo, realizing their position, in an instant cried out to his companions:

"Sauve qui peut!" (Let him escape who can.)

All ran, with the exception of Crombet, who was at once surrounded. He fired and killed several of his adversaries, then fell dead with a bullet in his forehead. The Spaniards turned to pursue the rest of the band, but they had disappeared.

Dispersed and wandering separately, their sufferings were intense. Maceo lived for days on bitter oranges, the only fruit which grows in those Cuban woods. His boots had given out, he was barefooted, for in his precipitate flight he had been forced to abandon all his supplies. After a time he met an Indian and asked him to show him the way out of the woods. The Indian, who had recognized him, agreed, and they went on together for several hours. Evening came on.

"General," said the Indian, "beyond this point I do not

know the way, and I think it would be better for you to remain in this grotto to-night. To-morrow I will return with one of my friends who knows the country, and he will lead you wherever you think best."

Maceo thanked him and rewarded him by giving him the only money he had left, an American twenty-dollar gold-piece. In the shelter pointed out by the guide the wind had heaped up a bed of leaves, upon which the tired fugitive stretched himself. But he was too tired and too anxious to sleep, and the thought came to him that it would not be prudent for him to rest there.

"No," he said to himself. "It is not well that anyone should know where I pass the night."

Then he arose and looked about him. The dew lay heavy upon the great leaves of the rich undergrowth, and a white, malarious veil, hanging above the earth and embracing it, trembled in the dim light of the night. Maceo's heart swelled with memories of his sorrowful youth, the remembrance of the natural and inevitable wrongs of his birth, and the desperate fight for freedom of his tortured country. He thought of Crombet who had fought by his side and had been like a brother to him, and of all the brave, determined men who had given their lives into his keeping and followed him without a question or a doubt. They too were fugitives, groping about in the forest.

"No, there must be no careless relaxation now," he thought.

Despite his longing for rest, he left his cave and crept out into the woods, where he hid himself among the leafage of the great plants at the foot of a tall tree. In that position he could watch the cave and signal should his guide return according to his promise.

He had just settled himself comfortably in his shelter when he heard voices in the direction of the grotto, and immediately afterwards saw a troop of armed Indians advancing. They were led by his guide, who had no sooner received his

money than he had gone to betray him to his enemies, and the Indians had come to capture him while he slept.

Maceo crept further away through the underbrush, that luxuriant growth which returns no sound of the cautious human footfall. It was not long before he heard the Indians clamoring loudly because the perfidious guide had brought them to an empty cave. It is evident that the Spanish authorities, knowing of Maceo's departure from San Domingo, and anticipating that he would attempt to land on the island, had laid their traps to capture him. The obstinacy of the captain whom Crombet had shot was suspicious, and the quickness with which armed bands turned up in the thick woods where he had been almost lost could hardly have been without design.

Maceo wandered about all that night, expecting at any moment to meet an enemy. Reaching at last a small hut among the rocks, he entered, revolver in hand, and an old negro sprang up from the floor.

"Do you recognize me?" asked Maceo.

"Yes, General," was the reply. "You are Don Antonio Maceo."

"Very good," said Maceo. "You will guide me to the nearest insurgent station. If you lead me into an ambush I will blow your brains out."

The old negro did not reply. Silently he led Maceo along a faintly-marked trail, and after several hours of marching they met a little group of Cubans, who welcomed Maceo with joy and gratitude. As for Maceo he was utterly exhausted, unable to take another step. The dangers which he faced after landing near Baracoa afford another proof of the daring qualities of the man, and also of the lack of real sympathy which the uprising encountered at the beginning. But as soon as it was known that Maceo had landed, and, in spite of the attempts to capture him, was at the head of an army, the whole aspect of things was changed. One by one, or in little groups, the Creoles who were serving in the Spanish ranks

joined the insurgents; those who had held back doubtfully shouldered their guns and came into camp, while the Indians who had failed to capture and assassinate Maceo, awed by his bravery, soon became some of his best soldiers.

All those who had landed with Maceo and had escaped from the attack at the banana plantation had to pass through trying ordeals before they arrived at insurgent camps, but they all came out safe. Maceo, who had not been a witness of the killing of Crombet, believed that he was still alive, and as soon as it was possible he ordered the woods searched in every direction. For a long time he looked for him at every turn, and in his dreams of Cuba Libre he saw his old friend living and triumphant. The Spaniards boasted that they had carried away his body, but this is doubtful, as those who saw the body which they exhibited as that of Crombet did not recognize it.

Maceo exerted himself at once to gather about him an army, and when he had a few hundred armed men he felt that his success was assured. When it is considered what he accomplished with these men, one can imagine what he might have done, with his military talents, could he have commanded a large army of trained soldiers. His organization of the rough material at his disposal was masterful, though for a long time he was hardly able to do much work with his troops. In his terrible ordeal he had become crippled; his feet were so swollen that for some time he had to be carried about in a hammock. But nothing escaped his keen eye and vigilance.

CHAPTER XVII

GOMEZ AND MACEO PERFECT THEIR PLANS — TRAGIC DEATH OF MARTI—MACEO'S BRILLIANT CAMPAIGN—NARROW ESCAPE OF CAMPOS.

Arrival of Marti, President of the Cuban Republic, and Gomez, Commander-in-Chief — Influence of Gomez in the Central Provinces — Arrival of Campos — His Plan to Confine the Revolution to Santiago de Cuba — Plan of Campaign Arranged by Gomez and Maceo — Gomez with Seven Hundred Cavalrymen Near the Enemy — A Wild Charge — The Spaniards Driven Back on their Reserves — Marti's Horse Becomes Unmanageable — Carried into the Ranks of the Enemy — They Fall upon Him — His Death — Campos Orders a Military Funeral — Maceo's Attack at Jobito — Barbers as Surgeons — Maceo Plans an Attack — Death of Goulet — Maceo Turns the Retreat into a Charge — Did Not Know He Was Attacking Campos — Features of a Cuban Camp — Uniform and Equipment of a *Mambis*.

GENERAL Maceo had hardly begun his preparations when a detachment was sent to receive Generals Maximo Gomez, Francisco Borrerro, Angel Guerra, and José Marti, under whose energetic management the insurrection had been organized. They arrived in Cuba on the 11th of April, five days before General Campos succeeded General Calleja as Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish forces in the island. Pending the formal action of the Cuban leaders when they should become more firmly established, the revolutionary committee appointed Marti President of the Republic of Cuba and Gomez as Commander-in-Chief of the army. In two months, therefore, a revolution which had, to all appearances, begun so insignificantly was fairly launched, and the greatest general in Spain was on his way to measure arms with the strongest leaders among the Cubans. If Gomez was less than Maceo an idol of the Cuban people in the east, he was better known in the central divisions of the island, and

the plan was to take steps at once to extend the insurrection into that quarter. Gomez had been one of the leading spirits of the previous war, and later had been an officer of high repute in the Honduras army. The knowledge of his presence in the island was an inspiring impulse upon the Cubans in the provinces of Puerto Principe and Santa Clara, who immediately prepared to join the insurgents, and, as in that section of the island the white race predominated, their sympathy afforded the insurrection a more favorable standing.

Campos's first plan of campaign was to confine the revolution to the province of Santiago de Cuba, and he was reported to have made the statement that he would crush the insurgents, establish peace, and return to Spain the following November. He issued a proclamation promising pardon and freedom to such rebellious Cubans as would surrender themselves and their arms, but it was too late for such an expedient to have the desired effect. Campos asserted that the province of Puerto Principe would never rise in revolt, and, in order to prevent it, he projected a line of railway from Santa Cruz on the south coast to the city of Puerto Principe, and another from Manzanillo to Bayamo, hoping thereby to engage the unemployed and quiet the fever of revolt. It became equally important for the Cuban generals to cross the country into Puerto Principe so that Gomez could bring into the field those who were waiting for a leader, hence both the Cubans and the Spaniards awaited the results of this first movement with great interest. Campos hastened a cordon of troops, estimated to number 10,000 men, near the border of Puerto Principe and Santiago to prevent Gomez from entering. Meanwhile, Maceo, who could more readily than Gomez recruit in the east, organized the troops as best he could. Several chiefs brought in little bands which they had gathered together, and Goulet with his force, which by this time numbered near 1,000 men, hastened to join his old commander. To the indomitable courage and fierce endurance of the Cubans was now added the buoyancy and confidence which came from the

knowledge that they were to follow the lead of generals of tried capacity, as daring fighters as the world has ever seen, and recruits came in much faster than the equipments could be supplied.

Gomez, Marti, and Maceo arranged their plan of campaign and then separated. It was decided that in order to facilitate the entrance of Gomez and Marti into the province of Puerto Principe, Maceo should attempt a diversion of the royal forces in the direction of Guantanamo. Gomez and Marti with about 700 cavalrymen turned their course westward. As their main purpose was to work their way into Puerto Principe, where Marti counted on the presence of Gomez and his own personality and eloquence to influence the undecided, it was policy for them to avoid, if possible, the Spanish troops, leaving them to be drawn away by Maceo with his superior forces. But, unfortunately, when they found themselves in the neighborhood of the enemy, the prudence of Gomez was overborne by the zeal of Marti.

On the 18th of May, when camped on the plains of Dos Rios, they learned that the first line of the enemy was in the neighborhood, safely protected by a fort. Starting out before daybreak the next morning, they soon came upon the Spanish outpost. Marti was all excitement. He desired to fight, but the prudent Gomez reminded Marti that skirmishing was not to be the object of the expedition, that they should pass around the enemy if possible, and he thought it would be wiser to profit by the heavy fog which enshrouded the plain by firing a few shots at the outposts, while they continued on their march unnoticed along the flank of the royal army. But the firing of the muskets excited Marti more and more. They were face to face with the hated Spaniards against whose oppression he had struggled and suffered. The hope of his youth and his manhood at last seemed to be realized. He had planned the great struggle now at hand; step by step, in the face of discouragements and obstacles, had infused it with life and made it a working force. Here at last was a chance

to strike. Why should they avoid this enemy with whom for twenty years he had longed to measure strength? He could not bear to think of drawing back, of slinking away.

"That would be dishonor," he said.

Before the wild exaltation of Marti, Gomez had not the heart to insist upon his own prudent tactics. And if, indeed, they had had a large army, instead of a force insignificant in comparison with the royal troops; had been properly armed and equipped, a decisive blow might have been struck then and there. The enthusiasm of the young recruits, led by an old warrior of mark and such a spirited champion as Marti, would have been hard to withstand, for no such frenzy of patriotic fervor prevailed among the Spanish youths, drawn into the struggle against their will. As it was, they quailed before the charge of those seven hundred cavalymen, and no serious harm might have been done but for the recklessness of Marti, who was mounted upon a very beautiful and vigorous horse. He was told that the animal might be unmanageable in a skirmish, even if ridden by an experienced horseman, but Marti would not listen.

"Viva Cuba Libre!" he cried, waving his sword, and, followed by his soldiers, he rushed upon the Spanish lines. Before the avalanche the Spanish army retreated, but in good order upon its reserves. That was the trap. Gomez sounded a rally to the troops, and they stopped, but Marti, carried on by the vigor of his horse, which he could not control, was taken straight into the ranks of the enemy. He received a bullet in his left eyebrow, another in his throat, and several sword thrusts in his body. Then the Spaniards fell upon their victim. The insurgents charged again, but in the face of such superior numbers the movement was of no avail. There was danger of losing all, and Marti was dead.

Marti wore upon his hat a scarf in the colors of Cuba Libre on which were embroidered the words "A. Marti." The commander of the Spanish forces hastened to transmit to Santiago the news of this important capture, and the rejoicing was great

among the Spaniards. General Campos at once gave orders to despatch two persons who knew Marti to identify him and bring back official proof of his death. After its identification the corpse was to be brought to Santiago, let it cost what it might. He did not propose to neglect the opportunity of producing upon public opinion an impression unfavorable to the Cuban cause, and, naturally, the news of Marti's death was at first received with incredulity by some. But the evidence was conclusive. The body of the dead president was carried to the cemetery, where it was exposed to the public view and photographed. By the order of General Campos, a Spanish general presided at the funeral of the illustrious insurgent, and pronounced a discourse over the grave, eulogizing the brilliant qualities of the fallen enemy, and mourning because his courage and his talents had not been exerted in a better cause. Those who had been present at the summary executions of the previous war thought that times had changed and military manners with them. At that time Marti's corpse would have been dragged through the streets of the city. But Campos knew that such brutal treatment would only arouse thousands of Cubans who were then in a doubtful attitude. The example of leniency had already been set by the Cubans at the order of the revolutionary committee, and to have offset this with outrages would have called down upon the Spanish the condemnation of other nations. And this was at a time when Spain was eagerly seeking moral support from outside for use in her relations with the United States, which were continually becoming more serious and complicated.

Marti's death appeared at first sight to be an irreparable loss, but the movement had received such an impulse that nothing could then have stopped its onward march. It was quickly arranged that T. Estrada Palma should act as president until such time as the Cuban Assembly could meet to definitely organize the republic. Marti had already issued the call for this meeting and it only awaited the favorable opportunity.

The new president at the outbreak of the Ten-Years War

was one of the wealthiest landowners in eastern Cuba. He took up arms, and served nine years in the field. During this time his mother was starved to death by the Spaniards. He was finally elected president of the Republic, and while in that capacity was captured and taken to Spain. In a census which was taken of the prisoners in the fortress in which he was confined he wrote upon the blank which was given him: "T. Estrada Palma; of foreign birth — Cuban; occupation, President of the Republic of Cuba." Upon the cessation of hostilities in 1878, the Spanish government offered him a high political position and the restitution of his vast estates, which had been confiscated, if he would take the oath of allegiance. This he refused to do, and, almost destitute, he departed for Honduras. In a small college there he found employment as a professor, and thus supported himself until he became postmaster-general of Honduras. The daughter of President Guardiola became his wife. Later, he set out for the United States and founded a school in the town of Central Valley, N. Y., for the education of Spanish-American children.

But he always retained his sympathy and enthusiasm for the cause of Cuba and offered everything he possessed to further the insurrection, becoming one of the leaders of the revolutionary committee, and thus, on Marti's death, the head of its operations.

Experience had taught Marti that Céspedes had failed in 1878 largely because of lack of arms. Before attempting to begin the war, therefore, Marti had organized a system of collecting money from exiled Cubans everywhere. He had but a small sum at the beginning, for his system had only begun its operations. The Spaniards generally believed that Marti controlled millions and jumped at the conclusion that he was backed solely by the people of the United States. But it is stated as a fact that Marti was compelled to start the war with no more than \$75,000, which would be hardly enough for a single expedition. But his system was in working order and it represented millions.

This is why the death of Marti did not check the march of the revolution. Marti knew well it would be so, and a short time before he set out with Gomez he had written to a friend in Havana a letter in which he used these significant words:

"I can die now, because my work is done. I feel that I shall soon be in the hands of that destiny which makes some men disappear after finishing their mission for the good of their country."

Did his highly wrought and sensitive mind receive one of those flashes of intuition of which history affords so many notable examples — a premonition of the fate that awaited him? If this be so, perhaps there is less reason to wonder at the recklessness with which he rushed upon the swords of the Spanish at Boca de Dos Rios.

The Cuban revolutionary organization was composed largely of the Cuban political clubs throughout the United States, about 300 in number, and all working under the general regulations laid down by Marti. Contributions of money from the members were regulated according to their resources. The clubs, in a general election which was held every two years, elected the treasurer of the party, but the real head of the whole organization was the president, or, as the Cubans called him, the delegate, who, after the outbreak of the insurrection, was appointed by the government in Cuba. Such was the office which Marti held and which fell to Palma.

He was the plenipotentiary with full power to dispose of funds, having the full confidence of the clubs. The Cubans knew that their contributions were used for the purposes to which they devoted them. They did not need to safeguard the men who held the funds when they knew that they had unreservedly relinquished all they had ever possessed to the cause, and many of them had sacrificed great wealth rather than swear allegiance to Spain. Thus it was that every Cuban cigarmaker left ten per cent. of his wages at the delegation, and the whole pay of one day's work every week. They went without home comforts and often deprived themselves and

their families of all but the bare necessities of life in order that they might help to set Cuba free. If there was a reverse in the field, or some discouraging circumstance like the death of one of the great leaders, the Cubans gave all the more. While the people of the United States and the rest of the world were reading in the newspapers of Cuban skirmishes, they little realized what a story of self-sacrifice, of devoted patriotism, lay under the surface of the life of the Cubans in this country and in Europe. It was a drama which had to be enacted in secret.

Men naturally wondered how it was that while Spain was sending over more men and arms, and spending money which the nation could ill-afford to lose, the poor Cubans kept up a contest on their side. But it was not maintained without money, and plenty of it. It is said that once a Wall street banker inquired into the income of the Cuban treasury in New York, and was surprised when he was shown that it was receiving an income averaging \$200,000 a month. The Cubans in Paris alone sent over \$120,000 at one time.

Bearing in mind these facts, it will be more readily understood why, with such a complete organization working in this country, the government of the United States was placed in an extremely difficult position in its endeavors to maintain the requirements of international law, especially when compelled to assume an attitude favorable to Spain while the people sympathized cordially with the struggling Cubans. And neither the vigilance of the government, nor the spies of Spain, nor Spanish diplomacy with strong influence to back it, could check the results of the patriotic self-sacrifice of the Cuban colony.

While Gomez, mourning the fate of the dashing but reckless Marti, was adroitly working his way along the flank of the enemy towards the province of Puerto Principe, Maceo was vigorously diverting the Spanish forces in the eastern part of the island. Other bands of insurgents were having frequent skirmishes amid the hills of Santiago de Cuba, and occasion-

ally a quite serious engagement. General Rabi defeated the Spanish colonels Santoscildes and Zubikoski at Los Negros. At Ramon de las Yaguas, Colonel Garzon surprised and captured Lieutenant Gallengo and a few Spanish soldiers. These he disarmed and permitted to go unmolested, for it should always be remembered that in these early engagements the Cubans were less concerned about killing Spaniards than they were in capturing their arms. At El Cacao, General Rabi cut to pieces the Spanish forces under Colonel Sanchez and obtained a good supply of arms and ammunition, and in several other small engagements the insurgents were successful, for while the Spaniards were almost always at an advantage as to numbers, and had the further advantage of good arms, they were at a disadvantage in almost every other respect. Their officers were utterly unequal to the kind of strategy which was required in fighting the insurgents in such a country. The fire of the insurgent musketry was likely to burst upon them at any moment unless they were in the open plains. Taken unawares, they would return the fire at random and seldom hit a rebel. On the other hand, the insurgents would use their poor firearms to the greatest advantage, and when the opportunity came make a wild dash at the enemy with their machetes, capturing all the arms and ammunition they could. Moreover, the adroit Cuban leaders made the most marvelous and unexpected movements with their little bands, all the time drawing the Spanish further and further from the points where success seemed the most promising.

In the pursuit of his plan Maceo attacked General Salcedo, who had 3,000 men, at Jarahuca, and defeated him, and in later operations succeeded in capturing 200 rifles and 40,000 rounds of ammunition by surprising a Spanish garrison at the little town of Cristo. On the 25th of May, at the head of 2,000 men, Maceo encamped at the town of Jobito, a little north of Santiago and not far from Guantanamo. He was close in the neighborhood of a large force of the Spanish, but his position was well chosen. At daybreak the next morning his

troops were vigorously attacked by the royal army under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Bach. The Spaniards were ranged upon a narrow road which runs along a river, and which for some distance is in full view of a plateau upon which Maceo and his army had bivouacked. On their left they practically commanded the enemy's column; it may be said that they overhung them. The two contending forces remained at their posts all the morning, exchanging a well-sustained fire of musketry. Suddenly towards 11 o'clock the insurgents heard a significant trumpeting in the enemy's camp; an officer of importance, one of the Spanish leaders, had been killed, and Lieutenant-Colonel Bach had been mortally wounded.

As the Cubans were in a superior position, the Spanish officer dared not risk an attack. He, therefore, sent to Guantanamo for reinforcements, and, abandoning his position, drew back to await them. They arrived in the evening and covered the Spanish commander's retreat. This was the first serious engagement of the campaign, and the insurgents had held the royal forces in check, fighting like demons. But the privations and suffering in the Cuban camps in these days required stout hearts. There were no doctors and no medicine, and the wounded insurgent had to rely upon nature for his cure, though there were a few barbers in the ranks who acted as surgeons.

For a few weeks after this little of importance occurred. Maceo effected a union with Rabi, and together they marched westward toward Manzanillo, meeting with little opposition. Meanwhile, General Campos had become impatient because his generals displayed so little energy; he determined to show them that he, the Captain-General, would meet the insurgents without the support of the entire army. Since his arrival in Cuba he had seldom left the ship upon which he had established his headquarters. He sailed from Havana to Santiago, and, wherever he thought he was needed, urging on first one and then the other, negotiating in one place and ordering a fight in another. Early in July he went to Manzanillo and

landed. Numerous complaints had appeared in the press that the Spanish forces at Bayamo, an inland city about twenty-five miles from Manzanillo, were in a deplorable condition, without food or hospitals, and cut off from Manzanillo by the insurgents. Campos, apparently, conceived the plan of relieving Bayamo and of crushing the collected forces of Maceo and Rabi at one blow, and of afterwards pushing westward to drive Gomez into the Spanish military line between the province of Santa Clara and Puerto Principe, thus catching the Cubans between two fires. He ordered three Spanish columns to march against Maceo's force from different directions, while he started from Manzanillo on the 12th with a convoy under General Santocildes, which was to re-victual Bayamo.

Everything went well until they reached the neighborhood of Peralejos, where the road divides. The new highway stretches out towards the north while the old road deflects slightly towards the south. The guide turned into the new road, which is better known and more worn by travel, but General Campos ordered him to take the old road.

Maceo had been warned that a Spanish column was to leave Manzanillo with commissary stores for Bayamo, and he decided to attack it with as strong a force as he could muster. With this end in view he had picked up Goulet's force encamped at St. Georges, and also sent messengers to Rabi and the others who were near by to join him. It was not long before his army, swelled by these reinforcements, numbered 3,000 men, of whom at least 500 were practically without arms. They had proceeded toward Bayamo, and halted near the parting of the roads.

Thinking that the Spanish column would follow the new, well-beaten road, Maceo distributed his troops among the underbrush and placed his equipage and the men who had no guns along the side of the old abandoned road. Goulet and his band was placed between the largest body of the insurgents and the military impedimenta. General Campos was moving forward with great caution, when his advance guard

came full upon the band of unarmed Cubans and fired a volley of musketry into their ranks. The result was a wild retreat. The panic of the unarmed soldiers was so great that Goulet's troops were swept backward. For a moment he seemed utterly abandoned, but his two aids-de-camp, Palacios and Colas, were near him, and the three undaunted soldiers united in a desperate effort to stem the flood of retreat. The Spaniards advanced firing volley after volley at the flying fugitives. Goulet mounted a rise of ground, to watch the movements of the enemy and to give orders to his lieutenants, and as he crouched at the foot of a tree half stripped by the Spanish bullets, which fell like rain, a bullet entered his knee, traversing the groin, and he fell dead. His two aids hastened to carry his body from the field.

Maceo, who had expected to face the Spaniards on the other road, heard the noise of the battle, and, notwithstanding the disadvantages of his position, he rallied his troops and faced the enemy by a change of front. When it is remembered that the undisciplined and panic-stricken unarmed band was in full retreat, it must be acknowledged that Maceo's change of front was remarkable, and that it did honor to his generalship. The aspect of the combat at once changed; the Spaniards fell back under the unexpected attack and felt that they were defeated.

At that moment General Campos ordered his officers to dismount. General Santocildes did not hear the order and remained upon his horse. Maceo was in front of his line surrounded by his staff, all young men of excellent family, used to the management of firearms and better marksmen than the average soldier. He ordered them to fire full upon the person who had remained upon his horse, supposing him to be the general in command. Santocildes received in his body the contents of twenty rifles and fell mortally wounded. As he fell the Spanish soldiers rushed forward with a stretcher to bear away his body. Maceo ordered his staff to fire upon the compact group which the enemy formed at that point. Three times the Spaniards were forced to drop the stretcher upon

which lay the body of their general, and each time they left upon the spot a number of dead and dying. They returned after the third repulse and this time they succeeded in carrying the body away with them.

Campos, seeing the turn the battle had taken, ordered his men to shoot all the horses and mules, and the dead bodies of the animals were piled up as a barricade. Maceo, on foot, urged the soldiers on with all his accustomed energy and courage. It was a warm and spirited fight. The dead increased on the side of the royal army, but they continued to pour upon the insurgents a well-sustained fire. The rebels, on the other hand, held their ground firmly. Campos received a ball in his boot and another broke his staff.

As it drew on towards night the rain began to fall in torrents and the ardor of the insurgents, whose ammunition was running low, was somewhat cooled. At this favorable moment Campos gave the order to his men to resume their march toward Bayamo, and the insurgents followed, harrassing the royal army all the way to the gates of the city. The engagement lasted eleven hours and cost the Spaniards, according to their own account, a general and seventy men killed, and 100 soldiers wounded more or less seriously. The Cubans declared that the Spaniards lost 400 killed and a large number wounded, while the Cuban loss was Goulet and about 130 men. Altogether the day had been a hard one, and Campos acknowledged in his report that his column had twice been in danger. On reaching Bayamo he sent for reinforcements, withdrawing a considerable number from Santa Clara province, thus tending, as Maceo purposed, to make Gomez's contemporaneous efforts in that direction easier.

Maceo did not learn till the following day that he had been fighting with the Captain-General.

"Had I known that," he said, "I would have sacrificed 500 of my men and taken him dead or alive! Thus with one blow I would have ended the war."

It is true that had such been the result of the battle the

consequences would have been incalculable, and even had Maceo attacked the Spanish as he expected to, the result might have been very different. As it was, Maceo was compelled to rescue his army from a rout. With what skill he faced his armed men about, and brought them up past the unarmed stragglers who were running for their lives, the results showed. That one battle proved that Maceo was a great general.

But it was not simply upon the field that he showed his great qualities. After the battle Maceo had the wounded picked up and cared for, and then, sitting down in his humble camp, he wrote the Captain-General the following letter:

To Marshal MARTINEZ CAMPOS:

Desiring that the wounded abandoned by your troops upon the battle-field shall not perish for want of help, I have ordered my men to carry them to the houses of the Cuban families living near the place of the combat, where they are to be kept until you send for them. It is understood that the soldiers who are sent by you for this purpose shall not be attacked by those whom I command.

(Signed) ANTONIO MACEO.

We may imagine the feelings with which the greatest general of the proud Spanish nation received this note from the mulatto general. But Campos was a wise and generous foe and knew how to appreciate Maceo. If the Spaniards had always been as magnanimous in the treatment of the wounded Cubans who fell into their hands there would have been less cause for a war which was destined to devastate the fair island of Cuba.

The next morning Maceo filed off with his troops. They were within sight of the city, and the Spaniards fired after them a harmless volley of artillery.

"That is the way to salute a general," said Maceo with a laugh.

When once his brilliant exploit was accomplished the insurgent leader retired. He had just learned that important forces were on their way to Bayamo to reinforce Campos, and he feared to be taken between two fires. He sent each band

to its respective encampment to await such a time as he might think best fitted for a new sortie.

Goulet was replaced by Colonel Higinio Vasquez, an old mulatto who had not the prestige of his predecessor but who proved a good commander. Diego Palacios was also made a commander. On returning to the country near Santiago, the troops commanded by Vasquez passed the little city of Baïre, which was defended by a small garrison. The vigilance of the sentinels was inadequate to the occasion and the insurgents penetrated easily into the city. The Spaniards retired into the church, which they barricaded and from which they directed a weak fire upon the insurgents. Vasquez ordered the commander of the garrison to surrender, but he refused. The Cubans continued to operate against the church, and then the commander entered into negotiations with Vasquez. In order to have time to receive instructions from Campos, he asked Vasquez to wait two days before exacting his surrender. Campos had fixed a certain lapse of time before the expiration of which no officer was permitted to surrender a fortified position. The Cuban commander, probably thinking that Campos could not help the garrison at that distance, agreed to wait until the two days should have elapsed. When that time had passed the Spaniard had surrendered, and Vasquez had saved his ammunition. He allowed the Spanish commander to keep his sword and gave him permission to return to a city occupied by Spaniards, but the Cubans disarmed the Spanish soldiers. They took possession of the guns and cartridges in the garrison, but were surprised to find that there was but a small supply of ammunition. Searching the corners of the church, however, they found in one place the ground had been disturbed. On digging they found the bodies of two soldiers, buried during the siege, and near by four boxes filled with cartridges. Owing to this discovery they were enabled to renew their ammunition, and they armed themselves with the guns taken from the enemy. Thus it was that the insurgents kept themselves supplied with ammunition, and as time went

on more and more of the weapons which Spain had sent to the island to be trained upon the Cubans were turned on the Spaniards. It made little difference to the former whether a Spaniard was dead or alive; but they wanted his rifle and his cartridge box. After the battle of Peralejos, the Cuban forces had picked up considerable quantities of ammunition which the men under Campos had abandoned, and Maceo even directed the cartridge shells to be gathered up so that they might be refilled. So precious to them were bullets in those days.

Had Goulet been spared a little longer to the cause of the insurgents, he might have made a name for himself in the world, for, while he had not the brilliancy nor the dash of Maceo, he was a brave man. When it is remembered from what despised material these mulatto generals were made, the qualities they showed must challenge our admiration. They could draw some of the best blood on the island into their service. The aids-de-camp who had stood by Goulet when he had been left almost alone at Peralejos were instances of this.

The life of a Cuban soldier could hardly be appreciated except after visiting their camps and observing their peculiarities. The usual tents were simply roofs of leaves fastened upon pickets about six feet in height and capable of sheltering five or six men, so that when the Spaniards made the pompous announcement that they had destroyed a rebel encampment it meant very little. As a matter of fact, the insurgents regarded an encampment as a thing of absolute insignificance, because in two hours they could set up as large a collection of the so-called tents as might be required. With so many woods and palm trees at hand, the Cubans had little cause to regret the loss of their improvised shelters. In one corner of an encampment would usually be an enclosure for cattle brought in for the troops. Cattle were raised in great abundance in sections of the province of Santiago de Cuba, and from the beginning of the war the insurgent authorities had declared them to be the property of the nation. This decree at least insured sus-

tenance to the Cuban army in that section. When it is also remembered that yams, bananas, cassava, sweet potatoes, mangoes, and sugar cane form the basis of a nourishment very desirable in the eyes of the natives, it can be understood how easy it was for the insurgents to live in a country where the rural people generally sympathized with them.

Nothing would seem to the American more curious than the equipment of an insurgent, or *mambis*, as he was called. The climate demands very little in the way of clothes. The soldier usually wore a pair of linen trousers and a knitted woolen shirt, and some of them wore a short blouse called *mambisa*, invented during the Ten-Years War. Its origin was significant. After many months of rough campaigning, clothes became rare, many of the mambis had no vests. This was an inconvenience because it deprived them of pockets into which they could put cartridges intended for instant use. But necessity, that fruitful mother of invention, came to the rescue. They adopted the plan of wearing their shirts outside of their trousers, turning up the flaps in front and behind, and sewing them up as far as the waistline, leaving openings in which to slip their hands. This arrangement gave them one large pocket at the front and another at the back, in which they could stow away a large quantity of ammunition or other supplies, which served also in some measure to protect the body. This form of dress was found to be so practicable that after the war jackets after the pattern were manufactured, and that is why the mambisa with pockets at the belt became so common among the later insurgents.

When the mambis was so fortunate as to be able to make a choice as to his footgear, he usually wore the *espadrille*.* Otherwise he went barefoot, and that was among the least of his troubles. The chiefs of the army usually wore leather shoes, and these might be called the principal insignia of their rank. The insurgents wore Panama hats with a cockade in the shape of a Cuban flag or a star attached to the brim, which was turned up in front and fastened to the crown.

* A kind of shoe having a sole of woven straw.

The most peculiar feature of the mambis' accoutrement was his "sack." It was an ordinary bag of burlaps or other coarse texture, such as might be found in any barn. To each end of these bags would be fastened ropes of straw which would be passed over the shoulders and under the arms. It was, of course, less practicable than the ordinary knapsack of our soldiers, but the soldier of Cuba Libre put up readily with such inconveniences, and the mambis was content when his sack was well filled with his traps, utensils, reserves of ammunition, and provisions. Besides this sack they usually had a small bag attached to a cross strap in which were choicer articles, their papers, or the commissions of their grade, if they had such. For arms they carried a machete, and, when they could obtain it, a rifle or a gun. Some of the clever ones made cartridge-holders out of old saddle girths. The nature of the equipment was optional and varied with the resources of the individual. The majority of the soldiers had a grade. They were ambitious, and there was no more satisfactory way of rewarding their valor than by advancing them in rank, but when the call to arms came, each one, from the commander-in-chief to the common soldier, would rush into the fight on his own account, and none of the insignia of official rank were worn in the army.

CHAPTER XVIII

ORGANIZATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA—STRENGTH OF SPANISH ARMY AND PECULIARITIES OF CUBAN WARFARE—ON TO HAVANA!

Campos Sends for Reinforcements—Landing of Other Cuban Leaders—Gomez Enters Puerto Principe—His Order for the Destruction of Sugar Plantations—The Reasons for It—A War on Spain's Finances—Campos Leaves Santiago for Santa Clara to Intercept Gomez—Plan for Concentrating Cuban Forces—Cuban Delegates Meet to Found the Republic—Picturesque Surroundings—Discussing the Constitution—Election of Officers—A Government Largely on Paper—Gomez's Great Plan for a Westward March—Strength of the Spanish Forces—Divisions of the Cuban Army—Gomez's Instructions—"To Havana"—To Push the Revolt into the West—Tactics of the Insurgents—Their Advantages in Such a Climate and Country—Spanish Difficulties—The Nature of Alleged Spanish Victories—Cubans Constantly Pushing Further Westward—Lunching as They Fled.

FORTUNE certainly favored the insurgents in leading the Captain-General into the province of Santiago de Cuba, for while Campos was unsuccessfully exerting himself to crush the rebellion there, he was leaving the way open for Gomez to carry the banner of Cuba Libre to the westward. After reaching Bayamo and examining the garrison there, Campos immediately sent for reinforcements and a considerable number of troops came from Santa Clara. That province he regarded as thoroughly loyal, and he did not believe for a moment that Gomez would be able to push beyond the old Jucaro trocha.

But it happened at about this time that three able Cuban leaders, Generals Roloff, Sanchez, and Rodriguez, landed in Santa Clara province with a large amount of war material, and before the Spaniards had extricated Campos from his position at Bayamo the army in Santa Clara had been organized into the Fourth Army Corps, and operations were at once

begun. It was not long before the insurrection had taken a vigorous stride there. Skirmishes were of almost daily occurrence and there were some important encounters caused by the action of the insurgents who undertook to destroy the railroad and telegraph communication of the province. Many of the Spanish Volunteers in this district showed that their loyalty to Spain could not be relied upon. One proof of this was that 400 under Major Casallas deserted and joined the Cuban ranks in a body at the first opportunity, taking with them all their arms, ammunition, and supplies.

General Gomez, after the engagement in which Marti lost his life, succeeded in eluding the forces sent to intercept him and entered the southern part of the province of Puerto Principe early in June, or before the events just related took place. Here he was joined by Salvador Cisneros Betancourt, the most influential Cuban in that district, and soon his forces were increased by young men from all over the province, thus forming the nucleus of what was later the Third Army Corps.

When Gomez reached Najasa, about thirty miles from the city of Puerto Principe, he issued one of the first of those general orders which had so much effect in the later conduct of the island. It was as follows:

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF LIBERATION,
Najasa, Camagüey, July 1, 1895.

To the Planters and Owners of Cattle Ranches :

In accord with the great interests of the revolution for the independence of the country and for which we are in arms :

Whereas all exploitations of any product whatsoever are aids and resources to the Government that we are fighting, it is resolved by the General-in-Chief to issue this general order throughout the island, that the introduction of articles of commerce, as well as beef and cattle, into the towns occupied by the enemy, is absolutely prohibited. The sugar plantations will stop their labors, and whosoever shall attempt to grind the crop, notwithstanding this order, will have their cane burned and their buildings demolished. The person who, disobeying this order, will try to profit from the present situation of affairs, will show by his conduct little respect for the rights of the revolution of redemption, and therefore shall be considered as an enemy, treated as a traitor, and tried as such in case of his capture.

MAXIMO GOMEZ,
The General-in-Chief.

The reasons for this order were the same as those which led to the destruction of cotton in the South during the American civil conflict. The sugar crop was a large source of revenue to the Spanish government, both directly and indirectly. He who follows the developments of this rebellion must always remember that while the Cubans were in no position to drive from their strongholds the Spaniards who held the ports and garrisoned the large towns, they could practically hold and control the rural districts. It was equally true that the Spaniards could not subjugate, except by vastly superior numbers, the numerous battalions of Cubans who were scattered about in the country, where the people generally sympathized with the insurrection. But while the Cubans could subsist easily upon the country itself, the Spaniards required always money, money, money. Ships must patrol the coast, reinforcements must be hurried from Spain, and they must be paid and fed. But Spain was poverty-stricken and she had for years depended upon Cuba to provide funds, and had even pawned the revenues of the island in the European Bourses.

The insurgent leaders were well aware of Spain's weakest point. A war against Spain's financial credit would be slow, but it would be sure, and the Cubans were not pressed for time. Every fall in the market price of Spanish securities, every deficit in the revenues, every month's pay of the army in arrears, every unpaid bill for transportation and supplies, would be to the Cubans an indirect victory, much more important to them than the mere slaying of a few Spanish youths whom the fever would kill sooner or later. The burning of sugar cane was therefore a deliberate and rational policy of war, for the planter could not then pay his income tax, nor buy from abroad so as to enable the Spanish to fleece him at the custom house. The Spaniards recognized that if the sugar crop could be gathered it would greatly weaken the insurrection, if it did not break it up, and they naturally did all they could to make out that the insurgents were carrying on a war of vandalism and barbarism. But the mere burning of the cane did not destroy

the plantation. It has even been affirmed that the burning of one crop of cane will result in so much greater a yield the following season that the loss is small, for the roots of the cane remain in good condition. How successful the insurgents were in this method of striking at the power of Spain may be observed from the fact that while the sugar crop of Cuba amounted to 1,040,000 tons in 1894, it fell to 300,000 tons the first year of the insurrection.

Having issued this order and another to the insurgent troops to destroy all railroad and telegraph lines possible, Gomez proceeded to ride over the country surrounding the city of Puerto Principe. He burned the railroad station of Alta Garcia, a few miles from the city, captured the fort of El Mulatto to the northwest of the city, and cut to pieces a small Spanish band near Las Yeguas. The town and the fort of San Jeronimo surrendered to him, and he attacked and raided the town of Cascorro in the eastern section of the province. This was one of his most profitable engagements, as he found a large quantity of arms and ammunition. All the wounded were picked up and cared for by the Cubans to the extent of their means, and prisoners were released to the Spanish, who were, unfortunately, seldom ready to be as magnanimous. Whenever Gomez found his position inferior or met a force too great for him to attack with safety, he contented himself with an ambush and a rapid retreat, which the Spanish news headquarters at once construed into a rebel rout, although the unmistakable fact was that the insurgents were constantly growing in numbers and were pushing their campaign further and further westward. By summer the insurrection had taken shape in the three great provinces of the east, and the time had come for the supreme effort to be made by the insurgent leaders.

Campos had meantime left Santiago de Cuba, where the uprising had become general, and was being vigorously pushed by Maceo and other insurgent leaders, and hurried back to Santa Clara province to prevent Gomez from passing beyond the Jucaro trocha, which stretches for fifty miles across the

western portion of Puerto Principe. The forces he had relied upon to prevent the westward march of Gomez had proved entirely inadequate for the sharp tactics of the veteran Cuban, and, besides, daring bands of insurgents were by this time roving over the districts of Santa Clara.

It was at this point that Gomez announced his intention of marching through Santa Clara into Matanzas and on to Havana. The Spaniards explained the progress of the insurrection by the fact that it was impossible for their soldiers to operate during the wet season, and they boasted that as soon as the winter or dry season set in the Cubans would be driven back into the province of Santiago de Cuba, where by the concentration of their entire fleet at the eastern shores of the island they could cut off the base of supplies and starve the rebels into submission. But it was in just this dry season that Gomez proposed to march towards Havana, and this movement must be regarded as the most remarkable of any during the war.

By the beginning of the dry season Gomez had practically perfected all his plans and had ordered Maceo, with about 4,000 men, mostly infantry, to follow up and join him near the trocha. Further westward, Generals Roloff, Sanchez, Perez, and Lacret were waiting under orders for the advance of the Commander-in-Chief. Gomez established his headquarters at Jimaguaya, in the province of Puerto Principe. Near the town is an immense prairie or savanna, difficult of approach, and it was upon this plain that it was decided to accomplish the formal organization of the republic and the concentration of its military forces. The call for a meeting of representatives of the Cuban people to form a permanent civil government had been issued by Marti as soon as he reached the island, but his death and the exigencies of the campaign had rendered it inadvisable to comply with the call till this time.

The formation of a republic by people who have rendered allegiance to monarchical institutions is always a dramatic moment in the history of nations, but seldom has a republic been set up under more picturesque circumstances than attended

the establishment of the Republic of Cuba on the 13th of September, 1895. On that broad savanna gathered the men who were to stand in the same relation to the young republic as the fathers of the Constitution of the United States stood to our people. These men were engaged in serious business, and they felt their responsibility. The Cuban revolution was organized on a basis which insured its continuance till Cuba was free. It might take years, but they knew the time would come when Spain could hold out no longer, when her last cent had gone and she could raise no more. They knew also that thousands of exiled Cubans and other sympathizers were dropping a large share of their wages into the revolutionary fund and would continue to do so. There was a grim determination, with confidence in ultimate success, in the acts of these men. Of course, one of their immediate hopes was that the new republic would be recognized by the United States.

At a preliminary session, the character of each representative was accredited by the respective credentials of his appointment, the representatives having been elected by the insurgents in each of the five army corps. There were twenty in all, representing all the provinces except Pinar del Rio. The assembly organized with Salvador Cisneros Betancourt president, and proceeded at once to form the constitution which was to rule the destinies of the republic. This discussion occupied days. Every article was debated, amendments were proposed and discussed, and finally on the 16th it was voted to refer the various propositions to a committee for a complete revision of the text. When they had completed the draft it was read, and each of the representatives affixed his signature to the paper. "Then," in the language of the secretary of the council, José Vivanco, "the president and other members of the assembly, with due solemnity, swore upon their honor to loyally and strictly observe the fundamental code of the Republic of Cuba, which was greeted by spontaneous and enthusiastic acclamations of all present; in testimony of which are the minutes in the general archives of the government."

On the 18th the assembly proceeded to the election of the officers of the government council, each representative depositing his ballot in an urn placed on the chairman's table. The voting resulted in the election of the following:

President.—Salvador Cisneros Betancourt, who had held the same position in the former revolutionary government.

Vice-President.—Bartolome Masó, a prominent citizen of Manzanillo.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs—Raphael Portuondo y Tamayo, a member of a wealthy and distinguished family of the province of Santiago de Cuba.

Secretary of War.—Carlos Roloff of Santa Clara, a native of Poland who had borne a conspicuous part in the former revolution.

Secretary of the Treasury.—Severo Pina, of an old and wealthy family of St. Spiritus.

Secretary of the Interior.—Dr. Santiago Garcia Canizares.

Sub-secretaries were chosen for each of the departments. The vice-president of the assembly immediately installed the President, and the latter in turn installed the other officers elected. The assembly then chose General Gomez, Commander-in-Chief of the army; General Maceo, Lieutenant-General, and Tomas Estrada Palma, the head of the revolutionary committee which operated from New York. The assembly also passed laws dividing the island into states, districts, and prefectures, regulating marriages, establishing post-offices, and providing for the collection of taxes. The whole arrangement was tolerably complete, but, unfortunately, for the time, existed mainly on paper.

The governmental council went to Gomez's camp, where he with his troops took the oath of allegiance to the constitution of the republic. They then proceeded to Maceo, who was still in the province of Santiago de Cuba working westward, and his forces took the oath. After visiting Santa Clara to administer the oath to the different forces there, the council returned to Santiago de Cuba for the purpose of establishing headquarters. During the month these officers promulgated their various regulations, which were published in two newspapers soon established. Provisions were made for

collecting revenue, and the army was authorized to destroy those plantations which would not pay taxes to the republic. The problem of the army's equipment was not so much a financial one, but arose from the caution necessary to run the Spanish blockade and evade the vigilance of the officers of the United States.

Civil formalities having been completed and the government having concluded a grand review of the forces which were to march to Havana, Gomez proceeded with his plans for marching to Havana. Maceo was bringing his forces up from the east with little difficulty, though he was compelled to fight some of the way. In point of strategy there have been few events in recent warfare to equal the remarkable character of the undertaking Gomez had in mind. For it is to Gomez alone, it has been said, that the honor of devising the movement is due. In carrying it out he accomplished feats worthy of the most conspicuous of the world's renowned generals, and he exhibited qualities placing him among the first of American commanders. This opinion has been expressed by men of thorough and critical knowledge of military affairs who followed the movements.

To thoroughly appreciate the nature of the stratagem it is necessary to observe something of the forces which Gomez and Maceo might be expected to encounter. The royal army was commanded by one of the most celebrated generals of the army of Spain. There could be no question, it might be supposed, that such an army under such a leader must oppose a desperate and powerful resistance. Neither could there be a doubt that every resource of brilliant strategical art would be brought to bear on the attempt to circumvent the plans of the army of free Cuba. According to the newspapers of Havana, on November 15, 1895, the total number of the royal army on duty in Cuba was as follows:

Infantry,	59,900
Cavalry,	13,886
Artillery,	1,858
Engineers,	1,415

Infantry of the Marine,	2,700
Policemen,	976
Gendarmes,	4,400
Guerrillas,	1,832
Total,	<u>86,967</u>

Of this total 81,591 were for active service in the field and 5,376 were for garrison and police duty. Adding to these figures about 40,000 Volunteers, who were in general employed in guarding the cities, we have a total of 125,000 men, or thereabouts. At this period of the war the Spaniards garrisoned over forty cities or villages, and if these garrisons were not in the actual conditions of a siege they were at least employed in defending the cities or villages and the people who were in them, for the insurgents were the absolute masters of the rural districts in the east, and they fired on any troops that ventured beyond the city limits. The garrisons of each city may be estimated as averaging about 1,000 men, or, in all, 40,000 men, of whom at least one-third were recruited among the Volunteers. It would appear from these figures that 26,000 men available for war and destined for that object were immobilized. Consequently, there remained about 55,000 Spaniards capable of taking the field. From this number must be deducted the troops which were in operation in the extreme eastern portion of the island, or east of the point of the concentration under Gomez, which numbered at least 6,000. It may be asserted, therefore, that that part of the Spanish army which was between Havana and Gomez must have numbered at least 50,000 well-armed men. It was against this defending force, vastly superior in numbers and equipment, that the insurgents were about to measure their strength.

From the outset, Gomez divided his troops into three columns, one commanded by Antonio Maceo, about 3,000 strong; another under the command of Suarez and Lacret, numbering 2,000 men, and the principal corps, numbering about 6,000 men, under his own personal direction. A column of 1,000 men under the command of Francisco Perez formed the advance guard. In all, therefore, there were 12,000 men.

This was the effective army with which Gomez began his march upon Havana, but it should be borne in mind that it was only the nucleus, for as the insurgents marched along they were joined by all the Cubans who daily embraced the cause of liberty. Two months later, when Gomez parted from Maceo near Havana, he had under his orders from 18,000 to 20,000 well-armed soldiers.

After Gomez had unfolded his plan and explained to his lieutenants all that he hoped, he told them that all their efforts were to be directed towards one object, to reach Havana. He insisted that it was not a question of killing Spanish soldiers, but of arriving before Havana. He expected them by a march — strategic if need be — and as rapid as possible, to succeed in reaching the goal, and they were to foil the enemy as often as possible, and in any way, whether by a false attack or by an absolute avoidance of a meeting. His final instructions were: "In the event of a forced battle, overthrow them; pass over them — and on! To Havana!"

Gomez well knew what an effect would be produced by the invasion of the western provinces of Cuba by the army of the liberators. Matanzas, Havana, and Pinar del Rio had never been stirred by the movement of the insurrection during the Ten-Years War. The insurgents had never been able to enter them. Assured by this precedent of immunity from attack, General Campos had felt it safe to promise to preserve them from any incursions of the rebels. His object in giving such a promise was to reassure public opinion, alarmed by the pessimistic rumors regarding the advance of the insurgents. However inferior the Spaniards of the royal army may have been in point of enthusiasm, there could have been no doubt that they were capable of defeating in open battle the undisciplined army of insurgents who were homogeneous in nothing but their love for Cuba and their hatred of Spain. But there was no reason to fear that the army of Gomez would be forced into battle, for in order to bring about such a result it would have been necessary to surround the insurgent army to

bring it to a halt and then attempt to destroy it in close conflict.

It would seem that Campos had such a plan as this in consideration for a time, but he found that it was a plan that could not be carried out by such an army against such an enemy. While the Spaniards marched in columns relatively large from 1,000 to 1,500 men, who could move but slowly, burdened as they were with a certain amount of luggage and the usual military impedimenta, the Cubans had divided their army corps into detachments of from 200 to 300 soldiers, well-equipped and carrying an adequate supply of ammunition, soldiers familiar with the country, with no useless baggage to transport, and habituated to such nourishment as they could gather from the trees, the plants, and other products of the ground over which they marched. These small detachments of natives, habituated to a climate which is barely supportable to others, slipped between the meshes of the net which Campos essayed in vain to stretch out, and as they marched with a very small convoy they cared very little if they left behind them an enemy who with his best efforts could not have hindered them from returning to their point of departure should such a movement become necessary.

It may be thought that it would have been a rational way of circumventing the Cubans for the Spaniards to have followed the tactics of Gomez and divided their columns into small bodies calculated to compete with the rebel troops in rapidity of mobilization, but the Spanish officers had a distinct disinclination to attack the Cubans except with a very superior force. Moreover, the Spanish soldiers were much embarrassed by the natural difficulties of the country, and their lack of familiarity with these difficulties, and with the country itself. They dared not leave their positions without the guidance of some one born in the country, and the recruiting of these guides became a serious problem. Each day it became more difficult, for the natives feared the insurgents and were haunted by visions of the reprisals which they feared might

follow any great victory obtained by Gomez, as the insurgents had declared that any Cuban found by them serving in the ranks of the Spanish army should be hanged.

There existed another reason why the movement of the Cuban army was easier and less influenced by nervous dread. Every movement of the Cubans was calculated, and they began their march with a distinct end in view, while the object of the Spanish movement was much more vague. To chase after the fleet-footed Cubans was far from easy. On the rare occasions when an insurgent column was engaged in a skirmish with the Spaniards, the insurgents sent forth a few flying volleys and disappeared as if the earth had swallowed them. It seemed to be of no importance to them which direction they took; they faced about in the very midst of a combat and fled in any direction, apparently without a plan. The Spaniard stood alone upon his ground and cried "Victory!" This is the explanation of the Spanish despatches to the journals of that day. It was always the same story, reading something like this: "After an insignificant discharge of musketry, the Cubans ran away."

And yet the Cubans were every day marching nearer and nearer to Havana. While the Spaniards were winning their alleged victories, the Cubans were bringing the whole island into insurrection and making it well-nigh impossible for loyal planters to harvest a sugar crop. Some of the war correspondents, who had never seen a war before, complained that there was only a handful of insurgents here and there and that Gomez would not fight. They missed entirely the strategem which he was carrying out with the most consummate skill.

Whether these tactics are called Cuban retreats or Spanish victories, it cannot be denied that they gave to the insurgents an advantage far exceeding victories which fall on more important combats. At times the royal troops endeavored to equal their adversaries in rapidity of movement, but it was like a race between day and night. As one observer expressed it: "The passage of the rebels resembled the trail of Hop o' my

Thumb, except that in the place of crumbs and pebbles the Cuban Hop o' my Thumbs left along their trail the bodies of their foundered horses, the chewed remains of sugar cane and bananas, and the empty cans of preserves which had been devoured as soon as pilfered, for the insurgents lunched as they fled. There were whole days together when their only food was sugar cane; and this simple nourishment sufficed to sustain the strength of these robust men who were inured to all suffering, who went into a skirmish as children go to play, and whose chief advantage was that there was no climatic danger for them in an atmosphere that is fatal to their enemies." Under such circumstances the march from Gomez's point of concentration was made. The Spaniards were incapable of parallel efforts and such a mode of living, and they lost more than an hour each day in making the *rancho*, or the soup for their meals.

CHAPTER XIX

THE FAMOUS JUCARO TROCHA—RUSE BY WHICH GOMEZ AND MACEO BROKE THE SPANISH DEFENSE—FEARFUL EXPERIENCES OF CARILLO AND HIS EXPEDITION.

Campos Reinforces the Jucaro Trocha—Character of This Notable Defense—Fifty Miles of Forts and Barbed Wire—Gomez's Plan to March 12,000 Men Over It—Maceo's Pretended Attack—Again Deceives the Spaniards—Burning Sugar Plantations in Santa Clara—Insurgents Divide into Small Bands—The Battle of Coliseo—Campos Foiled Again—Campos Falls Back Finally to Havana—All Cuba Under Martial Law—Landing of Carillo and Aguirre—Their Contract with a Steamer Captain—Leaving the Ship at Night in a Storm—Thirty Miles from Land in Small Boats—Blankets for Sails—Land at Last—The Forts of Santiago—Horror of the Expeditionists—Facing Death—The Guide Becomes Hopelessly Insane—Prepared for an Attack—Mistaken for Fishing Boats—In an Insurgent's Hut.

TWO weeks after Gomez began his march he was before the Jucaro trocha on which Campos was relying to keep the enemy within the eastern provinces. This military defense, which had been constructed during the former war, he had, in anticipation of the movement, strengthened and reinforced along its entire length. Those who have not seen these lines of defense have an inadequate idea of what they consist, and as similar lines were built later in the western section of the island, a description of the Jucaro trocha will serve for all. It stretched from Jucaro on the south coast of the province of Puerto Principe to Moron on the north. The country on each side of it was covered by a thick jungle of woods. The trocha consisted primarily of a cleared space through this jungle from 100 to 200 yards wide, and the trees, cut down to clear a way, were piled up on each side, thus forming a sort of barrier of tree trunks and their branches, averaging perhaps six feet high and fifty feet wide. These alone

would seem to an observer sufficient to prevent the passage of any army, especially if the barricades were guarded, but the Spanish found that such a device would not even prevent the passing of Cuban cavalry. The space between the lines of fallen trees was given up to a military road and forts and a maze of barbed wire. At intervals of every half mile along this roadway were the larger forts made of stone and adobe and painted white. Midway between the larger forts were placed blockhouses of two stories, the upper being of wood. Between each of the larger forts and the blockhouses, or within the short distance of a quarter of a mile, were placed three small forts of mud and planks surrounded by a ditch. They were capable of holding five men and were within hailing distance of each other, or about 150 yards.

The construction of the larger forts was such as apparently to render them invincible. Above the cellar was a vault enclosed by the stone and mud walls which rose about five feet higher, making a second-story defense, the roof of the vault being a sort of platform on which the men in the second story could stand and deliver their fire either over the top of the walls or through holes cut lower down near the platform, so that a shot could be sent directly on the heads of those who might approach close to the fort. The cellar could be used for reserves of ammunition. Covering the second story was a roof of sheet-iron supported by iron standards, and on the roof was a watch tower. The only approach to one of these forts was a movable ladder used something like the gangway of a man-of-war and which could be pulled out of reach.

Along one side of these fortifications was a maze of barbed wire, strung back and forth from three rows of poles, about five feet high. It is said that when this part of the trocha had been completed 450 yards of wire had been used to every twelve yards of posts. To all appearances, it would have been a difficult matter for a man on foot to pick or cut his way through the maze, to say nothing of the cavalymen and impedimenta. Such, in general, was the wall of defense which ran for fifty

miles from Jucaro to the town of Moron near the north shore. It was not in the complete state which has been described when Gomez and his army approached it from the east in the latter part of 1895, but Campos, to make assurance doubly sure, had reinforced the trocha with a large body of men. Gomez's plan involved marching 12,000 men over it.

Maceo had not yet brought up his division, and while waiting for him Gomez apparently thought he would ascertain what he could do with the trocha, and, if possible, discover the condition of things on the other side. So, leaving his army back some distance, with a few hundred men he began to manœuvre before the trocha and finally succeeded in working a small force through on the southern end. He immediately fell upon the little town of Pelayo, and captured the forts which guarded it, together with the entire garrison and a large amount of arms and ammunition. He then moved cautiously northward through the woods into the district of Remedios, then suddenly westward toward the trocha. The Spaniards appear to have been closely watching the southern end, believing that Gomez's remaining force would try to effect a passage there. In consequence, Gomez found the northern part weakly defended, or at least he succeeded in re-crossing it, and was soon joined by Maceo, who by this time had brought up his army, having marched across the whole of Puerto Principe province, eluding four Spanish columns which had been sent against him. Maceo's forces were therefore in front of the trocha some little distance to the north of where Gomez's main division was waiting to cross. It might seem that when they were in this position it would have been easy for the Spaniards whom Maceo had left in the rear to have closed in and hemmed in the Cubans between the trocha and themselves, but the country is a difficult one for the moving of disciplined troops, and, moreover, the Spanish officers were never quite sure where the enemy was and seemed to content themselves with trusting in luck to come upon him in a favorable location. Gomez understood the position of the Spaniards perfectly.

He ordered Maceo to make a feint of attack upon the northern portion of the trocha before which he was. Maceo accordingly sent a few soldiers to the front of the entrenchment of the royal army, and the Spaniards, thinking that the advance guard of the Cubans had opened an attack and proposed to cross the trocha to the north, passed the word down the trocha, and immediately the Spanish rushed *en masse* toward the north, leaving the southern portion, before which Gomez was concealed, unprotected. This was exactly what Gomez had counted upon, and he forthwith crossed the barricade without striking a blow, except to clear away trees and other obstacles. His passage seems to have been unsuspected by the Spanish engaged in holding back Maceo, who had no intention of crossing there or then. Finally, when he had heard that Gomez was safely over, Maceo beat a retreat, the Spaniards thinking they had won a victory the report of which would read well at Havana and Madrid. "The main body of the rebels under Gomez and Maceo endeavored to force a passage in the trocha to the north, but were repulsed and retreated in disorder," and so on.

Maceo had apparently disappeared towards the north, and the enemy naturally kept their attention turned in that direction; but as soon as the shrewd Cuban leader was out of sight he faced southward and hurried his men to the point where Gomez had just taken his men through, followed in his tracks without difficulty, and before the Spaniards realized what had happened the entire Cuban army were marching into Santa Clara province and the rear guard had defeated Colonel Segura, who was taking supplies to the trocha. The Cubans were so fortunate by a brilliant dash as to capture about 200 mules laden with arms, ammunition, and supplies.

On the arrival of the combined Cuban forces in Santa Clara, Gomez divided them, sending flying squadrons in advance under Generals Suarez, Perez, and Lacret, dispatching others to Sagua in the north and towards Trinidad in the south. Maceo's forces made a demonstration near the city of Santa

Clara, where Campos had made his headquarters, and Gomez threatened Cienfuegos. It was not, of course, Gomez's intention to seriously attack any of the large fortified towns, and he had good reasons for dividing his forces into several detachments. Had the army remained together it could have moved but slowly and the country would have afforded scant supplies for so large a force, while by division supplies could be drawn from the whole country round, a larger district would be brought into the insurrection, which was, after all, the main purpose of the expedition, the enemy would be more puzzled with the purposes and location of the force, and the march toward Havana would be more rapid. Gomez in all these operations kept an ample force in the rear so that retreat, if made necessary, would not be cut off.

Campos at Santa Clara saw that he had been outflanked by the clever ruse of the Cubans before the trocha and that he was now in a measure surrounded. So when he heard that Gomez was threatening Cienfuegos he made a precipitate march to that place, intrenching himself and assuming direct command of his troops. He also dispatched a large number of troops to form a line between Cienfuegos and Las Cruces to impede the westward march of the Cubans. Meanwhile, Gomez had not forgotten one of the main purposes of his campaign, which was to prevent the grinding of sugar cane so that Spain would lose her revenue and the Cuban workmen, left with nothing better to do, would take up arms. Shortly after crossing the trocha, therefore, he issued a peremptory order for the destruction of sugar plantations and railroad communication. Realizing that such destructive methods might so arouse the planters as to make them too active allies and supporters of the Spanish army, he supplemented this order with the following proclamation, which reveals something of the spirit of the old general:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF LIBERATION,

Sancti Spiritus, November 11, 1895.

To honest men, victims of the torch :

The painful measure made necessary by the revolution of redemption

drenched in innocent blood from Hatuey to our own times by cruel and merciless Spain will plunge you in misery. As General-in-Chief of the army of liberation, it is my duty to lead it to victory, without permitting myself to be restrained or terrified, by any means necessary to place Cuba, in the shortest time, in possession of her dearest ideal. I therefore place the responsibility for so great a ruin on those who look on impassively and force us to those extreme measures which they then condemn, like dolts and hypocrites that they are. After so many years of supplication, humiliation, contumely, banishment, and death, when this people, of its own will, has arisen in arms, there remains no other solution but to triumph; it matters not what means are employed to accomplish it.

This people cannot hesitate between the wealth of Spain and the liberty of Cuba. Its greatest crime would be to stain the land with blood without effecting its purposes because of puerile scruples and fears which do not concur with the character of the men in the field, challenging the fury of an army which is one of the bravest in the world, but which, in this war, is without enthusiasm or faith, ill-fed, and unpaid. The war did not begin February 24th; it is about to begin now.

The war had to be organized; it was necessary to calm and lead into the proper channels the revolutionary spirit always exaggerated in the beginning by wild enthusiasm. The struggle ought to begin in obedience to a plan and method more or less studied, as the result of the peculiarities of this war. This has already been done. Let Spain now send her soldiers to rivet the chains of her slaves; the children of this land are in the field, armed with the weapons of liberty. The struggle will be terrible, but success will crown the revolution and efforts of the oppressed.

MAXIMO GOMEZ, *General-in-Chief*.

Naturally, the destruction of sugar plantations caused some bitterness among alien owners, many of whom were citizens of the United States, and for a time it militated against the efforts of Palma, the plenipotentiary of the republic, who was seeking to secure a recognition of the belligerency of the Cubans from the government of the United States. Gomez maintained his purpose and endeavored to reassure Palma, as the following letter will show.

DISTRICT OF REMEDIOS,

Province of Santa Clara, December 8, 1895.

TO TOMAS ESTRADA PALMA.

MY DEAR AND ESTEEMED FRIEND: It is not long since I wrote you, but an opportunity offers by which I may send you a few words of encouragement and good cheer. Rest assured I write you whenever I can, which is not often, owing to the great amount of work which at present falls upon my shoulders. I know the pen is mightier than the sword, but my mission at present is with the latter; others must wield the pen.

Eight days ago Gen. Antonio Maceo and myself met and fought the enemy with our forces in conjunction. The Spanish column, including infantry, cavalry, and artillery, were our superiors in number, but the arms of the Cuban Republic were again victorious. I have not time at present to go into details of the battle; they will follow later. Suffice it to say, Spanish reports to the contrary notwithstanding, we won the day.

Our advance may be slow, but it will be sure and firm. If you hear of our retreat, remember that it will be temporary and for a purpose. Our faces are turned toward the west and nothing will stop us. The result of my observations as we proceed is that the Spaniards are in need of almost everything — money, sympathy, soldiers, and even leaders who have faith and courage in the righteousness of their cause.

If Cuban valor and resolution do not fail us, and if the hearts of Cuba's children do not weaken, I have every reason to believe that the close of the six-months campaign now initiated will find everything satisfactorily settled, and Cuba free.

I know that unfavorable comment has been made on some of the methods we have been forced to employ in this revolution, but it will not do to listen to the complaints of the superficial and irresponsible. No sugar crop must be made this winter under any circumstances, or for any amount of money. It is the source from which the enemy still hopes and dreams of obtaining its revenue. To prevent that end, for the good of our country, has been and shall be our program.

We are Cubans and have one great aim in view, one glorious object to obtain — the freedom of our country and liberty. It is of more importance to us than glory, public applause, or anything else. Everything else will follow in time. I have never believed in or advised a sanguinary revolution, but it must be a radical one. First of all, we must triumph; toward that end the most effective means, although they may appear harsh, must be employed.

There is nothing so bad, so dishonorable, so inexcusable, in the eyes of the world, as failure. Victory is within our reach. To hesitate, to delay it, to endanger it now, would be stupid, would be cowardly, would be criminal. We will succeed first; the applause of the world will follow. To do otherwise would be not to love one's country. I have never felt more confident than at the present moment. You can rest assured that Cuba will soon achieve her absolute independence.

Ever your true friend,

MAXIMO GOMEZ.

The insurgents continued their evasive movements with great skill. They advanced through Santa Clara, San Juan de Lasquaras, and Ranchuelas, till in their devious ways they reached the boundary of Matanzas. Campos was again out-flanked; he drew back and established his headquarters at Colon, twenty miles over the border of Matanzas. Here, just

as Campos was planning to concentrate his forces, surround Gomez and force him into open battle with a vastly superior Spanish force, Gomez was planning to again radiate his troops. This he did by sending General Bandera to the north, General Maceo remaining in the center, while he took his own forces southward, and Generals Suarez, Perez, Lacret, and other officers with small divisions were despatched to attract the attention of the enemy by rapid marches and raids. By the time Campos was ready to concentrate his forces, therefore, there was nothing except one of these various "will-o'-the-wisp" divisions to concentrate upon, though of this, apparently, he was not fully aware.

He had hopes that the Spanish forces in Gomez's rear would be able to co-operate with him, but every means of communication by railroad, telegraph, or telephone had been completely destroyed by the insurgents in their progress. Under other circumstances it is doubtful if the complicated strategy he contemplated would have been practicable owing to the natural conditions of the country, for such a move, even in European countries, would have required the co-operation of officers who were familiar with the ground over which they were to deploy, and the officers upon whom Campos depended were unaccustomed to Cuba. Campos, however, agreed with his generals — Garcia, Navarro, and Valdes — on the point of concentration where they were to meet on a day appointed and were to drive the enemy before them. At that place and at that appointed time the great battle should be fought. But Gomez continued his crafty march with his division, entering the province of Matanzas through Palma Sola to the south of Campos's headquarters which Maceo was ordered to attack by two columns advancing in the center. To draw the insurgents into his proposed trap, Campos ordered his pickets to return the fire of the insurgents in a feeble manner, while Maceo, who, like Campos, was hoping to deceive the enemy so as to leave the divisions to the north and south unobstructed, had given a like order to his men. This engagement, therefore, amounted

to but little. But during its progress the insurgents were busy with one of their flank movements. Suddenly the cane-brake which surrounded the Spanish camp burst into flames and towards the west there appeared a great blazing plain. Gomez had found the orders against the grinding of the sugar crop disobeyed in Matanzas, for the planters had been relying upon Campos's work and were not expecting an invasion, and his torch was being relentlessly applied. Campos understood at once that he had been foiled. It was not long before the flames threatened to lick the feet of his frenzied horses. He gave the orders to break the camp at once and looked about for his lieutenants. They were not to be found; they had been unable to concentrate. Campos alone had come to the rendezvous!

Such, in brief, was the battle of Coliseo in December, 1895, which was so construed by the press censors as to occasion much rejoicing at Havana, for they thought the rebels had been met and checked. In reality, however, a few insurgents had played their games with General Campos; a detachment of Cuban cavalry, commanded by Maceo, had made a whimsical charge on the Spanish pickets, a fire had broken out in the cane-brakes, and the Cubans had marched into Matanzas province.

Campos drew back to Jovellanos, towards which Gomez advanced, burning the sugar plantations on the way. With calls for the protection of the sugar plantations in both Santa Clara and Matanzas to attend to, the cities of Santa Clara, Cienfuegos, Colon, and Cardenas threatened, Campos drew back to Limonar, and Gomez advanced to Jovellanos, which commanded the railroad lines of Cardenas, Matanzas, and Havana. These lines he destroyed, while the smoke of the sugar plantations never ceased to darken the sky. With all communication with the east, except by water, cut off, Campos moved back to Matanzas and hurriedly sent orders for the concentration of as many troops as possible, sending even to the province of Santiago de Cuba for as many troops as could be

spared from there. Then he fell back to Havana and the insurgents, without serious obstacle, continued their destructive march towards the west, while Campos waited for reinforcements and set about actively to fortify the land approaches of the capital city. He also hurried as many troops as he could spare to the neighborhood of Batabano, directly across the island from Havana, withdrawing even a large number of marines from the fleets for shore duty, for by this time the insurgents were threatening to break the line and penetrate into Pinar del Rio. So grave was the situation that martial law was declared in both the provinces of Havana and Pinar del Rio. Thus by the end of 1895 the whole island from Point Maysi to Cape Antonio was declared to be in a state of siege. The censorship of the press became more rigid than ever, and an order was issued for the delivery of all horses in the island to the Spanish government at prices ranging from \$18 to \$35, doubtless more for the sake of crippling the insurgents than for any use which the Spanish forces could make of them. The horses were not paid for in cash, but in certificates that they had been delivered to the government at a certain value. As the Spanish forces had lost control of much of the rural territory of the island, the order naturally did not inconvenience the insurgents, and a large majority of the people outside of the cities were more ready to surrender their horses to the Cubans than to the government for nothing except a certificate which was of no pecuniary value.

As already explained, it was not the intention of General Gomez in carrying out this winter campaign to lay siege to Havana. That would have done little good, even supposing his troops could have held their place before the gates, for, while the bay was open, supplies or reinforcements could have been easily brought in. Gomez's two great objects were to prevent the grinding and export of sugar and the consequent flow of treasure into the Spanish coffers, and to infuse the Cubans everywhere with courage to take the field, with the belief that he could control the provinces and enforce his

orders. While the westward march of the main body of the troops was being carried on, the forces of the other Cuban army corps succeeded in carrying out the orders concerning sugar cane and the destruction of Spanish lines of communication. Some artillery had been introduced into the Cuban army, and with this small garrisons were more easily attacked. Moreover, the insurgents, in spite of the Spanish patrol of the coast, managed to preserve communication between the interior and certain points on the coast where, from time to time, supplies were received and carried inland.

It was also during the march westward that Generals Francisco Carillo and José M. Aguirre, two talented guerrilla chiefs, landed an important expedition on the eastern end of the island. They had chartered a steamer at New York to transport them to the eastern coast of Cuba with thirty-two men, besides a guide who was to direct them as soon as they landed upon Cuban soil, and who had been sent to the revolutionary committee from Santiago. It was arranged with the captain of the boat that on arriving in the waters of Aserraderos, a small seaport about ten leagues to the west of the city of Santiago, and when they should be but three miles from the shore, he should transfer them with their arms and baggage to small boats, after which he would be free to sail in any direction.

One night at about 11 o'clock, after a voyage of five days, while a very stiff breeze was blowing, the captain directed the passengers to make ready to leave the ship, as they had arrived in sight of land and were but about three miles from the shore. His contract, he said, was fulfilled, and he was ready to transfer them into small boats, in which they were to land. The passengers at once clambered down the side of the vessel into the tossing boats, but in the confusion of the night, and, hurried by the captain, who feared lest he should fall into the hands of a Spanish cruiser, the Cubans lost a large portion of their equipments before they could stow them safely in their small craft. Enough remained to somewhat overload them, however, and, as the sea was very rough, they were in con-

stant danger of being capsized. In one of the boats was Carillo with ten men; in the second was Aguirre with eight men and a dynamite gun; and the third, commanded by Colaso, contained the remainder of the company. As soon as everything which had not been lost in the transfer was in the boats, the steamer with all speed disappeared in the darkness. The insurgents had no idea as to the course they should take, as they could see but a few feet in any direction, so there was nothing for them to do but to toss about, awaiting the coming of the dawn.

At daybreak the wind fell and they gazed about them to discover some place where they might land, but all before them was tossing water. They realized that the captain of the steamer had deceived them. They were not three miles from shore; as a matter of fact, they were thirty, and liable to be picked up by any Spanish cruiser which happened along. Taking what they thought must be the right direction to reach land, they rowed for hours, each one taking his turn at the oars. Towards 10 o'clock the wind rose again, and to increase their speed they tried to make sails of their woolen blankets, using an oar for a mast and rigging rifles fastened end to end for yards. By this arrangement they were enabled to make much better headway.

After much difficulty and anxiety they drew near to land, but upon closer examination they were horrified to find that they were just opposite the port of Santiago, only twelve miles from Morro Castle perched high above the roadstead. At sight of this the guide began to tremble. He said that the first war or merchant vessel which came along must see them and give the alarm, and the recognition of them meant death. He became paralyzed with fear; his mind began to wander and in a short time he had become entirely insane.

Carillo was not the man to weaken under such an extremity. He had faith in the star of his destiny and used all his charms of persuasion to revive the spirits of his companions. It is a fact almost without precedent that no ship either en-

tered or left the port of Santiago on that long day, though this port is very much frequented. The star on which Carillo relied had not forsaken him. They kept on their way, heading as much as possible to the west of the frowning castle, and at 6 o'clock the boats were but three miles from the shore and about the same distance to the westward of the passage. But their position was more than critical. They were aware that each evening at nightfall a small gunboat made the rounds on the outside of the bay, and that if once they were caught they would be shot before they were many hours older. Anticipating a meeting with the gunboat, Carillo ordered his men to hide their arms, keeping them, however, so as to be within easy reach when the war vessel should be sighted, but only in case of an attack were they to fire. They fully expected to be attacked and that they were about to play a desperate game. At half-past six, night had completely settled in, and suddenly they saw the red light of the gunboat coming directly towards them, and as it crept on they watched it despairingly. Nearer and nearer it came, though a little to one side, and it passed within gunshot, but it did not hail them.

It seemed impossible that the Spanish should avoid seeing them, and it is probable that the officers thought that these three small boats belonged to some inoffensive Santiago fishermen. They were looking for larger game, and it would not have been reasonable for them to suppose that insurgents would attempt to land under the guns of Morro Castle. They finally landed toward 10 o'clock that night, and immediately began unshipping their ammunition and cannon, an operation which consumed a good part of the night, and at daybreak they set out to find their way. The danger was by no means past; they were entirely unfamiliar with the immediate surroundings; the guide had become a hopeless lunatic. Carillo with his aid-de-camp climbed to the top of the mountain before them and saw a hut on the other side close to the valley. They descended and entered it, and found a woman preparing breakfast. She offered him some coffee, which he accepted

gratefully and in his pleasantest manner. He was apparently unarmed, but he did not have the appearance of a Cuban, and when he asked the mistress of the house where her husband was and when he would return, she looked at him mistrustfully and said she did not know. Carillo knew from this action that he must be at the house of a Cuban and of an insurgent, and in a short time a man armed with a musket and leading two horses appeared. General Carillo made himself known at once, and the man, acting as a guide, soon had the expedition in the nearest insurgent camp. This expedition may be regarded as typical of many others.

At that time the insurgents in the east were under the high command of General José Maceo, Antonio's brother, and they were passing their lives in comparative quiet in their various camps. Nearly all martial efforts were confined to the surroundings of Havana, where Gomez was in charge, and the insurgents of Santiago de Cuba were rarely troubled with the unimportant sorties of the Spaniards. They pitched their camps wherever they could find a comfortable place, the officers usually taking possession of some old building or shed, while the men brought in palm leaves and constructed primitive shelters. They usually posted pickets on all the roads, and made themselves comfortable. Frequently, camps were placed near some planter, who deemed it wise to show his sympathy for the insurgents whether he really wished to or not, and he usually had the officers and staff at his meals.

Occasionally, however, a Spanish promenade would interrupt this calm. One day Colonel Sandoval left the city of Cobre, about ten miles from Santiago, with an army of 1,500 strong. They passed through Botija and camped upon the banks of the Cauto at a point called Dos Palmas, and one day passed over the road which meandered into the valley below a planter's house and then into his plantations. They marched along and fired a volley into the cocoa trees to intimidate the enemy. None were there, but the Cubans opened fire from an ambush further on. They were placed as

sharpshooters and fired at will while the Spanish fired great salvos. This noise lasted about a quarter of an hour, during which the 1,500 men of His Majesty the King repeatedly discharged all of their guns. One would have thought that two important armies were facing each other, though there were not at the utmost more than twenty-five of the insurgents. The noise of the musketry was like the pattering of rainfall upon a tin roof. Then everything ceased. The Spaniards had one wounded, and the Cubans had come without an accident out of the hailstorm of Spanish bullets. This is an example of many of the engagements.

Of course, the laborers on the plantation were all terrified, especially the women. Two days later, while the planter was resting after his breakfast, his domestics hurried to him and told him that armed men were advancing up the hill towards the house. He arose and distinctly saw them coming in his direction, while to the left, hidden behind some trees on his property, and not more than 400 yards from where he stood, he saw a group of insurgents. As soon as the Spaniards were half way up the hill, they fired upon the house, but the bullets passed overhead and did no harm. The insurgents immediately began to fire upon the advancing column. The Spaniards came up at a quick step and single file, following an old abandoned route, and the firing became more formidable. Six or seven rebels stood well in evidence upon the crest and fired upon their adversaries. Notwithstanding the successive discharges of the advancing column, which was hardly over 600 yards from them, only one Cuban was wounded, and he but slightly in the leg, while one of the Spanish officers fell from his saddle, and immediately every officer dismounted and walked beside his horse.

The column was still advancing when the planter saw crawling on the ground, in the yard which surrounded his house, three Cubans armed with rifles and very much excited by the skirmishing. He asked them what they were doing at that hour on his property. They replied that they were going

to fire upon the enemy, as they were in a good position for the purpose. The planter tried to dissuade them by telling them that they ran the risk of compromising him, and moreover, they could do no serious harm to the enemy. But they would not take his advice, and the one who commanded the two others, a Spanish deserter, gave his companions orders to begin firing. This made the planter's position extremely critical, for, on seeing shots come from the parapet surrounding the yard, the Spanish fired a volley on the house, while the women who had sought refuge near the planter began to cry terribly, and holding out their children to him besought him to save them. But none of the bullets seemed to reach them. He made all his people lie down in the mill for pounding coffee, a kind of circular trough in masonry, and bullet proof, and awaited events.

The planter foresaw that the Spaniards would accuse him of being an accomplice of the insurgents, and that he might have hard work to defend himself. He went out again to parley with the three Cubans, and finally persuaded them to go away. Meanwhile, the column reached the yard, and the planter came out of the house where the women had taken refuge, and as he did so the Spanish aimed their guns at him.

"It is useless to shoot," he cried, "there are on this place only inoffensive and peaceable people."

They then approached quietly, but with bayonets pointed. As soon as the commander came up where the master of the house was, the planter stepped forward and was placed between two soldiers with fixed bayonets.

"Did you shoot?" asked the commander.

"No, captain, if I had fired I should have run away with the insurgents."

"How many mambis were they?"

"Only three."

"Tell me the truth," said the commander, doubtfully.

"There were only three."

"How many times did they fire?"

"Three times, I believe."

The commander made a gesture of disbelief. Fortunately, at this moment they brought to him nine brass ends of empty cartridges. The Spanish soldiers searched everywhere except in the house, and they were just beginning to break in the doors when the commander called out to them: "The first man who touches anything here shall be hung." This was a characteristic remark, and reassured the planter somewhat as to the issue of the commander's questioning.

"Are you French?" he resumed.

"I am."

"Show me your papers."

The planter held out a certificate from the consul, and an authorization to live in the country given him by the Spanish government.

"Do you know that I had orders to shoot you?" said the Spanish commander. The planter kept silent.

"And also an order to burn your house?" Continued silence on the part of the planter.

"You had an insurgent camp upon your property," continued the captain.

"No, captain, it was on the highway outside of my land and my property," and he pointed out the place in the midst of the woods, but the Spanish officer manifested no desire to explore it.

"And all these miserable negroes and negresses whom you have here, what have you to say for them? They are all rebels and I shall put them to the sword."

Great lamentations and cries from the women.

"And those chickens in your yard, are they yours?"

"Yes, captain."

"Will you let me have four of them?"

"Ten if you wish," answered the planter, delighted to see the turn the conversation was taking.

"Have them caught immediately," ordered the captain.

Two negresses caught the chickens, and when the captain was in possession of them he asked the planter if he had any.

rum. Unfortunately, he had exhausted his stock upon the insurgents. But he offered them some sugar and water, which they accepted, and jugs of it was distributed about among the soldiers, who seemed to be satisfied with it, as there was nothing better. When each one had quenched his thirst the captain gave the orders to depart, and he said on leaving: "Advise your friends, the insurgents, not to fire on my troops from ambuscades on your property. If they do, I shall retrace my steps and burn your hacienda."

"I shall tell them so," replied the planter, "but I doubt whether they will listen to my words."

In fact, the column had not gone 200 yards from the house when it received a volley from the insurgents, who were hidden in the underbrush. But the captain did not retrace his steps. And thus it was that by means of a trifling tribute the planter saved his life and property.

Such was a characteristic incident of the war in Santiago while Gomez was driving Spain's great general into Havana. When Generals Carillo and Aguirre had arrived the insurgents sent Brigadier Cebreco to the shore to assist them in bringing their arms and cannon in, and on their return they made their camp near a planter and enjoyed his hospitality in the manner which has been described. Carillo expected General Rabi, who was to lead him into Santa Clara province, where he was better acquainted. Finally, Rabi arrived at the head of about 200 men, many of whom were Spaniards who had deserted and joined the insurgents, carrying their arms and baggage with them. The leaders at once set out for their westward march with their precious dynamite gun, which was used with good effect on the way, several forts being captured. Carillo took command in the Remedios district, where, owing to his popularity there, his army rapidly increased under constant recruits. Aguirre reported to Gomez and was soon engaged about Matanzas.

CHAPTER XX

THE ADVENT OF WEYLER, KNOWN AS "THE SPANISH BUTCHER"—HIS CRUELTY AND BARBARITY—THE FAMOUS \$5,000,000 TROCHA—DARING EXPLOITS OF MACEO.

Campos Badly Received at Havana—Spaniards Clamor for Sterner Methods—Campos Consults the Leaders—His Resignation and Self-Sacrifice—Weyler's Arrival—His Infamous Reputation—Commissioned Because of It—Progress of Gomez and Maceo—Weyler's Immense Forces—Largest Military Expedition Ever Transported by Sea—Strength of the Insurgents—Object of Their Campaign—Weyler's Boastful Proclamations—Civilized War Abandoned—Heroism of Young Adolfo Rodriguez—His Execution—Waiting for the Death Shot—A Cruel Pause—Wonderful Example of Self-Control—Weyler's Ineffective Military Operations—His Big Fence—Maceo Crosses and Recrosses It Easily—Cuba "Pacified"—Maceo Appears Where Least Expected—Maceo Surprised—Turning Defeat into Victory—An Example of His Daring and Strategy—Raid on Candelaria—Battles and Skirmishes—Death of Maceo's Brother José.

WHEN General Campos, having fallen back from one stronghold to another, finally made his stand in Havana, he was very badly received by the people, who considered him guilty of culpable negligence and carelessness. It was one of the absurdities of the situation that Spain was continually characterizing the rebellion as only the outbreak of a lot of ignorant negroes, and insisting that a state of war did not actually exist upon the island. Spanish pride bled at the thought that at any moment the bands of these rebels might pour triumphantly into the streets of Havana. Public emotion ran high. Since the battle of Coliseo hundreds of families had taken refuge within the walls of the capital, deserting the rural districts and even the villages. The highways and byways were cumbered with people distracted with fear and bringing in whatever they could bear or transport of their useful and precious possessions. Household goods and objects of value were piled together in confusion.

If from the beginning of the insurrection the population of Santiago de Cuba — which had known all the trials of the Ten-Years War — had dreaded to be involved in the vicissitudes which follow the march of armies, to what could be compared the fear of the panic-stricken people of Havana when they heard the cry, “The mambis are coming?”

The Spaniards of Havana were of the haughty and unrelenting type, from the beginning of the insurrection clamoring for revenge without mercy. Their aim was to restore the system of reprisals which had piled up hecatombs of helpless Cubans during the former war; such a system of revenge as had distinguished with an unevitable celebrity some of the Captain-Generals of the preceding insurrection, like Balma-ceda and such subordinate officers as Weyer. These fanatics, furious and trembling with fear, demanded of the marshal some cogent reason for his repeated defeats. They made serious threats, but the well-known energy of Campos held them in check; they dared not make any open attack on his person.

Confronted by the disfavor of the populace, Campos met the leaders of the three parties in an interview having for its object the adjustment of the existing conditions. He asked what measures they could propose and what they would advise. The Conservatives clamored for vigorous reprisals; the Reformists dared not express an opinion. The Autonomists timidly assured their leader of their support. In the face of such divergence of opinion, practically deprived of the assistance of the governmental parties, Campos thought it but right that he should resign his command.

In accepting his perilous office of commandant of Cuba, Campos had given proof of his self-sacrifice. He had attained the height of honor and glory in his own country; he had pacified Cuba after her Ten-Years War; he had pacified the people who were in revolt in Spain; he had restored and supported the Spanish monarchy, and when he was advanced in years, and should have been enjoying the rest earned by un-

faltering effort, he was sent to Cuba to fight a difficult and doubtful war, and to risk his reputation as a soldier with all the renown attendant upon a long life crowded with the distinction and the advantages which are the rewards of success. It is certainly to his honor that he did not waver from the line of conduct traced by him for his rule of life, a line inseparable from an exalted conception of honor and magnanimity. By his rectitude he had forced even the most implacable of his enemies to render homage to the greatness of his soul. When Spain was threatened with the penalty of her own bloody despotism, she turned over to one who had not sympathized with her system the subjection of this island after subjection had become impossible, and the Spaniards, terrified by the vengeance of events which threatened them, could simply clamor for more blood, more reprisals, in short, for a line of conduct which Campos could but regard as base and disastrous.

Campos sailed for Spain on the 17th of January, 1896, his office being temporarily left in the hands of General Sabas Marin, who, on the 10th of February, was succeeded by General Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau, Marquis of Teneriffe, better known and hated by the world at large simply as "Weyler." This general arrived preceded by a reputation for excessive severity and cruelty. He was accused of having committed the most atrocious crimes during the former war. The insurgent leaders were inclined to welcome his appointment, for they knew his disposition and counted upon the probability that his acts would quickly arouse sympathy for the struggling Cubans in the United States and elsewhere, and eventually secure for them that recognition which they so much desired, and which their representatives in the United States were so industriously seeking. Moreover, they said that his military talents were not brilliant, in ability not to be compared with Campos, and his appointment to the office at such a crisis in Cuba could be but for one purpose, of returning to a system of severe reprisals. Undoubtedly, the Spanish government had been moved by a certain stress of public opinion to appoint

him, for the impression then was that the failures of General Campos were due to a too lenient treatment, not simply of Cubans in the field but of Cubans apparently peaceful. Chiefly because of his reputation for severity in the former war, the Conservatives in Havana demanded him. He secured the important mission, indeed, mainly because as a man he lacked the high qualities possessed by Campos. It was pretended, however, that he had been especially instructed to moderate his ardor, a pretence doubtless suggested by the fear of possible complications with the United States.

The Cuban question had already been taken up by the United States Senate, and considerable excitement prevailed in New York as well as elsewhere in the country when the news of Weyler's appointment was received. The fear that the United States might recognize the belligerency of the Cubans hung like the sword of Damocles over the head of the Spanish Ministry, and while it was compelled to heed the clamors of the Conservatives in Havana and Madrid, it ostentatiously used every means calculated to avoid a declaration by this country which might double the force of the revolution. Naturally, all this agitation in Spain and Madrid filled the insurgent leaders with joy. They predicted that as soon as Weyler should begin his work all the Cubans who were still doubtful and wavering would be forced to leave the cities with their arms and baggage, preferring to take the chances of war to being captured in their houses and imprisoned, tortured, transported or shot — a prediction which came true.

Meanwhile, Gomez and Maceo had pushed through Madruga, Neuva-Paz, and Güines. When they reached the important railway line which unites Batabano to Havana, they destroyed it at several points, as also the telegraph lines. Having done this, the two chiefs separated; Gomez to go towards Havana, and Maceo to continue his march westward to bring the province of Pinar del Rio into the insurrection.

General Weyler brought over with him large reinforcements, and he must have begun his work for the pacification



EMINENT SPANISH LEADERS.

Admiral CERVERA.
Gen. WEYLER.

Prime Minister SAGASTA.
Gen. BLANCO.

of the island with a force of about 140,000 men. According to the official figures given out at Madrid, there had been at the outbreak of the insurrection 20,000 men for field work in the island. From that time to the 10th of March, 1896, there were sent over nine successive bodies of reinforcements aggregating a little more than 120,000 men. They were divided in the following proportions:

General officers,	40
Field officers,	562
Company officers,	4,768
Sergeants,	3,396
Corporals and privates,	112,560
Total,	<u>121,326</u>

It has been said that this made the largest military force ever transported by sea, and if it is added to the original permanent force, not counting the Volunteers in city garrisons, it makes an army of over 140,000, of which Weyler took command in an island no larger than Pennsylvania. Yet the Spanish government maintained that this was not a war! It was simply brigandage! And the refinements of international law could not seem to furnish a warrant for the recognition as belligerents of the patriots against whom Spain had armed such an immense force!

The armament which Spain had sent over during the year, according to official returns, consisted of the following, omitting field pieces and heavy ordnance:

- 64,125 Spanish Mauser magazine rifles, caliber 7 mm., model 1893.
- 1,176 Spanish Mauser magazine rifles, caliber 7.65 mm.
- 69,639 Remington repeating rifles, caliber .43 in., model 1871-89.
- 10,000 Remington repeating rifles, caliber .43 in., model 1871.
- 5,027 Mauser carbines, caliber 7 mm., model 1893.

The ammunition sent over for use in these guns was given as follows:

- 33,660,000 cartridges for Mauser 7 mm. rifle and carbine.
- 7,441,273 " " " 7.65 rifle.
- 13,725,520 " " Remington rifle, model 1871-89.
- 7,051,575 " " " " " 1871.

If every two thousandth bullet had killed a Cuban there would have been none left on the island. But it is probable that these bullets killed more Spaniards than Cubans, for the latter depended largely upon the supplies of ammunition which were captured from the Spanish, and the Cuban loss was always extremely small compared with that of the Spanish. A Spanish column would fire repeated discharges at half a dozen Cubans in ambush and possibly wound a man or two, while the half dozen Cubans might kill a dozen Spaniards and wound a score.

The insurgents starting in February as only a handful of men in the province of Santiago de Cuba, in December consisted of about 50,000 men, not over half of whom were fully armed and equipped; the rest carried miscellaneous weapons. This army was divided into five corps, two in Santiago, one in Puerto Principe, and two in Matanzas and Santa Clara. These corps were subdivided into brigades and divisions, scattered here and there all over the island.

This was the force that General Weyler with about four times as many armed men at his command was to crush. So far as the insurgents were concerned, their great object had been nearly accomplished; they had spread the insurrection all over Cuba, and all that remained for them was to hold the island till Spain went into bankruptcy or some one should interfere. There was no more thought of taking Havana than there was of taking Madrid. Their work was simply to harass the Spanish, at every opportunity, and at every point, to capture their arms and to cut off all supplies and all revenue from the island.

Upon his arrival at Havana, General Weyler, much to the delight of the uncompromising Spaniards, issued several boastful proclamations announcing that the war should be conducted in the sharpest manner. One of his proclamations commanded the different municipal governments to send him lists of all persons in any way identified with the insurrection, and announcing that all who did not surrender would be

severely punished. It was generally understood that no quarter would be given. The first results of his efforts to find those likely to be identified with the insurgents was to bring under suspicion many people who had taken no part in the uprising, many mothers who perhaps had sons in the insurgent ranks, or peaceful Cubans who were known to have taken part in the Ten-Years War. No leniency was to be shown to Cuban prisoners of war. Cuban hospitals were to be ruthlessly destroyed and all found in them put to death. It was no longer to be civilized war. The brutality of the fierce Spanish guerilleros was not to be restrained by any humanitarian considerations so foreign to their nature. The shooting in cold blood of luckless young Cubans became a regular early morning scene about the Spanish garrisons, and many were the examples of Cuban heroism all unknown to the world except to the soldiers who delighted in this wanton cruelty.

A case which may serve as an example of many was that of young Adolfo Rodriguez. It was one of the few cases witnessed by American eyes, and has been graphically described by a correspondent. Rodriguez was but twenty years old, the only son of a Cuban farmer living nine miles out of the city of Santa Clara. He had joined the revolution when it broke out in that province, leaving his father and mother and two sisters at the farm. Shortly afterwards he was captured by a Spanish detachment, though he defended himself so well that he severely wounded three of his assailants with his machete. Like others who were brought into the military prisons of the towns, he was sentenced to be shot on the plain outside the city. None of his friends could be present; it would not do for them to manifest any sympathy for a Cuban captive. Three hundred soldiers were marched out in the gray light of the morning to the music of a jaunty quickstep. Then, followed by a crowd of the curious, and between two priests, came Rodriguez, erect, soldierly, taking two steps to the priests' one. He had a handsome, gentle face framed in a mass of curly black hair. "It seems a petty thing to have been

pleased with at such a time," says the correspondent, "but I confess to have felt a thrill of satisfaction when I saw, as the Cuban passed me, that he held a cigarette between his lips, not arrogantly nor with bravado, but with the nonchalance of a man who meets his punishment fearlessly, and who will let his enemies see that they can kill him but cannot frighten him." The Cuban walked to where the officer directed him to stand and turned his back to the square of soldiers, facing the hills and the road across them to the farm where were his sorrowing father and mother and sisters. Straightening himself as far as the cords which bound him would allow, he fixed his eyes on the hills over which the morning light was breaking. The officer gave the order, the men raised their rifles, the Cuban heard the click of the triggers without a motion of his beaming face. Then came a pause, a dreadful, a cruel pause. As the officer had raised his sword to give the signal, another officer rode up and called his attention to the fact that the firing squad was so placed that they were in danger of hitting some of the soldiers at the extreme end of the square. The men were ordered to lower their rifles, and the officer walked across the grass and tapped Rodriguez on the shoulder. It must have been a terrible shock to one fully nerved for the ordeal, but this boy turned his head steadily, followed with his eyes the direction of the officer's sword, nodded his head gravely, and, with his shoulders squared, took up a new position, straightened his back again and once more waited for the fatal volley. Nothing could exceed such an exhibition of self-control. Again the sword rose, the triggers clicked, the sword dropped, and the men fired. The young Cuban sank on the grass without a struggle.

Another Cuban's blood for the freedom of Cubans' soil! And day after day, in garrisons all over the island, others such as Rodriguez were falling, without a murmur, without a fear, alone with their enemies; and the mothers and the sisters who wept for them were soon to meet a fate more horrible, huddled amid the sick and starving pacificos at Weyler's stations of

concentration, the climax of inhuman warfare, the extermination of the innocent and helpless.

Weyler's military achievements were chiefly conspicuous for their ineffectiveness. With Gomez and Maceo both in the regions of Havana when he boastfully took command, instead of throwing his vastly superior forces upon the insurgents, he adopted the expedient, always popular with Spanish commanders in Cuba, of building a fence. His idea was to prevent Maceo from getting into Pinar del Rio, or, if he should get in, to keep him there while he sent his columns against him. The boundary line between the provinces of Havana and Pinar del Rio lies close to the narrowest part of the island. At this narrowest part, between Artemisa and the Bay of Majara, Weyler, therefore, constructed another trocha about twenty-five miles long, and lying about forty miles west of Havana. This pretentious device was constructed in a country quite thickly settled, and therefore quite dissimilar from the jungle through which the Jucaro trocha was built. It differed also in character. A road wide enough to permit the cavalry to pass comfortably was bordered on each side by a ditch, three yards wide and three yards deep, in the lower places filled with water. Along these trenches was stretched barbed wire — imported from the United States, of course. As the island was not admitted to be in a state of war, nothing was contraband so far as the Spanish were concerned, but everything was so far as the Cubans were concerned. Beyond the ditches and the wire fence, which it was supposed would offer some obstacles to cavalry, were dug rifle pits twenty feet apart, and at intervals of about 100 yards were built "forts," so called, whose walls were formed by partitions of thick planks, a yard apart, the intervening space being filled with sand. At night this fortified line was lighted by electricity and the forts were connected by telephone wires. Twelve thousand men were concentrated on this elaborate highway, making it a permanent post, and 6,000 were placed toward Pinar del Rio and 6,000 more towards Havana to hold themselves in readi-

ness to reinforce the troops on guard in case of an attack. This great military work is supposed to have cost nearly \$5,000,000. It was to aid in pacifying "a few bandits."

But in spite of General Weyler's precautions, in the latter part of February Maceo led his forces across the incompletd trocha, and then recrossed to assist Gomez to carry the wounded out of reach of danger. Then he went on an expedition towards Matanzas, and Weyler announced in one of his glib proclamations that the provinces of Havana and Pinar del Rio were pacified and free from any large body of insurgents, whom he classed as outlaws to be dealt with by the mounted police. Both Maceo and Gomez were represented as fleeing towards the east before the victorious Spaniards. But Maceo escaped easily from the combination which had been planned by Weyler, and at the head of a large force, by quick marches through the swamps skirting the southern coast, once more appeared where he was least expected, determined to humble Weyler and return again to Pinar del Rio. On the 11th of March he suddenly attacked the city of Batabano, pillaged it, and burned a part of it. On the 14th he crossed the trocha again, and two days later fought a fierce battle with the Spaniards in which he captured arms and ammunition, but the resistance was so spirited that Maceo's force was divided. Tired out by their fighting Maceo's division halted near a cane farm and gave the horses a chance to eat and the men an opportunity to rest, stationing guards near the highway to Candelaria, which it was supposed the enemy would take if disposed to advance. A fierce tropical rain storm came on and the guards relaxed their vigilance, thinking the enemy would not march in such a storm, but as a matter of fact a large Spanish force under Colonels Inclan and Linares was coming up the road, and before the Cuban guards could gallop to where Maceo was reading the papers the enemy were less than half a mile away. Maceo had hardly mounted when the Spaniards opened a terrible fire and the Cuban infantry retreated in wild confusion.

Meanwhile, Maceo took in everything at a glance, and taking a circuitous route with a small guard he gained a position on the other side of the enemy, who were so occupied in storming the position of the retreating Cubans that he fell upon them entirely unexpected. Then the Spanish pack train and impedimenta turned and fled, and the wild rout of the Cubans came near being duplicated by the Spaniards. Had Maceo been reinforced by his other commands, as he had reason to expect, he would have won a great victory. But the Spanish saw how few men he really had and held their position till Maceo's ammunition ran out, when he retired. He had succeeded in capturing several mules laden with provisions, and the Spanish loss was heavy. Maceo was so displeased with the officers who had failed to rally their men that he deprived them of command. After that the insurgents fought bravely in many engagements during the greater part of the year when Maceo's army was roaming over the hills of the province and maintaining itself against all the forces sent by Weyler to overcome him.

Nothing could better show Maceo's daring and gift for strategy than his attack in June on the government stores at Candelaria, a town on the railroad line in Pinar del Rio about fifteen miles from the trocha. General Weyler had meditated making it a base of supplies during a campaign against the insurgent chief whom he considered the backbone of the insurrection, for he had sent thither a large amount of bread and meats under a strong convoy, which, with the ordinary garrison, made Candelaria a very strong place. Maceo heard of the supplies, and for weeks kept his spies prowling about the place in the guise of priests and poor workmen. Indeed, a lady of very good family and a strong sympathizer with the revolution was one of the most successful emissaries. It was decided that the stroke should be made on the feast of San Juan, when high mass was to be celebrated, for Maceo knew full well that the garrison usually attended such ceremonies in a body, leaving only a very few sentries on duty when the

enemy was not supposed to be anywhere near. About 200 insurgents straggled off into the town with their machetes hid under their jackets or in their trousers, and by design arranged themselves in the church porch and just inside the door, whereas the garrison, as had been surmised, were ranged in the best places near the high altar. During the sermon, which was delivered after the Gospels, a signal was given by a friendly accomplice from the church tower, and twenty minutes later there was a clatter of hoofs and a band of insurgents were driving a whole line of wagons out of the city, while every man had some plunder thrown across his saddle. When the bugle sounded the Spanish garrison came rushing out of the church, obstructed by the insurgents near the door, who pretended to be frightened peasants and planters, and a terrific crush with considerable loss of life resulted. When the Spaniards had made their way out they started in pursuit of the plunderers, who shot down the sentries and made good their escape into the woods. While the pursuit was in progress the insurgents who obstructed the Spaniards in the church joined their comrades. In this engagement the Spaniards lost a captain and several men, while the insurgents lost two.

Typical skirmishes and battles were taking place all over Cuba during the whole of the year 1896. Their description would be tedious and unnecessary, for they were much alike. They were nearly always reported as Spanish victories, though the insurgents roamed at will over every part of the island. Gomez had but one purpose — to wear out the Spanish. In July, General José Maceo was killed in a hard engagement in which his small army beat off the Spanish. Of the Maceo family none were left but Antonio. All had been sacrificed to Cuba Libre.

CHAPTER XXI

DIPLOMATIC TROUBLES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN—THE SANGUILY CASE—THE MORA CLAIM —CAPTURE OF THE *COMPETITOR*.

The Troubles Begin — The *Allianca* Affair — Rights of American Citizens Ignored — Sanguily and Aguirre — Arrested for Insurrection While Taking a Bath — A Sharp Interview — Threatening to Shoot American Citizens — The Consul's Strong Reply — Release of Aguirre — Sanguily Sentenced to Imprisonment for Life — His Lawyer Arrested and Placed in the Same Jail — History of the Mora Claim — A Court-Martial of the Dead — Extraordinary Diplomacy — A Wait of Ten Years — Mora Grows Old and Poor — Spain Offers to Compromise for \$1,500,000 — Ten Years More of Waiting — A Demand Not to Be Mistaken — A Spanish Comment — The Belligerency Question — Opposed by the Administration — The Capture of the *Competitor* — Captain Laborde's Story — Penalty of Death — "This Must Stop"

IF the people of the United States had felt upon the point of interfering in Cuban affairs during the Ten-Years War, the lovers of peace had abundant reasons for misgivings when the Cubans proclaimed a new insurrection in February, 1895. Cuba had become more closely identified with this country commercially; Americans controlled large property interests there and thousands of Cubans had meanwhile become citizens of the United States. While the farsighted deemed it inevitable that this government would in time be brought into the conflict, there were few manifestations of concern at first, and conservative opinion all over the country was strongly set against any steps which should give Spain offense. But with a diplomacy such as Spain practiced, and methods of warfare such as she adhered to, it was absolutely impossible for a self-respecting nation to remain thoroughly cordial, and the diplomatic friction began almost immediately after the standard of revolt was raised.

The revolution was hardly two weeks old when a Spanish gunboat off Cape Maysi fired upon and chased an American steamer, the *Allianca*, which was engaged in regular traffic between New York and Colon. This act at once raised a flurry in the United States, whose people knew how prone Spain had been in the former war to interfere with American vessels, and it was feared that something like a *Virginius* affair might result. The government of the United States at once demanded an explanation of the conduct of the captain of the gunboat and an apology. It should be remembered that no state of war existed affording any excuse for firing on American vessels. Spain at that time, engaged in putting down the outbreak of army officers in Madrid, knew well enough that if an outrage were committed on American commerce the United States might step in and grant belligerent rights to the Cubans, and her ministers very quickly disavowed the act with full expressions of regret and assurance of a non-recurrence of such an event, while the offending officer was relieved of his command.

But the State Department of the United States soon found that it had much more serious business on hand in protecting the rights of American citizens in Cuba. As already related, one of the first acts of the Captain-General at the outbreak of the rebellion was to place the western provinces under martial law, and on the day of the outbreak many arrests were made in the provinces of Havana and Matanzas, the revolution in that quarter being for the time suppressed. Two of the persons arrested in Havana were Julio Sanguily and José Aguirre, both American citizens. The former had been a brave and efficient officer in the Ten-Years War, had been wounded seven times, and, whether the Spanish authorities had any evidence against him or not, they naturally assumed that his sympathies were with the insurgents, though since the war he had become an American citizen. On the morning of the 24th of February, Sanguily was arrested at his house while taking a bath, a circumstance which furnished no very pre-

sumptive proof of his connection with the uprising of that day. He was thrown with others into Cabañas fortress, and subjected at once to trial by court-martial in direct violation of the treaty between the United States and Spain of January 12, 1877, which provided that American citizens arrested without arms in hand should not be tried by any exceptional tribunal but by those of ordinary or civil jurisdiction.

Our consul-general at Havana, Ramon O. Williams, went on the morning of the 25th to Captain-General Calleja and informed him that both Sanguily and Aguirre were naturalized citizens of the United States, and as such were duly inscribed in the register of foreigners kept in the office of the Governor-General. He remonstrated against the commitment to court-martial and asked for their immediate transfer to the civil jurisdiction. The Captain-General pretended to be surprised that they were American citizens and instantly answered the consul in an outburst of most violent language and gesture, saying that it was a disgrace to the American flag for the government of the United States to protect these men, who, it was notoriously known, were conspirators against the government of Spain; and, growing more violent, he exclaimed that many citizens of the United States were conspiring in Cuba against Spain, and that he would shoot every one of them caught in arms regardless of the consequences.

"But, General," interposed the consul calmly, "in carrying out such measures you will surely observe in all its parts the agreement between the two governments?"

"Yes, in observance of the agreement," he said, somewhat more moderately.

"Well, General, that is all I have come to ask for, but these American citizens, instead of having been committed before a civil court in observance of the agreement have been subjected to a trial by court-martial contrary to the agreement; for neither of them has been captured with arms in hand against the government, but both were arrested by the municipal police while peacefully deporting themselves in the city."

Calleja merely observed that the law governing the residence of foreigners in the island was paramount to the treaty between the United States and Spain. The consul firmly replied that his government would not admit such a construction of it. Calleja said the prisoners might apply to his judge-advocate, who would see whether they were entitled to rights under the treaty. As the judge-advocate was a creature of the Captain-General, he doubtless would have decided that the prisoners had no rights. Our consul firmly maintained that in deciding such a question no Spanish judge-advocate should supersede the diplomatic representative of the United States, and that he should at once take steps to formally remonstrate. Calleja again became excited.

"Your defense of these men is a disgrace to the American flag!" he exclaimed.

"General," replied the consul, "I am acting entirely within the confines of my official duty and in accordance with the instructions of the Secretary of State of the United States, and in strict conformity with the agreement of the 12th of January, 1877"; and he then bade Calleja good morning and withdrew. The incident, which is thus related in the diplomatic correspondence, serves to illustrate how lightly Spanish officials regarded treaty obligations, and shows also their feeling towards the United States. About a month later Sanguily was transferred to the civil jurisdiction, but he was almost immediately arrested upon another and a ridiculous charge, and submitted to a court-martial on that without any information being officially conveyed to the consul, who learned of it only through Sanguily's attorney in the other case. Another protest was made, and the Captain-General pretended to comply with the demand, but Sanguily was kept in military prison, and apparently it was to keep him there that the second charge was trumped up.

Four months later the consul wrote to the State Department that the cases of both Sanguily and Aguirre presented the anomaly that, while arrested at the very outbreak of the re-

bellion, they had not been brought to trial, though others arrested subsequently and for overt acts in connection with the rebellion had been released. Only the American citizens arrested solely on suspicion were subjected to the extreme arbitrary measures. "They are discriminated against on account of their quality of being American citizens," wrote the consul to the Secretary of State. In September, in view of the delay, the State Department demanded the instant release of Sanguily and Aguirre, and the later was released, a promise being given that Sanguily would be tried soon. As a matter of fact, the authorities had no case against him. The courts in December took up his case, and, although the evidence adduced against him was of the flimsiest character, he was sentenced to imprisonment for life. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Justice at Madrid, which ordered a new trial. In the last days of December, 1896, nearly two years after his arrest, he was again tried and sentenced to perpetual imprisonment. Meanwhile, his health had become broken in prison and he begged to be allowed to leave the island with his family. Another appeal was taken and still he languished in prison. Meanwhile, the lawyer who defended him in the first trial, and who made a magnificent defense, was arrested and looked from the bars of a cell adjoining Sanguily's in Cabaña fort, and the lawyer who managed his first appeal before the Madrid court was made to suffer so much in consequence that it was difficult to find any one who would undertake his second appeal there.

A fair idea of the dilatory tactics of Spain when dealing with the claims of American citizens can hardly be obtained from the consideration of cases which arose so late as the insurrection of 1895. The records of the State Department at this time had a long list of claims against Spain which, though strongly pressed from time to time, had never been adjusted. They extended back for fifty years. But there was one of only about twenty years' standing which became of considerable interest and importance, as it was in 1895, when Spain was endeavoring in every way to raise money to send troops to

Cuba, that the State Department demanded that it should be settled, not because Spain was in difficulties, but because Congress some months before the revolution had taken action which left the State Department no option except to press for a settlement. Spain had admitted the claim to be just many years before, and nine years before had promised to pay. It was known as the Mora claim, the early history of which properly belongs to the Ten-Years War.

Antonio Maximo Mora was born in Cuba, where he had large estates. In 1853 he came to New York and fixed his residence there, and in May, 1869, he took out his papers of naturalization and became a citizen of the United States. In November of the following year, in one of those peculiar freaks of barbarism with which Spain conducted the Ten-Years War, a court-martial was convened in Havana which passed sentence of death and confiscation of property against fifty-one persons, all of them absent from the island, and one of them dead, for alleged complicity in the Cuban rebellion. It is probable that the government simply wished the estates. Mr. Mora, who was then in New York, and had in no way given the rebellion aid and comfort, was among those sentenced. Secretary Fish at once protested against the sentence of confiscation, and our minister at Madrid pressed the matter there. In the last days of 1872, the Spanish government having shown no disposition to act, Secretary Fish cabled to our minister: "Urge the immediate release and restoration of the embargoed property." Early in 1873 a decree of restoration was issued in Madrid, for the United States were seriously talking of recognizing the belligerency of Cubans, but the decree was absolutely disregarded in Cuba. It was first supposed that this was an act of insubordination on the part of the Cuban authorities, but it turned out that with the decree of restoration which was sent to Cuba were also sent secret instructions not to comply with it. This mode of procedure was also Spanish.

Late in 1873, in fact, during the excitement over the *Vir-*

ginius affair, the Madrid government sent to the Captain-General an order reading: "The restitution must be made." But this also was evidently intended for consumption only in the United States. The restitution was not made. In 1875 our State Department informed the Madrid government that it should be obliged to take steps to hasten the restitution if something were not done. Three months later the Spanish Ministry sent our minister a note solemnly binding itself to place the property at the disposal of its owner, but it continued, nevertheless, to remain in the hands of the Spanish authorities of Cuba. Thus the matter ran along for *over ten years*, Mora meantime growing old, enfeebled, and poor, although his estates had been worth over \$2,000,000. Finally, in 1886, after many excuses, the Spanish government offered to settle the whole claim, interest and all, for \$1,500,000. The interest alone during the interval would have amounted to that. But Mora, considering his circumstances, agreed to this settlement, which could only be viewed in the nature of a compromise in which he sacrificed half his rightful fortune. Our government and Mora thought that they had at least secured a settlement. But Spain did not pay and would not make the provisions for its payment. Our demands were always met by excuses. Every succeeding Secretary of State did his best to make Spain settle, but could not, though the claim was freely admitted. Thus nearly *ten years more* passed. Finally, in 1894, Congress took action and left the State Department little option except to compel a settlement, and this was the state of the case when the revolution broke out and the Cubans demanded the recognition of their belligerency. Spain had never needed money more than at that minute, but she faced the fact that if she did not settle and settle quickly she might have to face the prospect of the United States forcibly demanding a settlement. Secretary Olney made a demand in a tone which could not be mistaken. Premier Sagasta was reported as saying that the only course open to his much-embarrassed government was to pay over the money, and it was paid.

Though a claim of such long standing could not fairly be regarded as having anything to do with the existing questions concerning Cuba, it was a significant fact that certain papers favorable to the administration and also opposed to intervention in Cuba considered this as in the nature of a bargain. In June, 1895, the *New York Times* said: "It will be difficult to avoid the conclusion that the payment of the award is also the purchase of our abstention from practical intervention in behalf of the Cuban insurgents."

As in the Ten-Years War, Spain was constantly making strong protests and bitter complaints against the alleged aid that the Cubans were receiving from sympathizers in the United States. Our government did all it could. Proclamations were issued warning citizens, and instructing officials to renew their vigilance, and a large expense, over \$2,000,000, was incurred in keeping a fleet of cutters in southern waters to intercept expeditions, many times to the annoyance of those engaged in legitimate business. The Cuban expeditionists were so sharp that they frequently escaped without being suspected by the Spanish spies or caught by the authorities. No government could have done more to live up to its obligations. Meantime, it was inevitable that the successes of a people struggling for their freedom from oppression should be welcome to the people of this country. When Campos was driven into Bayamo, the adherents of the policy of recognition gained evident strength and Congress manifested a decided disposition to act. Public meetings were held in many cities and towns expressing sympathy with the Cubans. These expressions were not dictated out of any hatred to Spain as a nation, but out of a natural dislike of her methods in Cuba. But the Spaniard could not bring himself to comprehend how the people of the United States could be actuated by a desire to see an oppressed people free. To the Spanish character such a sentiment would be entirely inexplicable. They could find no other motive for our interest in Cuba except in a desire to possess her by fair means or foul. They had not learned that the

Civil War had greatly changed the sentiment of this country towards Cuba. Nothing could furnish a better idea of how this country was regarded in Spain than a few expressions from a leading Spanish journal, *El Mercantil Valenciano*, in October, 1895.

"When would it have been possible for any nation with a history, for any European nation, degraded though it might be, to take advantage of a war in order to demand an indemnity of a million and a half of dollars? * The dignity and chivalry of every nation in old Europe would have recoiled at this, but no one is astonished at this in New America, in a race of people without morality and without justice.

"A blockade strictly carried out against the vessels of the starry flag would render extremely difficult, if not impossible, the carrying on of the enormous business done by the Yankees with Cuba. If, besides the strict blockade, we add occasionally the capture at sea, and the prompt execution by shooting, of those who attempt to run it, it will then be for the United States, and not Spain, to ask that the recognition of the rebels, as belligerents, be annulled.

"With regard to the possibility that the Yankees, fond of boasting and threats as they are, will make war on Spain on account of the blockade, or of the breaking off of commercial or even diplomatic relations, we need not worry ourselves. The North American republic is absolutely powerless for carrying out an offensive war with a nation even moderately military, as ours is. Let us defend ourselves in Cuba by sinking the American vessels that carry contraband of war, and by showing the world that we know how to make effective a blockade as extensive as that of Cuba, and let us laugh at the United States and at the belligerency of the insurgents."

In the latter part of 1895 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations took up the question of our attitude towards the new Cuban Republic. Palma, the Cuban representative at Washington, had made a strong appeal for recognition, and the claims of the Cubans were set forth in detail. By that time Gomez and Maceo had made their remarkable march of invasion and were the masters of the rural districts and were overrunning Havana province. Campos was about to be succeeded by Weyler, whose unpleasant reputation gave additional strength to the Cuban cause in this country. Even under Campos the people had been shocked by authentic accounts of the treatment of insurgent prisoners by the Span-

* The Mora claim already described.

iards, while the insurgents themselves treated the Spanish prisoners in a manner approved by civilized warfare. Early in February the Senate committee reported a concurrent resolution to the effect that the war had reached a magnitude which concerned all civilized nations, and if it were to continue it should be conducted on both sides on principles acknowledged to be obligatory upon civilized nations, and that the President, if he concurred in this opinion, should in a friendly spirit use the good offices of the government in requesting Spain to accord to the armies with which she was engaged the rights of belligerents. But President Cleveland was evidently opposed to interfering in Cuban affairs, and it was said to be at the administration's instance that the resolution was made concurrent instead of joint, the custom being not to send resolutions of the former character to the President.

It would apparently have been wise for Spain to admit the belligerency of the Cubans, for otherwise she incurred responsibility for all the damage done to the property of foreign residents in Cuba, and her liabilities in this respect were already enormous. But to a nation which seldom paid her obligations, even those which she admitted, this might not appear a serious matter. It was evident that some of the wisest and strongest men in the Senate were on the point of favoring an interference to save the island from further massacre and Spain from contracting a debt she could never pay, for fate was inexorably working for Cuban independence.

After a long debate the Senate passed by a vote of 64 to 6 a resolution favoring the recognition of Cuban belligerency, and interposing our friendly offices in behalf of Cuban independence. The house passed resolutions essentially the same by a vote of 263 to 16. This undoubtedly was a fair expression of the sentiment of the people of the United States. From this time forth, therefore, only the delicate requirements of international law could prevent interference by this nation, and it became a question of time when diplomacy should give way to sentiment and action.

The Spanish populace was much wrought up over this expression of opinion; our legation at Madrid had to be placed under guard, and at Barcelona our consular headquarters were attacked and the Stars and Stripes contemptuously treated. Spain hastened, however, to apologize and to offer reparation for those acts. She was frightened. But as these resolutions had no effect in shaping our active policy towards Spain, we continued to live up to the requirements of international law and to seize vessels and cargoes suspected to be intended for Cubans.

Notwithstanding the violent feelings which the Spanish in Spain and Havana were manifesting towards the United States, the Spanish government showed its desire to conciliate this country. General Weyler received our new consul-general, Lee, at Havana with marked cordiality. General Lee's military experience and professional training made him unusually competent to ascertain the exact state of affairs in Cuba, and he was not a man to be hoodwinked or cajoled when the interests of the United States were in danger. Meanwhile, in the summer of 1896, the presidential campaign diverted public interest in a great degree from the struggle going on in the oppressed island. It had become evident that it would remain for the next administration to determine what should be our policy towards the Cubans, against whose armies General Weyler was making poor headway, though he was beginning to treat the innocent and the helpless with a disregard for human instincts which excited the horror of the civilized world.

On the last day of April, 1896, the American schooner *Competitor* from Key West, with part of her crew, was captured near San Cayetano while engaged, as the Spanish alleged, in landing arms for the insurgents. She was towed to Havana, and our consul at once demanded that the protocol of 1877 be adhered to in the trial of any Americans who might be among the crew. The minister to Spain was urged also to request that the Captain-General be instructed to a strict ob-

servance of that treaty. The Spanish admiral claimed, however, that these men did not come within the treaty inasmuch as they were not "citizens of the United States residing in Spanish dominions," one clause of the treaty. We claimed that in the part of the treaty covering such cases there was nothing making residence of American citizens within Spanish dominions a condition necessary to entitle them to all its guarantees. The Spanish government promptly sent orders to Cuba for the suspension of all executive action till an examination had been made as to the standing of the Americans captured. But three days later the Spanish admiral officially informed our consul that the treaty did not apply to the American prisoners and that they would be tried by court-martial. Captain Laborde of the vessel was born in New Orleans and had once been deputy sheriff at Tampa. According to his statement, the vessel of which he was master belonged to a man in Key West, and she had a wrecking license. She had cleared the Key West custom house with a crew of four besides himself, taking on board twenty-four men as passengers for Lemon City, Fla., at two dollars each, and she had sailed at 2 o'clock in the morning. When in the neighborhood of Cape Sable on the 22d of April, the passengers forcibly took charge of the ship, and six of them went into the captain's cabin and with pistols compelled him to give up the command. The men then took the vessel to Cape Sable, where they took on twenty-three more men with arms and ammunition. They then sailed for the Cuban coast, landing near San Cayetano on the 25th. The captain was forced to go ashore in the first boat with one of the crew and nineteen men, who, on landing, at once escaped. He returned to the ship and another lot was landed. Then the vessel was sighted by a Spanish cutter. The captain displayed the American flag and made no attempt to escape with the passengers. The Spanish came aboard and seized them. They were put in what was called a Spanish windlass, the wrists being tied together and the rope then drawn tight by a stick so as to cause much torture. They were

taken without arms; indeed, there were none on board. Besides the captain there were two men, Melton, a correspondent of the Jacksonville *Times-Union*, and Gildea, the mate, an Englishman. A few days later two American citizens named Leavit and Barnet, who were supposed to have belonged to the crew, were captured while asleep and taken to Havana, where they were also subjected to court-martial.

The Spanish prosecuting officer asked for penalty of death for all on the ground that the local law for foreigners took precedence in such a case over any treaty, and the obedient court quickly pronounced a death sentence. Secretary Olney at once urged upon the Spanish minister at Washington that executions should not take place till this government had been permitted to examine the proceedings of the court, and as a result the Spanish government, much to Weyler's indignation, ordered the cases transferred to the Madrid court. This meant indefinite delay.

The summer months passed by, the prisoners complained of insufficient food, were afflicted with prison fever, and some of them were transferred to the military hospital. On September 3d Secretary Olney cabled the minister at Madrid that the delay in deciding the *Competitor* and other cases which had meanwhile arisen was "absolutely unreasonable. Call for prompt action and reasons justifying past delay or additional delay, if such is asked for." Thereupon the minister was informed that the authorities of the Madrid court had ordered a new trial before an ordinary tribunal, and that the decision would be made public "soon." But the time passed on, and late in November the consul at Havana accidentally heard that the marine court-martial was again trying the prisoners. He asked for an authorization to protest, but the State Department upon investigation was informed that it was only a preliminary proceeding, and while in such cases the validity of any military jurisdiction whatever was not in accord with the treaty, the department decided to simply watch the proceedings. Something of the character of these pro-

ceedings is indicated by the following letter, which Captain Laborde managed to get to the consul:

Fort CABAÑAS, December 11, 1896.

SIR: I beg to inform you that yesterday afternoon I was ordered by the actual military judge of the prosecution of the *Competitor's* crew to dress in a military suit, with the purpose of being recognized by someone. Of course I formally protested of such act and refused to be disguised in that way. He answered immediately that he was going to compel me by force, and fearing to become the victim of his brutality, I obeyed. As he did not allow my protest to be considered, I hurry to let you know this and afford a proof of the way justice is being done me.

I am, sir, your humble servant,

ALFRED LABORDE, *Master*.

When the cases were at this point, Congress called for the correspondence and took the matter in hand, but Spain continued to hold the men in prison, and it was long before their fate was determined.

It was one of the anomalies of the situation that while the island of Cuba was being devastated by war, and its people, even the peaceful ones, were victims of the destruction, a class of people who usually urged peace with Spain and forbearance with her diplomacy were very much disturbed by Turkish atrocities in Armenia. It was considered a wrong for Christian nations to allow those atrocities to continue, and the failure of the Christian nations of Europe to promptly intervene was vehemently denounced. It was even urged that the United States should step in. But a devastation quite as horrifying was going on right at our shores, and our interests were affected not simply by moral but financial considerations. The loss of a sugar crop in Cuba meant a great deal financially to the people of the United States as well as to Cubans. Sixty-seven million spoons went into sugar bowls every morning, and in a year at a spoonful a time this meant two million tons consumed by our people.

Fully one-half of it was expected to come from Cuba. The question which the people of the United States naturally asked themselves was this: "Shall we allow this war to go on

indefinitely? Shall we allow a war of extermination to be maintained at our very doors? Shall we allow Spanish troops in vast numbers to be sent to exterminate the Cuban population? Shall we allow a war of devastation to be carried on until the island of Cuba is ruined for all purposes of civilization, or shall we interpose and say to Spain, ‘ You have refused all reasonable overtures; you have turned deaf ears for years to the reasonable appeals of the Cubans for a just share in their own government, now we must say to you, *this must stop!*’ ”

CHAPTER XXII

WEYLER'S FUTILE EFFORTS—TRAGIC DEATH OF THE LAST OF THE MACEOS—THE MURDERS OF FONDEVIELA AND REMARKABLE EXPLOITS OF ARANGUREN.

Maceo the Terror of the Spanish Nation — Weyler's Futile Efforts to Capture Him — Rebel Hospitals and Spanish Victories — Maceo as Undaunted as Ever — A Picture of the Man and of His Camp — Was It a Spanish Trap? — Attack at Punta Brava — How Maceo Fell — Gomez's Son Kills Himself at His Side — Cubans Rescue Maceo's Body — Stories of His Death — Their Effect in the United States — Saved by a Lucky Bullet — Rejoicing of the Spanish People — Hopes of Cuban Surrender Disappointed — Maceo's Successor, Rivera — Insurgent Successes in Havana and Matanzas — Reign of Terror at Guanabacoa — Weyler Criticised at Madrid — Remarkable Exploits of Nestor Aranguren — Magnanimously Frees Spanish Prisoners of War — Nearly Captures Weyler Himself — Weyler's Campaign of Destruction — His Trip to Santa Clara.

THE terror of the proud Spanish nation was the dusky Maceo. Having constructed a five-million-dollar trocha and garrisoned it with about twenty thousand of her "brave sons" to prevent Maceo from escaping from Pinar del Rio, it soon appeared that the dashing Cuban had no particular desire to escape. With a force at his command of less than 4,000 armed men, he moved about the province of the west at will, capturing and destroying the garrison towns and so terrorizing the Spanish soldiers that they dared not move except in large columns, and these, moving slowly about in a hilly country, were at the constant mercy of the cleverly-handled insurgents. It was evident that unless Maceo could be subdued, Weyler's boasted trocha would be set down as a failure. Hence, Weyler's chief object became the capture of Maceo. Little attention was paid to Gomez or to other Cuban generals who were moving about in the provinces of Havana and Matanzas, but the greater part of the effective force of the

Spaniards was thrown against Maceo. Ten engagements were fought against him within fifteen days with no appreciable advantage to the Spaniards, though Weyler constantly regaled Madrid with accounts of his crushing blows, and the proud peninsulars daily scanned their papers in the expectation that an account of Maceo's capture would surely appear. But it did not, and soon the rainy season practically put an end to the Spanish operations and Maceo entrenched himself with greater strength in the province. In the meantime more reinforcements came from Spain, and at the end of the wet season Weyler took the field in person and with much *éclat*. He established headquarters on the line of the railroad between Havana and Pinar del Rio and several skirmishes ensued. Despite his reports of successful engagements with Maceo's army a continuous stream of wounded Spanish soldiers found their way back to Havana.

Soon Weyler returned, and, with that bravado which might be described as a species of grandiloquent falsehood, calmly adhered to in the face of its absurdity, he announced that the province was "pacified." But shortly came reports, which the censor was unable wholly to smother, that Maceo was capturing garrisons, and driving into fatal ambush the Spanish detachments sent against him. Again Weyler took the field. Three times he did this with the same results. In November he went forth with the largest body-guard ever known in the history of war, a cordon of 6,000 men, whose duty it was to care for his personal safety in a little province about the size of Connecticut, and a province which a few weeks before he had again pronounced pacified. At his command were over 60,000 troops to capture an army but one-fifteenth as large. On leaving Havana he declared himself entirely satisfied with what he had done during the campaign and insisted that all that remained for him in Pinar del Rio was to "reconnoitre the hills in the eastern part," whereupon the complete pacification of the province would soon follow. But the people against whom he gained his chief successes were civilian captives and

unarmed farmers. Occasionally, a small rebel hospital would be discovered in the woods and every wounded man would be slaughtered — “the insurgents leaving a large number of dead upon the field.” Weyler returned to Havana. The province was again “pacified.”

Yet, as undaunted as ever in the gloomy gorges of the hills of Pinar del Rio, within sight of the trocha, was the man against whom Weyler had made his showy marches. Sitting under the rain-sealed roof of his improvised hut, his brown face standing out clearly in the firelight, his clothes ragged and torn by the jungle thorns, and the four gilt stars on his faded coat rusted by sun and storm, there was apparently little about him to induce a Spaniard to give a *peso* for either his life or death. All about him in the flickering lights of the camp were the champing horses, and close by the edge of the trees, in long quiet lines like windrows, lay the Cubans, half of them barefooted and barebreasted. The gleam of white bandages could be seen all along the line, but even the sickest and most desperately wounded, in their fevered dreams, still clung to their machetes; no hospitals for them while they had an arm to wield or a leg to stand on. Out under the tall palms, silent and alert, stood the sentries, dark silhouettes against a starlit sky.

The dusky general at the fire rose to his feet, turned up the brim of his old faded hat, and peered earnestly down the dark wooded ridges of the mountains to the east where other camp fires were gleaming. Then you could imagine why it was that the Spanish government would pay a million *pesos* for the death of this man, with broad shoulders and heavy brow, whose gentle eyes could gleam with a terrible fierceness. The camp fires to the east were those of the Spanish along the trocha, and, as Maceo watched them, his lips curled with contempt. Here stood the last of the Maceos — there were his hereditary enemies. The blood of his family stained the island from end to end. He had fought them from his boyhood and would fight them till he died — or Cuba was free.

At this moment Maceo was as strong in that province as ever, in spite of the columns which Weyler had sent against him. There he might have remained and possibly might have lived till Cuba was free. But he had other plans. Just why Maceo at this time left his army to another gifted guerrilla chief, Ruis Rivera, has never been satisfactorily explained. That he left it because it was in sore distress, as the Spanish averred, and because he wished to learn why he was not reinforced, is absurd. His army was not in distress and Maceo had no fear of death. For years, time after time, he had rushed into the thickest of the battle laughing at the Spanish bullets in the belief that they would not hit him unless fate willed it so. The most plausible explanation of his move is that he proposed to leave the Pinar del Rio forces to Rivera to carry on the war there while he joined the forces operating in Havana province, thereby accomplishing the double purpose of making an aggressive movement under the nose of the boasting Weyler, and diverting his attention from the western province, which Rivera could then easily hold. At the same time that Maceo started eastward, Gomez started westward. With a guard of about a dozen of his staff Maceo suddenly crossed the trocha at the north and appeared in the province of Havana where he was apparently expected by the Cubans, and where he was least expected by the Spaniards, unless it is true that he was enticed over the trocha by a plot and drawn into a Spanish trap. He quickly gathered about him a small force of Cubans operating in the western part of Havana province, and on December 7th was suddenly attacked by a superior Spanish force under Colonel Cirujeda at Punta Brava. While Maceo was in the center of his staff, a heavy volley was fired directly at them and Maceo was shot in the neck and fell from his horse mortally wounded. Several of his staff also fell, while one of them galloped back to secure aid to carry away Maceo's body. Gomez's son, also on Maceo's staff, remained by the body and, when he could no longer defend it, seems to have killed himself and fallen at Maceo's

side. The Spaniards rifled Maceo's body of his jewels, but probably without knowing whose they were, for the body was left on the field and afterwards buried by the Cubans in a spot which remained a secret to all except a few.

The stories which reached this country concerning the mysterious death of Maceo greatly aroused the people and inflamed Congress, impatient under President Cleveland's mild diplomacy. The friends of the Cuban cause spread abroad a detailed and circumstantial story to the effect that Maceo had been treacherously persuaded to meet certain of the Spanish leaders under a flag of truce and that, with the members of his staff, he was murdered by men in ambush, the whole plot having been conceived by Spanish high officials. This version was readily believed in this country though vigorously denied at Madrid and Havana. It was very natural that it should be believed. Spanish reports of movements in Cuba had time and again been shown to be absurdly colored. It was well known that for months the whole military ability of general Weyler had been directed against Maceo; to take Maceo somehow, dead or alive, was the Spaniard's ambition. That they should have lured him into an ambush was plausible enough, except for one fact — Maceo was too shrewd to be tricked. He knew Spanish ways. On the other hand, was it probable that one who had lived day after day under the fire of the Spaniards, had boldly entered their fortified towns, and circumvented them time after time, should suddenly fall with nearly his whole staff in one of those skirmishes, the science of which he was a master? The theory of foul play, which was not in the least false to the spirit of the Spanish methods in Cuba and the Philippines, was further strengthened by the fact that Dr. Zertucha, Maceo's physician, who was with him at the time, very soon afterwards deliberately gave himself up to the Spaniards, was immediately released and given perfect liberty and protection. He was at once branded as a traitor by the Cubans and accused of having been the Spanish instrument to lead Maceo into the Spanish trap. But Zertucha promptly

defended himself with a story of the affair which showed that he was either a great rascal or a much-maligned patriot. Maceo, he said, was out of ammunition, had no supplies, had even followed the enemy's trail in search of cartridges. "I have wept and will continue to weep over the death of him who was my friend — my brother rather than my chief. It is impossible to believe that he should thus have exposed himself to certain death by placing himself in a position so dangerous as the one he took, especially as it was not strategical. No, Maceo, rather than struggle against certain elements, chose to die at his post, facing the enemy." As a reason for surrendering to the Spanish he said: "Upon the body of General Maceo and in the presence of General Diaz I swore that I would not serve under any other leader in the revolution. I am carrying out my oath."

His statement was not one calculated to entirely relieve him of suspicion. Several who had been near Maceo stated that soon after he had entered the province of Pinar del Rio he received advices from the Cuban agent in Havana that the Spaniards were secretly corresponding with some officer in his army, and the fact caused Maceo so much uneasiness that he issued an order for summarily dealing with anyone who was found to be in conferences with the enemy. It is also alleged that Maceo's suspicions of Zertucha were so great that he took good care to keep him near himself.

How important an element in Spanish affairs was this mulatto general may be judged from the statements made at the time in a Spanish journal, *El Pais*. "The indications are," it said, "that if it had not been for Maceo's death, not only would General Weyler have been recalled but a ministerial crisis would have occurred on December 9th. It is said on the best authority that on December 7th, when the government learned that General Maceo had passed the trocha, a cabinet council was summoned for the next day. The Duke of Tetuan and other ministers who are personal friends of General Martinez Campos were going to require the deposition of Weyler

on the ground that his failure was evident, and no time should be lost in having him replaced by some other general before the dry season was more advanced. General Weyler's lucky star saved the situation. On December 8th, Premier Canovas sent word that he was ill, and the meeting of the ministers was adjourned till the afternoon of the 9th. On the morning of that day the news of Maceo's death came, and both Weyler and the ministry could breathe more freely."

But a few days before the news of Maceo's death, the *El Liberal* of Madrid said: "Maceo is the war. To conquer him, to annihilate his followers, is to finish the war, to gladden the nation's heart, and to present us before the world as capable of accomplishing that which we purpose. Victory's first requirement is, that people know in advance who is to be conquered." Later, the same paper said: "After many a gloomy day, that of yesterday was a day of happiness and as regenerating as any in our glorious past. Maceo's death implies that the greatest part of his adherents will surrender, and that the remainder will be dispersed."

Great was the Spanish rejoicing. Royal flags were hoisted everywhere in Madrid, and bells were rung, while the Queen sent a gift to the wife of the Spanish officer whose men killed Maceo. As soon as the news reached Havana, a grand torchlight procession was organized, and after a long march through the illuminated streets, it proceeded to the palace where a great crowd was assembled. General Weyler was received amid cries of "Long live Spain!" "Long live the King!" and in response he said that he would now speedily pacify the island. A few days later, there was a great excursion from Havana to Punta Brava, and a fête on the spot where Maceo fell, in honor of Major Cirujeda's column. On the arrival of the excursionists, they were received by the officers, and there were speeches and much jubilation.

But General Weyler's expectations of a speedy breaking up of the rebellion were disappointed. He fully believed that the Cubans in Pinar del Rio would rush in and lay down their

arms. But no one surrendered except Zertucha, while every night the volleys of the insurgent skirmishers could be heard in the suburbs of Havana.

General Rivera, Maceo's successor in Pinar del Rio, took up a position in one of Maceo's old strongholds. In a few days General Weyler went again, in person, and with a strong force, to the province which he had declared pacified. But the campaign proved to be one of extermination. It was supposed that the insurgents were short of supplies, and so farms were ruined, everything that could not be carried away was burned, and animals were seized or killed. The Cuban soldiers in their depredations had only burned cane fields so as to prevent the Spaniards from deriving revenue, but the Spaniards spared nothing, from the potato field to the house of the planter who was suspected of sympathizing with the insurgents.

Rivera evaded the traps set for him with skill, though menaced by a greatly superior and a well-equipped force. Weyler was obliged to keep arrayed against him the same powerful army he had used against Maceo, and, as a result, he began to be the subject of severe criticism in Madrid, though his harsh methods made him a hero among the Conservatives of Havana, who received him with a great demonstration, when late in December he again returned from the field. Madrid papers said they should have received much more satisfaction from the demonstration had General Weyler shown that he had accomplished anything in Pinar del Rio. As a matter of fact, the insurgents seemed to be more active than ever, and the providential bullet which had gladdened Spanish hearts by killing Maceo had not been followed up. After Weyler had made another visit to the front, boasting that he would speedily pacify the province, had marched his men about the hills till they were tired out, and had won no signal advantage over the insurgents, he made his way back again towards Havana, and the Madrid papers were so vehement that the government seized them and began action against their proprietors.

While Weyler was using his troops to no effect in the

east, the insurgents, less liable to strong opposition, were overrunning Matanzas, and indeed were capturing the very suburbs of Havana itself. The divisions under command of Betancourt planned an attack on the Spanish force under Col. Aldea, and it was carried out so successfully that the Spaniards were demoralized, and they admitted a loss of seventy-five men. It was nearer twice that. The Spaniards fled in disorder into the town of Ceiba Mocha. A little later the insurgents seized and pillaged the town of Guanabacoa, which is practically a suburb of Havana, and then returned to their camps. The Spanish commander was replaced by Colonel Fondeviela who had the reputation of being a ruthless assassin. A reign of terror, apparently sanctioned by Weyler, began; men accused of giving information to the insurgents were arrested and never seen again in the city. Their bodies were lying beyond the outskirts. Fourteen such persons were killed on a single day, Sunday, January 3d. Many of them were well-known young men of the best Cuban families of the city, who, the day before, were living peacefully at their homes. Early in January the insurgents captured the town of Arroyo Naranjo, near Havana, took all the clothing and food, and reduced it to ashes, the Spaniards fleeing to the capital.

As Weyler's position became more insecure at Madrid, he became more reckless in fixing the character of reports. Without a word of truth Gomez was represented as desirous to treat with him for peace, though Gomez at the very moment was aggressively attacking Spanish forces in Santa Clara. Pinar del Rio was again declared as pacified, and within a few hours reports came to Havana that the Spanish division under Colonel Segura had been completely routed by Rivera, who had drawn the Spanish colonel into a tight place in the hills, and then charged with terrible effect; nearly three hundred Spaniards were killed, and as many more wounded, while the Cuban loss was small. This report, which turned out to be true, was suppressed by the censors, and the government circulated a report that Rivera had been killed. It was a desperate

game, and could not be expected to last long, unless circumstances altered for the better, but the Conservatives in Havana ostentatiously combined to express their confidence in the Captain-General, and this had an effect of softening the criticisms for a time.

It was a noticeable fact that in all the highly-colored reports of Spanish victories no account was ever given of the prisoners taken. The only mention was of insurgents killed. It was notorious that the Spanish executed the insurgents who fell into their hands, in sharp contrast to the policy which the Cubans had endeavored to carry out from the beginning of the war. The same fate overtook the sick and wounded when taken in Cuban hospitals. The Spanish newspapers would say that such an insurgent hospital was destroyed after an engagement with the forces which defended it, and so many were killed; nothing was said about the sick and wounded. In fact, they made up the list of the killed. An attack on these defenseless unfortunates was construed into a Spanish victory. As might be imagined, these crimes only intensified the Cuban hatred of the Spaniards, and confirmed them in the determination to fight it out to the bitter end — independence or death. Yet Weyler was pretending to expect that these people would soon lay down their arms.

At last he retired to his palace and remained inactive for a time, reiterating on every opportunity that the island would soon be pacified, and contenting himself with reviling the insurgents as bandits, though they swarmed all about Havana, and it was impossible to communicate with any place more than five miles from the city without first overcoming an insurgent force. To meet this unexpected activity, men and guns were drawn from the famous trocha, and that defense was again open. Some rebels poured through to reinforce Rivera in Pinar del Rio, where the insurgents maintained themselves easily.

While Fondeviela was continuing his butcheries in Guanabacoa, unrebuked by Weyler, though several Spanish dele-

gations had warned him, a very striking instance occurred, illustrative of much that characterized the war between the proud Spaniard and the Cuban "bandit." Operating in the vicinity of Havana was a young insurgent commander of good family, named Nestor Aranguren. He had taken the field for Cuba Libre at the head of a hundred other young men of equally high antecedents; indeed, they were said to be all university men, mostly graduates of the University of Havana. They were well equipped and of the bravest character, and Aranguren had not only the spirit of a true soldier but a natural genius for military affairs which had been at once recognized by his superiors and his promotion had been rapid. He had been kept in the province of Havana, where his influence and that of his men was considerable. One night, within sight of a Spanish fort, and almost at the gates of Havana, by a daring stroke, he derailed a train and captured several Spanish officers under Fondeviela's command. When the news reached Havana there was much mourning, for it was taken for granted that the officers would be killed, and they were greatly surprised when they came to Havana safe and sound. Aranguren had treated them with courtesy and given them a safe return to their camps. Such was the example of self-restraint under strong temptations which the alleged bandits furnished to the proud Spaniard who went about the island slaying in cold blood not simply the insurgents captured in battle, but sick and wounded men in hospitals and defenseless men and women leading peaceful lives. Yet these Cubans were the people whose belligerency the government of the United States could not recognize, their expeditions were chased by our war cutters, and the leaders of the expeditions arrested and tried, while the Spanish were buying in our ports whatever they could pay for, and our government was even dickering diplomatically with the Spanish government, which hoped thereby to preserve something of its supremacy over those brave and oppressed people.

It was not long after Aranguren's exploit that he nearly

captured the Captain-General himself. Weyler had left Havana with his strong body-guard and a force of troops for Matanzas. On his return march in the last week in January he entered a village in the south of Havana province, ordered the inhabitants to leave for a fortified place, and then burned the town. He then proceeded to the town of Gopaste, which was reached about nightfall, and guides were sent forward to reconnoitre. Aranguren had his forces concealed in the houses of the town, and but for an accident he might have accomplished one of the greatest feats of war. An accidental discharge of a gun by one of the insurgents gave the Spaniards the alarm, and, seeing that their plan had failed, the insurgents rushed from their concealment and drove the Spanish forces back to Weyler's position, and several of his guard were wounded.

In January the command of the insurgents in Pinar del Rio was assumed by Mayta Rodrigues, and Rivera crossed the trocha into Havana province, where the Cuban operations became more active than ever. At this time the Spanish government announced that it was meditating reforms and was placing before the autonomists a scheme which it was hoped might take the vitality out of the insurrection. Weyler endeavored to secure an interview with Gomez for the alleged purpose of offering peace on the basis of home rule. But Gomez had no faith in him and returned this message:

"Tell General Weyler that I do not consider him a man of honor. He is too deep in the mud to raise himself to my level and confer with me."

While the reforms were stated to be acceptable to the autonomists' party, that organization had dwindled to an inconsequential body, owing to the successes of the revolution and to the atrocities of the Spaniards in the island.

Unable to drive the Cubans out of Havana province with his greatly superior army, Weyler resorted to the device which he had tried in Pinar del Rio. Late in January he ordered the destruction of all plantations and buildings in the province which could be likely in any way to prove useful to the insur-

gents. The Madrid Chamber of Commerce protested, but to no avail. Weyler did not seem to recognize the fact that he was doing exactly what the insurgents had been doing for two years in order to deprive the Spaniards of revenue. He was helping the insurgents carry on their campaign. Thus the whole island, except in the east, where the insurgents were in full control, where they collected taxes and where some industries were proceeding under their protection, was made a desert. About Havana and Matanzas the Spaniards destroyed everything within their reach, and the insurgents did the same. If the Cubans came to a patch of potatoes they took what they wanted and destroyed the rest so that the Spaniards could not have them. If the Spaniards arrived at the patch first, they did the same thing. Weyler, as usual, regaled Madrid and Havana with claims that the island was being speedily pacified. So matters went on week after week.

Early in February Weyler determined to push a large force through to Santa Clara, in which locality Gomez was supposed to be. He went through a country in which not a green thing had been left growing. As Sheridan said of the valley of Virginia, "a crow flying over the country would have to take rations." The huts of the *pacificos* were pitched in the swamps about the forts and starvation was beginning to stare them in the face. When Weyler reached Santa Clara he was received with great ceremony. All the forces possible had been concentrated there and the city and the outskirts fairly swarmed with soldiers. To all appearances he was to strike a decisive blow. But his enemies, who had greatly increased in Spain, said that he had gone into the field to prevent his being recalled, as it would be a public scandal to recall a general when at the front.

Gomez, who had started westward at about the same time Maceo began his fatal journey eastward, soon after crossing the trocha had an engagement with Spanish forces under General Luque. The result of the encounter was a defeat of the Spaniards and their retreat.

Finding that the Spanish troops about him were greatly superior in numbers to his own, Gomez deemed it wise to escort the civil government, which he had proposed to move nearer to Havana, back into Puerto Principe, and having accomplished this he recrossed the trocha without the loss of a man and again took his place in the hills to the east of Santa Clara. The plan of his campaign was to move westward slowly, augmenting his force with the various brigades scattered along the route, and also by the army of General Garcia from the east. Meanwhile he detached two divisions, which made their way westward, and were soon operating in Weyler's rear.

General Calixto Garcia, who arrived in the island somewhat later than the other Cuban leaders, was one of the best-known fighters for Cuban freedom. He had fought with great ardor during the Ten-Years War, and shortly afterwards, when he found that Spain did not intend to keep her promises made at Zanjón, he took up arms again. But his small force was surrounded by the vigilant Spaniards, and, rather than be captured, he deliberately shot himself. The bullet passed from his chin through his tongue and came out between his eyebrows, and to this day the opening remains from the roof of his mouth to his forehead. He always keeps a bit of cotton in the hole in his forehead, a peculiarity which can be distinguished in his photographs.


Having been captured when thus wounded, he finally escaped from prison and wandered about the world till the new war began. Then he remained in the United States for a time, fitting out expeditions for Cuba. At last he arrived there and took command of the army of the East.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE MURDER OF DR. RUIZ AND THE THREATENED RESIGNATION OF CONSUL-GENERAL LEE—RELEASE OF SANGUILY—ON THE VERGE OF WAR—SPAIN ALARMED.

Congress Stirred by Stories of the Death of Maceo — Opposition to Belligerency — Spanish People Aroused — Trying to Soothe Us — Secretary Olney's Claims — Congress Amazed — Spain Seeks European Support — "Independence or Death" — Spain's Plan of Reform — Her Hand Still Heavy on Cuba — The Murderous Fondeviela — Killing of Dr. Ruiz — No Notice Given to Consul-General Lee — Lee Not Supported at Washington in His Defense of American Citizens — Arrest of Scott — Lee's Forceful Despatch — He Threatens to Depart — A Dramatic Climax — Cuban Sympathizers Classed as Jingo — Senator Sherman's Defense — Its Significance — Demand for a Ship-of-War for Havana — Sudden Release of Sanguiely — Spain Alarmed — Weyler's Failures in the East — Capture of General Rivera — Activity of Insurgents

FOR some weeks prior to the reassembling of Congress in December, 1896, it was apparent that the people of the United States would not permit the Cuban situation to drag along indefinitely. In behalf of the Cubans, both parties had inserted a strong plank in their platform, and the hopes of the Cuban sympathizers, which had been dashed by President Cleveland's gentle diplomacy, eagerly awaited the coming administration of William McKinley. That our interference would be tolerated, if, indeed, it were not welcomed by British interests, was evident from editorials in leading English papers. The chaotic condition of industry and commerce in Cuba could not be longer endured with complacency, when there was no evidence that the Spaniards could pacify the island, and when Spanish atrocities seemed to warrant interference on the grounds of humanity alone. Indignation meetings were held all over the United States, and were often addressed by leading and influential men. There was little interest in President



A FIRST-CLASS MODERN WARSHIP.—UNITED STATES BATTLESHIP "INDIANA" AT FULL SPEED.

Cleveland's message — his last annual state paper — except in his references to Cuba. He reviewed the struggle and saw no prospects of its early termination, and he suggested that if Spain should offer to Cuba a full measure of home rule, Cuba remaining subject to the Spanish sovereignty, such a solution might be satisfactory on both sides, and the United States might well consent to give guarantees for the carrying out of the arrangement. For the present he recommended our government to pursue our usual course. But hardly had the message been printed when the people were aroused by the stories of the fate of Maceo.

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations proceeded to action at once, and, notwithstanding the fact that Secretary Olney departed from custom and appeared before the committee and advised against any action by Congress, it unanimously passed a joint resolution, introduced and championed by Senator Cameron of Pennsylvania, acknowledging the independence of the Republic of Cuba, and offering friendly offices with government of Spain to bring the war to a close.

But it was evident that there were still too many forces against such a policy to admit of its adoption. The conservative men in the Senate considered it precipitate action. The friends of the incoming administration were not disposed to have the issue created until the new administration could act in the premises in its own way, and besides, it is difficult for our government to accomplish anything during that period between the election of a new President and his inauguration. It was evident, however, that the time was drawing near when something would be done, and but for the fact that a new administration was about to take up the responsibilities of office, Congress would have done its best to force the Executive to take action, poorly as we were prepared for war.

The Spanish people were again greatly aroused by the action of the committee. Popular feeling was evidently in favor of boldly defying the United States and of notifying this government that Cuba would be retained if it took Spain's last dol-

lar and her last man to uphold her sovereignty. The resolution, by the way, was more moderate than that which Spain had hastened to put into execution in favor of the South before actual hostilities had been begun in 1860. But the government of Spain, in spite of the clamors of the people, maintained a dignified attitude, relying on the influence of President Cleveland to oppose interference for the time, and again made it known that it would soon, or as soon as the condition of the island permitted, institute a system of autonomy similar to that in Puerto Rico and would liberalize the commercial regulations. Spanish statesmen considered always that the mere announcement of reform purposes would effectually soothe the feelings of American people. But so high ran the feeling in the United States that Secretary Olney deemed it expedient to make a public statement of his reasons for opposing the Senate resolution, and he further aroused Congress by the claim that the resolution amounted to nothing but a statement of opinion by the eminent gentlemen of the committee and that "the power to recognize the so-called Republic of Cuba as an independent state rests exclusively with the executive. A resolution on the subject by the Senate or by the House, by both bodies or by one, whether concurrent or joint, is inoperative as legislation and is important only as advice of great weight voluntarily tendered to the executive regarding the manner in which he shall exercise his constitutional functions." Congress was amazed. Good constitutional lawyers held that if such a resolution should be passed over the President's veto and he refused to execute it he would be liable to impeachment. It was recalled that just sixty years before President Jackson had in a message to Congress referred to it the question of the recognition of the Republic of Texas.

On December 21st the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations made a long report citing for the right of intervention a long line of European precedents, and showing that Europe has invariably asserted and practiced the right to interfere, separately and collectively, amicably and forcibly, when ques-

tions of independence were involved. The situation in Cuba and the duty of the United States as the committee saw it were stated, and it was claimed that there could be no rational interference except on the basis of independence. Congress then adjourned over for the holidays.

Meanwhile, Spanish policy was directed towards securing support from other European powers. She labored desperately to show the powers that her troubles with this country were also theirs, and it was evident she expected aid in defying "the Yankee." The attitude of France and Austria appeared to be favorable; they sympathized with Spain but were non-committal. The Vatican was of course distinctly favorable to Spain's cause. England offered little encouragement. President Cisneros of the Cuban Republic allowed it to be distinctly understood that it would treat with Spain only on the basis of the absolute independence of Cuba, and the Spanish journals announced that, while the death of Maceo implied the stupefaction of the insurgents, only the destruction of a large insurgent force or the complete pacification of a province could be sufficient for the establishment of the contemplated reforms. They looked to see General Weyler follow up the advantage which accident had thrown in his hands, but as the days elapsed, and the fruitlessness of Weyler's campaigns became apparent, they gave way to a spirit of criticism of the man who was so continually boasting of what he would do but never did it.

Some support was given those opposing the passage of the Cameron resolution by the intimations from Madrid that Spain was preparing to accept the offer of the administration, tendered sometime before, for friendly mediation in guaranteeing to the insurgents the efficiency of the proposed reforms, but these intimations evidently had no other purpose than to prevent, if possible, the passage of the resolution. To offset this, the delegate of the Cuban Republic at Washington, Gonzalo de Quesada, issued a long statement on January 3d, 1897, reiterating the position of the insurgents. There were

three parties to be considered, he said, Spain, the United States, and the Cubans. As to Spain, neither the genius of her institutions nor the character of her people would allow her to depart from her ancient system of colonization; indeed, Canovas had recently stated that while Spain would grant more liberal measures than had before been contemplated she would not under any circumstances grant autonomy after the fashion of Canada. The reason for this was plain, for under such a system there could be no more exploitation for Spanish monopolies nor use of the island to pay Spanish debts. As to the United States, it could not be expected that that government would accept the eternal role of a policeman to see that His Spanish Majesty fulfilled his contract. He justly declared that the idea that a free and happy people should become the sponsors for the continued monarchial domination of Cuba could find no sympathy. "As for Cubans," said Quesada, "they know well enough that when Spain is willing to give them genuine autonomy, it is because Cuba is lost and she desires by some trick or pressure to make the Cubans pay the enormous Spanish debt. To all projects the Cubans will respond, now and always, with their motto: 'Independence or Death.'"

As soon as Congress reassembled after the holidays it appeared that there was little chance of the passage of the Cameron resolutions, which were successfully side-tracked. The Cuban sympathizers contented themselves with debate on the case of Sanguily, favoring a request from the President for his instant release. As the Cortes was not in session it was evident that no reform, even if one were actually intended, could be legitimately carried out in Cuba for the present, but it was announced from Madrid in January that the cabinet, after consultation with the Queen, and manifestly with the purpose of preventing serious action by the United States by the coming administration, would probably pardon Sanguily and at once decree liberal reforms, trusting that the Cortes upon assembling would grant a bill of indemnity. But as the

last days of the administration approached it was apparent that Spain had only contempt for President Cleveland's policy of friendly mediation, had never seriously considered it, was proposing reforms only for effect upon the coming administration, that the Cubans would take no notice of it, and that the people of the United States rejected such a policy with scorn and were simply waiting for McKinley. This attitude was reflected in Congress and nothing was attempted with the resolutions of recognition. Fearing that the coming administration might not be so easily trifled with, the Spanish journals, which, in treating of the United States, had long been insolent, pretentious, and bombastic, became for the time very conciliatory.

The plan of reform which Spain proposed left her hand still heavy upon Cuba. It pretended to make the council of administration a more representative body, but as the electoral system was not materially changed, this meant nothing, and, of course, the Cubans knew it. Spain hoped that the Cuban sympathizers in the United States would not know it, and would, therefore, become less active in the cause of belligerency. The Cortes was still to have a veto power, and while it was provided that the Cuban council might have the right to make up a budget, it could be decreed from Madrid if not satisfactory. The tariff laws were only partially modified and Spanish products were to be favored by a large discriminating duty.

While Weyler was upon his earlier mission, news came of the landing of a large expedition of guns and men under Roloff, the minister of the war, in the eastern part of the island, the reinforcements at once joining Garcia's command. On the other hand, General Rivera, who succeeded Maceo in the west, was severely wounded in an engagement with a superior Spanish force under General Velasco, captured and taken to San Cristobal. Like Maceo, Rivera had left his forces, and, for some reason, was proceeding eastward with a guard of only about a hundred men. As the Spaniards seldom moved

at night, and as Rivera was surrounded at night, it was generally believed that he was captured through treachery, and that he would be shot. That was General Weyler's purpose, but Madrid interfered. The government at Spain had been brought to see that she could not demand the sympathy of civilized Europe by using the methods which had so long made her warfare in Cuba a disgrace. Another proof of Spain's conciliatory attitude was the removal of the prohibition on the exportation of leaf tobacco contracted for by American firms prior to the issue of an edict forbidding its shipment. Spain even considered the issue of an amnesty decree similar to that which had resulted in the surrender of many revolutionists in the Philippines. The authorities in Cuba sent to Madrid a fresh installment of reports of the pacification of the island, and the government suggested that if the proposed amnesty was favorably received a large portion of the troops would be withdrawn.

But the evidences of a more peaceful condition of things was only apparent. From a diplomatic point of view, Spain was simply endeavoring to draw the attention of the new administration away from the island.

While Weyler was in the field in Santa Clara, and at that moment when it was expected that he would engage Gomez and either fall or conquer, the murderous Fondeviela in his bloody operations at Guanabacoa became so reckless as to make American citizens his victims. Several Americans were already under arrest and lodged in various prisons at points held by the Spaniards, and the State Department had been diplomatically busy in looking out for their interests. It was difficult for General Lee to obtain any satisfactory reasons why these persons were arrested and thrown into vile prison holes, and all protests and demands were met by that evasive shifting policy which had always characterized Spain's dealings with American interests.

Among those arrested about the middle of February at Fondeviela's orders was Dr. Richard Ruiz, a naturalized

American citizen who had studied and practiced dentistry in Philadelphia for many years before going to Cuba. He was charged with having assisted General Aranguren's band to derail the train, when Spanish officers were captured and magnanimously released, as already related. The charge was of the flimsiest character, as the doctor had the reputation among all of attending strictly to business and of not meddling in any way with revolutionary movements. He was thrown into the Guanabacoa jail, no communication with him being allowed, and on the afternoon of February 17th he was found dead in a cell, there being little doubt that he had been beaten to death by the jailers at Fondeviela's orders. The Spanish authorities, as usual, had failed to give our consul any official notice of the arrest, and Consul-General Lee heard of it only unofficially. He was fully aroused.

It would appear that General Lee had experienced some difficulty in having his efforts in behalf of arrested American citizens satisfactorily supported at Washington, where the administration was apparently clinging to a hope that something might result from Spain's abundant promises, which Mr. Olney was slow to learn how to discount. Spain had given a semi-official assurance that Sanguily would be released, but the release did not come and, meanwhile, other American citizens were pining away in jail, and others were being arrested and disposed of in utter disregard of their rights as American citizens. It was stated in the papers that General Lee had kept the wires busy informing the State Department as to the death of Ruiz, and the arrest of other Americans, but had received no reply. Ten days before he had sent a despatch, saying that Charles Scott, an American citizen, had been arrested at Regla, charges unknown, as usual. Scott had been eleven days *incommunicado*, and it was reported to the consul that he had been several times under severe torture.

It was reported in the newspapers that Lee had made a demand for warships for a protection, had been refused, and had sent in his resignation. The feelings of the people were

greatly aroused; Congress became more bitter against the administration, and immediately called for the correspondence and reports of the consul-general at Havana relating to all American citizens in prison, whose cases had not been before reported on. It was not submitted till three days before the Cleveland administration went out of office. From this report it appears that General Lee sent the following telegram to the State Department on February 20th:

"Charles Scott, a citizen of the United States, arrested Regla; no charge given. Been without communication, jail, Havana, two hundred and sixty-four hours. Cannot stand another Ruiz murder and have demanded his release. How many war vessels Key West or within reach and will they be ordered here at once if necessary to sustain demand?"

Whatever the reply to this telegram, the State Department did not submit it to the Senate committee, not being compatible with public interests. Its nature may be judged from Gen. Lee's next despatch to Olney, which appears in the document:

"HAVANA, February 23, 1897.

"Situation simple; experience at Guanabacoa made it my duty to demand, before too late, that another American who had been incommunicado two hundred and sixty-four hours, be released from said incommunicado, and did so in courteous terms. If you support it, and Scott is so released, the trouble will terminate. If you do not, I must depart. All others arrested with Scott have been put in communication. Why should only American in lot not be? He had been incommunicado now three hundred and thirty-eight hours.

LEE."

That day the Spanish authorities complied with Lee's demand, as is seen from the following dispatch:

"HAVANA, February 23, 1897.

"Scott released from incommunicado to-day, on demand, after fourteen days' solitary confinement in cell five feet by eleven; damp; water on bottom cell. Not allowed anything to sleep on, or chair; discharges of the body removed once in five days. Was charged with having Cuban postage stamps in house. Scott says went always twelve hours without water, once two days. He is employe American Gas Company.

LEE."

Rather graphic, if concise, were these two dispatches of a single day, but they serve to illustrate the treatment re-

ceived by Americans in Spanish hands on more than one occasion, indeed, almost continually during the war. In Santiago those alleging American citizenship were arrested early in the war, and their fate remained a mystery. There were known to be at this time about forty Americans in Spanish prisons in Cuba, against whom charges had long been pending and never tried, or against whom no charges whatever had been preferred.

From the day of the arrest of Dr. Ruiz to the day of his death the Spanish authorities, though having his papers in their possession, never took the trouble to inform General Lee that he had been arrested, and he was only kept informed of the course of events from unofficial sources. This alone constituted a grave breach of international law. Yet, the case of Ruiz was one of daily occurrence in Cuba then, with this difference that the victim was usually a Cuban. It was the custom of Spanish officials to torture and, perhaps, murder their defenseless prisoners in their attempts to wring from them a desired confession incriminating them, as well as others, in some imaginary offense.

In investigating the case of Ruiz, Consul-General Lee demanded that the body be turned over to him, and that an autopsy be performed by two physicians, one an American, to be designated by himself. The acting Captain-General in Weyler's absence, Ahumada, saw that Lee was aroused and complied. The consul and physician proceeded to Guanabacoa, where Fondeviela tried to delay them, but they insisted and went to the jail to find that the body had been placed in a cart and was about to be taken away. A little delay would have prevented an investigation, which showed that Ruiz had met a horrible death, in a cell which would in a short time have proved the death of any man; that he had been arrested on a trumped-up charge, and that he had been kept incommunicado, like so many others, though, under our treaty with Spain, no American citizen could be held in close confinement for more than seventy-two hours.

For months General Lee had placed overwhelming proofs before the State Department that not a single provision of the treaty rights secured to us by Cushing and Pinckney was being observed by the Spanish authorities in Cuba, but Lee's friends claimed that his representations had not only been kept from the public, but had drawn no reply from the executive department. Lee had submitted in silence to a position so little to his liking and probably would have done so till the end of the administration, which was so near, but for the murder of Ruiz, of whose imprisonment he had notified the State Department and of whose fate he had warned it. He had taken the same course in the case of Scott, whose wife went to Lee in tears and said that he was being tortured, and, she feared, killed, though arrested only because he had a Cuban stamp in his large stamp collection.

The threatened resignation of Lee, unless upheld in his efforts to protect American citizens, precipitated a dramatic climax to the administration's conciliatory Cuban policy, and stirred Congress, with but a few hours longer to exist, into one of its most heated debates of Cuban affairs. The circumstances under which the Cameron resolution for the recognition of the Cubans was set aside have been already explained, and everyone had accepted as a fact that the delicate problems involved would be left to the new administration with our Spanish relations still cordial, when Lee's practical request for war ships came like a bombshell in a quiet camp. Secretary Olney, after the failure of the Spaniards to put into execution a scheme of autonomy in which the President had put his faith, had evidently endeavored to ward off an open rupture with Spain at any cost, while the Spaniards of Cuba, thinking, apparently, that Americans could be attacked with impunity, began to vent their natural hatred. Congress had nourished a feeling of contempt for our diplomatic forbearance with Spain, but, like others, had given up attempts at action. The conservative element which feared war and the burdens it might involve even with a power so weak as Spain, had found



ON THE DECK OF A MODERN WARSHIP.
After-deck of United States Battleship *Massachusetts*, showing monster 13-inch guns and revolving turret.

it easy to avoid sympathy for a few American citizens, most of whom were of Cuban birth, and the conservative press immediately branded any one who demanded that the government should compel Spain to live up to its treaty obligations as a "jingo."

But when the Ruiz incident and Lee's position became known, strong resolutions for insisting upon the protection of American citizens were introduced in the Senate and passed without division, and a resolution demanding the immediate release of Sanguily was also passed after a strong argument by Senator Sherman, who, in four days, was to take Olney's place at the head of the State department. "I trust the time will never come," he said, "when an American citizen can be wronged or persecuted by any power, great or small. That is the way I feel now. I am in favor of protecting this American citizen, though he is a naturalized citizen. I am opposed to wrong and tyranny and violence wherever it is exercised, and when it is exercised against an American I will stand up for him even if I am alone." Conservative senators endeavored to check the course of debate by stating that Spain was simply waiting for Sanguily's counsel to withdraw his appeal so as to pardon him. But it was held on the other side that Spanish history gave no assurance that such a promise would be fulfilled, if Sanguily forfeited his legal rights by such a withdrawal. "If I had my way," exclaimed Senator Frye of Maine, "a ship of war would start forthwith for Havana."

Spain was alarmed. At noon the next day a telegram reached Havana from Madrid for the immediate release of Sanguily. In two hours he walked feebly out of a prison where he had been kept, without a shadow of evidence to justify it, for over two years. Spain saw that it was no time to "fool" with the United States. If she had not acted speedily the McKinley administration would have begun with a war. It is probably also true that had not the strained relations between Lee and the State Department leaked out through Havana, Sanguily would have remained in jail. Secretary

Olney had made public nothing concerning the condition of affairs, and the attention of Congress would not then have been called to them but for the newspaper reports. By Sanguily's release the tension at Washington relaxed, and the public mind was absorbed by the inauguration of a new administration.

The Captain-General was still at Santa Clara province endeavoring to entrap Gomez, and it was reported that he was highly indignant at the release of Sanguily, holding that treaty rights ceased when martial law was proclaimed. On March 4th he was back again at Havana, and it was generally understood that his campaign had been a complete failure. He had led a vast army into Santa Clara, burning the cane fields on the way, and Gomez had sent his forces around him to unite with the insurgents in his rear. In this situation, Weyler returned to Havana by boat from Caibarien. Spain, however, maintained her conciliatory policy, releasing in a few days a few more prisoners, one of them a war correspondent for a New York paper who had been held for several weeks. The crisis seemed to be over, and the new administration was largely occupied with domestic affairs, having given to General Lee the assurance that his efforts to protect the rights of American citizens would be thoroughly supported. Spain even went so far as to remove Fondeviela from command at Guanabacoa. His record for cruelty was worse than that of any Spanish officer in Cuba, but he was quickly made chief of police in Havana. In the latter part of March Weyler again went to the front in Santa Clara, and it was evident that he must stand or fall upon his accomplishments there, for the rainy season was approaching, when the pacification of the island would be impossible.

But, meanwhile, there was renewed activity all over the island among the insurgents. Their lack of arms and ammunition was partly supplied by several new expeditions which escaped the authorities, and General Weyler's campaign in the east again proved a complete failure from a military point of view. As a matter of fact, he did not at any time go anywhere

near Gomez or Garcia, but skirted along the coast in a small steamer, touching at various fortified towns, making some changes in the civil administration. Not the slightest ground existed for the persistent reports that the Cubans were ready to negotiate; there was not a single day upon which fights were not taking place in all of the six provinces. Correspondents of the London papers who visited Gomez's camp said that the insurgents were never in better shape to fight than at this time.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE CONDITION OF CUBA IN 1897—HELPLESS WOMEN AND CHILDREN—AWFUL SCENES OF SUFFERING AND WOE—MISERY OF THE RECONCENTRADOS—FACING STARVATION AND DEATH.

Attitude of the McKinley Administration—Another Decree of Autonomy—On the Verge of Starvation—Unparalleled Scenes of Suffering—Weyler's Reasons for Concentrating—A Death Warrant to Thousands of the Innocent and Helpless—Driven from Burning Homes—Huddled in Swamps—A Plague Spot on Earth—A Spanish Account of Misery—Horrors at Güines—Coffins Used Again and Again—Testimony of a Catholic Mother Superior—The Living and the Dead Together—Dying Little Orphans—Scenes at the Very Gates of Havana—Heaped Pell-mell Like Animals—The Dead in the Embrace of the Dying—Terrible Conditions in Pinar Del Rio—15,000 Dying Children—Extermination the Real Object—The Massacres of Pacificos—The Dead Carts on Their Rounds—Shoveling the Victims into the Sand—A Guerrilla Triumph—A Mangled Body Strapped to a Mule—Incredulity in the United States.

FROM the first, the McKinley administration in courteous and diplomatic language gave Spain to understand that neither the people nor the government of the United States could regard with complacency an indefinite continuation of the existing condition of things in Cuba, and, as before, the friendly services of the United States were placed at the disposal of Spain in any way that might conduce to peace in the island and the institution of genuine reforms. But the two nations regarded Cuba from utterly irreconcilable standpoints. To Spain the only imaginable condition conducive to peace was a continuation of Spanish sovereignty, which, however much veneered with reforms, would nevertheless in reality be a sufficient sovereignty to permit the continued exploitation of the island. To the United States there appeared no possible condition conducive to peace but a grant of the broadest type of home rule or complete independence to the Cubans. From the Cuban standpoint, absolute independence

was the only solution, but there was a lingering belief in our government that if a genuine autonomy were granted the Cubans would feel it to their advantage to drop their arms.

Spain's ministry recognized in the attitude of the new administration a determination not to be so easily trifled with as before, and it therefore proceeded to release more American prisoners, and to make in its diplomacy as well as in the public prints great pretensions concerning a new scheme of autonomy which it was proposed to introduce, but in which lurked the insincerity characterizing all the plans of reform which Spain had from time to time been "meditating" for forty years. The Queen Regent signed the decree for these reforms on April 29th, and one of the humors of the act was that it was done upon the assurance of General Weyler that the four western provinces were at last completely pacified. That the reforms were intended to hoodwink the United States was evident from many circumstances, and the Havana papers quietly smiled at the cry of "Weyler and Reform."

The administration was not deceived by Weyler's assurances, and while hoping for the best from the alleged reforms, it proposed to examine into Cuba itself. President McKinley had at first intended to send Judge Day of Canton, Ohio, a man with whom he was thoroughly acquainted and in whose ability and integrity he had complete confidence, as a special commissioner, but he was made assistant Secretary of State, and William J. Calhoun of Illinois was appointed instead. Spain manifested some dislike to such a step on the ground that it appeared to be an interference with Cuban affairs which was not warranted, but the mission was consented to on the diplomatic understanding that Mr. Calhoun was to go for the purpose of acting with General Lee in an investigation of the Ruiz case.

Meanwhile, the enormous expenses of Weyler's management of affairs had produced something like a financial crisis at Havana. The debt had risen to \$425,000,000, and the revenue the Spanish could collect in the first two years of the war

amounted to only \$25,000,000. In the fall of 1896 Weyler had caused to be issued notes payable at the face value in silver to the extent of \$24,000,000, replacing the gold notes which had to be withdrawn because they would not circulate. These silver notes steadily depreciated. Weyler decreed that they were legal tender at their face value in all transactions, but the government which paid all its obligations in them seemed unwilling to itself accept them in payment. In May a crisis was reached; a run on the bank occurred and Weyler, who had gone to Santa Clara for a third time, was hastily summoned to Havana. A Spanish five-dollar gold piece was worth \$11.70 in the paper currency, and not only the business interests but the people were becoming restless. Famine was rapidly spreading in the capital itself. The Spanish officials, who were the only gainers under this regime, industriously circulated among the masses of the people a report that the United States were responsible for the situation by allowing arms and ammunition to be sent to the insurgents, and the condition of the finances caused a new class in the United States to beg Congress to intervene; over 700 of the bankers and merchants of New York and other commercial centers, whose trade was severely affected, representing, as their petition said, over \$100,000,000 worth of capital invested in the island, urged that Congress should take steps at once, outside of sentimental grounds, to make this investment safe. But the administration wisely showed its immediate concern over helpless Americans in Cuba who were on the verge of starvation.

It will now be necessary to examine briefly a feature of General Weyler's methods in Cuba to which full justice could hardly be done in a whole volume — his war on the *pacíficos*. There is no parallel for it in history. If a true and adequate history of it is ever written, it will be the largest and darkest picture of man's inhumanity ever drawn. Nothing in real life has quite so closely approached the tortures of the damned in the poetic dreams of Dante as the punishment deliberately imposed upon the innocent and the helpless, old men and old

women, mothers with babes in their arms, Cuban maidens and Cuban boys. And the remarkable thing about it is that it was taking place at the end of the nineteenth century within a hundred miles of the shores of the United States while many of its citizens were crying "Peace!" "Be still!" "It is none of our business!" "Do not interfere!" "That would lead to war and it would cost lots of money!"

In October, 1896, while Weyler, who had shown no military talents in the field, was vainly throwing his forces into Pinar del Rio, he conceived the idea that the quickest way to pacify the insurgents was to make war against the peaceful Cubans. Seeing that the movements of his columns were always made known to the Cuban leaders, thus giving them the opportunity of making ambushes, disastrous to Spanish columns, he thought that if the pacificos were driven from the country to the fortified towns, their houses and crops destroyed and their property confiscated, they could no longer aid the insurgents with information, shelter, or food. Having obtained permission from Madrid, therefore, he issued a decree on October 21st that all the inhabitants of the country districts or those who resided outside the lines of fortifications of the towns should within eight days enter the towns, and any individual found outside the lines in the country at the expiration of that period should be considered a rebel and should be "dealt with as such" — which in guerilla Spanish meant that they should be shot or hacked to death with machetes. The decree further stated that the transport of food from one place to another without the permission of the military authorities at the place of departure was absolutely forbidden. "Those who infringe upon this order will be tried and punished as aiders and abettors of the rebellion," that is, shot. The owners of cattle were ordered to drive their herds to the towns. The last section of the decree related to those combatants who should surrender themselves, and was of little importance because none surrendered.

Most of these men and women were of the *guajiro* class,

respectable, hard-working farmers on a small scale. On three or four acres of land they raised all the necessities of their simple lives, and even the luxuries, including coffee and tobacco. But they were naturally improvident in a land which was ever productive, and thus they had few resources to fall back upon in such unfortunate circumstances as Weyler's order suddenly forced upon them.

This death warrant of hundreds of thousands of innocent people, particularly women and children, was sent to the governors of the western provinces — it could not, of course, be carried out in the two eastern provinces which the Cubans controlled — and the governors made it known to the leaders of the Spanish guerrillas, who were intrusted with the task of informing the country people that they must leave their homesteads and belongings and remove to the appointed places of concentration. As these guerrillas, composed exclusively of Spanish jail-birds, were notorious for their inhumanity and outrages upon defenseless Cubans, brutality being a part of their trade, it may be imagined how the order was carried out. The people were not allowed to take away with them any property but what they could carry on their backs, and, as they filed away to the stations where they were destined to die of starvation and epidemic diseases, they saw their homes go up in smoke, their crops burned down, and their cattle and oxen confiscated to feed the hated Spanish troops who could not conquer Cuba. Wherever the peasants resisted they were driven in at the point of guns and often shot down to avoid further trouble.

This order showed the absolute incompetency of Weyler as a general as well as his inhumanity, for the able-bodied men of each family who had remained neutral, if not loyal, so long as they were permitted to live on their few acres, at once joined the insurgent ranks when ordered to concentrate, and thus it was almost entirely the old, the infirm, the women and the children who were driven into the towns. The order failed also to embarrass the insurgents by the destruction of the

plantations, for they were accustomed to finding their living in the woods, and they always regarded such destruction as an injury mainly to the Spanish. As a war measure, therefore, it was successful only as a boomerang.

The helpless people were allotted ground near the towns, almost invariably in low-lying, swampy, and malarious places. The Spanish residents would not be burdened with them and generally cared not how soon they died. They were concentrated in greatest numbers where the accommodations were least adequate, as if extermination were the main object. There was nothing for them to do and there was less and less for them to eat, and finally they stretched out upon the damp ground, gazing vacantly before them as the weary days dragged by. Mothers lay listless with dead babes in their arms. The quick and the dead lay side by side till the latter were taken and thrown into the dead carts, and carried off into the country where lay the half-buried bodies of hundreds of victims of this system of warfare. The huts of these people were jammed together in rows with but a few inches of space between, and the ground was covered with filth. Diseases of malignant types claimed their victims everywhere and every day. There was no medical attendance; it was fortunate if there were half rations. In the different stations of concentration there were estimated to be over 400,000 of these helpless people, and by the summer of 1897 the death rate had become terrible. The beautiful island was a plague spot upon earth.

By the first of May, or when the rainy season was nearly due, the full horrors of this policy began to manifest themselves. The Spaniards themselves no longer overlooked the fact, and even the censor allowed statements as to the condition of things to appear in some of the Havana papers. It may be taken for granted that the following from the *La Lucha* of Havana is considerably underdrawn:

“At a meeting held by the Health Junta in Güines, April 3d, it was decided to appoint a special committee to investigate the real sanitary con-

ditions of the population in that town. The report made by that committee shows conditions which are simply awful. The first house they entered in Luisa Delca street, they found twelve persons ill with small-pox, lacking not only medical assistance, but also food. There were a father and his two sons who were actually starving. They were three living skeletons.

"Almost everywhere else they went they met with similar sights. At the reservoir for the water supply, they were shocked to see it full of filth more than a foot deep. From the reservoir they went to the hospital, where there were only forty-three beds and forty-eight patients. There were two in each of three beds, and three in another bed. One of them in this bed had been dead for four and a half hours and was lying with the other two who were still living. There was only a single man in charge of all the sick, and one woman to do the washing. When they inquired about the kitchen, they were surprised to find that there was none.

"At the Plaza de la Villa, where there are two hundred huts of reconcentrados, in every hut there was one, two, or even five or six persons ill with small-pox, and all of them in the most wretched condition. Everywhere hunger, starvation, and illness reigned. In one house there was a coffin against the wall, and the woman of the house said that she had already used it to bury three members of her family, victims of small-pox. She had brought the coffin back home to use for the next one, and just then there was on the bare floor another man who had died of small-pox, awaiting his turn. She bought the coffin for fifty cents, knowing that it had been used several times before."

While it is doubtful if any of the stories of suffering sent to this country were exaggerations, we will give place in these pages to such accounts only as have an assured basis of reliability, and generally such as were transmitted to the State Department by our authorized consuls and which were not published in the newspapers of the day. These reports covered only certain points and so can give but a partial idea of the situation — they are but types of the whole.

From the abundance of such testimony the following extract from a letter from the Mother Superior of the Convent of the Sacred Heart in Havana to an old pupil in this country may be selected:

"The war is continuing its work of destruction. Captain-General Weyler's plan was to starve as many as he could and thus do away entirely with the Cuban race. He has succeeded in killing thus hundreds of thousands, without exaggeration, by the compulsory law of concentration.

"Lately, some of our older pupils discovered a place called 'Los Fosos,' which means 'the ditches,' because it is a low and marshy place. There over a thousand women, and children of both sexes, are living abandoned, unknown, and starving. Many are perfectly naked; all are heaped up pell mell! They have been there nearly two months. Of their number, fifteen to twenty or thirty die daily.

"At night there is no light, and in the morning the corpses and living are found together.

"Our children of Mary are perfect heroines, but only the older ones can enter into this den where the Government has concentrated the country people for the purpose of making them die from inanition. Their iniquitous plan is a great success. After having passed weeks without food, they are brought salt codfish or rice, and, in eating ravenously, they die.

"Now, we could fill books with the horrors of this place. Its history will yet be written. Our children of Mary, their husbands and friends, and our good bishop with many of the clergy are hard at work trying to alleviate this unheard-of misery. But it is almost impossible to aid so many. The Cubans are very charitable and generous, notwithstanding the poverty of every one. They are wonderful. They have stripped themselves of everything to cover the naked, for naked they are, and living together packed as are the animals in transportation cars. Just so! Just so! Do you understand? Can you imagine worse? And the filth! It cannot be told!

"There are in this place over one hundred little children without fathers or mothers. Nobody takes care of them, and some die daily. A woman who had eleven children has lost seven of them in three months, and she is now dying of inanition."

These reconcentrados, it should be understood, were at the very gates of the city of Havana. As General Lee said in one of his communications, there were fewer here than in most other places, and in general their condition was better than elsewhere. Yet their condition could hardly be exaggerated by the use of any words which the English language can command. In a report which was submitted to General Lee by one who visited these reconcentrados, and whom Lee vouches for as "a man of integrity and character," one of the sights was "460 women and children thrown on the ground, heaped pell-mell as animals, some in a dying condition, others sick and others dead, without the slightest cleanliness, nor the least help, not even to give water to the thirsty, with neither religious or social help, dying wherever chance laid them, and for this limited number of reconcentrados the deaths averaged be-

tween forty and fifty daily, giving relatively ten days of life for each person. Among the deaths we witnessed there was one impossible to forget," continued Lee's informant. "We found a young girl of eighteen seemingly lifeless on the ground; on her right side was the body of a young mother, cold and rigid, but with her young child still alive clinging to her dead breast; on her left hand side was also the corpse of a dead woman holding her son in a dead embrace; a little farther on a poor dying woman having in her arms a daughter of fourteen, crazy with pain, who after five or six days also died in spite of the care she received. In one corner a poor woman was dying, surrounded by her children, who contemplated her in silence, without a lament or shedding a tear, they themselves being real specters of hunger, emaciated in a horrible manner." As the dead were taken away new victims were driven in, and, says this informant for whom Lee vouches: "If any young girl came in any way nice looking, she was infallibly condemned to the most abominable of traffics." In time something was done through the energy of private persons for the help of these people, but it was estimated that the usual death rate among them was about 77 per cent.

Writing late in the year of 1897 to the State Department, the vice-consul at Sagua la Grande said: "It is difficult, it may be said almost impossible, to be able to describe the extension and intensity of such suffering, of such iniquitous, unjust, and sinful imposition, to annihilate thousands of women and children. If this Godless combination should be accurately represented it would seem an exaggeration induced by stirred fellow feeling. No history in the world, ancient or modern, can be compared an instant to this frightful, dreadful suffering. Perhaps civilization has not seen the like of it."

Shocked by the desperate distress he saw about him, the consul offered to contribute through the mayor 3,000 loaves of bread to feed the hungry, but the offer was refused, though the mayor had said in public that a thousand persons were dying of hunger in the city. The refusal, it was said, was due

to a fear to recognize officially a state of affairs which would cause criticisms of Weyler's style of warfare.

Nowhere was the condition more terrible than in Pinar del Rio province, but that section was visited so little by anyone except the Spanish that few adequate reports of the real state exist. The Spanish papers were always inclined to minimize the suffering, sometimes to avoid the subject altogether. But *La Lucha* declared that there were 40,000 reconcentrados in the province, absolutely destitute, and "15,000 of them were children, mostly orphans." It would seem as if extermination were the real purpose, for at the capital of the province where support might have been most easily obtained there were comparatively few reconcentrados, while huddled about the little places were as many as 4,000 destitute women and children. The taxpayers of these little centers having been ruined by the war, the authorities could incur no expense, so the Spanish papers said, for help. General Lee estimated that during the year 200,000 of the rural population in the four western provinces died from starvation and resultant causes, "and the deaths of whole families almost simultaneously or within a few days of each other, and of mothers praying for their children to be relieved of their horrible sufferings by death, are not the least of the many pitiable scenes which were ever present. In the provinces of Puerto Principe and Santiago de Cuba, where the order of concentration could not be enforced, the great mass of the people are self-sustaining."

Reports of the massacre of pacificos were of daily occurrence and many of them were shown to be authentic. Late in July, one was reported from Santi Spiritus peculiarly appalling in its details. The pacificos, who had been starving for several days, crowded around the forts and asked in vain of the commander to be allowed to seek food. A woman whose four children were dying of hunger resolved to brave the anger of the soldiers to save her boys from misery. In the night she slipped unnoticed between two sentinels and reached the woods. On returning in the morning with vegetables, she was

caught and recognized. At once the rumor was spread among the soldiers that the pacificos had an understanding with the insurgents and that the woman had gone out to inform them of the Spanish defenses. With a shout of "treason" the troops began the slaughter, the helpless pacificos were mowed down like sheep, and the commander reported the occurrence to General Weyler as a victory of his troops over the insurgents, who had many killed. Such news was, of course, received at Madrid with demonstrations of delight.

The morning light broke with little good cheer to any one in western Cuba, unless to the Spanish guerrillas and butchers. The first rays of the sun fell upon a land, once glowing in all the emerald brightness of exuberant tropical vegetation, now resembling nothing so much as a great ash heap. Where once stood the humble dwellings of the pacificos, surrounded by their rich garden patches and waving fields, were now heaps of ruins, the marks of fire, of death, and of desolation, and hovering always in the sultry air were the greedy vultures. Here and there were half-made graves from which protruded the festering flesh, sometimes the ghastly countenances of the victims of Spanish "military regulations."

Each town awoke each morning to face a fresh installment of the dead. Out to the *esplanada*, in full sight of the town, filed the usual morning procession, the band, playing a jaunty air, the priests, the soldiers and their officers, and there were shot in the back young boys who had been captured in various ways and charged with the stereotyped crime of rebellion, and found guilty after a court-martial in which the victims had nothing to say. As a matter of fact, very few of these victims were ever in the insurgent ranks; the great majority were simply peasants who had not heeded the proclamation of reconcentration, or who, starving, had attempted to escape through the Spanish lines to find a few roots, but had fallen in with the Spanish bushwhackers lying in wait day and night about the roads and byways leading from the town to the country districts. As a rule, those who were caught were shot down in

cold blood in their tracks, and, possibly, covered with a sprinkling of earth, while the case was reported as another Spanish victory in a skirmish. Some, however, were brought to town when captured and fiendishly tortured for a time in the hope of securing from them useful information; then in the gray dawn they were led out and shot.

As the sun rose higher over the desolate and bloody scene, it shone upon the dead carts filing away. In the camp of the starving *pacíficos* the dead had been assorted from the living, the harvest of another night, while those in whom the breath of life feebly lingered lay listless, speechless, dazed by the very enormity of their own suffering and of the suffering about them.

From morning to night these dead carts were busy, jolting out to the trenches and back. "The dead cart," says a reliable correspondent who witnessed these scenes about Matanzas, "is a great box on wheels, inside of which is another rough box which slides in and out like a coffin from a hearse. And indeed it is a coffin — the communal coffin, as it were — in which those who are shot down in San Severino as well as those who die of smallpox in the *pacífico* settlements, in which those who die of yellow fever in the hospitals as well as those who are found starved to death in the streets, are all laid and jostled during the mad gallop to the cemetery, or rather to the trenches adjoining the cemetery, where the dead are shoveled away out of sight under a few inches of sand. The great communal coffin holds four corpses 'comfortably,' as the driver told me; but very often he has to pack five or six bodies into it — the bodies of blacks and whites, children and men and women, all together. When the trench is reached they are pulled out by the legs and thrown without a coffin, and often without clothes, into the trenches. From morning to night this cart is always on its rounds and with two or three changes of horses; from morning to night you can see it, always moving swiftly through the streets of Matanzas, and always going in one direction; from morning to night, through the cracks in the rough-hewn

boards, there drips to the ground the blood of the martyrs who were murdered in the morning on the yellow sand of the esplanade by the blue waters of the bay. . . . The dead cart is next driven up Cascoro Hill, and from here it never returns empty, but always filled. On this hill there are living, or rather dying, about 3,000 people. The number of corpses carried away is about twenty-five or thirty daily. The *guajiros* hate to give up their dead, although the deaths occur principally from smallpox, and many are buried secretly at night outside the cabin doors. And so the dead cart goes upon its rounds where I have no longer the heart to follow. On my way back to the hotel I fell in with the local guerrillas marching in triumph through the principal streets of the city. There were about eighty men, with brutal jail-bird countenances, and indeed they were, as I afterwards learned, liberated convicts to a man. In the midst of them and the occasion of their triumphal bearing I saw the naked body of a white man tied on the back of a mule, with stomach slit open and nose cut off, and horribly mangled in the face and in other unspeakable ways. As they lounged through the streets they shouted to their friends that they had just had a sharp engagement with Betancourt's *partida*, which they say numbered about 500 men, and that they had killed a score or more whom the insurgents had carried off to rob them of their triumph, all but this one. They marched on with their reeking trophy to the headquarters of the civil guard. Here they untied the body and threw it on the ground. Hundreds of soldiers and Spanish civilians, too, now filed past, gloating over the sickening spectacle, turning over with their feet the dead body and closely scrutinizing it, as perhaps one might do on seeing a great tarpon or a moose. The *cabo*, or corporal, of the guerrillas held forth the while in a loud voice how the battle had been fought and what a charge he had made *al machete*, and how he had brought down two more men with his revolver. One of the civil guards came out of the building while the tall talk was going on, and, after examining the body, said: '*Hola,*

amigo, I imagine this *sin verguenza* (shameless fellow) must have died of hunger before you cut him up with the cold steel. Just look at him a moment, will you?' And with this the guard lifted up the corpse and disclosed the emaciated condition of what was really nothing but a skeleton, and none of the Spanish soldiers there doubted but that the occasion of this triumph was simply some poor fellow, crazed by the pangs of hunger, who had attempted to slip out of the town during the night, had been shot down, and then carved up with the machete so as to make as gory an exhibit as possible."


These are but glimpses of the panorama of death which it is distressing and revolting to follow. Of such was the whole. It has never been exaggerated; it never will be. Here fiction fell before reality. It was one of the unfortunate facts of the situation that the people of the United States did not really believe the stories of misery, of suffering, of outrage upon the island, partly doubtless because it seemed too terrible for the nineteenth century, and on American shores, and partly because of the poor character for truth which had been given some stories of military operations there. These stories of the *reconcentrados* were considered by many as examples of rather graphic writing by newspaper men, whereas these plucky and gifted writers had actually encountered a subject for which their capacity for exaggeration proved entirely inadequate to the demands of reality. Many of us were more ready to believe every harrowing tale of the slaughter of people in far off Armenia by the murderous Turks. But gradually the truth was brought home to those who would listen by the reports of Americans of unquestioned veracity who had gone to Cuba to satisfy themselves as to the real conditions. What they saw is graphically told by Senators Proctor and Thurston in the introductory pages of this book, and we may leave the picture with the little glimpse of it we have given. The details of cold-blooded murder and enforced starvation, executed as a part of the governmental business, by a professed Christian people, are not pleasant.

CHAPTER XXV

RELIEF OF STARVING AMERICAN CITIZENS IN CUBA—FAILURE OF WEYLER'S CAMPAIGN—INCREASING MISERY ON THE ISLAND—THE ASSASSINATION OF CANOVAS.

Suffering among American Residents in Cuba—The President Asks for \$50,000 for Their Relief—Spain Watches Us Anxiously—The Morgan Resolution—Exciting Debate in the Senate—Its Effect in Spain—Sagasta Rebels—Canovas Resigns—Given a New Lease of Life—Reasons for His Continuance and for Weyler's Longer Stay in Cuba—Political Conditions—Don Carlos—Canovas between Two Fires—Madrid Opinion—Weyler's Trip to Santiago—Gomez's New Westward Movement—Insurgent Successes—Weyler Meets Gomez for the First Time in Battle—Weyler's Defeat—Superior Tactics of Gomez—Return of Commissioner Calhoun—Gen. Stewart L. Woodford Appointed Minister to Madrid—His Instructions—Nothing to Humiliate Spain—A Season of Waiting—Death of Canovas—Party Quarrels Cease—Weyler Driven into Havana.

OFFICIAL information from our consuls in Cuba established the fact in the spring of 1897 that a large number of American citizens in Cuba were in a state of destitution, suffering for want of food and medicine as a result of Weyler's order for concentrating the country people in the towns. Early in May, Consul-General Lee reported that from six to eight hundred Americans were without means of support. The local authorities, even if kindly disposed, were unable to relieve the needs of their own people. President McKinley assured General Lee that provision would be made to relieve the American citizens, and to that end on the 17th of May he sent a message to Congress recommending an appropriation of \$50,000 to be immediately available for use under the direction of the Secretary of State; and it was desirable that a part of the sum might be left for providing transportation for such American citizens as desired to return to the United States but had no means to do so.



DIVINE SERVICE ON THE BATTLESHIP "TEXAS" WHILE IN PORT.

Public opinion in the United States was again strongly aroused. At a large mass meeting held at Washington, presided over by Senator Gallinger, strong pleas for intervention and sharp criticisms of the mild policy of the previous administration were made.

Spain watched these developments in the United States very anxiously, and the conservative Spanish journals advised the government to make no more concessions, and especially to forbid us to interfere in Cuban affairs. But the government was aware that such a policy would at once strengthen the warlike feeling in this country, and so it was officially according belligerent rights to the Cubans, which passed by a doned on the King's birthday and that Spain would place no obstacle in the way of relieving the American reconcentrados.

The message was followed by three days of long and exciting debate in the Senate over the Morgan resolution for according belligerent rights to the Cubans, which passed by a vote of 41 to 14, most of the latter being Republicans who did not wish to interfere with the policy of the administration, which at that time was summed up in the words, "a peaceful intervention to secure the independence of Cuba." This was substantially the demand in the platform on which the President had been elected, but he evidently did not propose to be swerved from a judicious course, though he recognized that the people were becoming impatient. Independence through purchase was regarded as one of the possibilities, but in any event it was seen that it must be independence. Spanish rule over the island was recognized as no longer possible or desirable. It was not unreasonable to suppose that some of the support of the belligerency resolution had come from political enemies who wished to force the administration into precipitate action, and the President did not propose to be forced. In his position he was upheld by the House.

The effect of this new excitement in the United States upon the Spanish government was pronounced. Sagasta, the Liberal leader, had allowed Canovas to pursue his policy for a

long time without criticism, though believing that the attempt to uphold the Weyler regime was driving the United States into warlike expressions. When the action of the United States Senate became known, Sagasta announced that the truce whereby he had supported Canovas in his Cuban policy was at an end. In a debate in the Cortes he said: "We have 200,000 troops in Cuba, but we are not masters of the territory trodden by our soldiers. Carlism is organizing itself in the peninsula and menaces us with a new war, thanks to the immunity it enjoys. The picture could not be gloomier. We have a war in Cuba and a war in the Philippines. We wish to know what has become of the sixteen millions of the former loan, as eight millions are still due the army. In Cuba no important problem has been solved, and there has only been an exaggeration of long-existing evils."

The feeling between the Liberals and Conservatives became very bitter. In a dispute in the lobby of the Cortes over the Morgan resolution between Comas, a Liberal senator, professor in the Madrid University, and the Duke of Tetuan, Minister of Foreign Affairs, the latter boxed the senator's ears, and the excitement became so great that the sitting was suspended. The Duke resigned his office, but the bitter feeling continued, though a duel was averted. The Liberals declared their intention of absenting themselves from the Cortes till reparation was made. Canovas appealed to the absentees, saying that love of country in the presence of grave international troubles should lead them to resume their duties, but they obstinately remained absent, and on the 2d of June Canovas tendered his resignation to the Queen. She summoned General Campos to Madrid, and after a consultation with the party leaders the Canovas ministry was given a new lease of life. Faith still lingered in the reports of Weyler as to the speedy pacification of Cuba; in fact he had held and continued to hold this position of the greatest pecuniary profit to himself largely by continually repeating what was not true as to the condition of the island. But there were other reasons

of state more weighty. If the recall of Weyler had had no other danger than the fall of the Canovas ministry the injury might have been repaired, though Canovas was a strong man — perhaps the only man in Spain in whom the throne had complete confidence. But such a crisis might also have entailed an admission of the condition of the finances and of the hopelessness of the war in Cuba, and the serious men in both parties feared that with a popular knowledge of so many accumulated troubles the monarchy would disappear and the country be devastated by another civil war. For this reason Canovas was given another lease of life, and Weyler remained to run his bloody career a little longer.

An understanding of the political condition of Spain requires a study of Don Carlos. His shadow darkened the path of the infant King. His sympathizers were continually denouncing the ministry for its Cuban policy and for its meekness towards the United States, and they were taking advantage of every fresh trouble to breed discord among the people. Canovas was, therefore, between two fires. He feared to provoke the intervention of the United States lest it lead to a war which would complete the ruin of Spanish resources and overthrow the monarchy; on the other hand, he feared that the recall of Weyler and a mild policy towards the United States would bring about a revolution at home and a general ruin through which Don Carlos would rise the master of the people. Much as the Liberals hated Canovas and his ministry, they saw that his fall might lead to their own destruction.

The Republican party in the kingdom was also active, if not altogether united. Early in 1897 the organ of the Progressist Republican party, *El Pais*, said of Cuba: "Do these people revolt without a cause and sacrifice everything for the mere sake of fighting? What have we done in favor of Cuba? How have we governed the Philippine Islands? Let us confess it frankly. There is a feeling of protest at the bottom of the terrible tragedy which now covers with blood the soil of our colonies. There is also in it a great responsibility for the

men who have ruled Spain these twenty years and for the monarchy which has not known how to promote the happiness of the people. There is no longer any monarchical party fit for governing. . . . Deprived of resources and weakened, Spain cannot sustain a second Ten-Years War in Cuba. Bankruptcy must soon come."

It was to reach this end that the Cuban revolutionary party was campaigning. This was the purpose in the beginning, to weaken Spain, to wear her out so that in despair and to save herself she would drop Cuba and leave it to the Cubans. And when Spain was really brought to the point of seeing that Cuba could be of no further use to her, her pride and domestic politics left her no other course but war with the United States. "War," said the same journal, "is the only solution that will prolong the days of the doomed monarchy. Woe to the throne if it avert it. To fall in Cuba is to fall with all the ignominy of Sedan; to fall in the United States is to fall with all the glory of Waterloo."

At this juncture General Weyler made an ostentatious trip to Santiago by water and there spoke grandiloquently, assuring the Spaniards that he had come to finish the pacification of the island. Moving the Spanish troops out of the city a short distance, he captured a few Cubans, not insurgents, indeed, too young to fight; sailed around to Manzanillo and then departed for Havana, saying that the rainy season would prevent his carrying the campaign further then. He had done nothing, and tried to do nothing except to create the impression at Madrid that he was covering the whole island with his pacification process. At the very time he was making this trip the insurgent forces were camping within sight of Havana, and Gomez was issuing orders for another westward movement. The rumor of this step was offset at Havana by suspiciously circumstantial stories to the effect that Weyler had at last hemmed Gomez in, that he must either fight or surrender, and that Gomez had been severely wounded. Within twenty-four hours the people of Havana were astounded to hear that a

force of over 5,000 insurgents, having worked their way from the Jucaro trocha, was invading Matanzas. Weyler telegraphed orders to hurry into Matanzas troops from Pinar del Rio and Havana, thus leaving the former province, so recently reported as pacified, at the mercy of the insurgents. It was for this very purpose that Gomez made the movement. While Havana was waiting to hear of the capture of Gomez, Weyler suddenly reappeared, having captured nothing, and with considerable flourish informed Spain that he was about to take the field in person. The Spanish forces were concentrated on the borders of Havana province and assumed an entirely defensive attitude. As usual, the invading force of the insurgents was divided. To the north was Colonel Rojas with 800 men; to the south Colonel Edward Garcia with 680; in the central division were 1,700 men divided into bands of about 200 each. Further to the east Colonel Verona had 1,000 men.

The time had come when Havana could not be deceived by Weyler's reports, for by the first of August the rebel bands had moved up and were making nightly raids upon the suburbs of the city. Small garrisons were captured on all sides, and trains were stopped. It was impossible for trains to proceed out of Havana in any direction without being strongly guarded by a detachment of troops in armored cars, which were freight cars sheathed over with iron plates, slits being left through which fire might be directed upon the attacking insurgents. An engine was always sent on some distance ahead of each train to guard against dynamite explosions, for in several cases trains had been blown up with great loss to the Spaniards. When Weyler wished to go to Matanzas he was compelled to take the boat. The inhabitants of the suburbs fled to the city, where the people were undeceived and began to place the blame upon Weyler, who up to this time had been upheld because of his inhuman methods. But the news was not allowed to go to Spain. "Nothing is happening except the raids of a few bandits," were the usual advices from Havana, and Weyler was so much chagrined at the letters sent to some of the New

York and London papers that their correspondents were expelled from the island.

It was quite evident that Madrid could not be deceived by the claims of pacification. "We have for some time purposely refrained," said *El Imparcial*, "from all comment and criticism concerning the Cuban question in order not to be prosecuted and not to give rise to press scandals. If we now break silence it is to express our astonishment upon learning that provinces have been declared pacified where fighting is an every-day occurrence and where the rebellion's most famous leaders continue at the head of their followers."

General Garcia, operating in the province of Santiago de Cuba with a well-equipped army, had driven the Spaniards into the more important towns after several victorious engagements. In their effort to hold Bayamo the Spaniards had several times undertaken to transport supplies from Manzanillo, but each time the rebels had fallen upon them and captured a large portion of the arms and provisions. Once they had blown up a boat laden with men and supplies on the Cauto River. It cost the Spaniards a large amount of money and blood to keep a garrison at Bayamo, and it was of no importance to them from a military standpoint, for the country was filled with insurgents and the Spaniards did not venture to attack. But Weyler knew that the fall of Bayamo would result in the fall of the ministry and possibly in a Spanish uprising.

After passing around Weyler's troops and entering Matanzas, Gomez returned to Santa Clara, where Weyler again endeavored or pretended to surround him. The result was that General Weyler met General Gomez for the first time in a pitched battle. There is a cattle ranch at La Reforma, in the eastern part of Santa Clara province, consisting of about 10,000 acres, and it was always a favorite camping-ground for Gomez, as his son, who fell by Maceo's side, was born there. At this time he camped on this ranch as usual.

It seems incredible that 1,500 men should stand and fight 20,000, but the Spaniards always march in columns of 1,000

men and one piece of artillery — one cannon. They came into Reforma in twenty different directions. Weyler's trap was apparently well laid, but Gomez, who was cognizant of it for two weeks, simply waited. His tactics here were typical of his tactics elsewhere. He sent a hundred men to fight one column and fifty to fight another column; a hundred against another, and seventy-five to meet still another, and so on. Ten Cubans have often been known to hold a Spanish column of 1,000 men until General Gomez could get together his impedimenta and get away — hold them at a complete standstill. The Spaniards were always in deadly fear of an ambuscade, and they would not run into it.

The Cubans on this occasion not only held the Spanish columns in check but several times small divisions charged, and on the last time Weyler's left flank was routed. His horse was wounded three times, although he did not come to the front. The battle wound up by Weyler's withdrawing his troops and Gomez came in and camped on the field. It was reported in Havana as a Spanish victory. The Cuban loss was twenty-six and the Spanish loss 185 and about 300 wounded. The Cuban wounded were always difficult to estimate because so many were wounded who paid no attention to it. There is an authentic instance of a case where a Mauser bullet passed through a man and he was not aware of it for two days. This bullet, which is of small caliber and covered with nickel, has wonderful penetrating power, but all accounts agree that it is not deadly unless it strikes a vital organ. In this one respect, apparently, the use of the Mauser rifle, the Spaniards were humane to the Cubans; but in no other.

The net result of Weyler's Santa Clara campaigns, from which such great results were expected, was the complete devastation of another province and a consequent reduction of the food supply upon which the Spanish troops were more dependent than the Cubans. In the country which the insurgents commanded, which was at least four-fifths of the island, and into which the Spanish troops did not venture except in a

large force, the Cubans found food on every bush and in every root. They held hill-locked valleys where their cattle grazed in safety and where they even planted quick crops like sweet potatoes, which ripen five or six times a year in Cuba. Gomez and his leaders availed themselves to the fullest extent of the advantages afforded by the nature of the country, fought only when they wanted to, and chose favorable moments for attack with rare discernment and judgment. Gomez showed himself to be not only a man born to command, but one skilled to a high degree in military science so far as it could be applied to the peculiar warfare in which the Cubans were engaged. His masterly circular movements by which he brought his forces to Weyler's rear when that general fancied he had the wily Cuban hemmed in was but a single example of the many cases in which he never failed to puzzle the Spanish, who, worn out by the chase, could never succeed in cornering him, and who lived in constant dread that he would fall upon them suddenly from some favorable ambush.

On his return from Cuba, Mr. Calhoun made a confidential report to the President upon the Ruiz case and as to the situation on the island as he saw it, and a few days later Stewart L. Woodford of New York was appointed to the Madrid ministry, with instructions to secure an indemnity of \$75,000 in the Ruiz case, and to impress upon the Spanish government the sincere wish of the United States to lend its aid towards the ending of the war in Cuba by the reaching of peaceful and lasting results, just and honorable alike to Spain and to the Cuban people. These instructions recited the character and duration of the contest, the widespread losses it entailed, the burdens and restraints it imposed upon us, with constant disturbance of national interests and the injury resulting from an indefinite continuance of this state of things.

It was stated that at this juncture our government was constrained to seriously inquire if the time was not ripe when Spain of her own volition, moved by her own interests and every sentiment of humanity, should put a stop to this destruc-

tive war and make proposals of settlement honorable to herself and just to her Cuban colonies. It was urged that as a neighboring nation with large interests in Cuba we could be required to wait only a reasonable time for the mother country to establish its authority and restore peace and order within the borders of the island; that we could not contemplate an indefinite period for the accomplishment of this result.

No solution was proposed to which the slightest idea of humiliation to Spain could attach, and indeed the precise proposals were withheld to avoid embarrassment to that government. All that was asked or expected was that some safe way might be speedily provided and permanent peace restored.

During the interval of time required for the newly-appointed American minister to present his credentials to the Spanish court, both the governments of the United States and of Spain maintained a waiting attitude as to Cuban affairs, though in the latter country domestic politics were much disturbed. It was held as an assured fact that the Canovas ministry would in a short time be required to resign, and it was expected that the event would take place very soon after the American minister presented his credentials and made his demands, an event which could hardly occur till October, when the Queen returned to Madrid from San Sebastian. Meanwhile, the Cortes had been dissolved, and Canovas, whose health had become somewhat impaired, had gone to Santa Agueda, a watering place not far from San Sebastian, where he was taking a course of baths and attending to affairs of state.

On the 8th of August, while Canovas was standing in the gallery of the bathing establishment waiting for his wife, a young Italian anarchist named Golli fired three shots at the minister, all taking effect, and he died in a few minutes. For years Canovas had been one of Spain's leading statesmen, a strong upholder of the monarchy and a defender of the integrity of the kingdom, and, though Spain's relations were in a very trying state, he was still hopeful of a settlement which would preserve to the kingdom peace at home and continued

dominion over Cuba with little surrender of royal prerogative. This assassination had the effect of stopping the political quarrel of the great parties; Sagasta and other Liberals at once placed themselves at the orders of the government, but General Azcarraga, the minister of war, was made premier provisionally.

It was the general opinion in this country that the death of Canovas would greatly change the Cuban situation, for by his ability and strength as a statesman he had braved as no other man could the public opinion of those who more and more called for the removal of Weyler. That general was at this time engaged in an effort to beat back the advancing insurgents in Matanzas, but he was gradually forced back towards Havana. The day after the tragedy in Spain his forces suffered a severe defeat at Aguacate in Havana province, and, leaving many Spanish dead on the field, he hurried back into the city with rebels firing on his rear guard. He had been utterly unable to check the invasion which Gomez had planned. Death had been on all sides, in the open ground of battle, in the hidden ambush, the burning building, the fever-infected swamp, the disease-breeding hospitals — yet the rebellion remained a living, active, aggressive force. The Spanish soldiers were in a bad way, they had not received their pay for months, they were weak from illness and poor rations, they were badly clothed and sometimes shoeless, their credit was exhausted, and they were in no condition to take the offensive. The only feature of Weyler's campaign which was working successfully was his war on the pacificos. They were dying by the hundreds in the centers of concentration every day. In Pinar del Rio whole towns were starving. There were no vegetables; people were feeding on emaciated dogs. Pacificos were driven into the city of Matanzas from some of the outside fortifications which the Spanish could not hold, and as the poor famished wretches came straggling along, vainly beaten by the soldiers to make them go on, many dropped down and died. Everywhere was misery and death.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE STORY OF MISS CISNEROS AND HER REMARKABLE ESCAPE—RECALL OF WEYLER—PENALTY OF DEATH TO ALL INSURGENTS TREATING WITH SPANIARDS.

Weyler Retained by the New Premier—The Escape of Evangelina Cisneros—Her Romantic Story—Following Her Father to Jail—On the Isla de Pinos—Attracted by Evangelina's Beauty—A Scream for Help—Berriz in Close Quarters—Guerrillas Appear—Her Escape to a Cave—Found by the Guerrillas—Sent to Havana—Thrown into a Vile Prison—Sympathy Aroused in this Country—An Appeal to the Queen—Her Escape through a Barred Window—Smuggled on a Steamer in Boy's Clothes—Her Enthusiastic Reception in New York—The Queen Tired of Cuban Troubles—Her Farewell to Minister Taylor—Sagasta's Ministry—Arrival in Havana of Blanco, and Return of Weyler—Weyler's Grotesque Failure—Blanco Announces a More Liberal Policy—Release of the *Competitor* Prisoners—Their Wretched Lot—Masó Elected President of Cuban Republic.

THE provisional premier, General Azcarraga, announced that General Weyler would be retained in Cuba and be supported by the government, which would strictly adhere to the late minister's policy. In writing to one of his political supporters he said: "General Woodford will be received and even welcomed as our mourned Don Antonio (Canovas) wished to welcome him. If he brings only claims of American citizens harmed in Cuba, attention will be paid to these claims so far as they are just. In a friendly manner he will be notified also of Spain's right to claim other damages, and instructions will be given for the purpose to our minister at Washington. But it will be a great mistake if he intends to suggest any other kind of American interference in Cuba." He said that America would be told very plainly to keep her hands off or take the consequences. But the Conservative forces were badly divided, and as the success of the ministry depended upon the carrying on of that policy which had nearly

been disastrous even under the strong hand of Canovas, it was evident that it could not long endure. Nothing but a conspicuous success by Weyler in Cuba could give it strength, and, as it happened, his forces met at this critical time their worst reverse of the year, a defeat peculiarly humiliating to the proud Spaniards.

As already stated, General Garcia's force in the province of Santiago de Cuba had through additions from successful expeditions one of the best-equipped forces on the island. Early in September he brought his army before Las Tunas, one of the five important places in the province, strongly defended by six forts. Before opening fire he wrote to the Spanish commander: "I have 5,000 men and artillery enough to shatter the whole town of Las Tunas. I give you three hours to surrender, and I will respect your life and that of your men."

No answer came, and the fire was opened on Friday, the 3d, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. The Spanish replied vigorously with their twelve-pounders, but the dynamite gun of the insurgents made great havoc in the forts. On Sunday at noon a white flag was raised on the principal fort and the commander announced his desire to surrender on honorable terms, having, he said, asked for reinforcements but received no reply. Garcia well knew why; no troops could be spared from any part of the province. The Spanish had been driven away from the Cauto River and hemmed in at Manzanillo, and every garrison in the province except that at the city of Santiago was helpless and isolated. In the two days' bombardment over 300 Spanish soldiers were killed. Garcia held seventy-five prisoners to be exchanged for an equal number of Cubans, and the others were disarmed and paroled. He secured several large guns and a quantity of arms, ammunition, and provisions.

General Luge, the commander of the province, attempted a few days later to retake the garrison with 5,000 men, but was defeated and driven westward. On the way he captured a small Cuban settlement and slaughtered the women and chil-

dren in suggestive contrast to Garcia's act in paroling the captives of Las Tunas. General Weyler was obliged to follow his glowing despatches of pacification with one asking the Madrid government for heavy reinforcements for the eastern provinces, as none could be spared from the west, where the rebels were moving about to suit themselves. This placed the Spanish ministry in a very delicate position. Weyler was told that he must retake the town, as the public criticism of the ministry was becoming very severe. But of Las Tunas little but ruins remained to be retaken.

Though the Spanish continued to report victories daily it was, nevertheless, a notable fact that the rebels were still as active as ever in all the provinces. All the rural districts were in the hands of the insurgents, who reigned as absolute masters, and in the eastern end of the island had reorganized the provinces. The royal troops were cantoned in the cities, from which they sallied forth now and then, but with small results. They would start out in the morning to crush a rebel force, fire a few volleys at them and return in time for their evening meal. In these engagements the Spanish loss was generally greater than the Cuban, though the Spanish reports were always to the contrary.

The peaceful peasants were the worst sufferers. It was estimated by good authorities that in the provinces of Havana and Pinar del Rio the Spaniards killed about five of them to one *bona fide* insurgent. This did not include the pacificos dying of starvation and disease.

In the fall of 1897 public interest in the United States was greatly aroused in the remarkable escape of Evangelina Cisneros, a young Cuban girl of good family, whose story reads like a romance. At the outbreak of the revolution she lived with her father and three sisters at a pleasant little place in Puerto Principe. Her father decided to enter the Cuban army, but before he could go he was arrested, and in time was sent to Isla de Pinos with other prisoners. Evangelina faithfully and dutifully followed his footsteps to share his punish-

ment and comfort him in his sorrow. She was eighteen years of age, cultured, talented, and beautiful. Through her efforts and the mediation of some friends, the governor of the penal settlement gave Cisneros permission to withdraw from the common criminals, and to live with his daughter, and there everything went well till a new governor came to the island, Colonel Berriz, a nephew of the Spanish minister of war and a favorite adjutant of Weyler. Struck by the girl's beauty, he endeavored to attract her to him, but failing, adopted harsher measures. Her father was arrested and taken to an unknown place. Late that night, when the girl was alone and wondering where her father was, Colonel Berriz came to her house, forced himself into her presence, sought to force her to submit to him by making her father's liberty contingent upon her compliance, and when this failed he would have overpowered her had she not slipped away from him, opened the door, and screamed for help, which came at once. Berriz was in close quarters for a moment, but succeeded in calling a few guerrillas who were near. As her friends were unarmed they could make no resistance; they tried to escape as best they could, and several were shot in cold blood. She managed to escape and hid in a cave till the next morning, when she was discovered by guerrillas, locked up, and later, with others, was sent to Havana, where she was placed in the Casa de Recojidas, the prison for disreputable women. In order to save the reputation of the villain, Colonel Berriz, the Spanish had invented an accusation against her character. Her experiences in that prison were horrible.

At intervals the story of this innocent girl's wrongs ran through the Cuban news in this country, and many people became interested. Her trial came on in August, and she was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment in an African penal settlement upon the testimony of the perjurers who were trying to save the reputation of the nephew of the man who had become the Premier of Spain. Mrs. Jefferson Davis, Julia Ward Howe, Mrs. John A. Logan, and others petitioned the

Queen for her release. The Pope, who had been appealed to, urged clemency, while Weyler, incensed at the efforts in the girl's behalf, publicly reiterated the falsehood as to her character. The Queen did not act.

The Spanish authorities did not fail to show their resentment of the interest displayed by the wives of Americans in the case of Miss Cisneros, for they not only shut her off from all communication with her friends but threw into the prison for lewd women in Santa Clara five women who dared to prepare a most courteous appeal to General Weyler for the release of Miss Cisneros. All these women belonged to the best families in Santa Clara. Señora Plana was sixty-seven years old and the widow of a former mayor of the city. Señorita Gutierrez was the principal of the oldest and best private college for young women in the island. These women were kept in prison without any definite charge being made against them, and instead of being put in the city jail they were thrust into pens the surroundings of which were of the filthiest character. That the prisoners were refined and elegant women made not the slightest difference, and their case was not an isolated one.

Meanwhile, a New York newspaper commissioned one of its ablest reporters to go to Havana and see if he could bring about her escape. The story of how the escape was planned and executed is a thrilling page of the romance of her life. It was a desperate game, but it succeeded, and one night, having succeeded in drugging the wretched women in the prison pen with her, lest they should betray her, she was helped through a window, one of the bars of which had been filed and bent by her accomplices. She was at first taken to a house of a friend in Havana and carefully concealed. In a few days, dressed in boy's clothes, she was smuggled on a steamer bound for New York, while the Spanish guards were searching Havana high and low for her. She became the heroine of the hour in New York, where a reception was arranged for her, and where her beauty and cultured ways won admiration and the story of her trials thrilled every heart.

While it is possible that few cases possessed so many dramatic features as that of Miss Cisneros, it was well known that there were hundreds of other victims, innocent of any charge except sympathy for the Cubans, victims of a punishment which could, as Mrs. Logan said in her strong appeal to the Queen in behalf of Miss Cisneros, "only to be compared to the atrocities inflicted upon the Christians by order of Nero, whose butchery of the innocents is even to this day considered the most fiendish the world ever saw; the thought of them must be sickening to your gentle soul." Had it not been for the daring rescue made by a newspaper man, she, like others, might have gone to wear away her life in an African penal settlement. For could the Queen pardon a mere girl when her punishment was necessary to save the reputation of the nephew of her Prime Minister? That she was moved by the appeals and the story of Miss Cisneros's sufferings there can be little doubt. She was tired and sick of the condition of things in Cuba. To pardon this girl might mean a cabinet crisis, and how much the case had to do with the fall of General Azcaraga can only be surmised. It was on September 28th that the Queen talked so plainly to Azcarraga that he resigned, but before the new ministry was fairly at work Miss Cisneros had slipped through her barred window and was on her way to New York.

On September 13th, when taking leave of Mr. Taylor, the departing minister of the United States, the Queen said:

"Do, pray, be a friend to Spain when you return to America."

"Madam, I will, so far as my conscience will permit," he replied, with a courtly bow.

The Queen received Minister Woodford graciously and conversed with him in an informal manner without any reference to the subject upon which both countries were intensely interested. His instructions were such as to give Spain no intimation of just what the United States would do as a last resort to end the trouble in Cuba, and his first duty was to

sound Spain as to our friendly intervention to bring about a settlement between the Cubans and the Spaniards. If Spain rejected this plan, the minister was to inform this government and receive new instruction.

Meanwhile, General Azcarraga was engaged in a desperate attempt to bring into a cabinet all the dissenting Conservative forces, but the larger wing of these under the leadership of Silvela refused to become a party to the government unless Weyler was recalled. To this Azcarraga would not consent, believing it would result in the downfall of the Conservatives. His situation was further complicated by the excommunication of the Minister of Finance, who had appropriated certain property of the church. This in Catholic Spain was a serious matter, but Azcarraga held on till the Queen, who had become disgusted with Conservative quarrels and horrors in Cuba, returned to Madrid September 28th, when she stated her sentiments so forcibly that the ministry tendered their resignations. This crisis naturally postponed any reply to Minister Woodford's note. When Sagasta was summoned to form a cabinet, hope of peace in Cuba was stimulated by the announcement that Weyler would be recalled if he did not resign, and General Blanco, considered as the most humane general in Spain, would take his place to carry out a comprehensive scheme of autonomy. But Weyler was not disposed to resign his lucrative position, and the hopeful feeling in the United States was offset by the rage with which the bloodthirsty element in Havana received the news of Weyler's fall. The Volunteers, at the instigation of one of Weyler's factotums, paraded the streets shouting "Death to the United States!" "Long live General Weyler!" and the whole city was for a short time in a state of terror. Even some of the so-called Autonomists declared that it was a shame for Spain to adopt home rule at the dictation of the United States.

General Blanco arrived at Havana on October 30th, and General Weyler departed, having bought a bill of exchange, it is reported, for \$600,000. His salary during his occupancy

of the island would have amounted to about \$80,000. Thus his methods of administration had been successful from a personal point of view; in fact, this was nearly always the case with Spanish officials in Cuba, but a carnival of theft prevailed under the Weyler regime. The expenses of the war had nearly doubled; millions had been spent for supplies, and yet the Spanish troops were poorly fed and poorly clothed. Medicine had been purchased in large quantities, but was always scarce, and the names of legions of dead Spaniards were kept on the pay-roll. Never had been more strikingly illustrated the saying that though a Spaniard will fight for his country, he also does not hesitate to rob it. The frauds of the commissariat were enormous, and Weyler was only one of the principal benefitters.

To sustain Weyler in pacifying a country which he was continually reporting to be troubled with a few bands of scattering bandits, Spain had poured out her young blood with a lavish hand — 130,000 men and officers in addition to the 120,000 which had been previously sent. Thus from the outbreak of the war she had sent to the island over 250,000 men, fully armed, and the mystery of the military world was what Weyler could do with them in an island so small that an army of 30,000 insurgents could practically hold the whole country and even raid the suburbs of Havana. History affords no parallel in the way of grotesque failures. With such an army and over 50,000 Volunteers at his back, Weyler had done nothing but complete the devastation of the fertile island and starve and kill thousands of pacificos, driven like sheep from their burning homes. His guerrillas, like the Duke of Alba's murderers in the Netherlands, had swept the country for hiding innocents, and butchered in cold blood wounded Cubans in their hospitals, not sparing the nurses. Hundreds had been thrown into filthy jails upon the flimsiest charges or none at all, their fate often remaining a mystery. He had met the generosity of the Cubans, who regularly set at liberty the Spaniards they captured, by killing Cuban prisoners upon

nearly every occasion, and all this cruelty and wantonness had but added fuel to the flame of Cuba's hatred toward the mother country, which now, in the hope of saving her devastated island, grudgingly proposed to offer an autonomy which, if more liberal than heretofore, was still restricted.

Many people of the United States had hopes in the new policy. Selfishly clinging to the hope of peace, we hesitated to set the stamp of intervention upon this wretched page of the history of barbarism, while scores of our own citizens were languishing in the dirty jails of Cuba with no hope of a trial, for there was no evidence of their guilt.

But the far-sighted could easily see that intervention must come. The administration, while disposed to exhaust every resource of diplomacy, saw that independence alone would avail. Every Cuban general in the field and every Cuban officer in the civil government asserted again and again that there could be no solution but independence. The fact that General Blanco, upon taking office, proclaimed at once that he proposed to follow "a broad policy of expansion, of generosity and forgiveness, tending to re-establish through liberality fraternity among all the inhabitants of the country, and to cement their adhesion to the mother country," made no difference. There could be no adhesion of the Cuban to such a mother as Spain had proved, and General Blanco found that at the very moment when Spain would permit autonomy the Cuban party of autonomy had dwindled away to nothing, and the army of independence was never stronger, more aggressive, more successful, or more confident. Cubans were quite well aware that Spain was equal to pigeon-holing the whole scheme after they had surrendered their arms.

Sagasta, whether believing that autonomy would be accepted or not, knew that it would gain time and tend to diminish the aggressive spirit in the United States. He had been given to understand that if something were not done it would be impossible to silence the demands of Congress when it met in December. Moreover, the time had come when the

island was of no further financial use to Spain. She had mortgaged Cuba's revenues for more than they were worth by the issue of bonds. To hold her longer would mean only an exhausting expense to Spain, and it was only that ungovernable pride which had been her ruin that prevented her from withdrawing from the devastated island. In this situation a war with the United States seemed to afford an avenue of escape with the possibility — the probability — as the Spanish statesman thought, that the other powers of Europe would step in and not only help her humble the United States but even give her back Cuba and preserve the dynasty. This attitude was plainly discernible in the Spanish journals and it should have been evident to us that war must come. From this time forth Spain used what resources she could command, not to push the war in Cuba but to strengthen herself for a contest with the United States, while doing everything to postpone the break by an ostentatious reversal of Weyler's policy as to the reconcentrados, and an attempt to infuse the forlorn hope of autonomy with enough life to keep the United States in a waiting attitude.

A reply to Minister Woodford's note was received by our government on October 23d. It appeared to be in the direction of a better understanding. It expressed in the suavest manner an appreciation of the friendly purposes of the United States, admitted that our country was deeply affected by the war in Cuba, and that its desire for peace was just. It declared that the Spanish government was bound by every consideration to a change of policy that should satisfy the United States and pacify Cuba within a reasonable time, and to this end Spain had decided to put into effect the political reforms long advocated by Sagasta, without halting for any consideration in the path which in his judgment would lead to peace. It was said that the military operations would be continued, but would be conducted with regard for private rights, and that Spanish sovereignty would be strictly guarded. It asked that Spain be left free to carry on its military and political opera-

tions as she saw fit, while the United States on its part better enforced the regulations against the filibustering expeditions. Stripped of its diplomatic phraseology, what Spain told the United States was substantially this:

“All the armed expeditions intended to benefit the Cuban rebels are organized in the United States and sail from United States ports. Some of these expeditions have been prevented from going to Cuba, but most of them have succeeded in leaving America. If there were no aid from United States citizens there would be no insurrection. The United States can best extend its friendly offices by suppressing these expeditions.”

Shortly after the reply to Minister Woodford's note, and after General Blanco had begun his work in Cuba, Hannis Taylor, whom Woodford had succeeded, in an article published in the *North American Review* explaining the condition of affairs in Spain and his efforts to induce the late Canovas ministry to try and save Cuba by a generous grant of autonomy, said that Spain had no understanding of the word autonomy, and that she was trifling with us as if we were children. He also stated as his belief that Congress should assert our duty on the broadest possible lines to put an end to the hopeless war in Cuba, because it involved constant disturbance of our own peace and the destruction of our own commerce and property interests; that our government had offered in vain our services as a peacemaker, and that, in view of Spain's refusal to accept such services in the form of mediation, this country must now devise some means of bringing the war in Cuba to a speedy close in case Spain fails to do so within a specified time. While Taylor's statement had the advantage of being true, it called forth bitter criticisms from Spain and was considered imprudent at home. But it no doubt better informed the people as to the insincerity of Spanish pretensions of reforms, and when Spain replied to Minister Woodford's acknowledgment of Spain's previous response, it was with the intimation that in granting autonomy to Cuba she would be

governed by circumstances. Her purpose was perhaps best expressed by General Pando, Blanco's chief of staff, when he said that autonomy would be one thing in the palace and another in the field, where it would be "autonomy at the point of the bayonet." As a result, the administration wisely began the work of putting the defenses and the armament of the nation, so long neglected, into better shape. The wisest men saw that war was inevitable unless Spain surrendered her sovereignty in Cuba on some terms. From this time on diplomacy was used largely in an effort to arrange the terms, and in Spain it was used to provoke the European powers into an attitude of hostility towards us. In Cuba the Spanish continued to burn Cuban hospitals, kill the inmates and helpless women and children, while the insurgents continued their successes. According to the reports of the Spanish health bureaus, a thousand reconcentrados were dying every day. It was too late to amend matters by annulling the decree of concentration, for the hapless people were now destitute, they had no homes to return to, and their fields had been destroyed. Even had there been anything for these pacificos to return to, and even had they strength enough remaining to return, they could have no confidence in the Spanish. The cruel guerrillas were still roaming about and their butcheries could hardly be restrained by any central authority. Blanco, apparently, endeavored to do what he could by establishing zones of cultivation for the employment of pacificos. The step proved a farce, an arrangement only on paper. His desire to have the grinding of sugar begin again could not avail, as the planters had not the means to restore their machinery. Moreover, Blanco soon found that Weyler had left the army in a terrible condition, and the officers endeavored to throw obstacles in the way of autonomy and milder methods, the uncompromising Spaniards being particularly bitter at the thought that the proposed reforms had been undertaken, as they supposed, at the instance of the United States. The horrors of the war were regarded with the utmost indifference by the more bigoted Spaniards at Havana.

The unfortunate were dying from hunger in the very streets of the city without arousing the slightest feeling of charity among the Spaniards. Some of the newspapers went so far as to consider the awful mortality a good thing for the country, the interests of Spain, and even of humanity. They declared that the result of Weyler's warfare was a natural selection, and that the classes which were dying out were useless and ought to be replaced by stronger and more industrious people from Spain. General Blanco felt the difficulties of his position so keenly that he was inclined to ask relief from office.

By order from Madrid the *Competitor* prisoners were released on the 17th of November, and the act was naturally regarded not so much as a concession as an effort on the part of Spain to deprive the friends of intervention in the Congress of a rational basis for action. It was in exact keeping with previous Spanish diplomacy to appease sentiment in this country at certain intervals by the release of American citizens kept a long time in prison without evidence of their guilt.

Broken in health by their long confinement and the treatment accorded them, and clad only in the rags which they had worn since their capture a year and a half before, they presented a pitiful spectacle as they landed in New York and fell into the arms of their friends. Melton, the newspaper man, who had started for Cuba under contract to write a series of articles for a Florida journal, robust, strong, and weighing 165 pounds, came back emaciated and so weak that he could hardly speak. Laborde had become paralyzed, and Leavitt had nearly lost his mind. The story they told of their sufferings was heartrending. Sentenced to death without any chance to defend themselves, and saved only because the execution was postponed from Madrid, for eighteen months they had lain in jail and been frequently subjected to torture by their cruel jailers. Yet some of the newspapers of the country hailed the tardy release of these men as a triumph of American citizenship and a disarmament of "jingoism." They pretended to regard it just as Spain in her crafty insin-

cerity trusted they would, and of course they reflected the opinion of many people desirous of peace at any price. But as their arrest, like that of other Americans, had taken place under a previous Spanish administration our government could do no more than give a fair trial to the new administration, which *seemed* so much more humanely disposed.

In constructing a scheme of autonomy more generous than those which had preceded, Sagasta found himself opposed by the commercial interests of the country, who said it would never do to allow the Cubans to regulate their own tariff; but he maintained his position so firmly as to devise and secure the signature of the Queen to a plan which granted the Cubans the electoral privileges of the peninsulars, allowed them an insular representative government, but left the tariff to a mixed commission, partly appointed by the Crown, the Captain-General reserving the right to decide disputes. But the plan was coldly welcomed at Havana, and was at once met by proclamations from Gomez and Garcia making it an offense punishable with death for any insurgent leader to accept proposals of autonomy from the Spaniards, and further decreeing that anyone sent from the Spanish to confer as to autonomy should be regarded as a spy and treated as such. In any event, the plan could have little operation outside of Havana and a few large centers, for the insurgents at this time were stronger than ever, and General Pando, who had set out to drive Gomez from the point where he had a short time before defeated Weyler, was repulsed and obliged to retreat.

Late in 1897 the Cuban General Assembly met and elected new government officials, Bartolome Masó becoming President of the Republic. By this act alone the determination of the Cubans was revealed, for Masó was the author of the motto "Independence or Death." Among his countrymen he was the soul of political honor and devotion to the cause of freedom, and Gomez had called him the Father of His Country. A cabinet was formed and the Cuban government continued to transact what business the conditions permitted.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE—THE TRAGIC DEATH OF COLONEL RUIZ—RIOTS IN HAVANA, AND THE "FRIENDLY VISIT" OF THE *MAINE*.

The Administration's Cuban Policy Outlined—Possibilities of Intervention—Opposition to Autonomy—Colonel Ruiz Hopes to Convert the Young Cuban Leader, Nestor Aranguren—The Latter's Reply to Ruiz's Letter—Aranguren Warns Him—The Meeting—Aranguren's Own Story of What Happened—Ruiz Shot—Organized Relief for the Reconcentrados—Military Operations in the East—Disquieting Reports—Lee Advises Having Warships in Readiness—A Delicate Situation—Winter Drill of North American Squadron—The Storm Breaks in Havana—"Death to Autonomy!"—Lee's Message—Blanco's Prompt Action—Death-Blow to Autonomy—Protection of American Citizens—The *Maine* Ordered to Havana—Strange Action of the Havana Authorities—Gen. Lee's Misgivings—The *Maine* Arrives Quietly—Demonstrations of Eternal Friendship.

THE assembling of Congress in December and the message of President McKinley were awaited with the keenest interest in the United States, in Spain, and in Cuba. Could the crisis in Cuban affairs be longer postponed? The President recognized the problem as the most important with which the government had to deal. His message told the story of the previous rebellions, and the relation of our government to them and to the existing rebellion in which destruction had been carried to every part of the island. He denounced the "cruel policy of reconcentration," which had utterly failed and which "was not civilized warfare, but extermination." Against this abuse he had repeatedly protested. After reviewing the more recent diplomatic negotiations, he said that three untried measures remained—the recognition of belligerency, the recognition of independence, and neutral intervention to end the war by imposing a rational compromise. He declared that he would not speak of forcible an-

nexation as that could not be thought of. "That, by our code of honor, would be criminal aggression." He gave his reasons for considering the question of recognition premature, though should such a step be deemed wise in the future he should not hesitate to take it. Intervention on humanitarian grounds would have been seriously considered but for the favorable change in Spain's policy. In conclusion, he said:

"I shall not impugn its sincerity, nor should impatience be suffered to embarrass it in the task it has undertaken. It is honestly due to Spain and to our friendly relations with Spain that she should be given a reasonable chance to realize her expectations, and to prove the asserted efficacy of the new order of things to which she stands irrevocably committed. . . . The near future will demonstrate whether the indispensable condition of righteous peace, just alike to the Cubans and to Spain as well as equitable to all our interests so intimately involved in the welfare of Cuba, is likely to be attained. If not, the exigency of other and further action by the United States will remain to be taken. When that time comes, that action will be determined in the line of indisputable right and duty. It will be faced without misgiving or hesitancy, in the light of the obligation this Government owes to itself, to the people who have confided to it the protection of their interests and honor, and to humanity.

"Sure of the right, keeping free from all offense ourselves; actuated only by upright and patriotic considerations, moved neither by passion nor selfishness, the Government will continue its watchful care over the rights and property of American citizens, and will abate none of its effort to bring about, by peaceful agencies, a peace which shall be honorable and enduring.

"If it shall hereafter appear to be a duty imposed by our obligations to ourselves, to civilization and to humanity, to intervene with force, it shall be without fault on our part, and only because the necessity for such action will be so clear as to command the support and approval of the civilized world."

Although the apparent hopefulness of the message was not shared by the majority of the members of Congress, they could not but be impressed with the strength of the reasons for waiting and watching results. But it soon became evident that, however good the disposition of Captain-General Blanco, it could have little effect upon an island so conditioned as Cuba. A large proportion of the Spanish subjects having commercial and business interests there would not accept autonomy, and the openly hostile attitude of the always

troublesome Volunteers caused the government much anxiety. Blanco did all he could to bring the insurgents around to a more favorable attitude, going so far as to liberate General Rivera, Maceo's successor, who had been captured in March and had been in Cabaña fortress ever since. The Captain-General endeavored to have him use his influence with the insurgents to accept autonomy, but he refused. A decree was published, offering amnesty to all exiles ordered from the island by Weyler, except common criminals, but how determined the insurgents were in the position they had taken is shown by one of the tragic incidents of this period.

The fearless young insurgent leader, Nestor Aranguren, whose daring raids upon the Spanish forces about Havana had given him the sobriquet of "the Cuban Sheridan," was a personal friend of Colonel Ruiz, Blanco's aide-de-camp. Ruiz had informed Blanco that he believed he could convince Aranguren of the advantage of surrendering and accepting autonomy. "I know his good heart," said Ruiz, "and I can induce him to abandon his folly and come back to Havana with me." Nothing could have been more pleasing to Blanco than to make a convert of this dashing young Cuban. Ruiz opened correspondence with him to this end, and Aranguren answered in amiable terms, but energetically refused to betray the Cuban cause. "We are suffering all the hardships of the life we are leading," said Aranguren, "only to make our country free. We do not hate the Spaniards personally, but we do not like their government in any form. As a gentleman I appreciate you and admire your talents, but in our intercourse let us drop political questions."

This letter encouraged Ruiz to answer that he was sure that "personally" Aranguren would not refuse to see him, and he asked for a meeting on December 9th two miles from Campo Florida. Aranguren sent the letter to General Rodriguez, commander of the insurgent forces in the province of Havana, and awaited orders. Receiving no reply on the day Ruiz had appointed, he did not go, so Ruiz returned to Campo

Florida and wrote again to Aranguren. On the 11th the latter received from General Rodriguez the message, "Do as you please, but if he offers autonomy do your duty." Aranguren sent a copy of this order to Ruiz with these words:

"If you desire to talk about the independence of Cuba or as a friend I will see you to-morrow. If not, for God's sake do not come."

Ruiz well understood the nature of the order which Gomez had given to his army. Anyone appearing to offer autonomy would be treated as a spy, but Ruiz still had faith in his powers to persuade Aranguren, so when he received the reply on the 13th he at once started for the rendezvous. What followed was thus related afterwards by Aranguren himself:

"The following day (it was 10 o'clock in the morning) Ruiz, in the full uniform of a Spanish colonel, and accompanied by two *practicos*, presented himself at one of the outposts. From the very start I felt nervous and would gladly have avoided the encounter, but it was not in my power to do so. I met Ruiz at the entrance to my camp. He was very pale and acted in a nervous, hesitating manner. He rode forward and attempted to grasp my hand, which I refused to let him have.

"'How fine you are looking,' he said, not appearing to notice my action. 'This life evidently agrees with you. You are a fortunate boy; no man among you all has the future that you have. Autonomy has been granted, and you, my dear friend, have been selected as the first one to be pardoned.'

"In vain did I hold up my hand and motion him to stop talking.

"'I have come,' he continued, 'to offer the pardon of a generous Government and such a position as you may desire. Ask what you will and you will have it. It all lies with you. Ask.'

"Ruiz had condemned himself, and I ordered my men to arrest him. He was at once tried, found guilty, and shot. He met his death like a brave man, fearless to the end. This is a true account of how all this sad affair occurred, and when my friends in the North read this, I hope they will reason as I did, that a soldier's duty to his country comes first of all."

It was said that the insurgents found upon Ruiz's body an authorization from General Blanco offering to give Aranguren \$100,000 and to extend official favors in the autonomous government. This act was industriously heralded as an evidence of the barbarity of the Cubans by the Spanish ministry and by "the peace at any price" men in the United States, and more

ado was made over it than over the hundreds of cases in which Cuban officers had been ruthlessly slain in cold blood, a fate that was still reserved for Aranguren himself. Ruiz did not go under a flag of truce; he went in the face of a warning. Aranguren was soldier enough to carry out the orders of his commander-in-chief. The injustice of classing this with the outrages daily practiced by the Spaniards was so flagrant that it only stirred the deeper the spirit of Cuban sympathizers in this country.

In view of the continued and indeed increasing suffering of the reconcentrados, and the widely-expressed desire throughout the United States to assist the helpless and starving, the government, after some difficulties, arranged in December with the Spanish minister so that charitable contributions in money or kind could be sent to the island by the benevolently disposed people of the country. Articles so intended could be consigned to the consul-general, who had arranged to co-operate with the local authorities in certain places. At first the relief was confined to Havana, but in a short time proper organizations were formed in the surrounding sections. The work was systematized under the supervision of Miss Clara Barton, president of the Red Cross Society of the United States, and her active and experienced assistants. Thus much suffering was prevented, though when the number of poor and destitute was so large it was almost impossible to relieve more than a few of the worst cases in each locality.

Spanish military operations on the island were at first boldly directed against the insurgent leaders in the east. Gomez still remained at his favorite camping-ground, and General Pando, the chief of staff of the Captain-General, undertook to dislodge him, but, failing to do so, he proceeded to Manzanillo, where the Spanish forces were in a desperate condition.

General Pando's object was to disperse General Garcia's army, which was in full control of the Cauto River and had the interior towns practically in a state of siege. He found

the Spanish troops in that section in a terrible condition, a small portion only fit to take part in an active campaign. He was able to get together a force superior in numbers to those which Garcia had in that region, and undertook to make his way inland from Manzanillo. The result was a Spanish defeat. Pando was obliged to return to the coast and to ask for reinforcements, which, however, Blanco could not spare considering the activity of the insurgents in the west. In Havana province the Spanish forces were centering their efforts upon Aranguren, who had been raised to the rank of brigadier-general, but thus far with poor results.

All these circumstances were particularly discouraging to General Blanco at a time when he was making the effort to establish the scheme of autonomous government, and was finding his acts frustrated by the quarrels of the Conservatives and the Autonomists. The decree of General Blanco announcing the establishment of autonomy on January 1st had a bombastic introduction about the blessing to be expected from the new regime. The plain truth was that outside the army of office-seekers, who were the natural result of the general poverty of the country, and a few Spaniards whose private interests led them to support Sagasta's government, there were no honest believers in autonomy. The Cubans were well aware that the decree was a sham, promulgated merely to endeavor to deceive the patriots. The uncompromising Spaniards laughed in the very faces of the new ministers. "An opera bouffe cabinet," was what *El Comercio* called the new ministry which took the oath of office on January 1st.

The determination not to give offices in the government to the uncompromising Spaniards had greatly enraged some of them. The advantage given to them by General Blanco of ten votes out of sixteen in the electoral junta, which practically enabled them to gain a majority in the Assembly, did not mollify them. Among the Volunteers, and even in the regular army, there was continual muttering of discontent, threatening to break out into violence upon any provocation,

and hardly had President McKinley's message been read in Congress before the State Department was receiving disquieting information from our consuls.

There were rumors, as General Lee telegraphed, of an extensive conspiracy in Matanzas directed against Americans. General Blanco promised to deal at once with the alleged conspirators, and in his note of December 3d General Lee said that he had the assurances that American life and property would be protected by the government at a moment's notice. "I have declined to make an application for the presence of one or more war ships in this harbor, and have advised those of our people who have wives and children here not to send them away, at least for the present, because such proceedings would not in my opinion be justifiable at this time from the standpoint of personal security. I still think that two war ships at least should be at Key West, prepared to move here at short notice, and that more of them should be sent to Dry Tortugas, and a coal station be established there." On the 13th General Lee wrote concerning the proposed autonomy on the efficacy of which both Spain and the United States were basing their hopes of peace: "The contest is most unequal. For it there are five or six of the head officers at the palace and twenty or thirty persons here in the city. Against it are, first, the insurgents, with or without arms, and the Cuban non-combatants; second, the great mass of the Spaniards. Indeed, there is the greatest apathy concerning autonomy in any form. No one asks what it will be or when, or how it will come. I do not see how it could even be put into operation by force."

In a letter on the 28th he said: "On the night of the 24th instant there seems to have been a concerted plan over the island to testify to the disapprobation of the people to the proposed autonomistic plans of the Spanish government. It culminated in this city about 2 o'clock on the morning of the 25th in the principal square of Havana, where a mob assembled with cries of 'Death to Autonomy!' and to General Blanco, and shouting 'Viva Weyler!' They made demon-

strations, too, against the office of the *Diario de la Marina*, a paper established in this town favoring autonomy, but were dispersed by the military police and soldiers."

The situation was one of extreme delicacy. The administration did not fail to perceive that the lives of American citizens were in some danger and that they should really have the moral support to be derived from the presence of a man-of-war; on the other hand, there was the danger that the appearance of a United States war ship in Cuban ports would cause a demonstration by the already inflamed enemies of autonomy and of the United States. There was the suggestion in General Lee's correspondence that a large and influential portion of the Spanish people in the Cuban cities were really desirous of a war with the United States, and that this feeling lay to some extent underneath the manifestations of disorder. General Lee was inclined to think that the arrival of a United States war ship would so excite the people as to precipitate a crisis at once, and so, from time to time, he advised delay. He had, however, come to the conclusion that it was essential to have a naval force in readiness to act, and the administration strongly seconded him in this belief. But it saw the necessity of proceeding cautiously, for Spain was regarding our naval plans with expressions of disapprobation.

The North Atlantic squadron had orders to rendezvous about Key West, not, it was stated, because of conditions at Havana, though the plan for winter drill in those waters undoubtedly had in it a measure of precaution. The *Maine* was coaled and ready for sea at short notice and was undoubtedly held in readiness in case of emergency.

On the 12th of January the anti-reform storm broke forth in serious riots in Havana, taking the shape of attacks upon the autonomistic papers. A mob headed by several army officers and made up of hundreds of the conservative Spaniards wrecked four newspaper offices, the immediate cause being General Blanco's refusal to suppress these journals, which were supporting him. The next day General Lee telegraphed to

Washington: "Soldiers sent to protect them fraternized with the mob. Two attacks were attempted to-day. I am told that troops massed inside of palace to protect Governor-General shout, 'Death to Autonomy!' 'Death to Blanco!' Uncertainty exists whether Blanco can control situation. If demonstrated he cannot maintain order, preserve life, and keep the peace, or if Americans and their interests are in danger, ships must be sent, and to that end should be prepared to move promptly. Excitement and uncertainty predominates everywhere." Blanco acted promptly and courageously. Artillery forces and cavalry detachments were placed at all strategic points in the city. He issued orders also to the autonomic papers to publish nothing more which would inflame the rioters. This was really a confession of weakness. The rioters thus gained their point. A death blow had been given to autonomy! Though the rioting ceased, it was not because the rioters had been forced to stop. The cause of the whole trouble was that the Spaniards were determined that no concession or authority should be given to the Cubans out of respect to the wishes of the United States or other power, and they had formed a conspiracy to compel Blanco either to give up autonomy or leave the island. It was hatched among the Volunteers and supported even by conservative spirits in Madrid.

Thousands of troops were brought in from the field and massed in the city under officers whom Blanco thought he could depend upon, and gradually quiet was restored, though there was much suppressed excitement. The Cuban question was again introduced into Congress and the popular feeling for intervention strongly asserted itself.

The administration was fully aware of the dangers of the situation, and quietly began to make preparations to act if necessary, though maintaining the most friendly attitude toward Spain. It was evident that autonomy was dead. The insurgents were driving the Spanish troops from their garrisons, the reconcentrados were starving notwithstanding

measures of relief; there could be but one outcome, but one policy. Spain must yield her sovereignty in the island or face war. The President, aware that any accident might precipitate trouble and endanger every American on the island, determined to use his diplomacy to induce Spain to peacefully yield her sovereignty in Cuba, and at the same time prepare to protect American rights.

In taking the necessary steps the administration desired to avoid any affront to Spain, and also the dangers of arousing the excitable Spaniards in Cuba and Spain. To have sent a battleship into Havana harbor while Blanco was offering assurances that the rights of all foreigners would be protected would in all probability have added new fuel to the riots. In two or three days quiet had been restored and a few days later the Spanish minister at Washington was informed that the United States desired to "resume" friendly naval calls in Cuban ports. The minister was inclined to demur, but considering the spirit in which the proposal was made there could hardly be reason for any diplomatic objection, and any Spanish alarm might be prevented if a Spanish war ship made a similar call at some American port.

On January 24th, Assistant Secretary Day sent the following despatch to General Lee:

"It is the purpose of this Government to resume friendly naval visits at Cuban ports. In that view, the *Maine* will call at the port of Havana in a day or two. Please arrange for a friendly interchange of calls with authorities."

Secretary Day made a statement to the public in which he said: "Sending the *Maine* to Havana means simply the resumption of friendly naval relations with Spain. It is customary for naval vessels of friendly nations to pass in and out of the harbors of other countries with which they are at peace, and British and German war ships have recently visited Havana. This is no new move. The President has intended to do it for some time, but heretofore something has happened



1. DRILLING MARINES ON THE BATTLESHIP "NEW YORK."
2. UNITED STATES BATTLESHIP "MAINE."

Blown up in Havana Harbor, February 15, 1898.

to postpone it. The orders for the *Maine* mean nothing more than I have said, and there is nothing alarming or unfriendly in them. The Spanish minister here is fully informed of what is going on, and so far as I know has not made the slightest objection to it." In a public statement the Spanish minister at Washington said: "It is perfectly in accord with usage for war ships of two friendly powers to enter and leave each other's ports; the war ships of Spain have visited American ports on complimentary missions three times in as many years, and if there has not been an American warship in Havana in the same length of time it is merely because the United States government has not seen fit to order one there." Unquestionably, it was a purely friendly act from a diplomatic point of view, and it was so published by the Spanish government, but the Spanish people were inclined to think otherwise. Excitable Spaniards in Madrid professed to think the United States had ulterior motives, and General Lee reported that the Havana authorities were fearful lest it should excite the people of the city and cause a demonstration. But the Spanish government, to show the appreciation of the courtesy of the United States — so smooth are the words of diplomacy — announced that the cruiser *Vizcaya* would soon pay a visit to an American port.

As soon as General Lee received Secretary Day's despatch he cabled back, advising a postponement of the visit of the *Maine* for six or seven days until the recent excitement was allayed, but he said he would consult the authorities. Captain-General Blanco had just gone on a trip to the eastern part of the island in the hopes of converting the insurgent leaders. Lee received a reply at once that the *Maine* had been ordered and would be at Havana the next day. "Keep us advised by frequent telegrams." The next day Lee telegraphed: "At an interview authorities profess to think United States has ulterior purpose in sending ship. Say it will obstruct autonomy, produce excitement, and most probably a demonstration. Ask that it is not done until they can get instructions

from Madrid, and say that if for friendly motives, as claimed, delay is unimportant."

As the Spanish minister at Washington had been fully informed of the purpose of this government, the ignorance of the Havana authorities must have been assumed or the authorities at Madrid had not advised Havana. The former was probably true, and the objections at Havana were doubtless made to provide an excuse for the inevitable failure of autonomy. They saw a chance to cast the responsibility upon the United States and use it as an argument with the European powers. Madrid had doubtless advised Havana how to receive the suggestion.

That General Lee had misgivings, not for the *Maine*, but of a hostile demonstration on the part of the Volunteers is evident from the despatch which he sent on the 25th: "Ship quietly arrived at 11 A. M. to-day. No demonstration so far." The *Maine* steamed into the harbor with no more disturbance than attends the arrival of the Key West mail steamer. When she came alongside Morro Castle she saluted the Spanish flag with twenty-one guns, the response being given by the guns of Cabañas. The *Maine* ran up the Spanish royal ensign and saluted the Spanish flagship with thirteen guns. The *Alfonso XIII.* ran up the Stars and Stripes and returned the salute gun for gun. The *Maine* dropped her anchor where the harbor master directed, and the official calls and other demonstrations of eternal friendship followed. But in spite of them it was impossible to overlook the strong undercurrent of feeling in the city, the excited talking of groups about the cafés, and the expressed opinion of radical Spaniards that the cause of Spain had been betrayed by the government, and that the nation had been humiliated by the first step in Yankee intervention. The arrival of the battleship was considered a joyful event among the Americans, for they had been in suspense and now felt that they were safe. This alone was enough to anger some of the Spaniards of the city.

In reality, the appearance of the *Maine* in Havana harbor was a necessary and justifiable move for the proper protection

of American citizens. In view of recent outbreaks in the city our citizens could not feel secure without such protection, and another outbreak might occur at any time and be less easily put down. The State Department had waited until it thought a reasonable time had elapsed after the outbreak to permit of the visit of the *Maine* being classed as a friendly act, a "resumption" of naval cordiality, and a free use of diplomatic fictions was doubtless wise for its effects not simply upon Spain but upon the inflammable Spaniards in Havana and the impatient people of this country.

It was plain that Congress was watching with impatience and ill-concealed excitement the next step in the President's policy. The belief was strong that when it was made perfectly clear to the world that autonomy had failed, the President would feel called upon to act in accordance with the declarations in his message. It did not seem possible that a crisis could long be delayed, for if it did not come through the vigorous action of the President there would evidently be an uprising in the Congress which would force the issue upon the country. The Congressional situation was strained to the last degree, for it was known that the half had not been told regarding the horrors of starvation and there was no appreciable amelioration of the dreadful situation. Only because of the profound respect for the President's judgment, the thorough confidence in his devotion to the national honor, the entire belief that he would act when the moment was ripe, restrained the impetuosity of his own party, while some of his opponents were striving to force the question for political effect.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE *MAINE* AND HER COMMANDER—THREATS AND WARNINGS—MINISTER DE LOME'S ABUSIVE LETTER—STARTLING NEWS—THE *MAINE* BLOWN UP.

The History of the *Maine*—Captain Sigsbee, Her Commander—His High Standing in the Navy Department—His Coolness and Self-possession—A Second in Which to Act—Many Lives Saved by a Prompt Decision—The *Maine* in Havana Harbor—An Unused Buoy—Captain Sigsbee's Precautions—Extraordinary Vigilance—The Hostility of the Spanish Rabble—Warnings Handed to Captain Sigsbee—His Official Relations—No Cordiality from Spanish Military Officers—Reporters at Hotel Inglaterra—Story of a Letter from Weyler—Weyler's Mysterious Hints at Mines—General Aranguren Betrayed by a Negro Captive—Surrounded and Killed—Conditions Worse and Worse—Publication of the De Lome Letter—Characteristic Spanish Diplomacy—De Lome Admits His Authorship and Resigns—Spain's Disavowal—A Better Feeling—A Midnight Dispatch—Startling News—" *Maine* Blown Up"—An Awful Catastrophe.

THE *Maine*, which was officially rated as a second-class battleship, was launched at the Brooklyn Navy Yard November 18, 1890, and was christened by Miss Alice Tracy Wilmerding, a niece of General Benjamin F. Tracy, then Secretary of the Navy. An act of Congress in 1886 authorized her construction at a cost not to exceed \$2,500,000, and it is said that her exact cost was \$2,484,503. The delay in completing her was due to difficulty in securing the heavy armor. Her dimensions were: Length at load water line 318 feet, beam 57 feet, draught, 21½ feet; her displacement was 6,648 tons. She could carry enough coal to steam 7,000 miles at ten knots an hour; she had twin screws and the indicated horse power of her vertical triple-expansion engines was 9,000. Her armor in the water line belt and the barbettes was twelve inches thick, and on the turrets ten inches thick. A protective steel deck, two inches in thickness on the crown and four inches on the slopes, protected the boilers

and engines. Her armament consisted of a main battery of four 10-inch guns, mounted in pairs in two turrets, and six 6-inch guns, two each in the bow and stern, and two on the main deck superstructure, amidships. The other armament consisted of eight 7-pounders and four machine guns; there were also seven torpedo tubes and two 30-foot torpedo boats, each weighing seven tons. She could hurl a broadside of 1,322 pounds, not including her small-arms fire, and she could fire 1,224 pounds ahead from her two turrets and forward guns, besides the smaller fire. Her crew consisted of 378 sailors, besides officers and forty marines.

Captain Sigsbee, her commander, is one of the most popular officers in the Navy Department. For four years he was chief of the Hydrographic Office, and by his energy it had been brought up to a high state of efficiency. He was born in the State of New York in 1845, and entered the service during the Civil War, having been graduated from the Naval Academy in 1863 in time to take part as an ensign in the attack on Mobile Bay under Farragut. In all the various commands afterwards entrusted to him he showed his skill, energy, and intelligence, and secured the confidence of the Department which led to his selection for the important command of the *Maine*, a position coveted by many of his rank. He had earned the reputation of being cool in emergencies, and he displayed this quality not long after taking command of the battleship. In the summer of 1897, while steaming up North River in New York Harbor, following his prescribed course, he saw just ahead a big excursion steamer crowded with people, steering out of course and bearing down upon him. He quickly signaled for the excursion boat to get out of the way, but, apparently, no attention was paid to the signals. A minute more and the *Maine* would run her down, with a certain loss of scores of lives. Captain Sigsbee had only a second in which to act; he turned the prow of the *Maine* inshore and she went crashing into the wharf. The wharf was wrecked and the *Maine* was somewhat damaged, but no lives were lost.

The captain was commended by the Department. After all was over, a friend asked him what passed through his mind as he headed towards the wharf.

"I thought," he said, "that my naval career was ended."

It was largely because of his carefulness, unflinching self-possession, and readiness for emergency that he was selected for the delicate mission of taking the *Maine* to the harbor of Havana, at a time when the presence of an American war ship was greatly needed there, and much good tact and cool judgment were also required.

The berth given the *Maine* was in the man-of-war anchorage off the Machina, or "the Shears," and was, to all appearances, one of the regular mooring buoys of the harbor. The Havana pilot who conducted her in said it was Buoy No. 4, but the bearing taken on the *Maine* soon after anchoring did not place the ship exactly according to the charted position of that buoy. No notice was taken of this because it was assumed that the charted position might represent former positions, and that the buoys might have been changed somewhat in the examination of the moorings. It appears to have been an unusual place for anchorage. Ship captains of several years' experience in running into the port of Havana asserted that they had never known a man-of-war to be anchored at that buoy, and that merchant vessels were very rarely anchored there. Unquestionably, it was the least used buoy in the harbor. It was stated that the vessel last anchored there before the arrival of the *Maine* was the *Ligaspi*, a Spanish dispatch boat which had been used by General Weyler in his tours about the waters of the island. She had run out and anchored there two days before the *Maine* arrived, and afterwards had taken a different position. It was noticed that in the series of social formalities following the arrival of the *Maine* the captain of the *Ligaspi* never called upon Captain Sigsbee, who regarded the fact with some suspicion, but did not consider it of serious moment.

Fully aware of the state of feeling among the radical Span-

iards and Volunteers in Havana, Captain Sigsbee took extraordinary precautions. He had sentries on the forecastle and poop, quartermaster and signal boy on the bridge, signal boy on the poop; the corporal of the guard especially instructed to look out for the port gangway, the officer of the deck and the quartermaster particularly directed to look out for the starboard gangway; a quarter watch was kept on deck all night; sentries' cartridge boxes were filled, and their arms kept loaded; a number of rounds of rapid-firing ammunition were kept in the pilot house and in the captain's spare pantry, under the after superstructure; additional charges of shell were close at hand for the secondary battery; steam was kept up in two boilers instead of one; special instructions were given to watch carefully all the hydraulic gear and report defects, and the officer of the deck was charged to make detailed reports to Captain Sigsbee, even of minor matters.

He also instructed the master-at-arms and the orderly sergeant to keep a watchful eye on everybody that came on board. When visitors went below they were to go with them, and afterwards were to carefully inspect the routes that these persons had taken lest packages of high explosives should have been left somewhere. The whole purport of the various orders was that the vessel was in a position requiring extreme vigilance.

The reasons for this were not founded upon any distrust of the high authorities of Havana, but upon the possibilities of danger from attempts of irresponsible parties. It was hardly conceived as possible that the *Maine* stood in any danger of mines or torpedoes, for they would have required some kind of official connivance. But the hostility of the Spanish rabble was very apparent. On the first Sunday after the arrival, when a ferryboat crowded with people, both civil and military, returning from a bull fight in Regla, passed the *Maine* she was greeted with yells, whistles, and derisive calls from a number of the passengers. When Captain Sigsbee and other officers were in the city they would occasionally be handed

slips of paper warning them to look out for their ship, but the captain thought little of these. General Lee was constantly receiving warnings and threats of assassination. One day Captain Sigsbee received in his mail a card upon which was written a lot of stuff — "Viva Weyler!" "Down with the United States!" "Are we going to submit to this vessel coming here from their rotten old fleet?" etc.

Yet his relations with the officials were outwardly cordial. Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright, second in command, was very particular concerning the occasional visitors, though very few except those of the highest social standing in the city came to the ship. They were always accompanied about by officers. There were but two visits of Spanish military officers. Once a party of five or six came aboard during Captain Sigsbee's absence and they were reported to him as appearing constrained and not desirous of accepting much courtesy. Captain Sigsbee said he invited Spanish officers to the ship, in fact, made considerable effort to get them on board socially, in order to show good will according to the spirit of the *Maine's* visit, but they did not come.

The correspondents of the United States papers and the reporters of the Havana journals were in the habit of meeting at the Hotel Inglaterra at night to talk and exchange news. One of these was Honoré François Lainé, the correspondent of the New York *Sun*, who was on rather friendly terms with Francisco Diaz, a reporter for the *Union Constitutionnel*, a Weylerite paper. One night in January, according to Lainé's story, they met at the hotel, and Diaz said that he had reliable information that General Weyler intended to become a candidate for the Cortes from the district of Havana. Asked how he knew, he said that he had a copy of a letter which Weyler had written to Santos Guzman, a lawyer and the head of the conservative party in Havana, as Spanish as garlic. Guzman had turned the letter over to the editor of the ultra-Spaniard *Union Constitutionnel*, in order that at the proper time Weyler's candidacy might be announced and commented on. Diaz

had succeeded in getting a copy of it, and Lainé made a copy of which the following is a translation:

MADRID, January 8, 1898.

His Excellency DON FRANCISCO DE LOS SANTOS GUZMAN,

HAVANA.

My Distinguished Personal and Political Friend: — Since the last events, I have changed my views about the attitude which our political party in Cuba ought to assume. I have thought before that it was more dignified for us to abstain from the electoral contest: I believe now that it is a patriotic duty for us to go to the polls. Our success can not be doubted; neither can be our majority of voters, nor that, with a program of defense of national honor, we will have side by side with us all those lukewarm politicians who, though Spaniards by heart are deceived by the inside combinations of Moret and Sagasta and take as scientific solutions of our colonial problems what are really dishonorable humiliations of our country before the United States.

Write on your flag, the flag of Spain: "Defense of National Honor," and I offer you my name as your candidate. After having commanded during two years 200,000 Spanish heroes in Cuba, the title I shall be more proud of is that of Deputy from Havana at the Cortes of Spain.

By the way, I have read these days that the Americans are thinking about sending one of their warships to that city. During my command in Cuba they did not even dare to dream about it. They knew the terrible punishment that awaited them. I have Havana harbor well prepared for such an emergency. I rapidly finished the work that Martinez Campos carelessly abandoned.

If the insult is made, I hope that there will be a Spanish hand to punish it as terribly as it deserves.

Romero is in better health than his friends could have expected, and notwithstanding how morally sick I feel breathing this humiliating atmosphere, is well, also, your affectionate friend and servant,

VALERIANO WEYLER.

By the time this letter reached Havana the riots had taken place, autonomy had revealed its weakness, and it had become a question whether any elections would be held. The Conservatives had announced that they would not by voting become parties to such a plan, and the information that Weyler had changed his mind and counselled participation in the elections and electing him as deputy in the face of the autonomous plan was naturally regarded as an important piece of news. But as the *Maine* had not then reached Havana, and little or nothing was known outside of official circles of her intended visit, the reporters took no notice of the latter part of Weyler's

note, regarding it as a species of that braggadocio to which they had become accustomed when he was Captain-General. Lainé threw the copy of the letter into his desk, and two days later the *Maine* anchored in the harbor.

Fortunately, the attention of Havana people was somewhat diverted at just this time by events in the field. General Blanco had gone on a trip to the eastern end of the island, where the Spanish forces had suffered several defeats at the hands of Garcia and Rabi, and on January 27th there was great joy among the Spaniards when the dead body of the young Cuban general, Aranguren, who for months had terrorized Havana by his daring raids, was brought to the city and exhibited. He had been one of the picturesque figures of the rebellion, second only to Maceo in the dread he inspired in the Spaniards, and after he executed Colonel Ruiz, who tried to induce him to accept autonomy, the great object of the Spanish officers was to capture Aranguren dead or alive. But he was not captured in battle. Through a Cuban prisoner, the Spaniards learned that the daring insurgent was in the habit of quietly paying visits to a family in the suburbs of Havana. Offered a bribe of \$500 if he would lead them to the place, the negro accepted, and one morning the Spanish cavalry burst upon it from all directions. Aranguren and his orderly were shot at the first volley, and the younger members of the family fell wounded into the arms of the father and mother, who were made prisoners.

General Blanco's mission to the east was a complete failure. He had gone with the expectation of winning the insurgent leaders over to autonomy, but their only response had been to press harder upon the Spanish forces in the east, which were in a sad condition of neglect, poorly fed, and not paid at all. The pretence of autonomy was sinking lower and lower into contempt; the new cabinet was like a hornets' nest; deeper and deeper into misery were falling the starving reconcentrados. From an American point of view the situation had become well-nigh intolerable. American citizens were held as

virtual prisoners away from their plantations; the American consuls required constant military and police protection, yet in response to the appeal for contributions they were doing everything possible to relieve the condition of the starving people, while the Spanish guerrillas were doing everything possible to exterminate them.

In a diplomatic note Spain pleaded for a longer trial of autonomy and said that the United States could not expect the war to close within an indefinite period unless filibustering expeditions were prevented. The whole responsibility for the success of these expeditions she placed upon us, though her naval vessels were supposed to command the whole coast of Cuba. This intimation was resented by the United States in a strong note, detailing our efforts to prevent filibustering.

When affairs were in this delicate situation, the Cuban Junta in New York made public the following astounding letter purporting to have been written by the Spanish minister at Washington, Senor De Lome, to the editor of *El Herald* at Madrid, who had recently been on a visit to Cuba:

LEGATION DE ESPAÑA, WASHINGTON.

EXIMO SEÑOR DON JOSÉ CANALEJAS:

My Distinguished and Dear Friend:—You need not apologize for not having written to me; I also ought to have written to you, but have not done so on account of being weighed down with work, and *nous sommes quittes*.

The situation here continues unchanged. Everything depends upon the political and military success in Cuba. The prologue of this second method of warfare will end the day that the Colonial Cabinet shall be appointed, and it relieves us in the eyes of this country of a part of the responsibility of what may happen there, and they must cast the responsibility upon the Cubans whom they believe to be so immaculate.

Until then we will not be able to see clearly and I consider it to be a loss of time and an advance by the wrong road—the sending of emissaries to the rebel field, the negotiating with the autonomists not yet declared to be legally constituted and the discovery of the intentions and purpose of this government. The exiles will return one by one, and, when they return, will come walking into the sheepfold, and the chiefs will gradually return. Neither of these had the courage to leave *en masse*, and they will not have the courage thus to return.

The message has undeceived the insurgents who expected something else, and has paralyzed the action of Congress, but I consider it bad.

Besides the natural and inevitable coarseness (*groseria*) with which he repeats all that the press and public opinion of Spain has said of Weyler, it shows once more what McKinley is — weak and catering to the rabble, and, besides, a low politician, who desires to leave a door open to me and to stand well with the jingoes of his party.

Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, it will only depend on ourselves whether he will prove bad and adverse to us. I agree entirely with you ; without a military success nothing will be accomplished there, and without military and political success there is here always danger that the insurgents will be encouraged, if not by the government, at least by part of the public opinion.

I do not believe you pay enough attention to the rôle of England. Nearly all that newspaper *canaille* which swarm in your hotel are English, and at the same time that they are correspondents of the *Journal* they are also correspondents of the best newspapers and reviews in London. Thus it has been since the beginning. To my mind the only object of England is that the Americans should occupy themselves with us and leave her in peace, and if there is a war so much the better ; that would further remove what is threatening her — although that will never happen.

It would be most important that you should agitate the question of commercial relations even though it would be only for effect, and that you should send here a man of importance in order that I may use him to make a propaganda among the Senators and others in opposition to the Junta and to win over exiles.

There goes Amblard. I believe he comes too deeply taken up with little political matters and there must be something very great or we shall lose.

Adela returns your salutation and we wish you in the new year to be a messenger of peace and take this New Year's present to poor Spain.

Always your attentive friend and servant who kisses your hands.

ENRIQUE DUPUY DE LOME.

How this letter found its way into the hands of the Cuban Junta was a mystery, and, indeed, has practically remained so, but it made little difference, as the Spanish minister at once declined to deny its authenticity, and afterwards admitted it. Following its publication events moved rapidly. Anticipating the inevitable, De Lome cabled his resignation to Sagasta. However much the President might be inclined to overlook the attack upon himself, he was aware of the serious aspect of the letter as affecting our relations with Spain. The State Department, which on the following day came into possession of the original letter, secured from De Lome a frank affirmation that he had written it, and Minister Woodford was

requested to demand De Lome's immediate recall. The Sagasta ministry accepted the resignation in time to prevent this government from handing De Lome his passports, but the incident was not regarded as closed unless Spain made some disavowal of the intimations that her agitation of the question of commercial relations was for nothing more than effect, and that she proposed to institute a lobby in the United States Senate.

The negotiations for reciprocal commercial relations formed one of the diplomatic side issues which Spain was apparently using to beguile the United States away from the point of intervention. Of course, our government was obliged to accept Spanish representations in this line as genuine, whether it really thought so or not. So long as Spain retained her sovereignty of the island it would be of the greatest advantage to obtain less discriminating tariffs in Cuba as related to American goods. In October, 1897, Minister De Lome had notified this government that as soon as Spain had leisure to take up the subject he would probably be authorized to enter into negotiations for reciprocal trade arrangements, but the Spanish government never seemed to have leisure to refer to the subject except when the United States showed a fresh disposition to do something with the Cuban question. On the 6th of February, or two days before De Lome's abusive letter was made public, he called upon John A. Kasson, who had been appointed a special commissioner plenipotentiary by this government for these commercial negotiations with Spain, and said that he had been authorized to act for Spain in the matter and that a special commissioner would soon arrive from Cuba to represent the autonomous government. Such was the situation when De Lome's letter practically announced that this dicker-ing over commercial relations was only for effect.

It was apparent enough to all who were watching developments that all of Spain's diplomacy was for effect — professions of reform, freer commercial relations, the pardoning of American citizens who had been long imprisoned — all for

the sake of throwing obstacles in the way of active intervention by this country in Cuban affairs, and of creating sympathy in Europe. But until this diplomatic veneer had been frankly exposed in the De Lome letter no notice was taken of it.

On the 14th of February, Spain sent a disavowal of the sentiments of the letter, and named Don Luis Polo y Barnabe to take De Lome's place, and the President authorized the statement that the incident was closed. The tension in the relations between the two nations appeared to be relaxed; a resolution for the belligerency of the Cubans was the same day reported adversely; De Lome had gone to New York, where he was waiting for the departure of a steamer, and the Spanish cruiser *Vizcaya* was on her way to the port of New York to reciprocate the friendly visit of the *Maine*, which was floating quietly in the harbor of Havana. Such was the situation when the following message flashed over the cables to the State Department:

HAVANA, February 16, 1898.—12.30 A. M.

Maine blown up and destroyed to-night at 9.40 P. M. Explosion occurred well forward under quarters of crew; consequence many were lost. It is believed all officers saved, but Jenkins and Merrit not yet accounted for. Cause of explosion yet to be investigated. Captain-General and Spanish army and navy officers have rendered every assistance. Sigsbee and most of his officers on Ward steamer *City of Washington*. Others on Spanish man-of-war and in city. Am with Sigsbee now, who has telegraphed Navy Department.

LEE.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE NIGHT OF FEBRUARY 15, 1898—A FEARFUL EXPLOSION AND SCENES OF HORROR—REMARKABLE ESCAPES—THE WORK OF RESCUE—THE NEWS AT WASHINGTON.

A Quiet night in Havana Harbor—The *Maine* Swinging at her Chain—A Sudden Roar, a Crashing Explosion, and a Mass of Flying Flames and Débris—The Shrieks of Dying Men—The Silence of Death—Captain Sigsbee's Escape—Standing on the Sinking Ship—Lowering the Boats—The Officers in the Mess Room—Frightful Experiences—Lieut. Jenkins Groping in the Water—"Which Way"—Lieutenant Hood's Graphic Story—The Work of Rescue—A Last Call but no Answer from the Burning Ruins—Spanish Delight—Captain Sigsbee Leaves the Ship—Visits from Spanish Officers—Sigsbee's Despatches to the Department—"Don' Send War Vessels"—Excitement at Washington—Scenes at the White House—In the Cabinet Room—The Official Impression—The General Impression—Sympathy of Spanish Officials at Havana—Public Funeral of the Victims—Appointment of the Court of Inquiry.

IT was a calm, warm night in the harbor of Havana—the night of February 15, 1898. The great United States battleship lay quietly at her anchorage pointing nearly northwest. About 250 yards ahead of her and midway between her anchorage and the Machina wharf was moored the Spanish man-of-war, the *Alfonso XII*. The Spanish despatch boat, *Ligaspi*, which had come out two days before, lay at a berth a little further to the north. The steamer *City of Washington* of the Ward line, which had just arrived, was lying about two hundred yards to the southward and eastward of the *Maine's* stern, slightly on the port quarter, and other vessels were quietly at anchor at distances somewhat more remote.

The stars shone dimly through the still and heavy atmosphere, while across the gently undulating waters of the harbor from every direction vibrated the lights of the city. So quiet was the night and the surroundings that the echoes of the

bugle sounding from the deck of the *Maine* at tattoo were singularly distinct, and they fell pleasantly upon the ear.

The usual inspection of magazines had been completed; every part of the ship, every room, every passageway had been entered and examined; the keys had been given to Captain Sigsbee, who was seated at his port cabin table, writing a letter to his family. Other officers were in their rooms aft, reading or writing, or conversing in little groups in other parts of the ship. Swinging in their hammocks and lying about the ship forward, some asleep and some spinning yarns, were the gallant young sailors and marines off duty. Others were on their watch on deck, and the sentries were at their posts. The reports had been made to the officer of the watch. Half-past nine — All was well.

Passengers from the United States on the *City of Washington* had come up to the stern of the ship to watch the *Maine*.

"We are under the guns of the United States," said one. "We are well protected, and we can sit here."

As they looked there came a roar of immense volume, a little interval, just enough to be distinguishable, and then a sharp crashing report, a burst of flame high in the air, and a great rising mass of smoke, streaked with burning or black flying objects. The bow of the *Maine* rose out of the water, and then, before the light of the explosion faded, the ship settled back and down — deeper and deeper — while round the bow surged a foaming semicircle of water, of débris, and groaning men, the cries for help falling to a low murmur as the bow settled below the foam.

Such was the frightful spectacle from a little distance in that awful moment — at 9.40 on the night of February 15th.

Death sealed the lips of 260 of her gallant men. All that was known of their experience was told in that appealing cry for help as it mingled with the hissing and the roaring of the fearful maelstrom of fire and water in which they were struggling — a cry which died away into a moan and then into the silence of death.



DESTRUCTION OF THE UNITED STATES BATTLESHIP "MAINE" IN THE HARBOR OF HAVANA,
FEBRUARY 15, 1898.

Captain Sigsbee was just finishing his letter when he felt the first crash of the explosion, the trembling and lurching motion of the vessel and the subsidence. The electric lights went out. He thought at once that the *Maine* had been blown up and was sinking. Thinking it might be necessary for him to make an exit by the cabin port holes on the starboard he rushed in that direction, but found that he could get out by the passage leading to the superstructure. He, therefore, took the latter route, feeling his way along and steadying himself by the bulkheads. At the quarter deck he found some of his officers who had escaped, asked a few questions hurriedly, and then climbed up on the side-rail, holding to the main rigging in order to see over the poop awning, which was covered with debris, but he could make little out of the black mass ahead of him. He ordered Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright to post sentries all around the ship, but in a moment they saw that there were no marines to post and no place forward to post them. By this time the surviving officers had all worked their way out and were standing by his side on the poop. He commanded silence everywhere, and directed that the forward magazines be flooded, but soon saw that they were already under water, and those who were coming up from the ward room told him that the water was rushing in over everything. About this time fire broke out in the mass forward and he could see the white floating bodies in the water and hear their faint cries. That gave him a better knowledge of the situation than anything else, and he immediately ordered the boats to be lowered, but it was found that only two boats were available. These were lowered and manned and left the ship to save the wounded, jointly with other boats, which by this time had arrived on the scene from the Spanish man-of-war and the *City of Washington*.

While Captain Sigsbee, with a few of his officers, was standing there the boats returned and reported that they had gathered in from the wreck all the wounded that could be found. The *Maine* was settling very fast, and by this time

the deck where the officers stood was level with the gig's gunwale afloat in the water alongside. The fire amidships was burning more fiercely and the spare ammunition in the pilot-house was exploding.

All the officers were accounted for except Lieutenant Jenkins and Engineer Merritt. At the time of the explosion Lieutenants Jungen, Holman, and Jenkins, and Chief Engineer Howell were at a small table in the after part of the wardroom messroom talking. Jungen has just finished his cigar and was rising, when there came the dull, deafening roar, followed by the frightful crash, and it seemed to them as if the whole ship was falling to pieces.

"We have been torpedoed!" shouted Holman, jumping up. "Follow me."

They had hardly reached the opposite door when the lights went out and left them in total darkness. Jungen supposed that both Holman and Jenkins were ahead of him, but he could hear neither, and stretching out his hands he followed along till he reached the ladder, which he ascended to the passageway of the after superstructure, turning to the left, intending to go forward. But he at once encountered a mass of *débris*. He tried to reach the ladder leading to the poop, but could not. His only escape was to raise himself by a door on the superstructure. At his first effort he failed and fell back; straining every muscle for the second effort, he swung himself up, caught a chain and raised himself to the poop, where he found the Captain and Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright. Holman and Howell worked themselves out in much the same manner, but Jenkins, who had probably tried to save some papers, missed his way.

The mess attendant, John H. Turpin, had been in the wardroom pantry when the explosion occurred, and the officers in the messroom had started to find their way out. Before he reached the messroom the lights were all extinguished. He heard Jenkins shout to him, "Which way?"

"I don't know which way," cried Turpin.

The water was rushing in rapidly, and as they groped about came nearly to their waists.

"Which way?" shouted Jenkins again.

"I don't know, sir, which way," replied Turpin again, as he felt his way along a wall. The water rose to his breast and Jenkins shouted again, and again Turpin replied that he could not make out his direction. Suddenly the whole compartment lit up by the light of an explosion — one of the after-explosions in the magazines — and Jenkins started forward, threw up both his hands, and fell by the steerage pantry. Turpin got his direction, and groped his way aft to the captain's ladder, which he found carried away. The water was up to his chin, and rushing in with frightful rapidity. He was just giving up when he felt a rope, and climbing on this hand over hand, he reached the deck, from which he soon jumped overboard. As he swam out a Spanish gig passed him, but he dove under water, thinking that the ship had been attacked and that he would be captured. When he came up he swam towards the *Maine's* barge and was pulled in. By this time many small boats were about the wreck, picking up the drowning men, and many were the thrilling, the fearful experiences of those who succeeded in extricating themselves from the awful wreck.

Lieutenant Hood's graphic story, as told to the Naval Board of Inquiry, gives a graphic picture of the horrors following the explosion. He said: "I was sitting on the port side of the deck, with my feet on the rail, and I both heard and felt — felt more than I heard — a big explosion that sounded and felt like an under-water explosion. I was under the impression that it came from forward starboard at the time. I instantly turned my head and that instant there was a second explosion. I saw the whole starboard side of the deck and everything above it as far aft as the after end of the superstructure spring up in the air with all kinds of objects in it — a regular crater-like performance with flames and everything else coming up. I immediately sprang behind the edge of the

superstructure for shelter, as there were a number of objects flying in my direction. I ran very quickly aft, as fast as I could, along the after end of the superstructure, and climbed up on a kind of step. I went under the barge, and by this time the explosion had passed. The objects had stopped flying around. Then I saw on the starboard side an immense amount of foaming water and wreckage and groaning men out there. It was scattered around in a circle, I should say about a hundred yards in diameter, off on the starboard side. I immediately proceeded to lower the gig with the help of another man. After I got that in the water, several officers jumped in it and one or two men, to rescue the wounded. In the meantime somebody else was lowering the other boat on the port side. I heard some groans forward and ran forward on the quarter deck down the poop ladder, and I immediately brought up on an immense pile of wreckage. I saw one man there who had been thrown from somewhere, pinned down by a ventilator. We got him up just in time, just before the water rose over him."

Corporal Thompson was lying in his hammock on the port gangway about twenty feet from the turret, when he was suddenly thrown through the port awning as high as the superstructure. He fell back on the deck stunned. As soon as he realized his position, he regained his feet and hung to the ridge rope till the water came nearly up to his neck. Just then a rope was thrown him from one of the boats; he let go of the ridge rope, sank, came up and managed to catch the line and was pulled into the boat.

Every few minutes, as the *Maine* burned fiercely, a shell would burst, scattering the flaming débris all about, but still the men in the boats worked bravely to find the injured. No more cries could be heard, though they knew that over 200 sailors must be on board. Then an officer of one of the *Maine's* boats approached the ship, and, with a voice that could be heard far away in the stillness of the night called out: "If any one is alive on board, for God's sake say so!" All

waited for an answer, but none came, save the echo from the shore.

Nearly all Havana was on the wharves watching the spectacle, and among the rabble could be heard the cry of "*Viva España!*" and "*Mueran los Americanos!*" Expressions of delight were unmistakable.

While Captain Sigsbee and Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright were watching the details of the awful scene from the poop, it became evident that they must take to the boats, as there was danger that the forward magazine might explode, for parts of it were constantly going off. Everything had been done that could be done. So they left the ship and went to the *City of Washington*, where they found the wounded and dying lying upon mattresses in the dining saloon. Many had been taken aboard the Spanish war ship, where they were being cared for. Having observed that the wounded were being attended to, and having directed a muster to be taken of those on board the rescuing vessels, the Captain went on deck and took a last look of the burning wreck of his vessel. At midnight he went below and dictated a telegram to the Navy Department. While there several Spanish officers — civil, military, and naval — came on board, in their own behalf and in representative capacity, expressing sympathy and sorrow for "the accident." There were the representatives of General Blanco and of the admiral of the station, and the civil governor of the province was on board in person. Having finished his telegrams, Captain Sigsbee met the group of Spanish gentlemen and thanked them for their visit and sympathy. Invariably, their expressions of sympathy were followed by eager inquiries as to Captain Sigsbee's idea of the cause of the accident, for accident it must have been, they said. Invariably, the Captain replied that he must await further investigation. Doubtless, this curiosity was natural. Even if entirely innocent, they knew that Spanish designs would be suspected because of the bitter feeling in Havana toward the United States, and because of the desperate character of the officers

of the Volunteers, as well as some of those of the regular army. But Captain's Sigsbee's visitors insisted that it must have been an accident.

"I am convinced it was the dynamo boiler," said a Spanish naval officer.

"But we had no dynamo," said Captain Sigsbee.

"Then it must have been the boilers," said the Spanish officer.

"But the forward boilers had not been lighted for three months," replied Sigsbee. "Only the after boilers were used, and the explosion occurred well forward."

But the torpedoes, someone suggested. The torpedoes had not been fitted with war-heads, and without them the torpedoes were harmless. Besides, they were kept aft. As for the forward magazines, the ammunition was exploding in detail while the officers were talking, and kept on exploding much of the night. Fifty feet aft from the bow was the first storeroom for ammunition. It was twenty feet wide across the ship, twelve feet fore and aft, and seven feet high. On one side was kept the shells and on another the powder for the 6-inch guns. Aft of this room was another of the same dimensions, the storeroom for ammunition for the six-pounder, and one-pounder Hotchkiss guns. Back of this was the first of the ship's large magazines, twenty-eight feet wide and twenty-four feet fore and aft. It was divided into three compartments by partitions, so that one-half of the magazine was used for powder for the 10-inch guns, and the other compartments contained powder for the 6-inch guns and shells for the 10-inch guns. Running along either side of the magazine were narrow coal bunkers. Everything had been thoroughly inspected shortly before the explosion. Had the explosion originated in those magazines, thought the survivors of the *Maine*, there would have been nothing left to explode. But they kept their thoughts to themselves. It was a critical time.

The despatch Captain Sigsbee sent to the Navy Department was as follows:

"*Maine* blown up in Havana harbor at 9.40 last night and destroyed. Many wounded and doubtless more killed or drowned. Wounded and others on board Spanish man-of-war and Ward Line steamers. Send light-house tender from Key West for crew and the few pieces of equipment above water. None has clothing other than that upon him. Public opinion should be suspended until further report. All officers believed to be saved; Jenkins and Merritt not yet accounted for. Many Spanish officers, including representatives of General Blanco, now with me to express sympathy."

He also sent the following to Key West:

"Tell admiral *Maine* blown up and destroyed. Send lighthouse tenders. Many killed and wounded. Don't send war vessels if others available."

When asked afterwards at Washington why he had advised against sending war ships he said: "In the first place there was a great deal of excitement, and I wanted to work along without men-of-war, and to allay the excitement in the city; and, in the next place, if there were any more mines, I did not want any more war vessels blown up. Up to that time I had strongly recommended that the *Indiana* be sent there, just to show them that the *Maine* was not the only vessel in the navy or the most powerful. After that time I had no more confidence in the people. Treachery had been shown us, and there was no special care for us. They had not attempted to protect us."

General Lee was sitting in his room in his hotel when the explosion occurred, and as soon as he learned that it was the *Maine*, he hastened to the palace and asked for General Blanco. He came immediately and Lee said that tears were in his eyes. He seemed to regret it as much as anyone in Havana. But he soon heard that many Spanish officers were drinking champagne at different cafés in honor of the event.

Three hours after the *Maine* had been blown up representatives of the press were rushing about Washington in cabs at midnight, ringing doorbells, and informing the Secretary of the Navy and every one connected with the department, of "a bad accident to the *Maine*." There was no doubt in the

minds of the Secretary of the Navy and his assistants that something unfriendly had happened to the battleship sent on her "friendly mission" a little more than a fortnight before. Suppressed excitement continued everywhere. Early the next morning crowds were gathered about the models of battleships and cruisers in the halls of the Navy Department. Men of the press and others were keeping a well-worn path between the Department and the White House, and here and there were little groups, all quiet, talking in low tones, some faces white, with strained expressions. At the White House were more faces white and strained, and the few words one heard were in strangely quiet undertones. The men on duty at the door and about the halls replied mechanically to questions of visitors.

Preparations for the last of the series of official receptions to be given the next evening had been nearly completed — the box arrangements for wraps all up in the outer corridor, and floral decorations in the east room and state parlors. A woman came in, and, as her first glance fell upon the improvised cloak-room, she exclaimed:

"Oh, you are not going on with the reception, are you, while a hundred American sailors lie dead in Havana?"

Her voice trembled with feeling, though she did not know that instead of one hundred dead American sailors, there were 260. That was given out later. There had been no order as yet to give up the reception, and the attendant to whom she spoke looked distressed, but could only reply:

"I — I don't know."

Up in the Cabinet-room the President was talking it over with such members of his cabinet as were in town, and during the day the contents of the dispatches from Havana were given out from time to time. There was no disposition to withhold anything, and, indeed, it would have been very unwise to have done so, under the strain of public excitement and anxiety. When the Attorney-General came out of the cabinet-room he was instantly surrounded by men of the press, who



APPEARANCE OF THE BATTLESHIP "MAINE." A FEW DAYS AFTER THE EXPLOSION.
A wrecking boat hoisting one of the great guns from the wreck.

looked rather than asked the questions usually "fired" in quest of information. He stood his ground well, looking them squarely in the face as he said in cool, deliberate tones:

"Everything known about the disaster will be given out; the President directs it, and you will learn all from the Secretary of the Navy. Perhaps it is just as well, therefore, that I should say nothing more."

Then, after an instant's pause, he added: "The Spanish government at Havana tenders its sympathy." He bowed and passed down the stairway. There was not a word of comment. Men of the press had become hardened to the "friendly relation" phase of the Cuban policy.

Ten minutes later the Secretary of the Navy came out of the cabinet-room. Three men who had been waiting for him were at his side at once. On their return one was asked:

"Well, what is the impression — the official impression?"

"Oh, the official impression is that it was an accident."

"And the other impression — the general impression?"

"Oh, the general impression is that it was *not* an accident."

In the meantime at the Navy Department telegrams were coming by the score from relatives and friends of the dead sailors buried next day at Havana. A Court of Inquiry to investigate the cause of the disaster was at once appointed, and it was also promptly decided not to send another warship to Havana for the present. General Lee, as well as Captain Sigsbee, advised against sending another ship at once, and, undoubtedly, they had good reasons for such advice.

The Spanish authorities, however, acted in the most sympathetic and cordial manner. The hospitals were opened for the wounded and the Spanish physicians and nurses assisted the surgeon of the ship in alleviating the sufferings of the injured. It being impossible to embalm the dead and send them to this country, the bodies that were found were buried in Havana, Captain-General Blanco offering to give them a public funeral at the public expense. There was a great funeral cortège, in which 5,000 people were in line. The Bishop of

Havana, assisted by the chaplain of the ship, conducted the religious ceremonies. No trouble was spared in Havana to make the survivors as comfortable as possible and to show sympathy for the great loss by the "accident."

The Court of Inquiry, composed of Captain William T. Sampson, Captain French E. Chadwick, Lieutenant-Commander William P. Potter, and Lieutenant-Commander Adolph Marix, proceeded at once to Havana and began a secret investigation on Monday the 21st. Divers were set to work under command of Captain Sigsbee. At first some little friction developed as to our rights in the wreck. When early on the morning of the 18th Captain Sigsbee and three of his officers rowed out to endeavor to find in the hulk the bodies of Lieutenant Jenkins and Engineer Merritt, they were stopped by a guard of armed Spanish sailors surrounding the sunken battleship. Captain Sigsbee declared who he was and his intentions, but they told him that they had strict orders not to allow any diver employed by Americans to go down unless accompanied by a Spanish diver. Captain Sigsbee returned and together with General Lee held a long discussion with the Admiral and General Blanco. It was urged that the wreck was American property and under the jurisdiction of American officers, and the point was finally carried. Had the Havana authorities insisted on their claim, the impression would naturally have been formed that they had reason to fear that something incriminating them would be found. They asked for a joint investigation, but the court preferred to act independently, with assurances to the Spanish officials that, on their part, every facility for making a separate investigation would be extended to them.

The administration had every reason for confidence in the members of the Court of Inquiry. Captain Sampson had been chief of the Bureau of Ordnance for several years, and was a man of positive convictions and judicial disposition. The other members had special qualifications which entitled them to confidence.

CHAPTER XXX

PREPARING FOR WAR—EVIDENCE OF SPANISH TREACHERY —MILLIONS FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE—A HISTORICAL MOMENT—THE DRIFT INTO WAR.

Effects of the *Maine* Incident upon Our Cuban Policy—A Plain, Concrete Case—The People Remain Patient—The President's Policy Interrupted—Reasons for the Accidental Theory—Not Really Believed in Official Circles—General Lee Informs the State Department that It Looked Like an Outside Explosion—Sudden Activity in Official Circles—Preparations for War—*Oregon* Ordered Home—Dewey Ordered to Concentrate His Fleet—Arrival and Departure of the *Vizcaya*—Our Precautions for Her Safety—Spain's Responsibility for the Safety of the *Maine*—Deeper and Deeper Misery in Cuba—Red Cross Work—Spain's Request for the Recall of General Lee—Her Reasons—Probing for the Weyler Letter—Lainé's Arrest and Expulsion—Lee Finds a Weyler Telegram—Corroborative Evidence—The President Seeks Support in Congress—\$50,000,000 for National Defense—A Critical Moment in Our National Life.

IT is a question whether the *Maine* incident really hastened or delayed actual hostilities. Undoubtedly, it crystallized American sentiment; here was something concrete in its character and appealing directly to the sentiment of the people as Americans. If they had been balancing doubtfully as to our grounds for interference because of Spanish excesses in Cuba and Spanish disregard of our rights, they could doubt no longer when a fine battleship lay at the bottom of Havana harbor, with the mangled bodies of 260 sailors and marines in the wreck. They might fail to appreciate the seriousness of affairs when couched in the smooth words of diplomacy, but the ruin of the *Maine* was understood. No matter whether it suggested motives of revenge or not; it suggested action. There was something more than a general impression that it was not an accident. It was a belief.

Nevertheless, the people were not at first impatient. Self-repression was a dominant characteristic, even in Congress.

Nothing else was talked about in conversation, but little was said in public utterance to arouse the suppressed excitement, and though it was attempted it met a silent reproof even from Cuban sympathizers who fully realized that action must follow. But it introduced a new phase into our relations with Spain, and one which required a little time for an adjustment, so that we might not appear to rush into war out of pure revenge. It really interrupted the course of the policy which the administration had laid down. Spain had been given to understand that we could not contemplate an indefinite continuance of the existing affairs in Cuba; our war ships had been sent to the vicinity of Cuba, and as a preparation for a vigorous policy the President had collected from the consuls on the island a great mass of reports confirming all the assertions in the newspapers about the starving reconcentrados. Congress had called for these reports and the President was just on the point of giving them to Congress and to the world when the news of the *Maine* explosion came. So the reports were held back in the fear that, when added to the disaster, the excitement might lead Congress to declare war on the instant, and prudence commanded that we should go to war, if we went at all, decently and in order.

It was for this reason that the administration fostered the impression that the sinking of the *Maine* might have been an accident, while the "peace-at-any-price" men became almost ridiculous in their efforts to show that it certainly was an accident. They were willing to gloat over and enlarge upon any rumor that the discipline on the *Maine* was bad, rumors which usually emanated from similar sources. To all appearances, they would have been glad to shift the responsibility upon one of the most competent and gallant of our naval officers, and their attitude had an exasperating rather than a quieting effect upon the mass of the people, who were waiting patiently for the report of the naval board. On the other hand, all sorts of rumors were circulated by those who seemed desirous of plunging the country at once into war. The administra-

tion, doubtless in the interest of peace and dispassionate judgment, appeared to hold the theory that the country should consider the disaster to the *Maine* an accident till there had been ample evidence to the contrary; on the other hand, the people preferred the theory that it should be considered a piece of Spanish treachery till there should be ample evidence to the contrary.

But if the higher officials of the administration and the leaders of Congress would not admit that they saw evidences of Spanish treachery in this tragedy following the long chain of dramatic incidents connected with our controversy with Spain, in their hearts was even more than a grave fear and a dark suspicion. And it was not long before this suspicion was strengthened. The administration does not seem to have sought information of a conclusive character till the whole could be known and given to the public. But if prudence required its members to avoid exciting Congress and the people, it also required it to secure some little intimation of what might be expected. Going to war is not a simple business. It requires, besides ways and means, men and arms, and a motive which any European nation favorable to Spain or hostile to the United States on general principles could not question. To rush into war might prove disastrous, and yet the President felt that if anything developed showing conclusively that the *Maine* was blown up from outside war would become inevitable. The people would hardly allow the government to take any other course, and no man ever had a greater respect for the sentiment of the people than President McKinley. They could not appreciate the perils of the situation nor the tremendous responsibilities resting upon the executive, who knew we were living over a volcano. But he wisely counseled patience and allowed the people to think that he believed the *Maine* to have met her fate through an accident. He had planned a Cuban policy upon broad lines, and it was a very serious matter to have such a disaster at such a moment suggesting in the hearts of so many the thought of revenge or swift retribution. Every considera-

tion of prudence and safety required him to keep this great moving patriotic sentiment of a nation of nearly 80,000,000 people in check. But could he?

General Lee sent but one dispatch concerning the investigation of the causes of the disaster, and that was the day after the naval board began its inquiry. In it he said: "Copper cylinders' ammunition found intact in 10-inch forward magazine, starboard side, this morning. Seems to show that magazine not exploded. Evidence beginning to prove explosion on port side by torpedo."

This dispatch was not given out then, not till long after; it would have been unwise; but the keen senses of the newspaper men knew that something had happened. "Owing to some inexplicable cause," wrote one on the 24th, "the air of Washington is again surcharged with feverish excitement over the extremely delicate situation resulting from the destruction of the battleship *Maine*."

The people understood the pacific official expressions and were not surprised when preparations for action were suddenly begun. Vessels out of commission were being put in readiness; ammunition was being manufactured at an unusual rate; coal was being stored at convenient points along the coast; fortifications were being repaired and put in readiness for the defense of the coast; inquiries concerning the mobilization of the naval and ordinary militia were sent to a few States likely to be first summoned into action in case of war. On March 9th it was decided to withdraw the battleship *Oregon* from the Pacific squadron. Such a step could hardly have been taken had peace been deemed probable, for it imposed upon the battleship a very long journey around the Horn. Orders were sent to Rear Admiral Dewey, commander of the Asiatic naval squadron, to concentrate his ships at Hong Kong; in fact, no step was spared for placing us in a position to sternly face a foe in the immediate future. Spain also began to negotiate for ships, and, fearing the successful consummation of such negotiations, Secretary Long on March 9th cabled to the naval at-

tachés of the United States abroad to obtain options on armored cruisers and torpedo boat-destroyers.

At the White House and State Department, where they were preparing to make representations to Spain in connection with the *Maine* disaster and the general Cuban question, they were talking peace. In the Military and Naval Departments, where they were preparing for war, they were talking peace. The average Senator or Representative was talking war. With them war was inevitable. But, peace or war, the President had a fixed purpose in view. If forcible intervention came, it would be because Spain declined to consider intermediary propositions looking to the independence of the island through peaceful means. He determined to keep his existing Cuban policy intact and to handle the *Maine* disaster as a separate incident.

So far as could be seen, the Spanish authorities made no attempt to discover whether a plot to blow up the *Maine* had existed. They seem to have taken it for granted that it was an accident, and their investigation was a farce — a most transparent effort to bolster up the accident theory. The whole forward part of the ship from a point just abaft the forward turret had been twisted fifteen or twenty degrees to starboard, and that part of the wreck was a wilderness of débris and curled and twisted plates.

But was the force of the explosion inward or outward? In seeking to answer this question the divers soon found conclusive testimony.

When it became evident from what little leaked out that the disaster could not have been caused by an explosion of the boilers, the "official impression" was that it must have been due to the explosion of the forward magazines where the powder was.


It was evident by the 26th that the administration had in reality abandoned the accident theory, and at a cabinet meeting the possibilities of the future were discussed. Even if it were conclusively shown that the Spanish government either

at Madrid or at Havana had nothing to do with the design, Spain would be no less responsible for not protecting the ship while in the harbor, particularly if she had been deliberately anchored over a mine.

The Spanish cruiser *Vizcaya*, which had arrived at the port of New York in the midst of the public excitement over the loss of the *Maine*, departed on February 26th as safe and sound as she came. The precautions of the port authorities to guard the Spanish vessel from all harm were thorough and effective, and the extreme to which these precautions were carried was illustrated by the fact that even the Holland submarine boat was constantly watched. The government, in short, accepted its responsibility for the security of a foreign vessel of war visiting its waters on a friendly mission.

It is a principle of international law that a ship of war admitted to a foreign port is accorded the privilege of extra-territoriality. While ordinarily this consists simply of immunity from local jurisdiction, yet by reason of the principles underlying the privilege of extra-territoriality such vessel of war is entitled to the same immunity and inviolability which surrounds the person of an ambassador and his hotel. It becomes, therefore, the duty of the authorities responsible for the government of the harbor visited by a foreign public vessel to use due diligence that such vessel is not injured by any violence of the inhabitants or by any hidden means of injury known to such government, such as submarine mines, torpedoes, or other concealed means of defense. And this duty is intensified to the highest degree when the fact is taken into consideration that foreign public vessels of war, being subject to the port regulations, must anchor where directed by the local authorities.

It is a well-established fact that a government is liable for damages done to alien residents of a country by a mob which by due diligence it could have repressed. Italy not long ago was indemnified by the United States for the injury done to her citizens by a mob in New Orleans. In 1853 the Congress of



IN HAMMOCKS "TWEEN DECKS"—WHERE "JACK" SLEEPS ON A BATTLESHIP.

the United States acceded to the demand of Spain for the indemnity for losses sustained by the consul of Spain and other persons residing at New Orleans or at Key West, in the year 1851, through the violence of individuals excited by the intelligence then recently received at those places of the execution of certain persons in Havana by the Spanish authorities of Cuba.

Should it be established that the *Maine* was blown up either through design or want of due diligence on the part of the authorities at Havana, Spain's responsibility would be complete, and would justify the United States in resorting to drastic measures of redress.

Convinced that the Cubans would not accept the plan of autonomy proposed, the autonomist party in Cuba began to discuss additional measures without any assurance from Spain that she would consent to them. They were suggested with the evident intention of determining, if possible, to what extent it would be necessary to go to induce the insurgents to lay down their arms. But the insurgents continued firm in their demand for absolute independence, and Spain was in reality equally firm in her determination to maintain her sovereignty and reject any active interference by the United States.

Financially, Spain was sinking deeper and deeper into debt, and knew not how to pay arrears due the army, civil servants, and other debtors, while an annual interest charge of \$65,000,000 was due and the Cuban indebtedness had arisen to nearly \$500,000,000. Meanwhile, affairs both financial and military seemed to be drifting without any clear plan of action or distinct hopes for the future. Bad as this was, the starvation and suffering in Cuba were much worse. Official statistics as reported showed that in the province of Matanzas alone 50,000 people had perished, and a third of the population left were in destitution.

Miss Clara Barton of the Red Cross Society, on her arrival in Cuba reported that the condition was far worse than she had believed possible. The planters and business men were

almost or quite ruined. It appeared as if years of peace would be required to restore industry and commerce to a normal state. In short, the entire condition of the island was desperate and apparently almost hopeless. Wholly apart from the *Maine* disaster, the serious issue in the Cuban question was a continuing one. Our government had reached the belief that the time had nearly come when humanity and commercial interests alone required it to intervene.

While the Court of Inquiry was conducting its inquiry, the public waited patiently and with little knowledge of the nature of the testimony or of the impression made upon the members of the board, which observed the greatest secrecy. But some points, for which the enterprising press were lying in wait, leaked out, such as, for example, the fact that much of the ammunition in the forward magazine was found intact. Everything went to confirm the general impression and belief that the disaster was not an accident. The public had made up its mind with an instinct which is generally unerring.

If the official appeal for help for the starving reconcentrados had been made in the hope that the sympathy of the people of the United States would prove the most humane factor, and therefore one of the most powerful influences in the peaceful effort to bring the war to a speedy close, it was a hope with little promise of fulfillment. Apparently, it had no effect on Spain. The authorities at Madrid and Havana did nothing, and did not try to do anything. But the American relief continued and could not be withdrawn when the need for it was becoming more and more pressing.

Up to the 10th of March the American committee for the relief of the reconcentrados had distributed rations to 18,000 starving people in Havana and the neighboring towns of Guanabacoa, and 85,000 in the whole island. Still the misery was intense and people were dying by the hundreds every day.

When, early in March, it was announced that fresh supplies would be carried to the island on two American war ships —

the *Montgomery* and the *Nashville* — the expedition was awaited with especial interest in view of the fate of the *Maine*, and this was followed by much disturbance of feeling when Spain, through Minister Woodford, requested that supplies should not be sent to Cuba on war vessels, and that our government should recall Consul-General Lee, through whose active efforts supplies had been distributed where most needed. The Madrid papers were charging that General Lee's sympathies were more with the insurgent than with the Spanish forces, and that he was in friendly relations with correspondents of papers which were considered to be decidedly unfriendly to Spain. They were so considered because they had endeavored to give a true and adequate idea of the sufferings on the island and the inhuman practices of the Spanish soldiers; also because they offered evidence that the *Maine* had been destroyed by design. It would have been strange, indeed, had Mr. Lee failed to have sympathy for the insurgents after what he had observed, but he at all times carefully refrained from official acts that would have compromised him or the people he represented.

After the destruction of the *Maine*, the correspondent, Lainé, whose story was afterwards told to a Senate committee, bethought himself of the Weyler letter, to the latter part of which he had paid little heed at the time a copy of it came into his possession. Lainé asserted that he tried to see Diaz, his informant, and secure, if possible, the original of the letter, but could not. He assumed that Diaz, being a Spaniard, must have notified the authorities that he had a copy of the letter, for on March 4th he was arrested and kept in Cabaña fortress. Through a friend who had witnessed the arrest, he had been able to inform the consul-general. On the 9th he was expelled from the island. He averred that the Spanish police officials had informed him that they knew of his secret, but that it would die with him, and he considered that he had been expelled rather than killed because he had been enabled to make his arrest known.

The letter was published in a New York paper and drew forth a denial from Guzman that he had ever received it, and from Weyler that he had ever sent it. General Lee knew Lainé well, and had, as he says, always found him "a very upright, honest, straight fellow." When he saw the copy of the Weyler letter, therefore, he thought the chances were that he had a copy of a genuine letter, and he set some machinery at work with the result that he found a cablegram signed "Weyler," sent from Barcelona to Eva Canel and Santos Guzman. The former was quite a noted Spanish woman in Havana who was a great admirer of General Weyler. During the mob riots she had shouted "*Viva Weyler!*" and "*Muera Blanco!*" and was finally expelled from the island by Blanco and sent to Mexico. Guzman was the one to whom the letter Lainé showed had been addressed. This cablegram read:

"Grave circumstances cause me to ask you to destroy the last letter of February 18."

General Lee was entirely satisfied that it was a genuine telegram received at Havana, and considered it corroborative of the letter shown by Lainé. The cablegram seemed to refer to a later letter, and to all appearance was sent after receiving information that his former letter had been made public. It will be noticed that Lainé's arrest occurred the 4th, the request for Lee's recall the 6th, and Lainé expulsion on the 9th.

Many saw in Spain's request for the recall of General Lee the hand of De Lome, who had just arrived at Madrid, as he was known to have advised his government to take such a course when he was minister. When the State Department first considered sending relief supplies to Cuba by war ships, De Lome had been very prompt to protest, and he also spoke unofficially to members of the State Department of what he considered the impropriety of General Lee's conduct in Havana.

The request for Lee's withdrawal was promptly refused by the President, who said in a public statement: "The President

will not consider the recall of General Lee. He has borne himself throughout this crisis with judgment, fidelity, and courage to the President's entire satisfaction. As to the supplies for the relief of the Cuban people, all arrangements have been made to carry a consignment this week from Key West by one of the naval vessels, whichever may be the best adapted and most available for the purpose, to Matanzas and Sagua."

It was decided to send the supplies in the *Fern* with the *Montgomery* as convoy, so, practically, both requests from Spain were refused and she was too wise to press them. The tone of the conservative press in Spain became very hostile to the United States, though the ministry made frequent expressions of its desire for friendly relations. Elections for the Cortes were pending and the Liberals were anxious that a majority should be chosen in support of the Sagasta ministry. There had been no election since the Canovas ministry, and thus the Liberals were in a minority, dangerous in view of the complications ahead.

The trend of events was unmistakable. The administration was doing everything possible to place the navy and army on a war footing and Spain was making efforts to buy war vessels. The President felt that the time had come to add to the fleet, and that required the support of Congress. His consultations with the leaders of Congress plainly showed that he would be gladly supported in any preparations for war, though there was some hesitancy shown by the naval committee, curiously enough, from the representatives of the State of Maine. The result of the President's consultation was the introduction by Mr. Cannon, chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations, of a measure setting apart \$50,000,000 for the defense of the nation to be used at the President's discretion. No statement was made of the reason why such a sum was demanded. But it was warmly approved throughout the country. The people simply knew that the controversy with Spain had reached such a point that the President felt it his duty to prepare for war. The bill was as follows:

"Be it enacted, etc., that there is hereby appropriated out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the national defense and for each and every purpose connected therewith, to be expended at the discretion of the President and to remain available until June 30, 1899, \$50,000,000."

It was passed in the House of Representatives on the 8th and in the Senate on the 9th of March, without a dissenting voice in either body and without debate in the Senate; and it was at once signed by the President. One of the striking features in the debate in the House was the apparently general agreement that it was essentially a peace rather than a war measure. The argument was that to be well prepared for any possible emergency was the best way to insure the calm and reasonable consideration of fair propositions for the maintenance of honor and justice without resort to war. The same reason was given for the continued activity of the army and navy, the reorganization of military departments, the purchase of war material, the equipping of ships, the enlisting of men, the increased estimates in the naval bill, the forming of two new regiments of artillery, which the army officials had long before unsuccessfully demanded as a necessity for coast defense. All of these steps were being taken, and the two days in which the resolution for defense was passed formed a dramatic climax. They were days when stocks, bonds, and calculating self-interest were lost sight of in the rise of American patriotism; a cool, strong, determined unit of thought and action, sweeping everything before it in the Congress of the United States.

There were many ready and anxious to belittle the step, as there will always be people who will belittle any great action. If it was only a peace measure it was a pretty big one. No step in the three years of our Cuban policy had so won the respect of nations. Its meaning was great and far reaching. It meant the freedom of Cuba — by peace if possible; if not, by war. That would depend upon Spain. President McKinley completely dominated the situation. Congress gave to him

\$50,000,000 and a vote of confidence such as no President ever had, both without his making a promise in return. He had neither to promise war to the "jingo," nor peace to the stock brokers. He deeply felt the trust imposed in him, for he considered it as a trust and not as a vindication.

History will certainly call that a striking moment in our national life when \$50,000,000 were given to the President without a minute's hesitation or a dissenting voice. Such a vote was not recalled in the whole history of Congress — every man voting, and all on one side, ready and eager to go on record. The four hours' debate in the House was not really a debate — but four hours of speeches all on one side. For the first time since the Civil War, Congress was united as one man in a common cause for the honor of a common flag. It was worth a few millions just to show to the world that silver and gold, protection and free trade, and all other differences, with the party names of Republican, Democrat, and Populist had vanished, leaving no East, West, North, nor South, but instead one solid American party, with a single plank in its platform, pledged to stand by the government. The nation with such confidence in its government is a great nation.

The dispatch of the Senate was somewhat surprising to those who had anticipated something of interest in connection with passing a special bill carrying \$50,000,000. It was all over in half an hour. Never before had so many senators voted solidly, and those who had been ridiculed as jingoes felt rather proud of the name when every Senator, including those who had been earnestly seeking to avoid complications with Spain, voted "aye." But it was a "peace measure."

It certainly seemed to have a calming effect upon Spain, and a semi-official statement was made in Madrid to the effect that Spain was no more desirous of war than the United States. Undoubtedly, this was generally true, in spite of a feeling that a war with the United States might be necessary to save the throne. The statement said there was no cause for war, but this was from Spain's standpoint. She had no desire for war

so long as the United States allowed affairs to go on in Cuba, and she held there was no cause for war so long as the United States did so. But from the American standpoint the war in Cuba must stop, and the only chance for peace was in Spain's yielding, and she would welcome a war with the United States rather than do that. If she withdrew from Cuba, it must be at the point of the guns of the United States, not of those of Cuban bandits. The far-sighted in this country understood this perfectly, and therefore considered the \$50,000,000 a war measure, not a peace measure.

The government at once became intensely active in putting the country in a condition of defense. Enormous quantities of war supplies were ordered; negotiations for the purchase of war ships building abroad were begun; recruiting stations for the navy were opened; the monitors, cruisers, and rams were put under commission; the great ordnance factory of the government was kept working night and day, and two cruisers, receiving finishing touches in English ship yards and intended for Brazil, were purchased.

CHAPTER XXXI

ATTITUDE OF EUROPEAN POWERS — INCREASING GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION — FINAL DIPLOMATIC EFFORT WITH SPAIN — REPORT OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY.

Sounding European Governments — Friendly Attitude of England — Reasons for Cherishing an Alliance — The Spanish Court of Inquiry — Marked Impression Made by Senator Proctor's Speech — Differing Policies — General Pando Seeks to Convert Cubans — Renewed Activity in War Preparations — Spain's Torpedo Flotilla Departs from the Canary Islands — Hastening Diplomacy — A Critical Situation — Our Demands upon Spain — Report of the Naval Court of Inquiry Submitted — Its Conclusions — Significance of the Keel Plates in the Wreck — Evidence Entirely Conclusive of Outside Explosion — Efforts to Fix the Responsibility — Captain Sigsbee's Testimony — *Maine* Anchored Just Where a Mine Would be Placed — Certain Navy Officials Suspected — Remarkable Conversation Heard on a Ferry Boat — An Anonymous Letter — \$6,000 for Blowing up the Ship.

THE European governments, while not officially sounded as to their attitude in case of war, gave indications of their official position, and in all cases save one their responses were satisfactory. Austria's manner, if not positively unfriendly, was somewhat chilling. Germany gave us to understand that its friendship and trade with the United States were of more importance to her than friendship and trade with Spain. But the most significant expression, and by far the most important, came from England. There had been some discussion as to joint action between the United States and England in case an attempt was made by continental powers to close neutral ports in China, but it had been indecisive. It was made clear, however, that there was a practically unanimous feeling in England with regard to the strength and justice of the American position in the differences with Spain. Never before in the history of England and the United States had there been such outspoken approval of

American policy; never before such warm expression of Anglo-Saxon fellowship. The sobriety of spirit and quiet determination, first to be in the right, and next to support the right at any cost, which had thus far been shown by the President, by Congress, and by the people of the country during these trying weeks had won the English heart, and it was evident that if war came with Spain, England would stand as a warning against any interference from Continental powers. It was not considered probable that there would be a formal alliance between the two countries, but their unconscious gravitation towards each other in time of danger showed again that blood was thicker than water. The historical and race kinship of the two peoples was evidently becoming more distinct in the national consciousness, and promised to constitute a great factor in the international problems of the future.

Certainly, the moral advantages of treating international questions on a high level were strikingly displayed during these weeks in which the administration was addressing itself with composure and dignity to the solution of the vexatious issues between it and Spain. Bluster and irritability would have lost us precisely that commanding moral position which restraint and moderation gained for us. It was this which thwarted the attempt made by Spain to secure support from the Continental powers. Sir Charles Dilke, one of the greatest authorities on foreign affairs in England, strongly expressed his sympathy with our attitude towards Cuba. Professor Bryce declared that he had always believed that "beneath the sometimes troubled surface there is a deep and strong current of sympathy for each other, as well as a sense of essential unity, in the two great and free English peoples on the opposite sides of the Atlantic."

England's disposition to cherish an alliance with us was very reasonably influenced by the diplomatic situation in Europe as to China. Rather than be deprived of the markets of the far East or to suffer the dismemberment of the Chinese empire, which was seriously threatened by the aggressive

policy of Russia, France, and Germany, England had intimated that she would go to war. Matters had arrived at a very critical stage, and had not the trouble between Spain and the United States brought forth the evidences of an understanding between the latter and England, the three Continental powers threatening England's prestige in the East might have pushed her to active operations. When the influence, even though entirely moral, of the United States was thrown in the balance with England, the powers drew back. This, doubtless, had its effect in stirring up the severe criticisms of the United States and the evident sympathy with Spain in the press of Russia, France, and Germany. It compelled a relinquishment of designs in the East at a time when they thought England to be unsupported.

Moreover, the Cuban war had been as disastrous in many ways to the interest of England as to ours. The railways had largely been built with capital borrowed in London; over 100 plantations were owned by Englishmen or were controlled by English capital, and England had been seriously considering what she should do with all the claims of her citizens for damages in the Cuban war, — damages for which Spain was liable.

Little was heard from the Naval Court of Inquiry in the *Maine* disaster, though from unofficial sources came occasional intimations that the explosion was external and not internal. But, in the pressure of other events, the importance of the inquiry was lost sight of. The President of the Spanish Court of Inquiry, Captain Peral, publicly stated that in his opinion the disaster was an accident, pure and simple. The prevailing idea was that much depended upon the report of our Court, and also much upon the reply of Spain to any demand for indemnity that might be made. It was semi-officially announced that Spain would resist the payment of an indemnity. This attitude taken in advance of the report of our Court, and only upon the public statement of Captain Peral, gave abundant evidence that the United States could expect nothing from Spanish

diplomacy. When it took twenty years to collect a claim which Spain acknowledged to be just, there was little prospect of securing an indemnity for the *Maine*.

Spain remained as firm as ever in its refusal to consider the freedom of Cuba; Captain-General Blanco, at a dinner given at Havana, declared that Spain would never give it up nor would she sell at any price.

Nothing made a more marked impression upon Congress and the country at this time than the speech of Senator Proctor in the Senate on March 17th. Owing to the aggressive character of some of the pro-Cuban newspapers, many people had formed the habit of discounting the news which came from the troubled island. Even when these statements were backed by reports from some correspondents of good repute, there was a disposition to doubt occurrences which hardly seemed possible in civilized warfare. This doubt manifested itself in the Senate among those who dreaded precipitate action, and it was fortunate, therefore, that some of the senators and congressmen had determined to see for themselves. Of all those who chose thus to inform themselves no man was more respected among his colleagues than Senator Proctor of Vermont, a level-headed, conservative New Englander, with much acumen, sobriety of judgment, and due regard for the responsibilities of his office. When, therefore, he described in cool, dispassionate language the conditions of Cuba as he saw them in February and early in March, and voiced his judgment concerning the future of Cuba if it continued under Spanish rule, doubtful people began to realize why it was that so many had long urged intervention. He assured the Senate that he spoke without any consultation with the President, and that his words could only be interpreted as an expression of his personal belief, but it was well known that he was a close friend of the President, and that his judgment was prized at the White House.

It had become apparent that, assuming that the *Maine* incident was satisfactorily settled, two radically differing parties existed among those close to the President: those who

advocated immediate intervention on the ground of humanity and commercial necessity, and those who preferred to give Spain a longer time to demonstrate the success or failure of autonomous government. All agreed that it would be useless and unwise to attempt to force the insurgents into accepting even the most generous Spanish terms, and all dreaded an attempt to settle the question by force at any time between May 1st and October 1st, when the mortality from fever might be greater than that from Spanish bullets. Undoubtedly, many sincere friends of Cuba, who had made up their minds that force would be necessary and wise, would have been glad to continue the relief to the reconcentrados and to impress upon Spain diplomatically the necessity of her granting freedom to Cuba on honorable terms, but events could not be so easily managed. The action of this nation cannot be determined by the President alone, or by Congress, or by any special interest; in the last analysis it must be determined by the people. There are times when the national consciousness rises higher than anything else and such times are momentous ones in the life of the nation.

The most important news which came from the theater of war at this time was that General Pando had announced an armistice in eastern Cuba, with the purpose of securing a conference with General Gomez and other leading insurgent officers to urge upon them the claims of more liberal autonomy. It was stated that the most generous terms would be offered, a proposition to willingly surrender Cuba to the Cubans, to disband the Spanish Volunteers, and to leave Cuba entirely free to govern herself on the payment of an annual sum to Spain of \$2,000,000. But it was too late for such measures as this, and as soon as the Volunteers heard of it they began to make trouble.

As the time for the report of the Naval Board approached, the public impatience increased. By the 24th the gravity of the situation could no longer be disguised by expressions of peace; the feeling of restlessness was noticeable everywhere.

A crisis seemed at hand. The activity of preparations in the Army and Navy Departments constantly increased. Troops had been ordered eastward; important changes had been made in the naval commands; telegraphic orders for the purchase of tugs and torpedo destroyers had gone forth. In Congress the nervous enthusiasm of the crowd of spectators who daily wandered about the great marble capitol found vent when Senator Gallinger of New Hampshire depicted the horrors he had witnessed in Cuba, and when Senator Thurston of Nebraska, who had just returned from a visit to Cuba, where his wife had died, in a glowing speech described the dreadful scenes he had witnessed, and declared strongly for action. As he neared the close of his speech he broke down under excitement, sympathy, and sorrow, and as he sat down he bowed his head upon his desk and wept, and the galleries broke into applause that for the first time in the United States Senate was allowed to go on unchecked.

Mrs. Thurston's death was a severe blow to Senator Thurston, and Washington people who knew her as a woman of high intellectual attainments, ever mindful of the suffering, sympathized with him deeply. She was a member of the Cuban Relief Association, and the horrors of the war in Cuba impressed her with the strongest desire to help the suffering people in every way possible. Her appeals sent home in behalf of the little children, with their starving mothers, could not be read without a feeling that they were wrung from a heart filled with anguish and pity, and the scenes of distress she witnessed had their effect in causing her fatal illness.

The gravity of the situation was increased by the departure from the Canary Islands of a flotilla of torpedo boats, ostensibly for the West Indies, though the opinion was held that the movement was for the purpose of influencing the elections to the Cortes to be held on the 27th. The Carlists, Conservatives, and Republicans were attacking Sagasta for alleged weakness in dealing with the United States.

The President early decided to treat the *Maine* question

and the general Cuban question separately, the latter having been inherited from the previous administration, and the former being an incident not affecting the general question from a diplomatic point of view, however much it might from the popular side. Realizing that it would be impossible to restrain Congress and the people after the report of the Court of Inquiry, the inevitable conclusions of which the administration well knew, the President hastened on his diplomatic negotiations in every way possible. He impressed upon Spain his desire for peace, but declared that the situation in Cuba must be relieved. We should insist upon making the relief of the starving effective. It would be impossible for the United States to allow the contest to go on, and as autonomy such as Spain had proposed would not be accepted by the Cubans, it was useless to consider further the possibilities of that plan as a measure of peace. But if Spain could be induced to suspend hostilities and induce the Cubans to treat, it was possible that the United States might by some arrangement bring about the compliance of the Cubans.

On March 23d Minister Woodford conveyed to the Spanish government the attitude of the administration, and two days later Spain replied to the effect that she could not agree with the "inaccurate conclusions" of the American government as to the conditions in Cuba, and she still insisted that autonomy was working well. Neither could Spain admit the interference foreshadowed in the American note and she deprecated the sending of official relief and war vessels to Cuba.

There was little time left. The President received the report on the *Maine* on the 25th, and it would not do to hold it back from Congress. He saw that the only way to avert war for the time was to induce Spain to grant an armistice during which the Cuban question could be deliberately and dispassionately considered and settled. Accordingly, on the 27th, as a result of much previous correspondence, he submitted through the minister at Madrid propositions for an armistice until October 1st for the negotiation of peace on the basis of

the independence of Cuba, with the good offices of the President. In addition to this, he asked for the immediate and effective revocation of the order of reconcentration so as to permit the people to return to their farms, the needy to be relieved with provisions and supplies from the United States, co-operating with the Spanish authorities, so as to afford full relief.

On the following day, and while the President was awaiting the reply to what he considered a final effort to settle affairs diplomatically, the report of the Court of Inquiry was made public, but it created no new excitement. It had been largely discounted. The public mind had already been made up, and the report came chiefly as a formal finding in a case that had already been decided upon abundant circumstantial evidence. Moreover, the Cuban question was developing so rapidly and upon such a large scale that the report took the place of an incident merely, another step in the inevitable course of events. Another reason for delay was removed, another reason for intervention offered. Among a certain class some disappointment prevailed because the Court had not been able to definitely fix the responsibility, the difficulties in the way of such a board when endeavoring to detect a Spanish culprit in such a state of affairs as existed at Havana not being appreciated; but it made little difference whether the responsibility was fixed or not, for, in fact, and in the eyes of the people of the United States, Spain could not escape the responsibility of the outrage, even if her officials were ignorant of any plot. She had failed to protect a vessel at Havana on a friendly mission, and the fact that the evidence was quite conclusive that the *Maine* had been blown up by a mine made the case against Spain all the stronger, for a mine sufficient to cause such destruction could not have existed without the knowledge of someone in authority about the fortifications of the city. Even had the Court reported that it had been unable to determine how the *Maine* had been blown up, it is doubtful if it would have made any serious difference with the situation. The fact

that a state of things existed in Cuba which made it unsafe for American war ships to go there was sufficient. The great Cuban question was still over and above incidental considerations; the *Maine* had simply determined the people to settle it, if not quickly by peace, then quickly by war.

President McKinley sent to Congress the full text of the report, together with the voluminous evidence taken, and a brief message recapitulating the well-known facts about the visit of the *Maine* to Havana, the organization of the Court and its proceedings, and giving this succinct statement of the findings:

“The evidence of the divers establishes that the after part of the ship was practically intact, and sank in that condition a very few moments after the explosion. The forward part was completely demolished.

“Upon the evidence of a concurrent external cause the finding of the Court is as follows :

“ ‘At frame 17 the outer shell of the ship, from a point $11\frac{1}{2}$ feet from the middle line of the ship and 6 feet above the keel when in its normal position, has been forced up so as to be now about 4 feet above the surface of the water, therefore about 34 feet above where it would be had the ship sunk uninjured.

“ ‘The outside bottom plating is bent into a reversed V shape (Λ), the after wing of which, about 15 feet broad and 32 feet in length (from frame 17 to frame 25), is doubled back upon itself against the continuation of the same plating, extending forward.

“ ‘At frame 18 the vertical keel is broken in two and the flat keel bent into an angle similar to the angle formed by the outside bottom plates. This break is now about 6 feet below the surface of the water and about 30 feet above its normal position.

“ ‘In the opinion of the court this effect could have been produced only by the explosion of a mine situated under the bottom of the ship at about frame 18 and somewhat on the port side of the ship.’

“The conclusions of the Court are :

“That the loss of the *Maine* was not in any respect due to fault or negligence on the part of any of the officers or members of her crew ;

“That the ship was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine, which caused the partial explosion of two or more of her forward magazines ; and

“That no evidence has been obtainable fixing the responsibility for the destruction of the *Maine* upon any person or persons.”

In conclusion, he said that he had directed the findings of the Court and the views of this government to be communicated to the government of Spain, and added: “I do not permit myself to doubt that the sense of justice of the Spanish na-

tion will dictate a course of action suggested by honor and the friendly relations of the two governments." He refrained from making an immediate demand for indemnity, desiring first to see what Spain might see fit to answer to our presentation of facts.

The evidence that the disaster was caused by an outside explosion was convincing to all who had a knowledge of the work of the Court of Inquiry. The center of the explosion was beneath and a little forward of the conning tower and on the port side, and not only did the wreck show that no explosion of the forward magazines could have produced such effects, but that they were plainly the effect of a force from underneath the ship. The keel at this center of explosion was blown up above the surface of the water, and the forward part of the ship had been thrown over forward so that the bow was driven into the mud. Indeed, about all of the forward part of the ship which appeared above water were the keel plates. More than this, the divers discovered, underneath this part of the raised keel and exactly where the center of the explosion was, a large hole in the mud, fully fifteen feet in diameter and seven feet deep. The Court was inclined to think that the force of the mine explosion must have exploded some part of the forward magazines, but, nevertheless, considerable ammunition from these magazines was found intact, whereas had the initial explosion taken place within them nothing would have remained. Besides, there was nothing to cause these ammunition stores to explode except an explosion from outside. The evidence was entirely conclusive.

Recognizing the obstacles to the work of obtaining any evidence calculated to fix the responsibility for the outrage, the Court of Inquiry does not seem to have devoted much attention to that branch of the investigation, although it secured some evidence that was not made public. As the *Maine* had been conducted by direction of the harbor authorities to a buoy so seldom used, and as such an explosion could not have been worked except by connivance with some one on shore in



IN THE HOSPITAL OF A BATTLESHIP.
Called the "Sick Bay" by sailors,

charge of or with a knowledge of the mines, an investigation to fix the responsibility would naturally have taken the Court in the direction of the authorities who were investigating the case for Spain, and who had asserted from the beginning that it was an accident. It was generally thought that General Blanco was innocent of any knowledge of a plot, but it was well known that a large proportion of the guards were hostile to him, were adherents of Weyler, were bitterly hostile to the United States, were capable of almost anything in the way of outrage, and were, moreover, in a position to use mines if such there were in the harbor.

"It is a curious fact," said Captain Sigsbee before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, which was pursuing an investigation of Cuban affairs at this time, "that the officers of the deck say we never swung in that particular direction before. The *Maine* is lying now in about the position she would have taken to play upon the Spanish batteries — the Morro and Cabañas. Now, if a mine had been planted there, where the *Maine* could play on the batteries, I assume that it would have been planted in just that place where the *Maine* was blown up. If only one had been planted it would have been just there."

"If that ship had swung into position to fire on the castle," asked Senator Morgan, "and a torpedo had been placed, or mine placed, under water so as to blow up the ship in case she did fire, then it would have been placed exactly where you were blown up?"

"I would have placed it there," replied Captain Sigsbee.

"That suggests the possibility of its having been placed there before you were located there?"

"It does."

"Has it occurred to you that very likely it was done so?"

"I think if we had owned the port and had suspected a possible aggressive spirit, I think we would have done the same thing."

"You would have put it right there?"

"If we had only one mine, I should have put it right there."

Captain Sigsbee said further that he had reasons, which it might be injudicious to disclose, to believe that a certain navy official was in charge of the electric battery which controlled the mine. The dangers to residents of Havana testifying before the Court of Inquiry were so great that none could be induced to do so unless names were suppressed. One such person appeared and testified through an interpreter that on the morning of the day the *Maine* was blown up he was crossing from Havana to Regla, that ferry passing quite near to the *Maine*. He was sitting on the front of the boat and about four feet from him were three Spanish officers, two of the army and one of the navy, in conversation with a stout man in citizen's dress. He noticed that they were conversing about the *Maine*.

"I have heard in the *Circulio Militar*o," said one of the army officers, referring to the military club on the Prado, "that it is nearly arranged. They are going to blow her up anyhow. It is a shame to Spain that she should be here in the bay."

The witness was standing close to the wall so that the officer did not notice he was listening, and he heard the citizen ask:

"Would not making explosions in the bay run great risk to the city of Havana?"

"No," said the officer, "it is arranged so that it will simply explode, open the vessel, and she will sink immediately."

"I will take plenty of beer on that occasion," said the citizen, with an exclamation of joy, and the men moved further away, so that no more was heard, though they continued to converse while looking at the *Maine*.

There appeared to be no clue to the identity of the officers, and the evidence does not seem to have been followed up; indeed, it would have been impossible to do so without the aid of detectives. The interpreter, who was one of General Lee's employes, also testified to the receipt at the consular office of

the following anonymous letter, dated the 18th, or three days after the destruction of the *Maine*:

“It should be remembered that at dawn of the day of the terrible catastrophe an individual was killed in a small boat together with another who is to be found wounded and a prisoner. They were going about the cruisers *Maine* and *Alfonso XII* and as the said individuals are of the worst antecedents as harbor thieves, I have interested myself in investigating what connection this occurrence could have with the explosion of the *Maine*, and I have discovered that those two men, together with another who is called Pepe Taco, had bought in a hardware store in Mercaderes street, called La Marina, a hose such as is used by divers, and that the three left Regla in a small boat which they placed under the wharves of Sta. Catalina and they were loitering more than an hour and a half while Pepe Taco, who is a calker and a diver, probably the best in these parts, did the work to bring about the explosion of the *Maine*. With this data I went to Regla and discovered that the family of the dead man who lived in the utmost misery in a house in Rodriguez Batista street had moved to a well-furnished one in Galabert street. There I learned that they had agreed with some merchants of Muralla street for the work of blowing up the ship for the sum of \$6,000 — \$2,000 in advance, the other \$4,000 after seeing the result. But as they did not come out of the adventure very well, having been attacked when they were retiring, the result of which was the death of one, who left his teeth in the boat, and another one wounded, the third one has not presented himself to collect the rest of the money and it could probably be secretly done that by paying him the rest, that the others will not now pay him, he would declare the truth of all this. The one whom I call the third is the diver Pepe Taco who was not wounded who, no doubt, is afraid to present himself to collect the rest. In Muralla street, they tell me was the place where the business was arranged with Messrs. Garcia, Corujedo, Villasuso, Maribona, and others whom I do not remember. The man arrested is being administered morphine constantly to see if he will die and not give evidence so as not, as they express it, to spoil the affair after it has come off so much to their taste.”

It was a fact recorded by the papers that on the night before the explosion a suspicious boat was seen crossing the bay, and the Spanish guard of the artillery dock fired on it, killing one of the men on board, who fell into the water. The other man landed and was arrested by the guard, but the next day after the explosion he was released. The authorities made a great mystery of the affair, but no attention was paid to the circumstance by the Court till the receipt of this anonymous letter. An effort was made to follow up the clue, but the results were kept a state secret.

The report of the Spanish Court of Inquiry based its reasons for concluding the explosion an internal one mainly on the statements that no dead fish were seen about the wreck, a fact entirely inconclusive, largely because there are few fish in the dirty waters of the bay. It was admitted that no effective examination had been made of the conditions of the wreck, but, it said, "this must not be understood to mean that the accuracy of these present conclusions requires such proof."

CHAPTER XXXII

NEARING A CRISIS—"REMEMBER THE *MAINE*"—SPAIN'S FINANCIAL STRAITS—HASTENING OUR NAVAL PREPARATIONS—SPAIN'S UNSATISFACTORY TACTICS.

Public Impatience Restrained with Difficulty—The President's Trying Position—Radical Resolutions in the Senate—The President's Firm Hand—Liberal Victory in Spain—The Cuban Deputies—Arrival of the *Vizcaya* and *Almirante Oquendo* in Havana—Spaniards in Hostile Mood—Spanish Torpedo Flotilla and Its Movements—Spain's Appeal to Europe—Suicide of the Dynasty—Desperate Financial Conditions—The Church as a Holder of Spanish Bonds—Putting the United States Navy in Readiness—The Key West Fleet and the Flying Squadron—Apparent Concession but Only for Effect—The Proposed Armistice—Congress Becomes More and More Impatient—The President's Reasons for Delay—Time Needed to Prepare—His Influence upon Congressional Leaders—Condition of Some of Our Battleships—Learning a Lesson.

THE report of the Court of Inquiry was formally and without debate referred to the committees on foreign affairs, but it at once became evident that the public patience, which had endured till this formal act was completed, could now be restrained only with the greatest difficulty. The navy was not disposed to rest content under an indefinite continuance of futile diplomacy while the murder of their comrades went unpunished, and this feeling was shared by a large portion of the public. Revenge is doubtless a questionable motive for war, but under the circumstances it could not fail to exist. "Remember the *Maine*" became a catch-phrase of the day. Congress, moreover, had for weeks been holding back resolutions for the prompt settlement of the Cuban questions, and feeling the stress of public opinion as its members did, the reference of the *Maine* report was at once followed by intimations that the President would not be left to control the situation for the purpose of dallying indefinitely,

or even for any length of time, with the crafty and shifting authorities at Madrid.

The President fully realized the increased difficulties of the situation, and, while he desired peace, he was in no mood to shrink from war if it became necessary; he simply wished to proceed in a manner which would leave no stain upon our action for history to record, and give none of the European powers a ground for just criticism. This desire was not influenced by any fear of them, or tacit surrender of the right of the United States to determine its own course in its own way, but because he wished war, if it came, to stand upon a sound moral basis as far as this country was concerned. Having enjoyed a long career in Congress as one of its leaders, he was fully able to appreciate its feelings, and he had no intention of defying a body for which he had the highest respect and in whose wisdom he had the greatest confidence. Still, he wished to use his own powers so that there could be no mistake resulting from the bitter passion of the hour.

On the 29th, the war spirit in the Senate, so long confined, burst forth with renewed energy. Four resolutions on the subject were offered respectively by Senators Allen, Rawlins, Foraker, and Frye, and were referred without debate to the Committee on Foreign Relations, the two senators last named being members of that committee. Senator Allen's resolution recognized the independence of Cuba and appropriated \$500,000 for relieving the suffering there; Senator Rawlins made his a virtual declaration of war against Spain, authorizing the use of the army and navy to carry it to a successful conclusion. Senator Frye's resolution was more mild, authorizing the President to take such effective steps as in his discretion were required to bring about peace in Cuba and the independence of the Cubans. The Foraker resolution called on Spain to withdraw from Cuba, and while not formally declaring war, authorized the use of the land and naval forces of the country to enforce the demands.

The same day the President held a conference with some

of the leading members of the two houses to arrange, if possible, a plan for executive and legislative action with the hope of heading off the too radical element in Congress, determined to have war at once and without reference to the existing diplomatic situation. Those who were attempting to hold back Congress till the executive could act were inclined to think that he would not be able to maintain his control of the situation and meet the expectations and demands of the people of the country unless he at once announced a positive policy, which would include a demand upon Spain for the immediate cessation of hostilities, not through the military device of an armistice but by the actual evacuation of Cuba by the Spanish troops, the granting of full and complete autonomy, and the assurance of ultimate independence. They considered it too late to talk of an armistice such as the President had proposed at Spain's suggestion. The people were not in a mood to take Spanish suggestions with patience, and there could be no true armistice so long as the Cubans refused to suspend hostilities for anything except independence.

But the President was able to prevail upon the leaders in Congress to curb their warlike spirit till after he could inform them whether Spain accepted or rejected the demands he had made in his last note, a reply to which he momentarily expected. He was hopeful, though far from sanguine, that at the last moment Spain would yield to the inevitable and accept terms on which war could be avoided, at least till the summer season was over. For he knew full well that those who would plunge the country into war at once had an inadequate conception of the difficulties of summer campaigning in Cuba.

The elections to the Spanish Cortes passed off quietly on Sunday, the 27th, and resulted in an overwhelming victory for the Liberals. While the other parties endeavored to secure popular support by declaring that the Sagasta ministry was not sufficiently firm in dealing with the United States, Sagasta gave expressions to terms of defiance, declaring that Spain would not concede our right to intervene, and thus partisan

lines gave way before a sentiment uniting all men in the support of those who were already in office. The result naturally strengthened the hands of Sagasta and gave him greater confidence in a determined policy. In the elections in Cuba, twenty of the thirty deputies to the Cortes were from the Autonomists, the rest from the Conservatives. Of the twenty Autonomists chosen, only eight were natives of Cuba, and of the ten Conservatives but one was Cuban-born, and he had lived mainly in Spain and was very pro-Spanish. Five of the Conservative deputies were notorious for their hatred of the United States. Feeling against this country ran very high in Havana, and Americans there were far from being in a comfortable or safe position. They were apt to be insulted wherever they went, and it was dangerous to resent it.

The arrival of the *Vizcaya* at Havana created an enthusiasm which threatened to end in an outbreak of the lawless elements. Crowds gathered to welcome the cruiser, shouting "*Viva España!*" and "*Viva Weyler!*" By taking extraordinary precautions General Blanco was able to preserve the peace, but there was abundant evidence of the feelings of the hostile Volunteers. A few days later the *Almirante Oquendo* arrived and was similarly welcomed.

In the latter part of March the report that the Spanish torpedo flotilla which had stopped at the Canary Islands had been ordered to Puerto Rico added to the gravity of the situation in this country and caused much alarm. As such a flotilla was not needed in Cuba for the purposes of suppressing the rebellion and was of an aggressive, not defensive, character, it seemed likely that Spain had determined upon hostile actions, and even the *Army and Navy Journal* went so far as to term it an act of war, justifying our immediate action, as if war had been declared by Spain. But in view of the preparations we had already made for action, if necessary, the appearance of the Spanish flotilla at Puerto Rico could really be regarded as little more than justifiable precaution.

Although the Queen and the Spanish government made



SWORD DRILL OF SAILORS ON A BATTLESHIP.

many diplomatic appeals for the help of Europe in preventing the impending intervention in Cuba, there was little indication of success. In Europe, as in the United States, the question which statesmen and financiers were asking was, how could Spain enter upon a great war with a treasury so empty? — a war in which she would ultimately and inevitably stand to lose not only Cuba and Puerto Rico but the Philippines, and which might involve the overthrow of the monarchy. But in reality the Spanish people had been so persistently deceived by their government as to Spanish successes in Cuba, and as to the military weakness and boastfulness of the United States, that they really believed Spain capable of doing great things, of actually invading the United States; and to have drawn back in the face of such an opinion would have so enraged the deluded people as to have at once overthrown the monarchy. The dynasty was likely to fall in either case. But if it stood any chance, it was in war.

The wisest in Spain as well as in the United States saw that the triumph of Spanish arms in Cuba, or even in the retention of Spanish sovereignty, would be a fruitless, if not a dangerous, victory. It certainly could not be final. Supposing that the armies of Garcia and Gomez laid down their arms and the insurgents were dispersed, what would be the very best condition the optimist could imagine? Even if it could be accomplished without recourse to another loan, the interest on the Cuban debt would then amount to \$30,000,000 per annum, and the revenues could not be made to reach this amount even before the island was devastated and by recourse to every possible means of taxation.

But beyond this, the maintenance of the army which would be necessary, and of the civil administration, even supposing honesty in administration, which would be supposing altogether too much, would cost \$80,000,000 more. Spain would hardly be able to make both ends of her own budget meet, to say nothing of helping Cuba.

Continued Spanish sovereignty in Cuba had, therefore, be-

come to Spain an absolute impossibility, and yet to yield it was a political impossibility — the suicide of the dynasty.

The financial condition of the Spanish government could hardly have been worse. Taxation, which before the war with Cuba was reckoned to consume one-fifth of the total income of the people, had been increased by every expedient known to bankrupting finance. Confessing the corruption or incapacity of her own officials, the government had carried further the costly policy of turning over to private monopolies the collection of the various taxes. The old tobacco monopoly had been renewed at a higher rental and monopolies were created to deal in petroleum and explosives. The government had asked permission to turn over to private companies for twenty-five years the state lottery, and for fifteen years a monopoly in the sale of salt. The 4 per cent. bonds of the government, which three years before had sold at 80, had by the end of March fallen to 51, and the government, in its straits to borrow, had pledged its customs revenue, increased the privileges of the state banks, and offered the railroads subsidies and an extension of privileges till 1980 for assistance in raising loans. The debts nominally resting on Spain had not been materially increased, because the war loans figured as the Cuban debt; but the home debt alone amounted to \$1,300,000,000, or \$400 for every family in the poverty-stricken nation. The enormous Cuban debt was relatively a more serious matter, for it was a question whether all the property remaining in Cuba after three years of war would have discharged the debt which the island would have been required to carry if Spain had been victorious. The crushing weight of this prospective load was one of the factors which made submission worse than death to the patriotic Cubans. It was to bring about just this state of things that Gomez had fought his campaigns, and it was apparent that when Spain reached the point at which she would be compelled to give up, the Cubans, having established their independence, would give themselves little concern over a debt which had been incurred in fighting and oppressing them.

The impending conflict, therefore, involved not only the Cuban debt but the bankruptcy of Spain, and naturally the holders of all her millions of debts became greatly concerned over the situation. To understand the developments which led to the declaration of war in spite of all the influence against it, it will be necessary to observe where this debt was held.

In the early part of the nineteenth century the property of the Church of Spain had so accumulated that it might be said almost without exaggeration that the ecclesiastical establishment had absorbed the wealth of the country. In 1820 there were no less than 150,000 priests in Spain, and clericalism had played a large part in the struggle of the dynasties, factions, and parties. The success of Christina after the death of Ferdinand in 1833 meant a defeat for the clerical party, and it was followed by sweeping confiscatory decrees which led to a protracted quarrel between the Vatican and the Spanish government. It was finally compromised in 1859 by a new Concordat between the Pope and the Spanish government, in accordance with which a large amount of church property was sold off and there was issued to the church several hundred millions of dollars of interest-bearing Spanish bonds. It was natural, therefore, that the church as the holder of such an enormous block of Spanish bonds should become especially anxious to maintain Spanish credit, and a war with the United States meant bankruptcy beyond peradventure.

During the last week in March the government of the United States had further increased its army and navy and put it in a condition of readiness for possible war. Admiral Sicard was given six months' leave of absence because of ill health, and Captain William T. Sampson was appointed commander of the fleet at Key West. He was considered an ideal officer for the important commission. A flying squadron with headquarters at Hampton Roads was organized with Commodore Winfield Scott Schley as its chief. It consisted of the battleships *Texas* and *Massachusetts*, and the cruisers *Brooklyn*, *Minneapolis*, and *Columbia*, the fleetest of our navy. Nego-

tiations for the purchase of foreign war ships continued; the entire fleet of revenue cutters belonging to the Treasury Department, which had for three years been kept busy in the effort to intercept Cuban filibusters, were by command of the President, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, transferred to the navy to co-operate with the naval service. Eleven of the finest yachts and largest tugs in the possession of private parties were purchased to be fitted out as torpedo, dispatch, and gunboats. Monitors that served in the Civil War were ordered into commission, and sent to the harbors of New York and Boston, there to be manned and handled by the naval militia. Ammunition was distributed to all the important seacoast fortifications, and all reserve field and siege guns in the interior were ordered to coast ports, while the infantry and cavalry forces of the government were placed in such a condition that within three days the entire army could be mobilized either at Atlanta or at Washington. Our agents scoured Europe for available munitions, and we secured an option upon everything that would be needed if war were declared. Most significant of all was an order to paint the war vessels in colors never used except in likelihood of hostile action.

The war tide rose by leaps and bounds during those few eventful hours in which Spain's reply was expected. Congress had waited patiently for the report on the *Maine*, and now here was another affair to wait for. The newspapers were full of conflicting statements as to what Spain proposed and what the President's policy was to be. Owing to the mystery which always surrounds diplomatic communications, the situation appeared much more complex and delicate than it really was. The President's note of the 27th had demanded an armistice till October 1st for the negotiation of peace on the basis of the independence of the Cubans, the immediate revocation of the order of reconcentration, and the relief of the needy. Spain saw that some concession was essential to pacify Congress, but she endeavored to grant only that which had the appearance but not the substance of concessions.

Her reply arrived at Washington on the night of the 31st. She consented to release the reconcentrados at once (something which she had ordered months before but without effect), and she announced that the cabinet had voted \$600,000 for the relief of the needy. But when it came to arranging terms of peace she said that she would confide that to the insular autonomist parliament, inasmuch as the concurrence of that body would be necessary to reach the final result, "*it being understood, however, that the powers reserved by the Constitution to the central government are not diminished or lessened.*" In other words, she did not propose to permit the United States to take part in peace negotiations, and she did not propose to surrender her sovereignty of the island. She proposed to leave peace measures exclusively to an autonomous government which was a farce and a failure, with which the insurgents would not treat and which was really but a blind to conceal Spain's purpose to handle the island as she always had handled it. Moreover, this alleged insular parliament would not meet for over a month. Spain said, however, she would not object to a suspension of hostilities if it were asked for by the general-in-chief of the insurgents. It was well known that Gomez would do nothing of the kind. Spain's reply gave no evidence of what powers the insular parliament had for negotiating peace. In fact, the reply, while calculated to give those prejudiced in favor of peace at any price a chance to say that Spain had offered all we had asked, had really given nothing. Even the order for the release of the reconcentrados and the appropriation of money for the needy were valueless, simply on paper and of no effect, as afterwards appeared. It was characteristic Spanish diplomacy, and the misfortune was that a certain international or diplomatic courtesy compelled the United States to wait on it.

Following this and during the first week in April our relations with Spain came to a crisis and the country was in a condition of feverish anxiety. Every day news was expected to show whether the outcome was to be peace or war, and as the

days passed it became more and more apparent that war would be inevitable. The feeling in Congress was tense. An increasing number in both the House and Senate showed an eagerness for action which would bring the differences with Spain to a head. Undoubtedly, this feeling was strengthened by the report of the Court of Inquiry and by the further evidence concerning the disaster which was later given by General Lee and Captain Sigsbee to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The more the testimony was studied the more did the feeling gain ground that the blowing up of the *Maine* was an act of treachery. Naval experts unhesitatingly expressed their belief that when the *Maine* was anchored to one particular buoy it was known that a mine lay underneath her, and mines of that kind, they said, were not in the possession of individuals, nor were they to be purchased in the markets. It was hinted that certain Spanish officials knew of the location of the mine and had expected to use it in case hostilities were declared.

Nothing but the influence of the President prevented Congress from prompt action, which would have been a virtual declaration of war. He could not have had any great amount of faith in the possibility of bringing Spain to terms by diplomatic methods after Spain's reply, but at the same time some of the European powers and the Vatican began to use their persuasive powers upon the proud but weak nation and something might come of it. At least the delay would enable the United States to perfect its preparations and take the necessary steps for the safety of American citizens on Spanish territory. It would undoubtedly have been his wish to have continued the negotiations over the rainy season in Cuba, meanwhile helping the reconcentrados, and in October, if necessary, to have struck the intervening blow to set Cuba free. It doubtless would have been the part of wisdom. Our forces could have been drilled and acclimated in southern camps, our navy could have been put in prime condition, the reconcentrados could have been helped back to their farms and started again,

and sober sense might by that time have convinced Spain that the best policy for her was to declare Cuba free.

But the impatience of Congress, whose members were daily swamped with letters from the people clamoring for war, could not be indefinitely curbed, and while the President was aware of it he did the best he could and much more than a man of less tact or one possessing in a less degree the confidence of Congress could have done. He had constant interviews with the leading men of both parties, took them into his confidence, explained to them the exact situation and succeeded in convincing them that a little delay would be wise from every point of view. If war was to come, every day's delay would be helpful; if anything was to be hoped from diplomacy, delay was absolutely necessary. Spain had made some apparent concessions and might make the necessary ones under European pressure. These representations had their effect upon a majority of the Senators and Congressmen, and by common consent they agreed to wait a few days longer.

Unfortunately, there were some who, boasting of superior patriotism, were anxious to make political capital by making bitter speeches against delay, even attacking the motives of the President, and unfortunately also the peace-at-any-price men in the country, professing to believe that the President was in accord with them, began to raise the cry "Stand by the President," thus adding to the impatience of Congress by creating the impression that he, like the peace men, had no idea of putting an end to the state of things which had become intolerable.

The people of the United States had lived so long at peace and had such an inadequate idea of the requirements of modern warfare that they could not appreciate the wisdom of delaying the initiation of hostilities. Out battleships were far from ready. The foul growth on the bottom of the *Massachusetts* had decreased her maximum forced draught speed from sixteen to ten knots, while the *Iowa*, the fastest of our battleships, at Key West was reduced to a like speed, and the dry dock

capacity was inadequate. Had not the navy yard forces been kept at work day and night almost from the time of the blowing up of the *Maine*, and all preparatory work been pushed with feverish haste, even while peace seemed possible, we should have been ill-prepared for an aggressive warfare beyond our shores at the time when the patience of Congress at last gave out. The people of this generation had yet to learn that two nations cannot proceed to war with the promptness with which two street gamins square off for a struggle with their fists.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE COALING PROBLEM—SPAIN'S PRETENDED ASSISTANCE OF THE STARVING RECONCENTRADOS—SCENES IN CONGRESS WHILE AWAITING THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.

The Army Ready to Move—The Importance of the Coaling Problem—Spain's Small Supply—Coaling at Neutral Ports—Blanco's Orders to Help the Reconcentrados—No Charity Except through Fear of War—Spain Playing to the Galleries of Europe—No Chance for Money to Get by the Spanish Officials—Appeal of the Autonomist Government—Position of the Self-Professed Friends of Peace—The Influence of the Commercial Spirit—"Reading the Riot Act to the President"—The President's Tact—April 6th, an Exciting Day—Waiting for the Message—It Fails to Arrive—General Lee's Request for Time to Get Out of Cuba—The President's Courageous Act—Bitter Attacks upon Him in Congress—Bravely Defended—Other Important Reasons for Delay—Spain's Foolish Action—The President's Expectation of War.

DURING these days of uncertainty and excitement preparations for placing the armies and navies in condition for immediate use, if called upon, continued with vigor in both Spain and the United States. The fleet of auxiliary naval vessels was further increased by the purchase of tugs and yachts; a new cruiser, called the *Diogenes*, which was built in Germany for a foreign power, was bought in England; the ships at Key West and Hampton Roads were stripped in readiness for actual war, and every preparation was made for moving the army. The state of New York placed a million dollars at the disposal of the governor for putting in readiness the military and naval reserve, and Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Iowa took similar action. An effort was made to purchase the Danish Island east of Puerto Rico for a coaling station, but was abandoned because of the price asked.

It was at once recognized that the coaling problem was one of the most important in modern naval warfare. Only

one power had really solved it in a satisfactory manner, and it is largely in the adequate establishment of a great number of coaling stations that Great Britain's commercial and naval strength lies. This had been so effectively demonstrated in the far East that Russia, Germany, and France were eagerly endeavoring to follow her example. Germany's plight was revealed by the cruise of her fleet to Chinese waters. The London *Punch* emphasized it by representing Prince Henry running about with his "mailed fist" and anxiously inquiring: "You haven't got a ton of coal about you, have you?"

Spain was poorly prepared to meet the problem in American waters, in spite of her possessions. One port in Puerto Rico and a few in Cuba were all that she could count upon, and in these the supply was not large, not more than enough to coal her fleet for two months. As to her coaling at neutral ports — mostly British — the government of Great Britain, as far back as 1882, had drawn up a series of neutrality regulations by which it was declared that any belligerent ship should be allowed to buy only enough coal to take her to the nearest port of her own country, and, furthermore, that no two supplies of coal should be granted at any British neutral port within three months of each other. The same restrictions had been adopted by some of the other powers, and for many years those in the United States who had advocated the "forward policy," had urged upon our government that we not only needed coaling stations in the West Indies, but in the East, and that our station at the Hawaiian Islands should be preserved at all hazards. Some of our highest naval authorities had frequently asserted that our national policy ought to be that no foreign power should hereafter acquire a coaling station within three thousand miles of San Francisco.

Spain sought to deprive the United States of a certain moral advantage in the dispute at this critical time by ordering Captain-General Blanco to rescind the infamous concentration order at once. Blanco stated that after the publication of the order the reconcentrados and their families would be

allowed to return with safety to their homes, that relief committees would allow them to secure new houses, and that assistance would be given to them in obtaining work and in engaging in agricultural pursuits. Spain, moreover, officially announced that the ministry had voted an appropriation of \$600,000 for the relief of the reconcentrados, and would accept whatever assistance in affording relief the United States might send, if not sent officially or by way of intervention.

Nothing but the certainty of war had up to this time been sufficient to induce Spain to even make the show of appropriating one *peso* for the relief of the starving people, and there was little in Spanish methods to convince us that she really had the intention of effectively relieving the suffering at this critical time. A vote of \$600,000 by the ministry was a very different thing from the actual use of that sum in relief.

During all those months when such steps on the part of Spain might have amounted to something, it was not known that the government, nor even the Queen, who was pictured as a woman much to be admired, had made the mildest sort of protest against a policy which would have disgraced the worst of the Sultan's Kurdish cavalry in Armenia. During the time when the whole world was ringing with the horrors of the Spanish policy in Cuba, and American charity was endeavoring to find a way to carry relief without offending Spain, all the Spanish illustrated papers were full of lively accounts and showy illustrations of the carnival revels throughout Spain. While nothing was contributed throughout the whole of Spain for the relief of the Queen's suffering subjects in the "Ever Faithful Isle," the Spaniards, with all their oft-mentioned impoverishment and lack of resources, had wealth enough to lavish upon carnival frivolities. Meanwhile, the Spanish government, evidently satisfied with its policy of extermination in Cuba, was somehow finding money all over Europe to spend in the purchase of munitions of war and additions to the navy with the purpose of fighting the United States. The Spanish element in Havana was able to give brilliant public

balls and theatrical entertainments for the raising of money for the Spanish navy, while contributing inappreciably for the relief of the wretched people who were dying daily in the very streets of Havana.

When, therefore, in the critical early days of April the Spanish ministry, desperately playing to the galleries of Europe, went through the form of appropriating money for the relief of the reconcentrados, there was very little reason to believe that a penny of it was really intended to be used for the purpose proclaimed, and as the days passed there was no evidence that any attempt was made to so employ it. As General Lee pithily remarked to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, even if the money actually ever passed out of the Spanish treasury, none of it would succeed in running the gauntlet of the Spanish officials in Cuba, who would certainly steal every dollar of it before it could reach the poor wretches for whom it was nominally intended. Officials who would steal even in handling the money intended for the army and for national defense, would hardly hesitate to take money sent for the relief of the Cubans whom, with grim satisfaction, they had ruthlessly imprisoned and starved in the hope of exterminating them.

At this time also the autonomist government of Cuba sent an appeal to President McKinley, urging him to respect the will of the majority of the people of Cuba, declaring that the majority believed in home rule under Spanish sovereignty, that the insurgents were in a minority, and that the majority had the right to decide the destinies of the island. It declared that it would be unjust for any foreign government to impose upon the majority a political régime against its will. But this appeal had no effect upon those who understood the actual situation. Reports from all our consuls had shown that autonomy was a failure and that the majority of the Spanish were as bitterly opposed to it as the insurgents themselves.

The first week in April was one of the most remarkable in the history of the country. Up to this time the peace people

had hardly realized that a crisis was approaching; they had not believed such a thing as war possible. "Surely," said they, "we have no righteous cause for war — no man of sense can want war. This talk will pass over." Indeed, up to the last moment a few self-possessed friends of peace in the United States declared their inability to discover any possible reason why we should give ourselves the slightest degree of concern about what was going on in Cuba. There are always men, otherwise intelligent, who are incapable of understanding events till they have receded some distance into history; they were born so. The bewilderment of the public as to the behavior of these advocates of peace at any price was not lessened by the fact that, to some extent, they were precisely the same gentlemen who, but a short time before, had vehemently demanded that the United States should make war upon the Turkish empire because it had not paid over to our government some thousands of dollars considered by us to be due for certain educational property destroyed by mobs several years ago in Asiatic Turkey. Some who had vehemently denounced the slaughter of seal pups on the Pribilof islands appeared to be unmoved when the slaughter of Cuban women and children was mentioned.

There was another and a larger class who, while expressing no opinion concerning the Cuban question, were actuated by more worthy motives. They formed the opinion that Congress was driving the country into an unnecessary war, which would cost an immense amount of money, disorganize business, which was just beginning to recover from the previous depression, and cost much in American blood. Assembling as boards of trade, or chambers of commerce, they petitioned Congress to sustain the President in his effort to procure a peaceful settlement. While these men were patriotic citizens, ready to do their part if war became necessary, their efforts naturally became associated with those in this country and in Europe who brought their influence to bear at Washington simply out of regard for the value of stocks and bonds. "What is the

killing of a few Cubans to a general impairment of values?" as one eminent financier said! The investment market is largely an international affair and has its ramifications everywhere. While no appreciable part of the Spanish debt was held in the United States, the great bankers of Europe, who had large interests at stake in the maintenance of Spanish credit, had also intimate connection with great banking houses in New York, and these, in turn, had intimate connection with banking houses in other parts of the country. The rich rewards which the large banking houses of New York reap from gigantic financial operations are dependent upon their ability to enlist the co-operation of European capital. These so-called "conservative business interests" undoubtedly had the right to be heard, but they really paraded before themselves men whose patriotism was much less questionable, by employing the ingenious methods of making a show of public opinion by resolutions adopted by chambers of commerce. These methods were perfectly understood by members of Congress, and none of them were deceived into supposing that the circular letters and mimeographed resolutions represented any spontaneous movement of public sentiment. The unfortunate thing about it was that it led to the impression that the President's message was being held back out of deference to these representations, and led to many bitter attacks upon him which were wholly unjustifiable.

Congress and the people were impatiently waiting for the message and they misconstrued the air of mystery that prevailed over its non-appearance. Angry Congressmen flocked to the President at all hours, and he heard them, listening with courteous attention, which he never for a moment relaxed, and then in a few words he would quiet them down and they would go away content for the time. In a few days, roused by excited companions or constituents, they would reappear as warlike as ever, and with patience he would calm them down once more, showing not only his reserve strength, but his high-minded tact. They went away convinced by the Presi-

dent's sincerity that he proposed to carry out a strong policy entirely to their liking, but why did not the message come?

One day a Congressman started for the White House with the intention, as he said, of "reading the riot act to the President." But when there his resentment melted. He could neither threaten nor abuse this cordial gentleman, who asked his opinions and expressed himself so firmly. So he, like others, went back and waited while men of the opposing party were charging that the administration was being held up by Wall Street, and that its motives were altogether bad. It was a trying moment for the President's friends as well as for the President.

At last it was announced that the message was completed and would be sent to Congress on Wednesday, April 6th. On Tuesday it was read at the cabinet meeting. The air of the capital was full of electricity. On Wednesday morning the crowds surging to the Capitol reminded people of the exciting days of the Civil War. At six o'clock in the morning the entrances were besieged though the Houses would not convene till noon. There was not room in the galleries for a third of the people who wished to be there. Every seat was occupied, not only in the strangers' gallery, but also those for the press, for the diplomatic corps, and the friends of the members. An intensity of feeling was apparent in the galleries, on the floor, everywhere. Several members brought their little children with them, holding them in their laps, believing that it would be a day which they would remember when they had grown to manhood. A buzz of discussion filled the air. Visitors in the front rows of the gallery leaned over to see the photographs of starving Cubans that were being circulated.

The regular business of the House began and the time wore on toward one o'clock without sign of that for which all were waiting. Once there was a little flutter of anticipation at the appearance of a messenger, but it was only a message from the Senate that he brought. Then a rumor passed from mouth to mouth that the message was coming at two o'clock.

A few courageous individuals ventured to leave their places to go in search of food, and after a struggle in a restaurant returned with sandwiches and fruits. The rest sat stolid, giving scant attention to the debate in the House. It was all very well to discuss the reorganization of the army, but the crowd were waiting for another story — the President's story of Cuba's wrongs. Five minutes past two and no message! Then came a whisper, followed by a vague rustle of impatience, that three o'clock would be the hour. Still no one moved. All were too conscious of the waiting crowds without, ready to overflow an empty seat. But at last notes were sent up from members on the floor to their friends above with the disappointing news that the message was not to be sent over; and unless the visitors were prepared to stay till Monday they might as well go home. Reluctantly, the crowd melted, hoping still that this might be a false report. Even as late as five o'clock that afternoon there were some persistent seekers still waiting, tired, cross, disappointed, hungry, but quite sure that if they waited long enough the document might come.

When the message had been read to the cabinet and was ready to be transmitted, word came from Consul-General Lee, suggesting that action be postponed till the following week, in order that all officials of the United States and all citizens so desiring might withdraw from Cuba in safety. Excitement was running high at Havana. The President at once saw the force of the appeal, and, moreover, there was reason for faith in a lingering hope that Spain would yield at the last moment. Lee's message was not only a reason for further delay, but it was a convenient one, something that might hold Congress in check a little longer till the last peaceful resource had been expended. The President intimated that he would comply with Lee's appeal. Immediately some of his ablest advisers in the cabinet protested that the temper of Congress and the people was such that no postponement would be tolerated. It would be dangerous. A fear was expressed lest the President should suffer greatly from criticism.

"It is not a question of what will happen to me," he is reported to have said, "but what will happen to those in Cuba. I shall not send in this message till the last one of them has left the island."

And he did not. It was a courageous thing to do when some congressmen, many editors, and many of the people were impugning his motives. One afternoon a Democratic Congressman from Ohio ventured to declare that "influences in New York wired over to Boston, wired from Boston out to the Western cities, and then back here under the name of the peace party — which simply means the speculating party in stocks and bonds, a new name and a disguise — demonstrate that there will be no war. . . . I say that the center of this telegram business is not even Wall Street, but Lombard Street. It is a sympathetic fall in stocks that gentlemen who control the administration fear more than they fear war. We owe an apology to Judas Iscariot. . . . Ever since March, 1897, this administration has been doing something endeavoring to raise the price of stocks. . . . Dictators to the administration are now with their shoulders under the market trying to hold it up."

This called forth a prompt reply from another Ohio Congressman, General Grosvenor, one of the most picturesque personages in either house, a striking figure, with silver hair and beard and a ringing voice. He said, in part:

"The gentleman from Ohio makes a charge that ought to condemn the President of the United States to impeachment and imprisonment. The gentleman declares that no message came from General Lee yesterday, that it was a 'fake' report; that it was false and that it was given out for a corrupt purpose by the President — namely, to affect the stock market. Every part of that statement is, without qualification, absolutely without foundation in truth. I will ask the gentleman from Ohio, suppose the message had gone to Congress yesterday and suppose that last night the blood of the chivalrous gentleman from Virginia [General Lee] had soaked the soil of Cuba, what would have been the verdict of the American people against the administration? The President withheld his message from Congress upon the representation of General Lee that there was trouble there. The world will be notified to-night that the President has been assailed by

distinguished representatives on this floor, his motive impugned, his integrity censured, his whole action charged as being instigated by criminal purpose; and this in a body boasting that it is going to stand by the administration."

It is a source of gratification that only one member of Congress was found at that time willing to give official publicity to the absurd and baseless charge that the President was influenced by stock jobbers in withholding the message. But other reasons contributed to the President's wish to hold it back, diplomatic reasons which could not prudently have been made public, and which, therefore, only increased the mystery, the impatience, and the criticism. Reference has already been made to the deep interest the Roman Catholic Church had in maintaining Spanish credit, besides the interest naturally felt by the Pope in a Catholic nation. Pope Leo, that venerable figure, the loftiness of whose personal character had won for him the esteem of good men of all communions, had for months apparently been bringing his influence to bear at Madrid, where his influence was greatest, in a desire to ward off a war. His advisers in this country and in Rome being such intelligent Americans as Archbishops Ireland and Keane, must have confirmed his own intuitions that the American people would not accept his arbitration or do anything to concede his authority as a temporal ruler. But the Pope seems to have cherished the hope that Spain might be persuaded to withdraw under such terms as would not sacrifice her pride at every point, while the essential features of the demands of American public opinion would be granted, and President McKinley had intimated to the Vatican authorities that any influence which the Pope could bring to bear on Spain would be appreciated by lovers of peace. It was due to the joint pressure of the Pope and the European powers that Spain made new advances at a time when diplomatic relations were thought to be closed.

Archbishop Ireland, an American of the highest patriotism, acted for the Pope here, and he had a clear comprehension of all the factors involved in the complicated situation. His

opinion, as expressed to the President, that the Pope, if a little more time were accorded, might be able to induce Spain to depart from Cuba without resort to war, in itself furnished ample and conclusive reasons for granting a few days' delay. Secrecy was observed solely for the sake of effectiveness of the negotiations. But, unfortunately, the Spanish authorities did a very foolish thing, though one not without precedent. She allowed the Minister of the Interior, Señor Capdepon, who had had nothing to do with the negotiations, and, in view of his official position would not have, except as an adviser, to make a statement that the Pope had consented to act as mediator *at the suggestion of the United States!* This was so utterly false that it did not need the official denial of the administration at Washington, which was, however, made. The Spanish government seems to have made the statement to satisfy its ungovernable pride. In answer to Spain's appeal the Pope had declared that if she would suspend hostilities for a time he would endeavor to make a permanent peace. Spain accepted the condition just before the day approached on which the President intended to send in his message, and such was the situation on that day when the message was held back.

It was plain to the President that whatever form he gave his message, Congress would take its appearance as a signal for taking action leading to war. If he counseled peace, Congress would take the matter into its own hands; if he counseled war, Congress would cheerfully follow. It was this latter course which Congress hoped for and expected. Realizing this, he felt it would be unwise to send in a message while the powers and the Pope were bringing their influence to bear upon Spain. He was entirely right, but the expectant people could not understand his motives because of the mystery surrounding the affair. That the President fully expected war was evident, for the wrecking company which was at work on the *Maine* had been ordered to leave Havana harbor, a step that would hardly have been taken if any hope of peace remained.

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE JOINT NOTE OF THE SIX POWERS — QUEEN CHRISTINA ACTS TOO LATE — THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE AT LAST — "THE WAR IN CUBA MUST STOP."

A Little Play behind the Scenes — Attempts of European Powers to Act — Austria's Interest in the Spanish Dynasty — The French Investment in Spanish Bonds — Plans for a Joint Appeal — An Impressive Moment in the White House — The European Note — The President's Reply — Humanitarian Considerations — Novel Proceeding in Our Diplomacy — Condition on Which England and Russia Acted — A Good Opportunity for the President — A Similar Request Made at Madrid — Spain Replies that She has Gone as Far as She Can — The Queen Takes Matters in Her Own Hand and Would Go Further — Too Late — Blanco Ordered to Suspend Hostilities — Riots in Madrid — General Lee and Many Americans Leave Havana — No Further Postponement of Message Possible — Useless to Listen to Spain's Insincere Diplomacy — The Message Submitted — History of the Troubles Reviewed — Advising against Recognizing the Independence of the Cuban Government — Spain's Proposal as to the *Maine* — The Time for Action at Hand.

A VERY interesting little play was going on behind the scenes while the exciting events attending the delay of the message were taking place upon the stage. Indeed, this little by-play might have had a small part in the postponing of the message. The European powers had up to this time taken no concerted action either to influence Spain or to plead with the United States for peace. It was understood that Austria had undertaken to secure joint action to warn this country against interfering with Spanish rights in Cuba, and it was also understood that France, Germany, and Russia would have been disposed to join in deprecating our forcible intervention, but England stood in the way of such joint action, and without her the Continental powers might have found themselves in an embarrassing position had they attempted it. It should be remembered that at the time our relations with Spain approached a crisis after the destruction of the *Maine*, the European powers were on the point of a crisis

of their own because of affairs in China. The aggressiveness of France, Germany, and Russia in securing rights from the weakened Chinese empire had stirred Great Britain to the defense of her rights, and called forth from her ministers the declaration that she would go to war rather than suffer a diminution of her rights in the East by the partition of China. Germany, France, and Russia were in a position to act with a degree of concert against England, and were evidently on the point of doing so when the Spanish-American crisis suddenly revealed the fact that England not only sympathized with us but was disposed to favor an English-speaking alliance, whose influence, of course, would be felt in the East as well as the West. The Continental powers, which had thought to take Great Britain unsupported, suddenly drew back when they saw that their action would force Great Britain into a natural alliance with the United States.

Moreover, Austria had a certain further interest, as the people of Spain happened to be ruled by a branch of the Austrian Bourbons, and the house of Hapsburg could not in decency neglect its own. Indeed, from the very first, Spain's course was guided not so much by considerations of the national welfare as by the desperate desire to protect the interests of the Queen Regent and her son and ward, the lad Alfonso. The French government also had the further interest of protecting her investors who had absorbed a large portion of Spain's bonds. The Spanish debt had been scaled down considerably after the Ten-Years War in Cuba, and the prospect of a war with the United States was a serious one for these French investors.

When these powers saw that it would be impossible to take concerted action in defense of Spanish sovereignty, the proposition was made for a joint appeal for peace to be presented to both Spain and the United States, and this was done on the 7th, the day following the excitement over the delay of the message. The visit had been arranged in advance, the President knew that an appeal would be presented the same day to

the Madrid government; he knew just what the diplomats would say before they said it, and, indeed, their joint note had been inspected and *viséd* at the State Department before presentation. Nevertheless, it was an impressive moment when the representatives of Great Britain, Germany, France, Austria, Italy, and Russia appeared before the President, the British ambassador, who was spokesman, stating that they had been commissioned to approach him with a message of "friendship and peace." He then presented the following note:

"The undersigned, representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia, duly authorized in that behalf, address in the name of their respective governments a pressing appeal to the feelings of humanity and moderation of the President and of the American people in their existing differences with Spain. They earnestly hope that further negotiations will lead to an agreement which, while securing the maintenance of peace, will afford all necessary guarantees for the re-establishment of order in Cuba.

"The powers do not doubt that the humanitarian and purely disinterested character of this representation will be fully recognized and appreciated by the American nation."

The powers acted here not with any idea of suggesting what we ought to do or must do, and whether intentionally or not they gave to the President an opportunity to declare just how irrevocable was the intention of the United States that order must be restored and established in Cuba, thus enabling the powers to deal more effectively with responsible officials at Madrid. The President replied thus, at once making it clear to Europe and to Congress why he could not deal further with Spain on the basis she proposed:

"The government of the United States recognizes the good will which has prompted the friendly communication of the representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia, as set forth in the address of your excellencies, and shares the hope therein expressed that the outcome of the situation in Cuba may be the maintenance of peace between the United States and Spain by affording the necessary guarantees for the re-establishment of order in the island, so terminating the chronic condition of disturbance there, which so deeply injures the interests and menaces the tranquillity of the American nation by the character and

consequences of the struggle thus kept up at our doors, besides shocking its sense of humanity.

"The government of the United States appreciates the humanitarian and disinterested character of the communication now made on behalf of the powers named, and for its part is confident that equal appreciation will be shown for its own earnest and unselfish endeavors to fulfill a duty to humanity by ending a situation the indefinite prolongation of which has become insufferable."

The fact that the representatives of the powers were received in a collective capacity at all aroused some criticism in this country, for it was a distinctly novel proceeding in our diplomacy. The American spirit does not consent to have the concert of Europe, as such, acting diplomatically in any affair which concerns us, and doubtless the President might have declined with propriety to be addressed by the particular group of European powers which of late years has assumed to impose its mandates upon the rest of the world. On the other hand, the attitude of the powers was one to which this government could take no just exception, and it might have proved disadvantageous had the reception of the appeal been declined. The British minister would not consent to act with the representatives of the other powers until he was assured that no design of menace lay in the proposition, and the Russian minister declined to act till assured that the note would be welcomed by the United States. He considered the affair a mere bit of formality. It also gave the President an opportunity to make a statement which might remove any misconception in the minds of Europeans as to our right to deal with our own affairs unmolested, and of reminding them that, much as they deprecated war from a humanitarian point of view, it was chiefly from this very point of view that we were about to go to war.

The powers proffered the same request to the government at Madrid, and Señor Gullon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, simply replied that Spain had reached the limit of her policy in conceding the demands and allowing the pretensions of the United States. She, however, immediately embraced the opportunity to bring forward another alleged

concession, carefully stating that it was in obedience to European intervention and not American demands. This implied that Spain had thus arranged for European support, but the United States government knew well enough that there was no ground for the implication. The concession took the form of an order to General Blanco to suspend hostilities for the present. Contrary to previous intimations, this so-called armistice was entirely without conditions, and its duration was to be determined by Blanco. It was not an armistice in any sense of the word, nor did it even include a request to the insurgents to join in it. An armistice is, of course, an agreement between two hostile governments or military commanders for a mutual cessation of hostilities. In this case, so far from an armistice having been determined upon, Señor Quesada, speaking officially for the Cuban Junta, said positively that the Republic of Cuba would not consent to any negotiations for armistice or suspension of hostilities unless the basis was the absolute independence of Cuba.

The Spanish cabinet were reported as at odds over the question of the suspension of hostilities, but the Queen, influenced apparently by the Pope, took the matter into her own hands and insisted upon it, though the order which came late on Saturday, the 9th, was accompanied by an unofficial intimation that Spain would gladly see the United States withdraw its war ships from the neighborhood of Cuba and the Philippine Islands during the further negotiations. The Queen was evidently in a mood, when it was too late, to concede autonomy on Canadian lines rather than lose the sovereignty of Cuba. But these repeated yieldings to what were considered the demands of the people of the United States made the royal position even more uncomfortable by angering the Spanish masses.

Riots occurred in Madrid on Sunday afternoon and evening. The Prefect, who was witnessing the Easter Sunday bull fight, promptly left the ring, and by energetic measures prevented a serious outbreak. The demonstration was made by Carlists, Republicans, and Romerists, and a number of the

leaders were arrested. Much feeling was aroused among the people by a report, evidently circulated by design, that the Spanish minister had been attacked at Washington and his residence wrecked. There was no truth whatever in the story, and Minister Polo hastened to assure his government that nothing serious had happened.

Meanwhile, the delay in the message gave the needed opportunity for the withdrawal of Americans from Cuba. When the excitement was running high, General Lee left on the *Fern*, reaching Key West Saturday evening, and with him came most of the other American officials and residents in Cuba and many Cubans who believed their lives in danger at Havana. A deplorable but necessary result of the withdrawal of Americans from Cuba was the immediate cessation of our efforts to relieve the reconcentrados, for Miss Barton and the other Red Cross agents took General Lee's advice and left the island. No consular officials remained in Cuba to supervise the distribution of supplies, and the regular freight and passenger service between Cuba and the United States ceased. Considerable supplies of provisions were left in Cuba, and it was the belief of the officials of this country that they would be used for the army, the Spanish taking no interest in relieving the reconcentrados. Indeed, nothing had occurred to indicate that Spain had taken the slightest step to use in charity any of the \$600,000 voted by the cabinet several days before. The move was regarded as insincere and made only to gain time.

Notwithstanding the apparent change in Spain's attitude, it was evident that another postponement of the message would not do. However unjust, the impression had become strong that in the White House during the development of the crisis there had been too many statesmen near the President who looked upon the cause of Cuba without sympathy, either moral or political, who thought of the *Maine's* destruction as merely a regrettable subject for diplomatic negotiation, who habitually thought of the Monroe doctrine as a pretentious theory, and whose ambition for the greatness of the United States and

whose conception of its future welfare were bound up within their existing commercial interests. As a matter of fact, the delay was caused by the creditable desire of the President not to weaken the action of his government by even the appearance of injustice to Spain. But Spain's diplomacy, as crafty and insincere as ever, by alleged concessions and by other devices, if not stimulating the hope that she would withdraw from Cuba, at least compelled the President to listen again and again or be accused of a diplomatic discourtesy.

The time had come, however, when it was useless and might be dangerous to listen longer. Such diplomacy might be kept up till doomsday. Having failed to accomplish anything by it, nothing remained but to calmly pass the issue over to Congress, which might be more temperate under its responsibility. So not far from noon on Monday, the 11th, the message was delivered substantially as drafted the week before, but supplemented with a statement of Spain's latest action.

The message opened with a long, thorough, and convincing historical review of the entire subject. The President pointed out that the existing revolution was only one of several such disturbances which had caused the United States enormous loss in trade and had "by the exercise of cruel, barbarous, and uncivilized practices of warfare shocked the sensibilities and offended the humane sympathies of our people." He then referred to the efforts of President Cleveland to bring about peace, and their failure; to the institution in October, 1896, of "the policy of devastation and concentration," and to the fact that by March 18, 1897, the mortality among the reconcentrados from starvation and disease exceeded 50 per cent. of their whole number — adding, "it was not civilized warfare; it was extermination. The only peace it could beget was that of the wilderness and the grave."

The history of the attempts of his administration to improve the condition of affairs in Cuba were next considered — the overtures made to the Spanish administration which succeeded that of the assassinated prime minister Canovas; the

successful demand for the release of American citizens imprisoned in Cuba; the appointment of a Cuban relief committee; the appeal to the American people for contributions, and the action of the Red Cross Society; finally, Spain's revocation of the order of concentration and appropriation of money for the relief of the sufferers. Still, he said, the situation remained unendurable, and on March 27th he had made propositions through Minister Woodford looking to an armistice until October 1st. To this Spain replied, offering to entrust the effort to make peace to the Cuban so-called autonomous parliament. This was quite unsatisfactory, as the parliament was not to meet till May 4th and its powers were indefinite.

Then the President came to the question of what action the government should take. Forcible annexation, he said, would be "criminal aggression"; recognizing belligerency would "accomplish nothing towards the end for which we labor — the instant pacification of Cuba and the cessation of the misery that afflicts the island"; recognizing the independence of Cuba had no historical precedent clearly applicable to the situation. He added: "From the standpoint of experience, I do not think it would be wise or prudent for this government to recognize at the present time the independence of the so-called Cuban republic." As to intervention, he held that there were good grounds for such action: first, in the cause of humanity; second, for the protection of our citizens in Cuba; third, from the injury to our commerce and the devastation of the island; fourth, from the constant menace to our peace in many and unexpected ways, arising out of such a war at our doors. The last reason was illustrated and enforced by this reference to the destruction of the battleship *Maine*:

"The destruction of the noble vessel has filled the national heart with inexpressible horror. Two hundred and fifty-eight brave sailors and marines and two officers of our navy reposing in the fancied security of a friendly harbor have been hurled to death; grief and want brought to their homes and sorrow to the nation. . . . The destruction of the *Maine* by whatever exterior cause is a patent and impressive proof of a state of things

in Cuba that is intolerable. That condition is thus shown to be such that the Spanish government cannot assure safety to a vessel of the American navy in the harbor of Havana on a mission of peace and rightfully there."

After referring to his statement in his message of the year before, that the time might come when it would be necessary to intervene with force, the President closed with these words:

"The long trial has proved that the object for which Spain has waged the war cannot be attained. The fire of insurrection may flame or may smolder with varying seasons, but it has not been and it is plain that it cannot be extinguished by present methods. The only hope of relief and repose from a condition which can no longer be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba. In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests which give us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop.

"In view of these facts and of these considerations, I ask the Congress to authorize and empower the President to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government, capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquillity and the security of its citizens as well as our own, and to use the military and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for these purposes.

"And in the interest of humanity and to aid in preserving the lives of the starving people of the island I recommend that the distribution of food and supplies be continued, and that an appropriation be made out of the public treasury to supplement the charity of our citizens.

"The issue is now with Congress. It is a solemn responsibility. I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the Constitution and the law, I await your action.

"Yesterday, and since the preparation of the foregoing message, official information was received by me that the latest decree of the Queen Regent of Spain directs General Blanco, in order to prepare and facilitate peace, to proclaim a suspension of hostilities, the duration and details of which have not yet been communicated to me.

"This fact, with every other pertinent consideration will, I am sure, have your just and careful attention in the solemn deliberations upon which you are about to enter. If this measure attains a successful result, then our aspirations as a Christian, peace-loving people will be realized. If it fails, it will be only another justification for our contemplated action."

CHAPTER XXXV

RECEPTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE—ARRIVAL OF GENERAL LEE—EXCITING DEBATES IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE—OUR ULTIMATUM TO SPAIN—BREAKING OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

How the President's Message was Received—A Plain Unimpassioned Statement—Congress Expected Something More Fiery—General Lee's Arrival at Washington—Ovations on the Route—A Warm Welcome—His Testimony before the Senate Committee—Resolutions for Intervention—The Question of Recognizing the Independence of Cuba—The Tension of Feeling—Coming Together on the Final Vote—Report of the Senate Committee—Defending the President—An Impressive Speech—An Amendment to Recognize the Cuban Republic Passed—Disagreeing Action and a Conference—The Final Draft—Wisdom of Going to War without Recognizing Cuba—The President Prepares His Ultimatum—Signing the Resolutions—Minister Polo Demands His Passports—Spanish Ministry Withhold the President's Despatch to Woodford—A High-handed Performance—Woodford Given His Passports.

THE message was very coldly received by Congress, which, for weeks, had been so wrought up over the anticipation of it that something of a more fiery character was expected. Their appetites sought rhetorical vehemence, and they were disappointed to find only a plain, unimpassioned statement of facts which had long been familiar. But once did the message strike the high note suited to the war party's ears, and that was when it said, "*This war must stop.*" But Congress expected that the President would lead the way, and that it could follow on, shouting for war, but taking no responsibility in the premises. The President, however, cast the responsibility squarely upon it. "The issue is now with Congress," he said, and further on he added, "Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the Constitution and the law, I await your action." This was a plain assurance that the President would now stand by Congress, though Congress had only

with great difficulty been induced to stand by him, in his serious efforts to settle the trouble by diplomacy. Congress had waited for the President, now the President waited for Congress. In this situation there was but one thing for Congress consistently to do. The message was, without debate, referred to the committees on foreign affairs. On a second reading, Congress found the message more to its taste, and it had the assurance that the President was ready to intervene just as soon as authority was given him to do so.

On the evening of the day the message was presented General Lee arrived at Washington. His progress northward was in the nature of a triumph, being lustily cheered along the way and at Richmond royally received by Governor Tyler. Great was the enthusiasm at Washington; crowds were at the depot when his train rolled in, and lined the street as he was driven to his hotel, to which a vast number of people flocked, some with torches, in procession. A patriotic serenade was arranged, and in spite of his wearisome trip he had to step out on the balcony and address the multitude. He was at once in great demand at the State Department and before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, to which he made a long statement on the situation in Cuba, and gave his reasons for the conviction that the *Maine* was blown up from outside. He believed it was done by Spanish officials, but that the Captain-General had no knowledge of it. He considered the alleged letter from Weyler to Santos Guzman, already referred to, genuine. Captain Sigsbee expressed the same conviction as to the *Maine*, and said that the Spanish exercised no vigilance whatever over any but their own vessels. As to the Spanish Board of Inquiry, it did nothing for a week after the explosion and did very little work at all on the wreck. General Lee further said that the armistice was not of the slightest use or effect. He said the Cubans had only the skeleton form of a government, with no permanent capital, but that all Cubans sympathized with the insurgents and four-fifths of the inhabitants of the island were Cubans.

While the case was in the hands of committees the world waited in almost breathless suspense for the outcome, but it did not wait long. The House was the first to act. On the 13th a resolution was introduced by the acting chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee following the recommendation of the President, authorizing and directing him to intervene at once to stop the war in Cuba, that permanent peace might be secured, and that a stable and independent government might be established by the people of Cuba, and empowering him to use the land and naval forces of the United States for that purpose. There were those who desired more radical action, and insisted that there should be a recognition of the Cuban republic, but the administration forces held together admirably, and the resolutions of the majority of the committee were carried on a final vote by 322 to 19, on Saturday the 16th.

The debate was extremely exciting at times. Though there was an agreement between the Democratic and Republican members of the committee as to the presentation of the resolutions and the minority substitute, an unfortunate misunderstanding arose among the members of both parties, culminating in an occurrence which cast a blot on the historic proceedings of the day. The difference of opinion on which the parties were lined against each other was simply over the form of the resolution, the Democrats largely wishing to recognize the independence of Cuba at the outset, in defiance of the recommendations of the President and the advice of General Lee, and the Republicans wishing to postpone such recognition till a more favorable time. During the excitement a personal quarrel occurred between two members; a Georgian was called a liar and responded by throwing a book at the head of the offending Pennsylvanian. Before the end of the day explanations were made and the incident only serves to show the tension of feeling in Congress.

In the final vote both parties came together and the unity of North and South and the common feeling at the last were worth remembering. It was certainly remarkable that out

of that great body of men only nineteen were in opposition. The long-expected crisis had come and been met in a strong one-minded way and generally with dignity. The resolution as passed by the House was understood to meet the desires of the President, which was another remarkable feature considering the severe criticisms to which he had been subjected by members who at last voted for the desired resolution. The Democratic substitute would have been a virtual declaration of war, and, although the other resolution could under existing circumstances lead to nothing else unless Spain speedily admitted the independence of Cuba, it was a much wiser expression and a safer course.

In the Senate on the 14th the Foreign Relations Committee reported resolutions in harmony with those of the House, accompanied by a strong and brilliant report prepared and presented by Senator Davis, the chairman of the committee. It discussed the *Maine* incident and other reasons for the grave step proposed, and a minority of four led by Senator Turpie added a statement advocating the recognition of the existing government of the Cuban republic. It is probable that the resolutions of the majority would have been passed in short order but for the introduction of a resolution recognizing the Cuban republic, and conspicuously advocated by Senators Foraker on the Republican side and Turpie on the Democratic side. A long debate followed, some of the Democratic and so-called "silver" Senators making severe attacks upon the President, declaring that his message was inconclusive, that his course had been vacillating, and that he had been under the influence of senators interested in stocks and bonds. It was unfortunately apparent that certain leaders were anxious to make capital for their party. These criticisms were repelled with emphasis by both Republican and Democratic senators. Senator Hoar made a long and very able address upholding the President and warning the Senate against going beyond the recommendations of the message. He declared that the proposal to recognize the independence of the Cuban republic

was an extremely unwise one, of such a nature as to entangle us in case of intervention, which he regarded as almost inevitable. He thought it would be far wiser to place in the hands of the President the power he asked for and trust him to secure the pacification of Cuba without resort to war, if possible. It might be that with this power in his hands he could come to a satisfactory agreement with Spain. "If, in the providence of God," he said, "this country is called upon to do a great act of international justice, let us do it in the spirit of justice and not of revenge." He felt that if we went to war it should be with "sanction of international law, the sympathy of all humane and liberty-loving nations, with the approval of our own consciences, and with the certainty of the applauding judgment of history." He did not like to think of the Genius of America "angry, snarling, shouting, screaming, clawing with her nails," but rather "to think of her in her honest and serene beauty, inspired by sentiments — even towards her enemies — not of hate but of love; perhaps a little pale about the eyes and with a smile on her lips, but as sure, determined, unerring, and invincible as was the Archangel Michael when he struck down and trampled upon the demon of darkness."

Mr. Lodge made a brilliant historical argument, urging strong and immediate action. Mr. Turpie declared that the recognition of independence must logically precede intervention and was "the great outlying, overshadowing fact in the whole transaction." Mr. Foraker made an elaborate argument in favor of recognition. Mr. Fairbanks found the so-called republic of Cuba "too nebulous, too mythical; at most a military oligarchy with no habitat." Mr. Daniel declared that the resolutions as reported would naturally result in turning our guns upon the insurgents, and this charge led to a lively passage at arms between Mr. Daniel and Mr. Gray. The possibility of the United States becoming liable for Spanish bonds issued to pay the expenses of the Cuban war unless we first recognized Cuban independence was discussed with some vigor, but was generally repudiated.

There were a few, very few, who still thought we had no cause for intervention. Mr. Wellington and Mr. White argued that Spain had already complied with our demands, and the latter added: "It has been well and thoughtfully said that no more sublime spectacle has ever been presented than that of a great nation sacrificing for justice its passion and its pride."

Just before the vote was taken, Mr. Gorman, the Democratic senator from Maryland, made a very impressive speech, defending the President, declaring that his course had been wise and patriotic, and that both branches of Congress ought to uphold him; that it was a time to drop all party differences and to act, not as Republicans or Democrats, but as American citizens. He wished that the record of division already made could be blotted out and only a united people presented to the world. He added:

"I pledge myself to forget that McKinley was elected by the Republican party because I know and believe that as President of a united people he will bear his country's flag aloft, and that no nation, Spain or any other, will receive from him aught else than that fair, manly, and brave treatment of an American President."

The vote on the amendment recognizing the Cuban republic was 51 in favor to 37 against. The affirmative vote was made up of 29 Democrats, 6 Populists, 5 silver Republicans, and 11 regular Republicans; the negative vote consisted of 32 Republicans and 5 Democrats, the latter being Gray, Caffrey, Gorman, Morgan, and Faulkner.

The Senate resolutions came before the House on Monday; Mr. Dingley moved concurrence with an amendment striking out the clause concerning the recognition of the Cuban republic, and upon this motion called for the previous question, which was ordered, thus shutting off debate. The Republican leaders had made preparations for the division, using all the influence they had to bring radical Republicans into line. The Democrats and Populists, who, with a single exception, were solidly arrayed in favor of the Senate resolutions unamended, hoped for sufficient Republican help to carry their

point; but in this they were disappointed. When the vote was taken Dingley's motion was carried by 178 to 156. Fourteen Republicans broke over party lines and voted in opposition. Four of them were from Wisconsin, two from Indiana, seven from Illinois, and one from North Dakota.

The resolutions as amended then went back to the Senate, and, before they were received, ten of the Republican senators who had voted with the Democrats and Populists on Saturday had a conference and decided to work against concurrence in the House amendment. The Senate by a vote of 46 to 32, showing no change in the attitude of the two parties, resolved to adhere to its resolutions and sent them back to the House, which again voted to non-concur and returned the resolutions to the Senate with the independence clause again stricken out; it resolved to insist on its amendment and asked for a conference. The vote was 172 to 148, showing a majority of two more than on the former vote. At 1:10 A. M. on Tuesday the conferees of the two Houses reached an agreement. On the part of the Senate, the clause recognizing the independence of the Cuban republic was yielded, and on the part of the House the paragraph declaring that Cuba is and of right ought to be free was accepted. The two houses then passed the resolutions in the following form:

“WHEREAS, The abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battleship, with two hundred and sixty of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured, as has been set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of April 11, 1898, upon which the action of Congress was invited; therefore be it resolved:

“*First.* That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

“*Second.* That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

“*Third.* That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is,

directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States to such an extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

"Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people."

It was not without considerable difficulty that enough Republicans were held to the defense of the President's position. The feeling in behalf of Cuba and against Spain was so bitter that it required the greatest parliamentary skill and the strong hand of the Speaker to prevent concurrence with the Senate. The great majority felt that the Cuban republic had won its freedom, and in their excitement they failed to grasp the legal reasons against such action. Recognition of the Masó government might follow later, but at the outset of intervention the recognition of that government would have undoubtedly hampered our efforts. Had we acknowledged it, our only logical course would have been to form an offensive and defensive alliance with this new sovereign power, and then, in a strictly subordinate way, co-operate simply with General Gomez. It was much better for us to enter upon the conflict upon our own responsibility. Under the resolution, as adopted, our demand that Spain withdraw her troops and relinquish sovereignty in the island could mean nothing than that she should relinquish the sovereignty to the United States. This left us free to establish the Cuban government as seemed best for the Cuban people, but the same resolution distinctly avowed that in taking upon ourselves the responsibility of restoring order in the island we should relinquish authority as soon as we had been able to establish an independent Cuban republic. Recognition of the Masó government would not only have hampered our military operations, but it would have been humiliating to have taken the field simply as an ally of the Cuban army, reserving no authority over the determina-

tion of results. The shrewdest men in Congress saw this plainly, although all their feelings were for the Cuban republic. If we had recognized the republic months earlier and allowed the Cubans to win their own independence, if they could, the case would have been different.

The resolutions were sent to the President late on Tuesday, the 19th. As there was reason to believe that if they were promptly signed diplomatic relations would be broken off before an ultimatum could be sent, the President delayed the act of signing till an ultimatum had been prepared. Shortly before noon on the 20th the ultimatum was delivered to Señor Polo, the Spanish Minister at Washington. About an hour earlier it was sent to Minister Woodford as an open dispatch, accompanied by an order that it be presented to the Sagasta ministry at once.

Immediately on receiving the ultimatum Señor Polo demanded his passports, which were sent to him promptly by the State Department, and he closed the legation, leaving at once for Canada. The ultimatum arrived at the Madrid telegraph office in due time, but by direction of the Spanish government was withheld from Minister Woodford till the following day. Spain, having learned the contents of the dispatch, decided to give Minister Woodford his passports before he had an opportunity to present the ultimatum, and this she did, seeking by a characteristic trick to win a technical advantage. But this she lost, as the ultimatum had already been officially communicated through Minister Polo.

The ultimatum, a paraphrase of the resolutions of Congress couched in diplomatic language, was as follows:

“ To Woodford, Minister, Madrid :

“ You have been furnished with the text of a joint resolution voted by the Congress of the United States on the 19th inst., approved to-day, in relation to the pacification of the island of Cuba. In obedience to that act the President directs you to immediately communicate to the Government of Spain said resolution, with the formal demand of the Government of the United States that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval

forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. In taking this step, the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the government and control of the island to its people, under such free and independent government as they may establish.

"If by the hour of noon on Saturday next, the 23d day of April, instant, there be not communicated to this Government by that of Spain a full and satisfactory response to this demand and resolution whereby the ends of peace in Cuba shall be assured, the President will proceed without further notice to use the power and authority enjoined and conferred upon him by the said joint resolution to such extent as may be necessary to carry the same into effect."

In view of the swiftness with which the quarrel had come to a head the new Spanish Cortes was called by the Queen to meet on April 20th, a day somewhat earlier than that originally set. The party groups held preliminary meetings on the 19th, by which time the action of the American Congress had become fully known in Madrid. Sagasta at the head of the Liberal party made statements of the most uncompromising character, and war was declared inevitable alike by all Spanish statesmen and the press. The belief prevailed in this country that Spain would endeavor to resort to another evasive diplomatic scheme, but she knew quite well that the President had resolved to listen no longer; he would approve the resolutions of Congress, and she resolved to let the war come. It had the desired effect of bringing all parties together and of strengthening for the time the position of the Queen. Don Carlos was forced to join in the warlike procession, though he knew that his opportunity would inevitably come later.

In her speech to the Cortes on the 20th, or at the very time President McKinley was signing the resolutions, the Queen declared "the unalterable resolution of my government to defend our rights whatsoever sacrifices may be imposed upon us in accomplishing this task." She added: "Thus identifying myself with the nation, I not only fulfill the oath I swore in accepting the Regency, but I follow the dictates of a mother's heart, trusting the Spanish people to gather behind

my son's throne and defend it until he is old enough to defend it himself, as well as trusting to the Spanish people to defend the honor and the territory of the nation." She ascribed the most unworthy motives to those in the United States who had urged interference in Cuban affairs.

Sagasta, in his opening address to the Cortes, used even stronger language, and amid universal enthusiasm said: "Acts, not words, are required. . . . We are resolved not to yield in anything touching the national honor or the integrity of Spanish territory, because we admit no negotiations in question of honor and we do not make a traffic of shame."

Minister Woodford left Madrid promptly after receiving his passports, having notified the United States consuls through Consul-General Bowen at Barcelona to close their consulates. There were some demonstrations at his departure, but he was carefully guarded at the instance of the Spanish authorities. At Valladolid, the train was attacked and stoned and windows were broken; but the civil guards protected Minister Woodford's carriage with drawn swords. At Tolosa, the Spanish police made an attempt to arrest Mr. Woodford's colored servant, claiming that he was a citizen of Spain. Woodford protested and declared he would only allow the servant to be removed by force, and this was not attempted. It was a relief to him and his party when they finally reached French soil. The Spanish minister and his suite left Washington without molestation or any hostile demonstrations, and made his way to Canada without receiving insults of any kind.

The day after General Woodford left there were a number of enthusiastic processions in Madrid, and a mob gathered in front of the Equitable Life Insurance building, tore down the American escutcheon, and gleefully broke the American eagle in pieces. The civil governor, instead of checking the demonstration, allowed the mob full liberty, mingling with the crowd and saying in an address to the populace: "The Spanish lion is aroused from his slumber. He will shake his mane and disperse the rest of the brute creation."

At Barcelona, Consul-General Bowen reported that during the week before he left, eight angry mobs of over 8,000 persons each made violent demonstrations before the consulate. Once he was compelled to face a mob for some time before the police came, and the night before he left, a mob, including some of the most influential citizens, came to the building determined to secure the Eagle and Shield. On finding they had been removed, they were very angry and it required force on the part of the police to disperse them.

The series of events indicates clearly enough that peace between the two countries was broken by the act of Spain and not of the United States. Spain considered the approval of the joint resolutions of Congress a virtual declaration of war, and she at once broke off relations with this government. That began the war. The Cuban question became our war with Spain.

CHAPTER XXXVI



THE SPANISH AND AMERICAN NAVIES—PROCLAMATION OF CUBAN BLOCKADE—DEPARTURE OF AN AMERICAN SQUADRON FOR CUBAN WATERS—THE FIRST SHOT OF THE WAR—THE CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS.

Beginning Operations—Plans for Offensive and Defensive Action—Comparison of the Spanish and United States Navies—Spain's Armored Cruisers—Superiority of Our Guns and Gunners—The Spirit of the Navy—Lieutenant Commander Wainwright's Plea for a Chance to Fight—Peculiar Positions of Antagonists—Spain's Best Ships neither in Cuban nor Philippine Waters—The Cape Verde Squadron—Speculations as to Naval Results—Spaniards Suspected of Dark Designs—Commodore Howell's Auxiliary Fleet—Blockading Cuban Ports—Departure of Admiral Sampson's Imposing Fleet—Commodore Dewey Ordered to Sail for Manila—Caution of the Naval Strategy Board—A Spanish Ship Sighted—The First Shot of the War—The Spanish Flag Comes Down—Other Prizes Captured—The Call for Volunteers—Prompt Response—A Conflict between Amateurs and Professionals—Reorganizing the Army—A Cause of Delay.

WHEN on Thursday, the 21st, the news of General Woodford's dismissal was received at Washington, it was considered as sufficiently marking the beginning of hostilities. No further answer could be expected to the ultimatum, and the administration felt free to begin active operations at once. In adopting plans for the war the government was obliged to consider the requirements of both offensive action and of defensive precautions. The President at first kept strongly in view the possibility of carrying supplies to the reconcentrados, an object at once requiring a convenient base of operations on the Cuban shore, which was in the hands of the Spanish, whom it was proposed to drive from the island. While, to accomplish these objects, an army would be very soon required, it was evident that the initial steps would be taken at once by the navy, and it was decided to direct it towards two ends—a blockade of Havana and the destruction of Spain's fleet. The idea of taking Havana at once was dis-

carded as too risky, though it was, doubtless, less risky than the cautious strategists of the government supposed. The fear of incurring the loss of some of our fighting ships and the suspicion that Spain might await a good opportunity to strike our navy, when weakened by the loss or absence of ships for repairs, or to strike at our extensive seaboard, led the government quite naturally to the conclusion that the safer and surer course would be to blockade Havana and await Spain's attempt to relieve the city, in the meantime seeking a convenient base of operations on the Cuban coast as near Havana as possible.

A comparison of Spain's navy with ours showed but one first-class Spanish battleship, the *Pelayo*, to our four. Spain had two old second-class battleships, the *Numancia* and *Vittoria*; we had a modern one, the *Texas*. But if we were superior in battleships, Spain was ahead in armored cruisers; while we had but two, the *New York* and *Brooklyn*, she had no less than eight — the *Vizcaya*, *Almirante Oquendo*, *Carlos V.*, *Cardinal Cisneros*, *Cristobal Colon*, *Cataluña*, *Maria Teresa*, and *Princess de Asturias*. In protected cruisers, however, the tables were again turned; Spain had eight, the United States had more than twice as many. In gunboats and dispatch boats, Spain's great number of eighty represented but small and weak vessels far inferior to those of the United States. Of monitors she had none; we had five modern and thirteen old-fashioned boats of this type, and one dynamite monitor or cruiser, the *Vesuvius*, whose utility, however, remained to be tested. Spain's torpedo-boat destroyers numbered six; we had none except such vessels as were armed in the auxiliary fleet. Spain's entire torpedo outfit numbered about sixty vessels and ours about twenty. Many naval experts considered armored cruisers and torpedo craft the two most effective engines of war and, therefore, regarded our navy as behind that of Spain in real effectiveness; but this was only a theory. As a whole, taking account of tonnage, speed, and armament, our navy was far better than Spain's. This was especially noticeable in guns, of which we had more than twice



PROMINENT AMERICAN NAVAL OFFICERS.

Admiral F. M. BUNCE.

Commodore JOHN C. WATSON.

Lieut. RICHMOND P. HOBSON.

Captain CHARLES D. SIGSBEE.

as many as Spain had. Taking into account our auxiliary fleet of eighty vessels, many of them of superior speed, we certainly possessed a good advantage over Spain in striking power. But the greatest advantage we had was in the superiority of American sailors, even if in number they were less than Spain's. The Spaniards had never had much drill in squadron maneuvers or in gun practice.

We did not appreciate at this time as it deserved the fact that no matter how marvelous the gun it is really the man behind the gun who decides the contest. The modern gun had become a complicated machine, terrible if used effectively, but, capable of firing at long range, the chances of missing had been greatly increased unless skill had kept pace with the development.

The spirit prevailing in our navy is well illustrated by the appeal of Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright, who was executive officer of the *Maine*, to be allowed to go into active service again. He was formerly Chief Intelligence Officer of the navy, and Secretary Long had decided to restore him to his old duties. But he did not wish to stay on shore duty; he wanted a chance to fight the men who had been responsible for the destruction of the *Maine*, and he said so. The authorities finally gave way to his appeal, and he was placed in command of the fast yacht, *Corsair*, which had been purchased from J. Pierpont Morgan and renamed the *Gloucester*. He looked eagerly for opportunities to meet the enemy, and, in time, they came.

Like the Spanish military service, the naval service was in bad condition. As a matter of fact, the Spanish had hardly mechanical skill enough to handle the new fighting craft which on paper gave her a fair strength. But this was not appreciated at first anywhere, not even in Spain, and certainly the United States government could not with wisdom place confidence in any apparent or theoretical weakness of the enemy.

The naval position of the two antagonists was certainly

peculiar at the beginning. Spain had no large, heavily-armored vessels to guard her interests either in the West Indies or the Philippines. The *Vizcaya* and *Almirante Oquendo* had a few days before, or when war appeared inevitable, sailed from Havana, and were supposed to have gone to join the Cape Verde fleet. As far as the Navy Department knew, the old cruiser *Alfonso XII.* and a number of small gunboats were all that remained in Cuban waters. At Puerto Rico there were a few gunboats, but nothing formidable. The most formidable and first available Spanish squadron was in command of Admiral Cervera, at St. Vincent in the Cape Verde islands, which belong to Portugal. This comprised the armored cruisers *Maria Teresa*, *Cristobal Colon*, *Vizcaya*, and *Almirante Oquendo*, with three torpedo-boat destroyers, three torpedo boats, the transatlantic steamer *City of Cadiz*, armed as an auxiliary cruiser, and a coaling vessel. As naval reckonings went, this squadron was considered to be a fair match for our flying squadron at Hampton Roads.

Spain was apparently forming a second squadron at Cadiz, consisting of the battleship *Pelayo*, the armored cruisers *Carlos V.*, *Cardinal Cisneros*, *Numancia*, *Vittoria*, *Princess Mercedes*, and a few gunboats, torpedo-boat destroyers, and torpedo boats. The Philippine squadron consisted of four cruisers, none of them armored, and several gunboats and small craft.

A torpedo-boat destroyer, the *Temerario*, was in the Rio de la Plata on the South American coast, and it was even considered possible that she might be waiting there to make a night assault upon our battleship *Oregon* and the gunboat *Marietta*, which were on their long journey around Cape Horn. Two Spanish torpedo-boat destroyers were also being repaired in the British Isles.

What Spain proposed to do with these ships was a matter of pure speculation; what she could do with them or what the United States could do against them was quite as much so, for, with the exception of the short and sharp battle of the Yalu, in the war between Japan and China, there was little

in the history of actual warfare to judge modern warships by. All calculations had been theoretical and based upon the size of vessels, their speed, the number and character of their guns, and the qualities of their armor. It was admitted that there might be undreamed-of possibilities in the action of such fighting machines; the ease with which the *Maine* had been blown up suggested the dangerous character of torpedo boats, and among the general public any fears were apt to be exaggerated.

Moreover, we had grown into the habit of always suspecting the Spaniard of dark designs, and it was a notable fact that owing to the strict censorship of the Spanish press and the concentration of authority in Spain, it was difficult to know for a certainty where any of the Spanish ships were, or what strategy the wily Spaniard might invent. On the other hand, our plans of campaign were at first published openly in the papers, so that the Spaniards, if they cared to know, could easily perceive what we were thinking of and doing. Indeed, the Spanish minister, Señor Polo, instead of departing for home, at once took quarters in Toronto, where he carried on a spy system and bureau of information for the Spanish government. An enemy in the dark is usually smaller than one in the open, but he always looks larger, and consequently our strategy board proceeded with the utmost caution, never with reckless bravado, though sometimes with apparent fickleness.

In view of the possibility that Spain might send one of her squadrons either to harass our shipping, which was mostly coastwise, or to attack our coast cities, some of which were not supposed to be well defended, though harbors were being rapidly mined, it had been early decided to equip a patrol squadron under the command of Commodore Howell, composed largely of well-built liners which had been purchased and converted into armed cruisers. Conspicuous among these were four admirable ships of the Morgan line, which had joined the navy under the picturesque names of the *Yankee*, the *Dixie*, the *Prairie*, and the *Yosemite*. The splendid American-built transatlantic liners *St. Paul* and *St. Louis* had

also been impressed into the naval service, and Captain Sigsbee, of the ill-starred *Maine*, had been given the command of the former. The liners *New York* and *Paris* were also taken and rechristened the *Harvard* and the *Yale*. The attempt to buy warships abroad had brought a very small aggregate of results. The transformation of merchantmen and yachts into a naval auxiliary fleet had, however, been accomplished in a remarkably successful manner. This auxiliary fleet did away with the necessity of keeping Schley's flying squadron at Hampton roads, and left it free to strike for any point, while the main fleet, under Sampson, could at once begin operations on the Cuban coast, awaiting the movements of the Spanish fleet, if it should come in that direction.

The necessity of these extensive preparations was made more conspicuous by the uncertainty as to what Spain would do as to privateering. The government of the United States at the beginning announced its intention of adhering to the declaration of Paris, though not a party to it, and of maintaining its four cardinal principles: abolishment of privateering, neutral flag to exempt an enemy's goods from capture except contraband of war, neutral goods under the enemy's flag not to be seized, a blockade to be binding must be effective. Spain, on her part, issued a decree recognizing that a state of war existed, breaking off all treaties with the United States and promising to observe the rules of the declaration of Paris, except that she maintained her rights to grant letter of marque to privateers. But to carry on privateering after the old-time methods would have been to fly in the face of European sentiment, and that Spain could hardly afford to do, great as was the temptation to prey upon American shipping, inflicting expensive injuries, though she might not hope to overcome us in war.

Regarding the breaking off of diplomatic negotiations as a virtual declaration of war, the President, without waiting for time limit set in his ultimatum to expire, ordered the Key West fleet to move at once to Cuba and form a blockade, and the same day, the 21st, he issued a proclamation declaring

that the United States government "has instituted and will maintain a blockade on the north coast of Cuba, including ports on said coast between Cardenas and Bahia Honda, and the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba." The proclamation added that neutral vessels approaching such coasts or attempting to leave them without knowledge of the establishment of the blockade would be duly warned by the commander of the blockade forces and released, but upon attempting the second time to enter any blockaded port they would be captured and sent to the nearest American port as prizes. Neutral vessels lying in blockaded ports were allowed thirty days to issue therefrom.

In accordance with this order Rear Admiral Sampson's fleet, the most imposing that had ever been gathered in this country, departed on the following morning in two columns for the Cuban coast. At the same time Commodore Schley of the flying squadron was ordered to put his ships in readiness for instant action, and a little later two of his fastest cruisers were ordered off to sea to cruise in search of Spanish ships, especially off the New England coasts, for there were various stories afloat of the presence of Spanish cruisers near those waters, a fair illustration of the uncertainty even in official circles of the probable movements of the Spanish navy.

On the 21st also, orders were sent to Commodore Dewey, whose squadron was mobilized at Hong Kong, on the opposite side of the globe, to proceed at once to Manila, the chief port of the Philippines, institute a blockade and destroy or capture whatever Spanish fleet existed there. To follow up these steps it was decided to call for 100,000 volunteer troops as soon as Congress could authorize it, and steps were taken to charter a large number of transports and supply ships as quickly as possible.

It seems to have been the plan of Spain to hold the flower of its navy at the Cape Verde Islands in the hopes that Admiral Sampson's squadron would at once attack Havana and suffer considerable losses under the guns of its forts, whereupon

the Spanish ships could hurry over and attack our fleet in a weakened condition. Some of the more warlike newspapers in the country, less proficient in naval strategy than in the issue of extra editions, were raising the cry, "Smash Havana!" but our naval strategy board were too wise to risk their fleet while the Cape Verde ships were in prime condition, and orders were issued to Sampson not to attack Cuban ports for the present, though he could use his discretion if fired upon.

The Key West fleet had proceeded but a short distance on the morning of the 22d, the flagship *New York* and the battle-ships *Iowa* and *Indiana* leading in one line to the southward, and the gunboats *Helena*, *Machias*, *Nashville*, and *Castine* in another to the northward, when smoke was seen on the horizon to westward. By seven o'clock it was discovered that she was a merchantman flying a Spanish flag. The *Nashville* suddenly left the line and headed at full speed for the Spaniard. As she approached a shot was fired from her port battery, striking the water some distance ahead of the merchantman, which held her way as if nothing was happening. For a few minutes the *Nashville* continued the chase and then fired another shot which apparently passed within a rod of the Spaniard's bow, and the captain quickly reversed the engines and hauled down the Spanish ensign. She was boarded by a half-dozen men from the *Nashville*, and was found to be the steamship *Buena Ventura*, plying between New York and West Indian ports. The captain said he did not know that war had been declared, but she was sent to Key West, where much excitement prevailed over the first shot of the war.

The blockading squadron arrived off Havana towards evening of the same day; the red light was lighted in Morro Castle tower and three shots were fired as a signal that the Americans had appeared. Havana armed itself at once in anticipation of attack, not understanding our more peaceful intentions for the time being. Some shots were fired from the fortifications during the night, falling far short of our ships, which lay quietly out some distance, working their search lights and

the latter, a fine, large new vessel. Two ships were taken at the mouth of Havana harbor, indeed almost under the guns of Morro Castle. The President was disposed to release all Spanish prizes taken during these first days of the war in consideration of the notice given by Spain allowing American vessels in Spanish ports freely to depart, but he waited to see if Spain were acting in good faith. As a matter of fact, there were no American vessels in Spanish ports, except possibly a few pleasure yachts, and Spain's action might have been for effect and for the very purpose of placing our seizures of Spanish ships in as bad a light as possible.

On the 20th, or immediately after the resolutions for intervention were disposed of, the House passed promptly and without division a bill authorizing the President to call for army volunteers, and defining the terms on which volunteers from the state militia forces could be enlisted and officered. The bill was passed in the Senate the next day, but owing to defects it was sent back to both houses and did not become a law till the 23d, when the President, in conformity with its provisions, issued a proclamation calling for two-year volunteers, the total number apportioned among the states according to population. Measures were taken for the enlistment of as large a proportion as possible of the National Guard in the United States Army, the purpose being to amalgamate the regulars and volunteers as soon as possible.

The requisitions made by Secretary Alger on the state governors calling for 125,000 volunteers, met with instant and adequate response, but also not a little adverse criticism from the National Guardsmen, whose jealousy of the regular army had much to do with the defeat of the first Hull bill for its reorganization to meet requirements. By the provisions of that measure, the regular army's war strength would have been raised to 104,000 men. In his telegraphic call Secretary Alger declared that preference would be given to regiments of the National Guard or state militia, for the reason that they were armed, presumably equipped and drilled. In issuing his



THE CALL TO WAR.

A Grand Army Veteran of the Civil War bringing his son into a recruiting office in a country town to answer to the call for volunteers in the war with Spain.

confirmatory letter, however, the Secretary of War said that the men called for were to be enlisted in the United States service, their state organizations being preserved as long as they remained in their own states. The result was that many regiments manifested a decided reluctance to act under an uncertainty as to the necessity of giving up their organizations.

It was not so much a conflict between State and Federal elements as a conflict between amateurs and professionals, and when the fact was thoroughly understood there was no uncertainty as to results. Whatever the influence of the National Guard, the Federal government could ill-afford to have men enlisted as volunteers who would not serve unconditionally under army orders. It was very soon shown that while the National Guard in some States was in a high state of efficiency, in others it was far from being prepared for war. Some of the Western regiments came into the Eastern camps almost destitute of equipments. Even the New York State militia, ill-provided with overcoats and blankets, were sent to an unprepared camp, and the control was so poor that at first there were scenes of rowdyism in the villages about the camps. Had United States army officers been in charge there would have been nothing of this kind permitted. It was a useful lesson to State authorities, for it revealed the fact that the organizations which had been maintained with so much expense, and which had been so often admired in parades, were in a condition far from satisfactory to meet a sudden call in defense of the country.

Soon after gathering in their respective State rendezvous, the volunteers were forced to undergo the somewhat trying ordeal of examination by United States army surgeons before they could be accepted and mustered into service. In not a few of the States the percentage of men rejected, both officers and privates, was so large that State officials endeavored to induce the Federal authorities to be less rigorous in their demands, but, for reason obvious enough, the Federal authorities declined to relent.

If the militia in some States had permitted officers and privates to come to look upon the militia organization as a social institution existing chiefly for the pleasure of the men enrolled, it was certainly a fortunate event that disclosed the weakness at this early day of the war and at a time when not faced by a foe more dangerous than Spain. The Federal authorities were quite right in insisting that men entering the army should be unlikely candidates for the hospital and pension roll, and, in spite of the influence of the National Guard in some States, the Federal authorities were supported by public opinion.

On the 25th was passed a modified bill for reorganizing the regular army, giving it a maximum strength of 61,000, creating the three-battalion form, and providing for the enlistment and promotion of the requisite number of officers. The imperative necessity for passing the reorganization bill was that, owing to the complicated machinery of modern siege guns, it would be impossible to entrust volunteer forces with the coast defenses within three months. But considerable jealousy was shown between the amateur and regular forces, and it soon became apparent that the formation of the army would be responsible for delay in the war.

Among the people who had not an adequate idea of the requirements of war there was the greatest optimism as to the promptness with which it would end — a naval battle or two and it would all be over with, they thought; and the idea was also extensively held in official circles, though not among the army and navy. But the co-operation of the Cubans was exaggerated, and, besides, the troops immediately available for military operations in Cuba were only those which could be spared from the small regular army. None of the National Guard regiments were fitted at once for such campaigning as would be required in Cuba. At the best, from one to three months of preliminary training and seasoning was needed. It was shown unmistakably both in the Mexican and Civil War that training and drilling consuming months of time were absolutely necessary to get raw recruits into shape.

CHAPTER XXXVII

WAR FORMALLY PROCLAIMED—THE BOMBARDMENT OF MATANZAS—EXPERIENCES ON A MODERN WARSHIP— COMMODORE DEWEY SAILS TOWARDS MANILA.

Enthusiasm and Generosity among the People of the United States—College Patriotism—Prompt Action by the Women of the Country—Red Cross Nurses—The Dangers of Yellow Fever—Surgeon-General's Warning—Rejoicing in Havana—Blanco's Grandiloquent Manifesto—Congress Formally Declares War—Spain Talks of Scandalous Aggression—Troubles in the Cortes—Importance of Securing a Base on Cuban Coast—Havana Ignored—Advancing to Matanzas—The Nature of the Bay—Waiting for the Word to Fire—A Shot from the Batteries—Engagement Becomes General—A Thrilling Sight—Following the Powerful Projectiles to the Target—Clouds of Smoke—Three Hundred Shots in Eighteen Minutes—The *Puritan's* Remarkable Shot—Terrible Destruction—The Concussion of Great Guns—General Blanco's Report of Casualties—"A Mule Killed"—The Cape Verde Spanish Fleet Sails—Commodore Dewey Points his Fleet towards Manila—Significance of his Orders.

ON every side existed abundant evidence of patriotism and generosity. Of course, as in every war, there were avaricious speculators who figured how much personal wealth they could grab from the national treasury which required so much for the equipment of the forces. But the great multitude of the rich and poor alike had no such sordid ambition. Enlistments came in rapidly from every quarter, and from every station in life. The Federal Treasury, the Post-Office Department, the boards of aldermen in many of the cities, presidents and directors of great railway corporations and many patriotic employers of labor put their employes at ease by either guaranteeing that all of them who cared to volunteer should be paid in full while away and reinstated when they returned, or that they should be reinstated simply. Prominent and rich people offered money and services to the government and valuable steam yachts were tendered for its use. John Jacob Astor, having offered free transportation for

troops over his railroads in Ohio and Illinois, and having put his yacht, the *Nourmahal*, at the disposal of the government as an auxiliary cruiser, then offered to furnish and equip a battery of artillery for service in Cuba or in any place where the government might wish to use it. At the colleges the enthusiasm was great, and mass meetings addressed by the presidents and professors were held in many of the leading educational institutions. Many students volunteered. As a recognition of the contributions of Yale and Harvard to our national glory in years past, the *Paris* and the *New York*, the fast steamers impressed into the service of the navy, were renamed after those institutions.

The expression of patriotism from the women of the country was what was to be expected. In several cities they had early organized, forming auxiliary corps to make comforts for the soldiers going to the war. These auxiliaries were independent, being formed without any immediate connection with regiments, and others were formed connected semi-officially with companies and regiments of the National Guard.

The volunteers, nurses, and honorary members of the Red Cross Society received instructions at the hospitals. A detachment of the nurses of this society sailed from New York on the *State of Texas* on the 23d to be in readiness in Cuban waters. The nurses of the Red Cross Society, and others who maintain an independent organization, were not governed by the Surgeon-General's ultimatum that the government would not accept the services of any nurse who had not had yellow fever or passed through one or more epidemics of that disease. In the judgment of the Surgeon-General, it would be adding burdens, and making more demands on the hospital resources of the government in Cuba and Key West, to send out nurses who were not immune. The male nurses meeting the government requirements were the only government nurses at first sent out. This decision changed the character of the services rendered to the soldiers and sailors by the volunteer women and nurses, but did not lessen their enthusiastic determination to serve.



Engraved by Chas. A. Hall H.C. from a photograph expressly for this work.

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Nelson D. Miles

The Surgeon-General, who was considered one of the highest authorities in the world on enteric diseases, strongly advised against the immediate invasion of Cuba, predicting that the mortality among volunteers from yellow fever alone would be between 35 and 50 per cent. if undertaken before October 1st. This fact, together with the other that many of the regiments from the different States were slow in recruiting and came to the national camps poorly equipped, led the authorities to delay any large military operations on the island for a time, though it was desired to secure a base for distributing provisions to the reconcentrados if possible, and arms to the insurgents. But, as in most wars, it was found that plans had to be changed to meet new conditions.

The news of the breaking off of diplomatic negotiations between the United States and Spain appeared to be received in Havana with rejoicing. No further attempt to secure a conference with the insurgents in the interests of autonomy was made, and the Captain-General declared the island to be in a state of war. He annulled all his former decrees granting pardon to insurgents, and placed under martial law all accused of rebellion. Spanish forces in the western provinces began to concentrate in Havana, burning and destroying the country as they came in. In a grandiloquent manifesto, Blanco declared his intention of shedding his blood for the honor of Spain, and he called upon all to vigorously repel the invader. The Correspondent of the London *Times*, whose reports were as impartial as any sent from the island, was expelled, and other steps taken to prevent the exact state of things from being known.

While no doubt as to when the war began was entertained by the administration, it was deemed best that Congress should adopt a resolution formally declaring the time when the state of war began to exist. In a message to Congress on the 25th, the President asked that, in view of the measures already taken by him and with a view to the adoption of other necessary measures, Congress take formal action at once "to the end

that the definition of the international status of the United States as a belligerent power may be made known, and the assertion of all its rights and the maintenance of all its duties in the conduct of a public war may be assured." Congress acted with the utmost promptness and passed a resolution declaring that a state of war existed and had existed between the United States and Spain since, and including, April 21st. The vote in the House was unanimous.

The Spanish government followed up its circular of the 18th by another on the 26th, in which it expressed its regret at being compelled to appeal to force to expel the "scandalous aggression" of the United States and defend the national dignity and historic integrity of the fatherland.

It was the evident purpose of the United States government at this time, while the intentions of the Cape Verde fleet were uncertain, to effect a landing in Cuba promptly and as near Havana as possible, in order to hold communication with the insurgents, to form a base for our own military operations and to carry relief to reconcentrados.

All reports indicated that the Spanish army in concentrating their forces had seized all available food in the large centers, and the reconcentrados were in a worse predicament than ever. A base for our own military operations was quite as important. General Grant had pointed out many years before, or when the *Virginius* case seemed likely to lead us into war, that the conquest of Havana could best be undertaken by an army landed somewhere east of the city while a blockading force held the approaches to the harbor. This plan was evidently in the minds of the government and it was the expectation that such an expedition might lead the way in a short time.

In carrying out this policy it became Admiral Sampson's duty to ignore the fortifications of Havana, keeping the blockade effective at all times, while preparing a suitable base for landing troops. The city of Matanzas presented a convenient point for such a base, but the blockading fleet could see that

the Spaniards were very busy in placing new fortifications and more modern guns about the harbor, and, consequently, Admiral Sampson set out to destroy them on the 27th.

It was a very interesting event, drawing the first blood of the conflict. For the first time in thirty years our war ships en-



MAP OF HAVANA, ITS HARBOR AND DEFENCES.

tered upon the serious business of war. In the afternoon Admiral Sampson on his flagship *New York* reached the harbor of Matanzas, where the monitor *Puritan* and the cruiser *Cincinnati* were maintaining the blockade. The city lies at the head of a bay about four miles from the sea and the mouth of the bay is about three miles wide. On its west side is Point Rubalcaya and on the east side Point Maya, both having a high elevation above the sea and giving their batteries a very commanding position. Stretching back from these batteries are commanding hills, in the shrubbery of which the Spaniards had been busy placing concealed batteries.

The *New York* led the way into the bay, followed a hundred yards astern on the port side by the *Puritan*, while the *Cincinnati* was about the same distance behind on the starboard. The crews were all at their quarters waiting for the

“ music ” to begin, the orders being to open fire when the batteries fired their first shot. At a few minutes before one o'clock there was a puff of smoke from the east shore and an 8-inch shell whizzed toward the *New York* and fell considerably short. The range to the east shore was still over three miles, but the flagship promptly opened fire with one of her heavy guns. The engagement in a few minutes became general, and shore and bay was covered with the wind-swept smoke while the hollows below the hills roared with the cannonading. The *New York* steamed quickly in and circled around to the westward toward Point Rubalcaya, while the *Puritan* swung eastward to engage the Maya batteries.

It was the first opportunity the gunners of the *New York* had enjoyed for target practice of this kind and it was a stirring sight to see. As a big puff of smoke rose from her side, the eye turning to the battery on shore would behold a cloud of dust and fragments flying high in the air, indicating the terrific force of modern projectiles. The *New York* soon reduced the range to about a mile and a quarter, and was tossing shells into Rubalcaya at the rate of about three a minute with wonderful precision and apparently with great destructiveness.

In the meantime the *Puritan* was taking care of Point Maya. It was a long shot to that battery and it was so well masked that the only target was the infrequent smoke of a gun, but when the *Puritan* found the range her shells burst every time within the fortifications, great clouds of dust and fragments rising high in the air with every explosion. Up to this time the *Cincinnati* had received no order to join in the action and her crew and officers could hardly contain themselves. Finally, Captain Chester himself signaled asking permission to engage, and it was granted by the flagship. The *Cincinnati* quickly steamed up to within two thousand yards broadside on and all her guns seemed to go at once. But this grim sport was of short duration.

At the end of eighteen minutes, the batteries apparently having been silenced, the *New York* gave the signal to retire,



GUN CREW WORKING A MONSTER 13-INCH GUN IN ACTION.

but soon after a last defiant shot was fired from the shore. Almost instantly one of the big guns of the *Puritan*, which was in line, replied. It was the best shot of the day and excited the admiration of every witness. It struck the battery just where the smoke had showed the gun, tore its way into the earthworks and exploded with terrible destruction. Then the ships stood out to sea.

The display of marksmanship on the American vessels was superb; the firing was rapid and every one of the three hundred shots fired seemed to do its work of destruction to the new forts, but not one of the enemy's shots hit the ships; they were absolutely unharmed except from the usual results of the concussion of their own guns. A correspondent wrote: "When a 10,000-ton ship, usually as steady as a rock, shakes and trembles like a frightened child; when firmly-fitted bolts start from their sockets and window-panes and woodwork are shattered; when the roar peals up from port and starboard and you feel your feet leaving the deck and your glasses jumping around your forehead, while blinding, blackening smoke hides everything from sight — then it is that you first realize the terrible power of a modern war ship's batteries."

Not one of our men was hurt, and the gunners and their assistants were delighted to embrace the opportunity they had so long waited for to "pump a little iron," as one of them expressed it, "into those Spaniards." It is not known what the casualties were on shore, but it is difficult to see how those who manned the batteries could have entirely escaped unless they ran away. Captain-General Blanco sent home a report of the usual Spanish color. No lives were lost, he said, except that of one mule. Our vessels were injured by the Spanish fire, and he was quite sure a smokestack was hit.

On the 26th the President issued an order proclaiming our policy regarding the rights of Spanish vessels and the rights of neutrals, indicating an intention to pursue a liberal course least calculated to irritate foreign powers, and giving Spanish merchant vessels within the ports of the United States until

May 21st for loading their cargoes and departing. The right of search was to be exercised with strict regard for the rights of neutrals, and mail steamers were not to be interfered with except on the clearest grounds of suspicion of having contraband goods or of violating the blockade. This proclamation was followed within a few days by decrees of neutrality from most of the foreign nations. Great Britain was one of the first to declare her neutrality, sending notices to all ports in all colonies under her dominion. This, of course, necessitated a prompt departure from the port of Hong Kong of Dewey's fleet, and it moved to Mirs Bay, a Chinese port, where also it could remain but twenty-four hours.

Portugal, having dominion over the Cape Verde Islands, at which the Spanish fleet was concentrated, delayed for some days to define her position, and it was at one time suspected that she might make common cause with Spain. At last, however, she took a neutral position, daring no longer to disregard the obligations of neutrality, and the Spanish fleet, which had been reported as having sailed several times, actually sailed on the 29th, two days after Commodore Dewey sailed from Mirs Bay for Manila.

Public attention in the United States was so completely taken up with the situation about Cuba, especially after the news of the departure of Cervera's fleet from St. Vincent, that little was thought of Dewey's movements. In a general way, it was thought that, neutral declarations having shut our Asiatic squadron off from Hong Kong, it would be necessary for our fleet to secure a base for coal and supplies nearer than Honolulu or San Francisco, and, as the Spanish Philippines lay but two or three days' sail from Hong Kong, and as we were at war with Spain, it would be a stroke to secure a coaling station there. Very few in the discussion which preceded the actual outbreak of war had for a moment supposed that the armed intervention for the pacification of Cuba would begin with a campaign of conquest in islands on exactly the opposite side of the world. It had been the declared purpose of our gov-

ernment to free Cuba and extend a helping hand to the starving people of that island, and it had begun by establishing a pacific blockade which for the time shut off supplies not only from the Spanish but from the reconcentrados, and all were expecting that as speedily as possible we would use the navy to strike at any naval force Spain sent to the defense of the islands, and also to assist in landing troops near Havana, establishing a base of supplies for ourselves and for the suffering Cubans. Incidentally, we were at war with Spain, and it was, of course, our business to strike Spain wherever we found her. While we were thinking of other things, and wondering at what point Cervera's fleet would appear, Dewey, obeying orders the significance of which had not occurred to the American people, struck a blow that in a day changed the opinions of the nation and, apparently, the course of its policy.

The revolution which had been proceeding in the Philippines against Spanish authority, for very much the same reasons as in Cuba, had up to this time attracted little attention in the world and least of all in the United States. Agreeably to the traditions of a hundred years, we had viewed with little concern the troubles of others in far-away lands. Having rigorously kept to the doctrine that the destiny of all peoples on the Western Hemisphere was a subject for our immediate concern, and having upheld it whenever occasion demanded, we had confined our efforts on the other side of the world to the support of enterprising and daring missionaries, satisfied to take the heathen under our religious influence under whatever flag of authority the exigencies of European colonization imposed upon him. As a government, we had grown into the habit of keeping our hands off. Spanish oppression and brutality would never have tempted us to assume the duty of a maker of peace and a bearer of freedom to the Philippines had Cuba not been at our doors. But the conception of our duty quickly enlarged after Commodore Dewey pointed his ships for Manila.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS—THEIR EXTENT, CHARACTER, AND NATIVE LIFE—REBELLION OF THE FILIPINOS AND ITS THRILLING INCIDENTS—THE TRAGIC DEATH OF DR. RIZAL—GENERAL AGUINALDO AND COMMODORE DEWEY.

Magellan the Navigator Hears of the Wonderful Spice Islands—Persuades the Spanish King that they Might Belong to Spain—Sailing Westward Instead of Eastward—Wonderful Voyage—Discovery of the Philippines—The Natives—Early Importance of Manila—The Slaughter of the Prosperous Chinese—Depressing Results—A Long and Ugly History—Character of the Islands—Peculiarities of Spanish Government—The Uprising of 1896—The Catapunan Society—Appealing to the Filipinos—A Bloody Conflict—Outrages on Both Sides—A Hundred Prisoners Suffocated in a Single Night—Public Executions—Dramatic Incidents—The Romantic Story of Dr. Rizal—His Love Affair—Sentenced to Death—Married in his Cell Just Before his Execution—His Death—Patriotic Verses—His Widow Joins the Insurgents and is Welcomed as a Joan of Arc—Insurgent Leaders Leave the Country—Insurrection Breaks Out Again—General Aguinaldo's Exile.

WHEN Pope Alexander VI. divided the world between Portugal and Spain by a line from pole to pole some three hundred miles west of the Azores, as related in an early chapter, he did not imagine that one navigator sailing east and another west might meet somewhere on the other side of the globe. Yet this very thing happened, and, in consequence of it, for three hundred years the Spanish had one day too many in their calendar and the Portuguese one day too few. It happened that Magellan, who was a Portuguese, had begun his career as a navigator by sailing under Portuguese commanders eastward around the Cape of Good Hope to the Indies, and he had a desire to lead an expedition to the rich "spice" islands about which he had heard. But his king treated him ungratefully, so he transferred his allegiance to the Spanish flag, and finally persuaded Charles V. of Spain that the wonderful islands would lie within that part of the world the Pope had given to Spain, if only good care



AN OLD COLORED COUPLE, CUBAN REFUGEES, DRIVEN FROM THEIR HOME BY SPANISH CRUELTY.
The wife was 80 years old and blind. They are making their way into the American lines.

was taken to sail westward instead of eastward. Thus it happened that Magellan made that wonderful journey — “the most wonderful in history,” as John Fiske, the historian, calls it, “doubtless the greatest feat of navigation that has ever been performed.” His ships were the first to circumnavigate the globe, though Magellan himself was killed by natives in the islands which were claimed by Spain and soon became known as the Philippines, in honor of Philip II., one of the most dishonored kings who ever reigned in Spain.

Antonio de Morga, writing about eighty years later, or in 1609, put this maritime achievement in this way: “Having won America, a fourth part of the earth which the ancients never knew, the Spaniards sailed, following the sun, and discovered in the western ocean an archipelago of many islands adjacent to further Asia, inhabited by various nations, abounding in rich metals, precious stones, and pearls, and all manner of fruit, where, raising the standard of the faith, they snatched them from the yoke and power of the devil and placed them under the command and government of Spain.”

Manila was an important commercial center while Liverpool was only a fishing station and while the Indians were still occupying Manhattan Island. Formerly, the islands had been under Chinese dominion, but the yoke was shaken off by an invasion from India, and it was these invaders with whom the Spaniards chiefly had to deal. But the Chinese still maintained a brisk trade with the Philippines in cotton, silks, metals, and quicksilver. From time to time a great many enterprising Chinese landed in the islands, and early in the seventeenth century they came in large numbers, but the Spaniards became jealous of their strength and began to persecute them in many ways till at last they were goaded into rebellion. Several times the Spaniards endeavored to exterminate them, but they continued to arrive and to thrive till finally it was decreed that every Chinaman on the island of Luzon should be killed. Twenty-four thousand of them were put to death with one curious result, according to the his-

torian of that day: "When the war was at an end, the want and difficulties of the city began because there were no Chinese who exercised various arts and brought all the provisions; neither was any food to be found to eat nor shoes to wear, not even for very excessive prices. All this weighed down the spirit of the Spaniards."

We need not follow the long and ugly history of the Spaniards in these islands; in many respects it is similar to that of Cuba. It was the purpose and the endeavor of the Spanish government to make all the money possible out of the people, giving to them little in return but "the faith," which was always rather obstinately declined.

Lying wholly within the tropics, the islands, big and little, number nearly a thousand, varying in size from Luzon, which is somewhat larger than Cuba and about the size of the State of Illinois, to tiny islets hardly worth a name. Altogether their area is twice that of New England. The tropical scenery in the forests of this archipelago is of unsurpassed splendor, the heat and moisture combining to produce vegetation of a magnificence which beggars description. Gigantic trees towering to a height of two or three hundred feet are festooned with graceful rattans. Splendid tree-ferns rise thirty or forty feet into the air, while underneath are smaller varieties and exquisite orchids. So dense is the vegetation in some of these forests that the fierce tropical sun hardly penetrates to the ground beneath them and the dense undergrowth constantly drips with moisture.

The islands contain some 10,000,000 natives of different tribes, many of whom the Spaniards were never able to bring under their authority. The main population consists of the Tagals. They, together with the various mixtures of half-breeds, bore a burdensome taxation and other unhappy conditions for many years, and, so long as the only educated people on the islands were the rulers, there was little trouble. Little by little, the natives and half-breeds became educated, some of the young men of the richer families going abroad, and with

greater education came greater ambition. The natives began to desire some voice in the government, the abuses of which



MAP OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

they began to understand; and, of course, the proud Spaniard and the power-loving friar looked with as pronounced disfavor

upon the demands of these people as they did upon those of the Cubans.

The church organization became very powerful in the hands of the various orders of Dominicans, Augustinians, Recoletanos, and Franciscans, and even the Governor-General himself dared not oppose them. The Archbishop received a salary of \$12,000 a year, though to conduct the whole ecclesiastical establishment cost no less than \$1,000,000 a year. The Archbishop lived in a palace in considerable state, and on the great feast days he was the only one allowed to ride in a carriage.

The Governor-General received a salary of \$40,000, though the cost of his office to the colony was no less than \$1,000,000 a year. As in Cuba, governors came with empty pockets and went away with full ones. It was asserted that Weyler put \$6,000,000 to his credit during the short time he had control of the Philippines, and the sub-officials stole in like manner. The peculations amounted to millions of dollars annually and absolutely nothing was done for internal improvements. The budget showed that only \$6,000 was appropriated for new improvements in this whole archipelago, and yet \$60,000 was set apart for the Manila Cathedral, \$4,000 for the choir alone.

If a bridge was destroyed by a flood or earthquake, it was never repaired. And so it went on for year after year. Had Spain been actuated by the spirit of internal improvement that characterized the administration of England and Holland in adjacent countries, had she subordinated her religious fanaticism and her avarice to a desire to better the natives, the commerce of the islands might have been fifty times as great, for in natural productiveness there is no land on the globe surpassing the Philippines.

The beginning of the end of it all came in 1896 while General Blanco was Governor-General of the colony. Rebellion broke out, and Spain, whose forces in Cuba under General Campos had just been swept back to Havana, was called upon to

face the brotherhood of the Catapunan in the Philippines. This society was the strongest political society in the islands, having a membership of about 50,000 "Filipinos" in Luzon alone, and through it the munitions of war were mostly contributed to the insurgents. They issued an appeal in which they said: "We make no racial distinction. We call upon all possessing honor and national dignity. All are sufferers, the Filipino, and the Asiatic, the American, and the European. We invite all to help raise a down-trodden and tormented race — a country destroyed and hurled into the slough of degradation. We except no one, not even a Spaniard, because in our ranks there are some noble Spaniards, lovers of justice, free from prejudice, who are supporting our demands for individuality and national dignity."

Native Filipinos, residing in Madrid, expressed their grievances in an address to the Spanish people, containing extracts from the Philippine budget for 1896-97. It showed that the Philippine treasury was compelled to pay a heavy contribution to the general expenses of the government at Madrid; pensions to the Duke of Veragua and to the Marquis of Bedmar, besides providing for the entire cost of the Spanish consulates at all the important Asiatic ports. It contributed, like Cuba, a large amount of money for the office of the colonial minister, and for a purely ornamental and purely Spanish body called the Council of the Philippines. It paid the expenses of the penal colony of Fernando Po in Africa, and all the pensions and retiring allowances of all the civil and military employes who had ever served in the Philippines, a sum amounting to nearly \$2,000,000 annually.

The real fighting began in August, 1896, and repeated bloody conflicts followed. At first the natives were poorly armed; indeed, the majority bore no weapons at all. But after a while the organization was improved, *bolos*, or long sharp knives somewhat like the Cuban machetes, were distributed to the men, and a few secured firearms which were brought in from Hong Kong and Singapore. Gradually, the

area of discontent widened into the province of Cavité, where most of the fighting took place. Before reinforcements could be brought from Spain, the insurgents had practical control of that province.

The rebels were not as wisely controlled as the Cubans and many outrages occurred on both sides. The Spanish authorities, with their usual stupidity, endeavored to prevent the foreigners in the islands sending out information, but, in spite of all precautions, a few details reached the outer world, showing that the rising was a serious one, that horrible outrages were committed by the rebels, and that the Spanish troops retaliated with almost corresponding brutality.

A hundred rebels, or suspected rebels, were suffocated to death in the "Dark Hole of Manila" in one night. This place is an old inquisitorial prison, in the base of the main fortifications on the Pasig River, which flows through Manila, a dark and unsanitary hole below the ground level, unused for more than a hundred years before this revolution, with stagnant water, poisoned, stifling atmosphere, and infested with rats and vermin. Spanish officers on guard during that long and awful night heard the piteous cries of the miserable creatures who had been thrown into this horrible pit, and their condition was made more terrible when, acting upon the orders of a lieutenant, the sentinel in charge covered up the only air hole in the dungeon, "because it rained," he said.

The public executions were made greater fêtes even than in Cuba. An American who was present in the country at this time wrote:

"These executions were generally made the occasion for quite a jubilee—a turnout of the *élite*, a gala day, a time for rejoicing. The fact that there was to be an execution was prominently, joyously announced, officially and otherwise, in the local newspapers. There was at least one military band in evidence, and the morning when unfortunates who had protested against Spanish misrule were to be shot found the Spanish colors flying from a great many buildings, and the warships in the harbor 'dressed.' The Philippine capital had a holiday aspect.

"The deadly work was generally performed in the cool of the morning. That these events were fully appreciated was shown by the presence on the

Lunetta of thousands of people. Hundreds of fashionably-dressed ladies and gentlemen 'graced' the occasion with their presence. For the most part these fashionables came in their equipages. These ladies would stand in their vehicles, determined not to miss any part of the ghastly show. The signal from the commanding lieutenant that the victims were dead was the signal for these delighted lady spectators to wave their handkerchiefs or parasols as evidence of their satisfaction."

As in Cuba, this bloody work abounded in dramatic incidents, many touching examples of heroic martyrdom; and the fate of Dr. Rizal will have an enduring place in the history of these troubled isles. He was one of the prominent leaders in the secret organization which supported the insurrection against Spanish tyranny; not an adventurer, but a man of culture, an experienced and able physician, once the president of the Manila University, a leader in the educational and scientific as well as social life of his "beloved Filipinas." He was a lover of equality, and while Spain's yoke did not chafe his own shoulders severely, he had pity for the less fortunate natives about him, and his love of his native country took precedence of all else in his strong and impulsive nature.

Although he did not appear directly in connection with the organization of the rebellion, the Spanish secured evidence to show his intimate relations with the most active leaders of the insurrection. Two years before, because of his political views, he had been sent into exile in the island of Mindanao, where he practiced his profession with profit, and where he met the lady who finally became his wife and his widow in a single day. Miss Taufer was born at Hong Kong of European parents. Her father was in poor health, and they went to Manila, thinking the climate would be beneficial. After a stay of six months they visited the island where Dr. Rizal was a practitioner and where he was called in as an attending physician. He fell in love with the young lady, and the engagement was ultimately announced. Upon promise of freedom, Dr. Rizal seems to have been tricked, late in 1896, into returning to Manila, where he was at once placed on board the Spanish cruiser *Castilla* and conveyed to Spain.

Meanwhile, the Spanish authorities had seized certain papers of the Catapunan society which were thought to implicate Dr. Rizal, and to show that he had been in constant communication with the insurgent leaders in Luzon. Arriving at Barcelona, he was arrested and sent back to Manila for trial. Once there, he was speedily condemned to death. The time for his execution was fixed for December 6th. At six o'clock on that fateful morning, Miss Taufer was admitted to his cell. In two hours the execution would take place. A priest was in attendance upon the condemned man. The scene was pathetic.

Dr. Rizal, seized with a sudden inspiration, proposed that a marriage ceremony be performed then and there, and the lady eagerly assented. There, while the rays of the early tropical sun streamed through the little barred window of the cell upon the group, were spoken the solemn words which joined the lovers in wedlock till death should part them. The wife remained with her husband till the summons came, and then they led her away. The execution was attended with the usual formalities and was a sad but imposing spectacle. Great crowds of Spaniards, including many ladies, attended, but the natives were not so numerous as on former occasions. Rizal displayed great fortitude, walking from the prison with firm tread and head erect, his arms pinioned behind his back. He looked about him carefully, glanced at his executioners, and then, with his eyes fixed upon the rippling sunlit waters of the bay, received the volley of eight rifles, swayed and fell. Another bullet was put into the body at short range to make sure of death, and the band struck up the usual lively airs.

A few hours before his marriage and his death he wrote some remarkable verses — “*Mi Ultimo Pensamiento*” (My Last Thought) — an incident somewhat similar to that when years before the Cuban poet Valdez left an enduring prayer in verse before falling a martyr on the plaza of Matanzas. Rizal's poem abounded in the spirit of a patriot, as will be seen from a translation of the opening verse:

“Farewell, adored fatherland ! Our Eden lost, farewell !
Farewell, O sun’s lov’d region, pearl of the Eastern sea !
Gladly I die for thy dear sake : Yea, thou knowest well
Were my sad life more radiant far than mortal tongue could tell
Yet would I give it gladly, joyously for thee.”

The execution caused a great sensation in Manila because of his prominence and his romantic marriage, and a week later the widow set off on foot for the rebel camp at Imus, where she was hailed as a modern Joan of Arc and was received with great demonstrations. She followed the insurgents into many of their victorious engagements.

During the long struggle many wealthy half-castes were implicated. Many fled the country and their estates were turned into the coffers of the government. More troops were hurried out from Spain, earthworks were thrown up at Cavité, and 8-inch guns looked out over the bay. New batteries were planted behind the walls of Old Manila, stretching from the river south along the bay to the promenade, and families living in the suburbs pitched tents in the streets of the old city. Thus Spain held the insurgents in check, while the commercial interests of the islands suffered greatly.

In December, 1897, General Primo de Rivera, who above all Spanish generals had an intimate knowledge of the country and its inhabitants, found the situation untenable for both parties. It appeared to be somewhat like the Cuban situation. Neither party could drive out the other, the rebels being secure in their mountain fastnesses and the Spaniards holding the chief towns and villages on the coast. Rivera, therefore, sent two well-known Philippine natives occupying high position in Manila to propose terms of peace to General Emilio Aguinaldo, the head of the military movements of the insurgents, then at Biac Na Bato. A council of the revolutionary government was held in which it was agreed to lay down their arms on condition of certain reforms being introduced. The principal ones which the Spanish authorities agreed to were: the secularization of the religious orders and their inhibition from all

official vetoes in civil administration; a general amnesty for all rebels and guarantees for their personal security and from vengeance of the friars after returning to their homes; radical reforms to curtail the glaring abuses in public administration; freedom of the press; representation in the Spanish parliament; abolition of the system of the deportation of political suspects.

If the Philippine insurgents had had the benefit of as much experience with the Spanish government in such agreements as the Cuban insurgents had, they would have known that no such arrangement would have received the necessary sanction at Madrid; but Rivera agreed to the reforms, making the significant condition that the principal rebel leaders must leave the country during the pleasure of His Majesty. As these leaders had lost all their property either by confiscation or plunder, Rivera agreed further to provide them with funds to live in a becoming manner on foreign soil. He was very glad to get them out of the way so cheaply, and it was generally regarded as a bribe. To what extent the leaders were influenced by this offer it is difficult to say.

The rebels laid down their arms and peace was apparently secured, but no sooner had they done so and had returned to their homes than the religious orders began again to persecute them and to trump up imaginary charges to procure their arrest. The Spanish government, on its side, imagining itself now secure, desisted from carrying out the proposed reforms, a trick like that played on the Cubans at Zanjón in 1878. The Filipinos, however, refused to be duped, and again rose in rebellion, not only around Manila but all over the neighboring islands, but they necessarily had to begin all over again, their arms having been surrendered and their leaders having left the country.

General Aguinaldo, accompanied by his aid-de-camp and private secretary, had gone first to Hong Kong, then to Saigon in French Indo-China, and then to Singapore, arriving there incognito at about the time matters came to a crisis between

Spain and the United States. The purpose of his visit to Singapore, as the story goes, was to consult with some of his Philippine friends, and particularly with Howard W. Bray, an old and intimate English friend for ten years resident in the Philippines, about the affairs of the islands generally, and particularly as to the advisability of lending his aid to the Americans in the Philippines in case of war. The repudiation of the reforms which Rivera had promised to immediately carry into effect left Aguinaldo and other leaders, many of whom had gone to Hong Kong, free to act. Meanwhile, Mr. Bray was introduced to Spencer Pratt, Consul-General of the United States at Singapore, who was anxious in view of the contingencies to learn as much as possible as to the conditions in the Philippines.

Soon after Aguinaldo arrived, therefore, an interview was arranged at which Bray acted as interpreter. Aguinaldo explained the nature of the co-operation he could give in the event of the American squadron operating on Manila, and said he would guarantee to maintain order and discipline among the native troops, preventing them from committing outrages upon defenseless Spaniards beyond the inevitable in fair and honorable warfare. He further declared his ability to establish a proper and responsible government on liberal principles and would be willing to accept the same terms for the Philippines as the United States proposed to give Cuba.

The Consul-General placed himself at once in telegraphic communication with Commodore Dewey at Hong Kong, and it is said that as a result of the interchange of messages Aguinaldo at once left for Hong Kong and for Manila.

CHAPTER XXXIX

COMMODORE DEWEY AND HIS SQUADRON — INCIDENTS OF THE CRUISE TO MANILA — SEARCHING FOR THE ENEMY — THRILLING SAIL PAST THE BATTERIES AND OVER THE MINES — ADVANCING TO THE BATTLE.

Commodore Dewey's Squadron — Its Guns and Armor — Dewey's Service in the Navy — Admiral Porter's Tribute — Proclamation of the Governor-General of the Philippines — Bombastic Encouragement — Dewey's Cruise to Manila — Rolling in the China Sea — "Prepare for Action" — Practice on the Way — Stripping the Ships — All Unnecessary Articles Thrown Overboard — A Look into Subig Bay — Movements of the Spanish Admiral — Why he Retired to Manila — The United States Squadron Holds a Council of War — Dewey Announces His Purpose to Enter Manila Harbor that Night — Engines Started Again — Men Quietly Sent to Their Guns — In Sight of the Forts — Increasing the Speed — Silent and Alert — Discovered at Last — A Flash of Light, a Rocket, and then the Boom of a Gun — Dewey's Orders — Silencing a Battery — Silently Onward — Breakfast at the Guns — The Morning Breaks over Manila — The Enemy Sighted at Cavité — Heading for Battle — The Spanish Squadron — Its Advantage.

THE United States squadron which sailed out of Mirs Bay on April 27th was not made up of "ironclads" or armored battleships. They were the four protected cruisers, *Olympia*, *Baltimore*, *Boston*, and *Raleigh*, and the two gunboats, *Concord* and *Petrel*. The *Olympia*, which was the flagship, Captain C. V. Gridley commanding, carried ten rapid-fire 5-inch guns and four 8-inch guns mounted in barbette turrets, with armor of four inches in average thickness. This was about all the armor there was in the whole squadron. In her secondary battery were fourteen 6-pounders, seven 1-pounders, four Gatlings, and one field gun. The *Baltimore*, Captain N. M. Dyer commanding, had four 8-inch and six 6-inch rifles, and four 6-pounders, with several smaller rapid-fire guns. The *Boston*, Captain Frank Wildes commanding, carried two 8-inch and six 6-inch rifles, and two 6-pounders, with other smaller guns. The *Raleigh*, Captain J. B. Coughlan commanding, had one 6-inch and ten rapid-fire 5-inch guns and



Engraved by G. S. Wall, N.Y. from a photograph. Enlarged for this work.
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George Dewey

eight 6-pounders. The combined tonnage of the last three cruisers is less than that of the battleship *Iowa*. The tonnage of the *Olympia*, the largest and strongest of the squadron, is about one-half that of the *Iowa*.

The 1,700-ton gunboat, *Concord*, carried six 6-inch rifles and two 6-pounders; the 900-ton gunboat *Petrel* carried four 6-inch guns. The combined tonnage of these boats was 19,100. Accompanying the squadron was the revenue cutter *Hugh McCulloch*, which had just arrived at Hong Kong, having been ordered by the Secretary of the Treasury to report to Commodore Dewey as a dispatch vessel. She carried four light pieces. Two merchant steamers, the *Nashan*, laden with 3,000 tons of Cardiff coal, and the *Zafiro*, carrying 7,000 tons of similar coal, having been purchased by the Commodore, went with the squadron, regarded merely as merchant vessels owned by the United States. Their officers and crew all gave notice of their intention to become American citizens and remained on board to navigate the vessels as needed. It should be remembered that all these steps, including the concentration of these vessels at Hong Kong, had taken place in the interval following the destruction of the *Maine*, and is a clear indication of the expectation of war which prevailed at Washington and also of the expectation that the Philippines would figure in the conflict which had become inevitable. It was due to the prudent foresight of the authorities at Washington, seconded by the prompt and energetic action of Commodore Dewey in the Orient, that he was able to sail out of Chinese waters within a week after war was opened.

Commodore George Dewey was a good type of the American naval officer. He had been faithfully performing the tasks allotted to him for thirty years and the time of his retirement was approaching. In person he is slightly built, of medium height, with finely-chiseled face, firmly-set lips, and clear eyes. He was known as a man quiet in manner, sparing and incisive in speech, and decisive in action. He was just beginning his naval career at the time of the Civil War, and

at the time of the capture of New Orleans was a lieutenant on the old *Mississippi*, which, when trying to run the batteries of Port Hudson in March, 1863, ran aground. The enemy had her in range and poured shells into her hull till her commander, seeing she could not be saved, ordered her fired. Captain Smith and Lieutenant Dewey were the last to leave the ship. "It is in such trying moments," said Admiral Porter in his official report, "that men show of what metal they are made, and in this instance the metal was of the best."

When, late in 1897, changes were made in the command of the some of the squadrons, Commodore Dewey did not wish to go t the Orient. He much preferred a station where there would be fighting if war came, for no one then thought of active hostilities in the East. He was, nevertheless, assigned to the Asiatic squadron and raised his flag on the *Olympia* on January 3, 1898.

When information that Commodore Dewey would proceed to threaten the Philippines reached Manila, the Spanish Governor-General issued several proclamations, one of which included the following:

"The American people, composed of all the social excrescences, have exhausted our patience and provoked war with perfidious machinations, acts of treachery and outrages against the law of nations and international conventions.

"A squadron manned by foreigners and possessing neither instructions nor discipline is preparing to come to this archipelago with the ruffianly intention of robbing us of all that means life, honor, and liberty.

"The aggressors shall not profane the tombs of your fathers, shall not gratify their lustful passions at the cost of your wives and daughters, shall not cover you with dishonor, shall not appropriate the property your industry has accumulated as provision against old age, and shall not perpetrate any of the crimes inspired by their wickedness and covetousness, because your valor and patriotism will suffice to punish this miserable people, that, claiming to be civilized and cultivated, have exterminated the unhappy natives of North America instead of bringing them to a life of civilization and progress."

Owing to the necessity of economy in the use of coal as well as the danger of driving into the rather heavy sea that was running, a speed of about eight knots was maintained in mak-

ing the trip to the Philippines. Even at this slow speed the heavily-laden *Nashan* and *Zafiro* made a decidedly wet voyage, and the *Petrel* pitched and rolled deeply. Gun-drills and other exercises kept the officers and men occupied continuously during this run, and from the time the squadron left Mirs Bay until it came into the presence of the enemy there was not an hour in which preparations for battle were not under way.

When the tired ship's company had finished its day's work on Wednesday, the first day out, and the *Olympia* had settled down to the quiet of the first watch, the stillness was broken with abrupt harshness by the blare of the bugle, and red and white lights flashed up and down the masts of all the ships in response to the Commodore's peremptory signal: "Prepare for action."

In two minutes each vessel was alive with men, who, but a moment before, had been soundly asleep, or were supposed to be. From the bridge of the flagship sharply-uttered orders proceeded, and in seven minutes the executive officer was able to report to Captain Gridley:

"The ship is ready for action, sir."

Looking back along the line of ships dimly visible in the moonlight, which fell on the China Sea, it was easy to see that every one of them were stripped for battle, and the Commodore was naturally greatly pleased with the quick and thorough response to his signal, for he knew that such readiness was very soon to be in serious demand. He was preparing for the first naval battle of the new navy of the United States.

Search-light and night-signal exercise took place during a large part of the first watch on Thursday night, and the progress made in working both the lights and the signals was very satisfactory. Friday was passed without incident, except that the weather became very warm and muggy, and the work of the men below deck was exhausting, but in spite of the heat and the heavy sea the ships kept their positions with precision.


The island of Luzon was sighted early Saturday morning, and being, as was supposed, in close proximity to the enemy,

the whole squadron began its final preparation for battle. Chain-cables were coiled around the ammunition hoists to give them further protection. Nets of tough Manila rope were stretched beneath all the boats and drawn across the wardroom bulkheads to protect the woodwork, flying splinters from which, when struck by shot or shell, might become deadly missiles. All unnecessary material was thrown overboard and went swimming off on the tossing China Sea.

When a few miles distant from Subig Bay, a rather deep opening in the bold and rugged coast, about forty miles north of Manila, the *Boston* and the *Concord* were sent ahead to learn whether any part of the Spanish squadron was hidden there. Later, they were reinforced by the *Baltimore*, the three vessels moving at a speed of about fifteen knots, while the other three remained with the transports and steamed at only six knots. In the afternoon the three scouting vessels returned, having explored Subig Bay without finding any craft there except a few small sloops and schooners which were overhauled, but not otherwise disturbed.

It had been reported from Manila several days before Dewey sailed, that Montijo, the Spanish Admiral, had taken his fleet to Subig Bay and assumed a position favorable for giving the Americans a warm welcome, and while the Commodore was taking no Spanish reports for granted, he took the precaution to look in. The bay is one of the best harbors on the coast, being used by steamers in the typhoon season in preference to Manila Bay. The latter is surrounded chiefly by lowlands so that the fury of the storm is not diminished by the surroundings, while Subig Bay is amply protected by the Bataan Mountains on the east and a coast range on the west. About half way up the bay is Grande Island, commanding both sides of the entrance, which, at this point, is but about two miles wide, and if the island were properly fortified it would be an absolute protection to the city of Subig, a place of about 12,000 inhabitants at the head of the bay. Montijo went to the bay at about the time of the declaration of war, in-

tending to fortify Grande Island, either to prevent Dewey from using it as a base in case he did not enter Manila Bay, or



MAP OF MANILA AND SURROUNDING COUNTRY.

to be used by the Spanish in case Manila became too unpleasant for them. But he concluded that he could not fortify the place in less than a month, and having heard that Dewey had

sailed he put back to Manila on the 30th, or the day Dewey's fleet came in sight of the island.

When the scouting vessels returned, reporting no enemy at Subig and none in sight along the coast, Commodore Dewey came to the conclusion that the Spanish admiral had withdrawn to Manila with the intention of holding against him the mouth of the harbor, which is about ten miles wide, between flanking chains of low mountains that start upward from the water's edge, each point being occupied by a fort. Dividing this entrance into two channels are two islands, Corregidor and Cadallo, both fortified, and lying so far to the north that the northern channel is narrow, while between the islands and the forts on the southern point there is a sweep of water over eight miles wide. The usual course for vessels going and coming from Chinese ports is through the narrow channel, which Dewey knew was well mined, and while the other channel was supposed to be mined, it presented less dangers because of its width and, though there were some shallows, deep water could be followed by an experienced navigator.

Dewey halted his squadron a short distance from Subig Bay, and, while the vessels lay motionless on the calm sea, the commanding officers were summoned over to the flagship for instructions. He told his astonished captains that he intended to enter Manila Bay that night in spite of the forts and in spite of the mines. He felt confident that the Spaniards would not expect him to make such a move, and, therefore, he was resolved to make it. He stated the details of his plans and gave his directions. The officers went back to their ships, the engines were started again, and the squadron idled along at a speed of about four knots, not wishing to appear at the entrance of Manila Bay too early. The moon had risen, and, although it was occasionally obscured by light clouds, the night was not one in which a squadron ought to have been able to run through a well-defended channel without drawing upon itself a hot fire. Something of the kind was expected, and at a quarter to ten o'clock, as the ships drifted quietly along, the men were sent

to their guns, not by the usual bugle call, but by a whispered word of mouth.

Every man was ready and the final steps of battle clearing were completed in silence in a very few minutes — and they were dramatic moments. Off to port could be seen the sullen “loom of the land,” where, for all they knew, the enemy was already watching their approach, and were preparing their guns for a terrific fire at the right moment. Closer and closer they crept, a long line of dark hulks with the transports in the rear. Not a light was permitted to show in any vessel except one at the very stern, which was necessary as a guide to the following ship, and these lights were shaded on each side.

As they approached the entrance and the first fort, the speed was increased to eight knots, and quietly the line slipped past the batteries on the north point of the entrance without any evidence that the enemy had discovered them. Every man was silent, but on the alert; every eye was fixed on the sombre forts; every nerve was strained; every pulse beat strongly. Then Corregidor Island came abeam to port and every glass was turned on its frowning point. But not until the long line had swung into the broad channel — the Boca Grande as it is called — did the outlooks of Corregidor catch sight of it. A few sparks flew up out of the funnel of one of the gunboats. In a moment a bright light flashed up in the center of the island, and it was answered by a similar one on the north shore. Then a rather feeble rocket staggered aloft over Corregidor, and the American sailors standing by their guns felt sure every moment that the batteries would open. But they did not. The Spaniards were evidently taken by surprise. No one had been at the guns, and it took time to get the batteries ready for action. On went the American squadron deeper and deeper into the bay. And not until the leaders of the squadron had passed out of easy range did a gun greet the long line of silent ships.

It was nearly half-past eleven when there was a bright flash from the batteries off to port, the boom of a heavy gun, and the

vindictive whistle of a shot far overhead. It came from a battery too far astern to enable the leaders to return the fire to advantage, but the Commodore was somewhat uneasy about the three non-combatant ships in the rear. He, therefore, signaled to the *Hugh McCulloch* to lead the transports up to a position where they would be protected by the cruisers and less exposed to attack. As the *Hugh McCulloch* was coming up she signaled that her chief engineer had been taken with a stroke of heat prostration and medical consultation was asked for. He died in twenty minutes of heart failure, due, perhaps, to the strain of those thrilling moments, during which all stood silent in the constant expectation of an exploding mine or a hail of shell from the shore. But the minutes dragged by and the ships crept onward.

The *Raleigh*, which was steaming along third in line, fired the first reply to the shot from the batteries from a 5-inch gun, and presently the *Boston* followed suit. Another shot flew from the batteries, and, as the Commodore's ships were on the close lookout for the flash to obtain an idea of where to aim, the *Concord* placed a 6-inch shell so exactly over the spot where the flash had occurred that an exclamation of admiration was heard on all sides. It was a marvelous shot. Dewey's sailors did not know it then, but that shot disabled the gun and killed nearly every man in the group of Spaniards about it.

There were no more shots fired from the shore, and as the Commodore did not wish to waste time on the batteries or to make any more "fuss" than necessary in approaching Manila, where he now supposed the Spanish fleet must be, the squadron kept on its silent course. Speed was reduced to less than three knots, as there was no haste. The Commodore wished to arrive off Manila at the first break of dawn, but no earlier. The men lay down beside their guns to get what sleep they could, but the time was not conducive to sleep, and the strictest lookout was kept for the enemy's ships and torpedo boats.

At four o'clock coffee and hardtack were served out to the men, and the officers were glad to get the same frugal refresh-

ments. No one felt like sitting down to a formal breakfast. The lights of Manila had long been in sight. The dawn of that Sunday morning began at half-past four when the squadron was about six miles from the city, lying on the low alluvial plains which form a sort of huge doormat to the main range of mountains, running along the eastern coast of Luzon. As the sun came up exactly behind the city, the shadow cast by the land obscured the harbor foreground, but finally the city became clearer, looking like a white chalk-line on the low shore, and its domes began to glisten against the mountains fifteen miles beyond. Then the presence of a group of vessels in the foreground could be made out, but before five o'clock it could be seen that they were nothing but merchant ships. Where was the enemy?

The cruisers were creeping up in close battle order, the flagship leading, followed by the *Baltimore*, the *Raleigh*, the *Petrel*, the *Concord*, and the *Boston*. They had passed up the broad bay to the northward of Manila, and had turned toward the south, which position they were holding when the Spanish squadron was sighted in the little bay of Cavité, under the guns of the forts of that arsenal, the larger ships lying outside the breakwater, while inside could be seen the smaller gunboats. The enemy was found and the American squadron was holding a course directly towards him. It was about five o'clock.

The vessels under Admiral Montijo's command consisted of the cruiser *Reina Christina*, the flagship, 3,500 tons, and with a battery of six 6.2-inch, two 2.7-inch, six 6-pounders, and six 3-pounder rapid-fire guns; the *Castilla*, 3,300 tons, with a battery of four 5.6-inch, two 4.7-inch, two 3.3-inch, four 2.9-inch, and eight 6-pounder rapid-fire guns; the *Isla de Cuba* and *Isla de Luzon*, 1,030 tons each, with batteries of four 4.7-inch, four 6-pounders, and two 3-pounder rapid-fire guns; the *Don Antonio de Ulloa* and *Don Juan de Austria*, 1,130 tons each, with batteries of four 4.7-inch, two 2.7-inch, and two 3-pounder rapid-fire guns; the *General Lezo* and *Marques del Duero*, 524 and 500 tons respectively, with bat-

teries of small rapid-fire guns. The *Velasco* was also in port, but was undergoing repairs and her guns were mounted on earthworks on the shore. There were also four torpedo boats and two fine transports, the *Manila* and the *Isla de Mindanao*.

While the Spanish ships exceeded those of Commodore Dewey's attacking squadron in number and in the number of its men, they were less in aggregate tonnage. Neither were they as well protected as Dewey's ships, although their guns could readily pierce the steel sides of the American cruisers if well aimed. If the Spanish squadron had been compelled to come out in the open sea and fight it would have had little chance even in the hands of experienced gunners. But what gave the Spaniards an equalizing, if not a superior, advantage was the position they held under the protection of the shore batteries. Experts have estimated that one good gun mounted on shore is worth several aboard ship, having a fixed platform, and, therefore, able to fire with greater accuracy. Another advantage the enemy had was the perfect knowledge of the harbor and the exact distance of our ships at all times. The American fleet was compelled to maneuver in strange waters with a Spanish chart which they dared not trust.


CHAPTER XL

THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY — A TERRIBLE STORM OF SHOT AND SHELL — SCENES OF BLOOD AND CARNAGE — ANNIHILATION OF THE SPANISH FLEET — COMMODORE DEWEY'S GREAT VICTORY.

Commodore Dewey's Squadron in Battle Array — Advancing Silently towards the Enemy — Mines Exploded in Front of the *Olympia* — "Remember the Maine!" — The Time for Action Comes — Torpedo Launches Venture an Attack — Rapid Guns — The *Reina Christina* Attacks the *Olympia* — Meets with a Terrible Fire — Destructive Shot of the *Boston* — Retiring for Breakfast — Taking Account of Damages — The Fury of the Second Attack — Spaniards Fighting Desperately — Defiant Gunners Swallowed up in the Bloody Water — Escape of the Spanish Admiral — A Gruesome Sight — Ships Burnt, Sunk, and Deserted — Surrender of the Fort — Care of the Wounded — Experiences on the American Ships — Cutting the Cable — Commodore Dewey's Modest Despatches.

MANILA Bay extends in a northeasterly direction, its greatest length being some thirty-five miles and its circumference about one hundred and twenty. The city of Manila lies to the extreme east side on both banks of the muddy Pasig River. On the south bank is the old city surrounded by a moat and massive walls, constructed in the sixteenth century and crowned by some antiquated guns and a few modern and high-power guns recently added. New Manila on the north bank is entirely defenseless. Eight miles distant and on the southern shore of the bay is Cavité, having a small bay of its own, formed by a projecting neck of land. This was well fortified by large guns and contained an arsenal and slips for large vessels. Under these heavy guns and drawn up in fair order for defense were the fourteen ships of the enemy, and apparently they had been taken by surprise, for they were in no position to maneuver as a squadron; indeed, some were making hurried efforts to get up steam.

As the *Olympia*, followed by the *Baltimore*, *Raleigh*, *Petrel*, *Concord*, and *Boston* in the order named, steamed towards the enemy, every man was on the alert. Trim and fresh-looking in their paint, gay with fluttering signals, they presented a real holiday aspect as they cruised along, but clustered about the decks at their guns, stripped for hot work and



MAP OF THE BAY AND HARBOR OF MANILA.

were others equally eager who could not see what was going on outside but felt that every moment they might hear the boom of a gun and the rattle of projectiles. On the bridge were the commanding officers; in their proper stations were the signal officers, the range-finders, the navigators, all performing duties of the utmost importance upon a modern fighting ship.

At intervals the range was called out. Nearer and nearer they were approaching the enemy. Yet the minutes, minutes of fearful tension, passed and not a sound broke the stillness of that Sabbath morn whose flaming light was breaking over the mountains back of Manila.

Commodore Dewey's orders were to hold the fire till an effective range had been reached. He did not propose to waste any more powder than necessary. On they went, the transports holding off out of range and their crews crowding the decks to watch the spectacle.

At 5:15, when about five miles from the Spanish fleet and

impatient for the signal which would mean a plunge into an experience entirely novel, were eager, gallant men, while down out of sight in the bowels of the ships at the ammunition hoists and at the boilers

about four miles from the Old Manila guns, two batteries from the former and three from the latter opened fire. But it was ill-directed. Shot followed shot, kicking up the water about Commodore Dewey's squadron, on board which, as it steamed ahead, all was as silent as if the ships were empty, except for the whirr of the blowers and the throb of the engines and an occasional order.

At intervals the range-finders exhibited their signal flags, and as each range was called the gunners lowered the sight bars. The range from Cavité was decreasing fast and the shots from its guns and from the Spanish cruisers, which now opened fire, began to shriek through the air and lash the water about them. Faster and faster they came, when suddenly, some distance ahead, a great column of water shot into the air, and then another close by. The enemy had fired two mines, but they were too far away to do any damage, and the ships pushed on. "The air seemed full of things," as one of the officers expressed it. The heat was intense. Stripped of all their clothing except their trousers, the gunners waited impatiently at the port guns to line them on the enemy.

When about three miles from Cavité, the *Olympia* began to swing her port batteries towards the Spanish line, and just then a shell burst directly over her. From the boatswain's mate at the after 5-inch guns came a hoarse cry: "Remember the *Maine*!" And then the cry arose from the throats of every man on the decks.

The time had come. The gunners had the range. One after another the ships followed after the *Olympia* with their port batteries to the enemy. At exactly nineteen minutes to six, or more than twenty minutes after the enemy had opened fire, Commodore Dewey, who stood on the bridge closely watching events, turned to the captain of his flagship and said:

"You may fire, when ready, Captain Gridley."



In an instant one of the *Olympia's* 8-inch guns sent a shell screeching into Cavité fort three miles away. Big guns and little guns chimed in from all the ships before the roar had

died away. A hailstorm of iron flew at the Spanish ships from the rapid-fire guns, while large shells dropped upon the fort. It was one continuous roar. The fire from Cavité and the Spanish ships was redoubled. Shot and shells flew all about, splashed the water about the ships, throwing it over the decks and drenching the men. Occasionally, they came whistling through the rigging and rattling about the sides of the vessels. A great cloud of smoke enveloped them, for there was very little wind, and signaling became difficult. Still the terrific fire was poured into the enemy as the squadron steamed by. It was a scene of awful magnificence.

"Another unpleasant thing about the Spanish shells," said an eye-witness on the *Olympia*, "was the way they had of coming at us even when they had not been properly aimed. Thus it often happened that a projectile which had not only fallen short, but which was not even a good line shot, would be upset by its impact with the water and would come tumbling end over end, far out of its original direction. And how these fellows did roar, plainly visible if they came anywhere near us, and as they rose from the water and spun round and round, they seemed to be about the size of a barrel, especially if an observer happened to be close on the line of their eccentric flight." But all these flying missiles did no serious execution, while our sailors could see through the rifted smoke that the broadsides poured by our vessels were making some impression on the Spanish ships.

Having passed the line firing the port batteries, the *Olympia* came around, taking a course back and closer to the enemy's ships, and the others followed, a great roaring, smoking, flashing, shrieking procession, and, as it passed along, the starboard batteries blazed away at the enemy.

The roar of the steady thunder of cannon was terrible. When the fort was pouring its terrific fire upon our ships, it looked to those on the *McCulloch* and the transports as if our vessels could not possibly endure the fusilade. Heavy shells and solid shot fell about them like hail from the clouds, and



PROMINENT AMERICAN GENERALS.

Maj.-Gen. JOHN R. BROOKE.
Maj.-Gen. ADNA R. CHAFFEE.

Maj.-Gen. FITZHUGH LEE.
Maj.-Gen. JOSEPH E. WHEELER.

many exploded immediately over the ships. At one time the Americans were anything but sure of victory, and this was after the fire had been kept up for an hour. It looked as though every gun of the Spanish ships had been turned loose on Dewey's cruisers, and the shore line was a veritable blaze of fire from the batteries. The din was simply indescribable.

Tons and tons of shot continued to fall over our ships, whose salvation was the bad marksmanship of the Spaniards. Most of their shots were high, falling over into the bay beyond. This was especially noticeable after the American ships had swung about and run back nearer to the enemy's line. The Spanish gunners did not change their range except on the forts, where the marksmen were better trained, or had the advantage of a solid platform and a better defense.

In the midst of the terrific din a couple of torpedo launches were seen leaving the shore and heading for the American ships. Quickly the gunners turned their rapid-fire guns on them, and in the terrible hail of shot and shell which fell upon them one was immediately sunk and the other so badly damaged that she ran on the beach to save herself. That was the first and last venture of the Spanish torpedo craft.

Round came the *Olympia* again, after having passed the enemy's line to the eastward, and nearer still toward it the procession retraced its course, using again the port batteries. Then the *Reina Christina* was seen coming out towards the *Olympia* to give her battle. Admiral Montijo stood on the bridge, and his vessel made a gallant assault. But the fire of Dewey's squadron was concentrated upon the reckless Spaniard. Shells riddled her sides and swept her deck, and just as the admiral stepped from the bridge a shot struck it and carried it completely overboard. She quickly turned back towards the harbor, and while speeding in the *Boston* sent an 8-inch shell into her stern, sweeping through the vessel, creating terrible havoc, and setting the ship afire. Many of the men were killed. Yet through his glass the American commodore could see the Spanish admiral calmly walking the deck

while the Spanish sailors were keeping their guns hot, discharging shells which flew all around the *Olympia* and her followers, doing very little damage to the flagship, but how much to the others he could not tell.

Round swung the line again, giving the starboard batteries another chance, and this time closer still to the enemy. From the beginning of the engagement, the three batteries at Manila had kept up a continuous fire, which the American squadron had not returned, paying its attention entirely to the Spanish fleet and the Cavité batteries. At this point, Commodore Dewey sent a message to the Governor-General to the effect that if the Manila batteries did not cease firing he would shell the city. It had the effect of silencing them. The Governor-General could not fail to appreciate Commodore Dewey's advantages in the situation, for, if he withdrew his ships from in front of the Cavité batteries to Manila, eight miles away, he could shell the city without probable interference from the Spanish fleet, whose admiral would not dare to attack Dewey unaided by the strong forts at Cavité after what he had seen of American gunnery. Dewey would doubtless have been very glad to have enticed the Spanish admiral away from the Cavité forts so that he might speedily finish his ships in open battle. This would have left him free to return to Cavité and devote his undivided attention to its batteries.

After steaming past the Spanish line the fifth time, Commodore Dewey, at 7.35, gave orders to withdraw across the bay for breakfast. The men had been fighting for two hours on nothing but the coffee and hardtack which they had at 4 o'clock. The commodore also wished to take account of his damages and the loss of life.

When the American "jackies" realized that they were being withdrawn from the fight, there was a wail of disappointment at first, illustrated by the almost tearful appeal of one gun captain to Commander Lamberton of the *Olympia*:

"For God's sake, captain, don't stop now. Let's finish 'em up right off. Damn the breakfast!"

In passing the last time by the enemy's line the American cruisers had gone within very close range, and while the officers could see that they had wrought sad havoc with some of the Spanish ships, the batteries and vessels were still firing vigorously. One shot passed through the *Baltimore*, and the *Boston* was hit not far from the water line. Dewey did not at this time appreciate how nearly he had the enemy whipped, and the Spanish did not realize as yet the straits they were in.

Seeing the storm of shells striking about the *Olympia* and bursting close aboard the ships of the squadron, the commodore had reason to fear that our loss had been heavy. He knew that the *Olympia* had escaped without serious casualties, but as she had had a dozen hairbreadth misses, it did not seem possible that the others had been equally fortunate. On the other ships the situation was similarly regarded; indeed, it was thought that the *Olympia* had been seriously damaged when she pulled away.

It was not long before it was discovered that no serious harm had been done his ships and not a life had been lost. It seemed nothing less than miraculous that they should have come out of such a hail of iron so little damaged.

When it was found that not a man had been killed, and that none of the vessels had been seriously harmed, an old gunner on the flagship remarked: "The Spaniards couldn't hit a flock of barns."

But the lack of precision in the aim of the Spaniards was not more remarkable than the small damage done when their shots did hit, for in such a rain of iron some could not fail to strike even if the aim had been poor or at random. The escapes were wonderful. The shell which pierced the *Boston* went crashing into the wardroom and exploded within five feet of Paymaster Martin. He was not hit, though it set fire to the lockers and did considerable damage before the fire was extinguished. The fragments of a single shell struck within a radius of fifteen feet of Commodore Dewey. An armor-piercing projectile struck a box of 3-pounder ammunition on

board the *Baltimore*, exploded it, and the whole discharge passed between two groups of men so near together that it was difficult to see how all escaped, and yet but a half dozen were wounded and that only slightly.

The Spaniards knowing that the *Baltimore* and *Boston* had been hit, and thinking that all their firing must have done some damage, when they saw the American ships draw away concluded that they had been obliged to give up the attack. They set up a cheer, and the story at once went to Manila and from there to Madrid that the American squadron had attacked, partially destroying the Spanish fleet, and had finally been obliged to retreat. But the American sailors were only resting on their guns and taking a little well-earned breakfast; and as they did so the damage they had done the enemy began to appear. The *Reina Christina* was seen to be burning fiercely and two of the other ships were on fire.

In telling his own story afterwards, Admiral Montijo said: "I observed fire on my ship forward and our steering gear was damaged, rendering the vessel unmanageable. We were subjected to a terrific hail of shell and shot. The engines were struck and we estimated that we had seventy hits about our hull and superstructure. The boilers were not hit, but the pipe to the condenser was destroyed. A few moments later, I observed that the after part of the ship was on fire. A shell from an American ship had penetrated and burst with deadly effect, killing many of our men. My flag lieutenant said to me: 'The ship is in flames. It is impossible to stay on the *Christina* any longer.' He signaled to the gunboat *Isla de Cuba*, and I and my staff were transferred to her and my flag was hoisted. Before leaving the *Christina* my flag was hauled down. My flagship was now a mass of flames. I ordered away all the boats I could to save the crew. Many of the men jumped overboard without clothing, and succeeded in reaching the shore several hundred yards away."

As the Americans looked through their glasses they could see that the enemy's fleet was done for. In a little time the

Reina Christina was a mass of flames, and the *Castilla* and the *Don Antonio del Ulloa* were burning fiercely. It would be an easy matter to rush in and finish the fleet, but the Cavité fortress remained to be silenced, and there was no telling what its guns might do at close range. Commodore Dewey decided to run in and do his worst. What followed is thus concisely told in his official report:

"At 11.16 I returned to the attack. By this time the Spanish flagship and almost all the Spanish fleet were in flames. At 12.30 the squadron ceased firing, the batteries being silenced, and the ships sunk, burned, and deserted."

This modest statement gives a very inadequate idea of the fury of that final attack. This time the *Baltimore*, which the enemy supposed had been disabled, took the lead, followed by the *Olympia*. The *Baltimore* had orders to attack the shore batteries furiously, and hers was one of the most daring deeds of the engagement. The batteries mounted 10-inch guns, a shot from one of which, had it struck her, might have sunk her immediately. But, using the lead for soundings, she dashed in at high speed until she was close under the blaze of the guns on shore, when she swung around and let them have her big shells with all the fury they were capable of. She was the admiration of the whole fleet. Cheer after cheer went up from the *Olympia's* men, who had borne the brunt of the first battle.

The other ships turned their rapid-fire guns upon the Spanish fleet, particularly the *Isla de Cuba*, to which the admiral had transferred his flag. The *Don Antonio de Ulloa* made a magnificent show of desperate bravery. When her commander found that she was so torn by American shells and swept by fire that he could not keep her afloat, he nailed her colors to the mast and she sank with all hands fighting to the last. The *Isla de Cuba* was soon on fire, but her men were fighting with desperation. This soon left the *Don Juan de Austria* practically to make the fight alone, the gunboats being already disabled or withdrawn to the little harbor behind the fort. For a few minutes this cruiser received the hail of

Dewey's rapid-fire guns, when suddenly a shell struck her and exploded in her forward magazine. Like a fan, splinters, men, guns, parts of the superstructure, and thousands of movable things shot high into the air. The next moment the *Don Juan de Austria* was sinking. Still the men aft worked their guns, and as the ship sank they went down in a frenzy of impotent rage, shrieking defiance as the blood-stained water closed over them, and still the American ships relentlessly advanced.

The *Isla de Cuba* sought refuge behind the pier at Cavité, where, recognizing the futility of fighting any more, Admiral Montijo prepared to disembark, and he gave orders for the evacuation of the remainder of the ships. His last signal to the captains of his fleet was, "Scuttle and abandon your ships." Then he escaped in a small boat into Racoor Bay, and finally to Manila. The American vessels closed in and rained a deadly fire upon the forts, and at 12.15 the Spanish flag was hauled down and a white flag went up, amid great cheering from the decks of the American sailors.

One gunboat was sunk at the end of the engagement. Her crew had left her with her colors flying and she went down thus — a very impressive picture.

It was a gruesome sight which the bay presented. The smoking hulks of the Spanish vessels which had not fully sunk were seen to be strewn with corpses and wounded men, and bodies were floating about in the water.

At 12.30 the squadron returned and anchored off Manila, the *Petrel* being left behind to complete the destruction of the smaller vessels, which had run in behind the point of Cavité. This duty was performed in the most expeditious and complete manner. There was plenty of material for discussion among the gallant sailors of Commodore Dewey's squadron that night. They had experienced their first battle, the first battle of the new navy. They realized, as only men after such a battle can, the dangers from which they had escaped unscathed. Even when no shots entered the ships the experiences were anything but pleasant. The concussion of

the big guns when fired across the deck made havoc with the breakables on board. "Bookshelves were torn out," said one officer in speaking of his room, "and everything — clothes, electric fans, books, tobacco, curios, and the rest — was on the floor in one mass."

An American officer, writing home a few days later, said: "I have often wondered, as I dare say everyone has, how people in a scrap would feel and behave; have wondered whether calm, deliberate action would be possible to a tender-foot. Personally, I sincerely hope I have seen my last, as well as my first, battle. All the same, I was delighted to see that, so far from being rattled or excited, we seemed to do what was to be done as deliberately as on parade. I have more respect for the Spaniards than ever before. Their fighting their ships as long as they did in the condition in which they were is wonderful. I said as much to one of them in a party on board yesterday. He replied, with a bow:

"'We but did, or tried to do, what you did; we did our duty.'"

Early the next morning the squadron returned to Cavité to take possession, but when the officers, sent in on the *Petrel*, approached the shore, they were surprised to find the arsenal still occupied by a force of Spaniards with Mauser rifles. As the white flag had been hoisted the day before, Commander Lamberton of the *Olympia*, who had been sent ashore to represent the Commodore, could not understand what the Spaniards intended to do. On landing he was met by Captain Sostoa of the Spanish navy and they went to the arsenal headquarters, where they were at once surrounded by an armed guard. When asked why men were under arms when they had surrendered the day before, Captain Sostoa replied that they had not surrendered, but had merely hoisted the white flag to enable the women and children to repair to places of safety. There was some further parley, and finally Commander Lamberton said that they were not there to discuss past events, but to take possession of the arsenal, and if all the

Spaniards there did not surrender their guns and persons as prisoners of war the American ships would open fire.

The Spanish captain asked for more time, and finally Commander Lamberton said that he would give them two hours, and if the white flag was not hoisted over the arsenal by noon fire would be reopened without any more parley. He then returned to report to the Commodore. While they waited the crews from the ships rowed about the wrecks and observed the destruction they had made. But the Spaniards wished to parley further, and in a little while army officers came out to the flagship and said that the navy would surrender, but the army could not. They were told that they must or take the consequences, and a general recall was sounded for the men off in the boats. The *Olympia* offered the Spanish officers coal for their launch to take them back, and while they stood on deck they were given an object lesson. A small steamship was reported leaving Cavité for Manila. "Give her a shot," was the order to the *Olympia's* gunners, and in less than a half-minute a shot was tossed across her bows. She did not stop, but another caught the range exactly and she was at once beached.

At quarter to eleven the white flag was hoisted on the arsenal, but when a landing party was sent to take possession in the afternoon they found that every seaman had marched off to Manila, taking his Mauser rifle with him. As they had been announcing that the Americans would kill everyone in Cavité, the landing party was met by a long procession of priests and Sisters of Mercy, begging them not to injure the wounded men in the hospital. As a matter of fact, the Americans had already rescued about 200 Spaniards and sent them ashore, but they had been so misled by the priests and friars that they expected to be killed. Our men proceeded to take care of the wounded, to bury the dead, and to defend the place from the swarm of native looters that had rushed in on learning that the Spanish guard had withdrawn. The same day the *Raleigh* and the *Baltimore* went down the bay and

secured the surrender of the batteries on Corregidor Island, paroled the garrison, and destroyed the mines and torpedoes past which the squadron had had the good fortune to sail unharmed.

Having learned that the Governor of Manila had refused to allow the cable company to transmit his message announcing the result of his visit to Manila, Commodore Dewey sent the *Zafiro* a short distance to cut the cable, which was done, thus making the world dependent for several days upon the first Spanish report for information as to the situation. On Thursday the *Hugh McCulloch* sailed for Hong Kong, and so ended the first chapter of the Manila campaign.

Commodore Dewey's own modest account of the conflict, which he sent to Hong Kong on the *McCulloch*, and which arrived in Washington six days after the battle, was as follows:

MANILA, May 1st.

The squadron arrived at Manila at daybreak this morning. Immediately engaged the enemy and destroyed the following vessels: *Reina Christina*, *Castilla*, *Don Antonio de Ulloa*, *Isla de Luzon*, *Isla de Cuba*, *General Lezo*, *Marques del Duero*, *El Gano*, *Velasco*, transport *Isla de Mindanao*, and one other vessel and water battery at Cavité. Squadron is uninjured. Only few men were slightly wounded. The only means of telegraphing is to the American consul at Hong Kong. I shall communicate with him.

DEWEY.

CAVITÉ, May 4th.

I have taken possession of the naval station at Cavité, Philippine Islands, and destroyed its fortifications. Have destroyed fortification at bay entrance, paroling the garrison. I control the bay completely and can take the city at any time. The squadron is in excellent health and spirits. The Spanish loss is not fully known, but very heavy; 150 killed including captain, on *Reina Christina* alone. I am assisting in protecting the Spanish sick and wounded. Two hundred and fifty sick and wounded in hospital within our lines. Much excitement at Manila. Will protect foreign residents.

DEWEY.

The orders which Commodore Dewey had received from his government were to destroy the Spanish fleet. He obeyed. Seven thousand miles away from a home base of supplies he set

out calmly to run the gauntlet of mined harbors and land fortifications. His answer to his government's instructions was in the brief dispatches above, brief, but as impressive as anything in naval history.

The losses of the Spaniards included ten warships, several torpedo boats, two transports, the navy yard, and nine batteries. About 1,200 men were killed or wounded, and the estimated value of the Spanish property destroyed or captured was \$6,000,000. On the American side the total loss was eight men slightly wounded, and \$5,000 damage to the ships.

The moral of it is that unskilled bravery is no match for bravery mated with skill in the use of the modern machinery of war. Civilization has advanced beyond the crude instruments that in their management demanded nothing so much as a strong arm and a brave heart. The modern fighting machine requires training and skill.

Neither squadron contained an armored ship. The American vessels had their vitals covered by what are known as protective decks, while but two of the Spanish ships were so built. But for all that they might have riddled or sunk some of our squadron; the forts might have done this alone had they been able to shoot straight. The little *Petrel*, secure in their wild inaccuracy, danced up to within a thousand yards of their forts.

Nothing but audacity that was much more than bravado could have accomplished so much; an audacity born of the conviction that they had vessels which were honestly constructed, guns that had been tested in target practice, gunners that had become so expert in sub-caliber practice that they scarcely ever missed fire. The Spanish were overborne by the torrent of metal which rained down on their ships, their guns, and their men. They fought desperately with pure animal courage and sank with their ships rather than surrender them. The Spaniards were without skill, fired in the old fashion, blazing away with only general aim, while every American gunner was an expert sharpshooter, trained by target practice, and their shots told with terrible effect.

The international effect of the victory was at once to give the United States prestige among the nations of the world as a naval power. Its effect in the United States was to give a good degree of sober self-confidence as to the result of any engagement in American waters between the Spanish and American fleets. Another Spanish fleet might be more formidable than that at Manila, but there would be the same difference between the Spanish and the American gunner.

No wonder the President, without waiting for further action, promoted Commodore Dewey to be acting rear admiral, and Congress promptly complied with the suggestion to create him a rear admiral and to extend the nation's thanks. Beautiful was the spirit of the comments of brother officers upon the valor and glory of the officers and crew of the Asiatic squadron. Not the slightest trace of jealousy, naught but joy in the result and entire willingness that honor be given to those to whom honor is due. As for the carping critics of the navy at home, they became as dumb as the Sphinx.

In the combined sagacity and boldness of Commodore Dewey this naval engagement was unsurpassed in the naval history of the world; in the results achieved, unequaled. Never before had an entire fleet been destroyed without the loss of a ship or even of a single life on the part of the attacking forces. The silent sail at midnight past the fort which was supposed to command the entrance to the bay, the almost contemptuous disregard of the mines placed in the harbor for its protection, the calm pushing forward after two mines had exploded in front of one of the vessels, the silent receiving without return the earliest fire of the enemy, the terrible fire poured upon the fleet and shore batteries when the Commodore had reached the point where he could make fire most effective, the stopping after two hours of cannonade for breakfast, and taking account of damages, and then the resumption of the battle, the sailing closer to the shore by the aid of the lead to make the fire more effective, the brave, but hopeless, resistance of the Spaniards till their every ship was absolutely

destroyed or placed entirely *hors de combat*, the quick and chivalrous attention to the Spanish wounded by Commodore Dewey as soon as victory was complete, the report wired to the government at home as modest as the deed was heroic — all combine to make this naval engagement one of the most romantic, as well as one of the most decisive, in the world's history.

CHAPTER XLI

AWAITING ADMIRAL CERVERA AND HIS FLEET—ANXIETY FOR THE *OREGON*—CERVERA'S UNEXPECTED ARRIVAL AT MARTINIQUE.

A Period of Uncomfortable Uncertainty—Where would Cervera Appear?—Relative Distances of the Hostile Squadrons—Three Theories as to Cervera's Probable Course—Plausibility of the Theory that He Might Intercept the *Oregon*—The *Oregon* at Rio Janeiro—Captain Clark has no Fear of Spanish Fleet—Possibility of a Spanish Attack on Coast Cities—General Opinion that Cervera would Steer for Puerto Rico—Admiral Sampson Starts Out to Meet Him—His Formidable Fleet—The Anticipated Battle—Days of Anxious Waiting—Strategists all at Sea—Renewed Concern for the *Oregon*—Strength of the Spanish Cruisers—Unknown Possibilities of Torpedo Warfare—Astonishing Announcement that Cervera had Returned to Cadiz—Assurances from London—Spanish Denials Disbelieved—Sudden Preparations for Invading Cuba—Cervera is Sighted off Martinique—He Learns that Sampson Had Called for Him at Puerto Rico.

THE month of May, which opened so gloriously for our arms in the Orient, produced a most exciting period of uncertainty on this side of the world, where we were supposed to be immediately engaged in war. So crushing was Dewey's victory that, while hardly a blow had been struck in the west, many began to speak of peace, assuming that Spain could not possibly be so rash as to pursue a warlike course with such unfavorable prospects; but, by her naval strategy, which consisted of dodging under cover of misleading reports, for many days she kept not only our people, but the government, in a state of uncertainty, at times bordering upon fear, and in the end her maneuvers resulted in a complete change of the government's plans for the invasion of Cuba.

When it was definitely known that the Cape Verde fleet under Admiral Cervera had actually sailed on April 29th, Admiral Sampson's squadron was maintaining without notable incidents the Cuban blockade, and Commodore Schley's flying

squadron was impatiently awaiting orders, with steam up, at Hampton Roads. It was reported that some of the torpedo craft when sailing out of the Cape Verde harbor had taken a northerly direction, as if bound for the Canaries, while the four armored cruisers and three torpedo-boat destroyers had taken a westerly direction. A dispatch boat in the service of a New York newspaper followed the main fleet for some hours, and, when it was seen to continue on in a westerly course after nightfall, returned to St. Vincent, the information being cabled to this country. Apparently, this was the only information the government had of the intended course of the Spanish squadron, and the question before the naval strategy board at once became: Where will Cervera make his appearance?

The nearest Spanish port in western waters was San Juan, Puerto Rico, which is 2,300 miles from the Cape Verde Islands. It is also about 1,100 miles from Havana, off which lay Sampson's squadron, and about 1,300 miles from Hampton Roads, where Schley's sailors were pining for Spanish targets. It is something over 3,000 miles from St. Vincent to important ports on our Atlantic seaboard, and on the other hand it is only about 1,600 miles from St. Vincent to the eastern point of Brazil, towards which the battleship *Oregon* and the gunboat *Marietta* were making their way, convoying the unarmed *Nictheroy*, which had been purchased in Brazil, and was to become the cruiser *Buffalo*.

Apparently, there was not the slightest information outside of Spain's ministry as to what Cervera's sailing orders were, and it was quite probable that Cervera did not know himself till he opened them well out to sea, and, having sailed while Dewey was still on his way to the Philippines, his voyage could not have been marred or his purposes changed by any unpleasant reflections upon the nature of that event. To the government and to everyone in the United States obliged or disposed to speculate upon what Cervera would do, there appeared three courses more or less rational open to him. He

might adopt the shortest trip, that to the Brazilian coast, and attempt to take or destroy our battleship and its attendants; or he might proceed at once to Puerto Rico to replenish his stock of coal and supplies and learn the situation; or, he might count upon our looking for him in these more southerly ports, and, therefore, embrace the opportunity to take the longer journey to the New England coast or to ports further south on the Atlantic seaboard.

All three of these theories had their supporters among the strategists of the people, of the press, and even of the government. It did not seem probable that he would run to any place but one of these, though the fact that the enemy, if wise, is apt to appear where least expected was appreciated and added its share to the spicy uncertainty of the problem.

Some plausibility was given to the theory that Cervera would endeavor to intercept the *Oregon* and her consorts, because he had deferred sailing till a date which would naturally be adopted if having in mind the accomplishment of that object. The *Oregon*, which had left Callao, Peru, on April 7th, had on the 17th arrived at Punta Arenas, the Chilian port in the Straits of Magellan, where the *Marietta* was waiting. They delayed two days taking on coal and proceeded on their way northward. By making the same speed as on the trip from Callao, they would naturally arrive off the easternmost point of South America at about the same time that the Cape Verde fleet would reach it, if steaming in that direction. The force of this conjecture was strengthened on the 30th, or the day after Cervera's squadron sailed, by the arrival of the *Oregon* and *Marietta* at Rio Janeiro. He who studies the map will observe that the eastern point of South America, around which the American vessels would be compelled to sail, is about half-way between Rio Janeiro and the Cape Verde Islands, whence Cervera's fleet sailed.

The government strategists regarded such a Spanish purpose as a possibility, and when Captain Clark of the *Oregon* reported from Rio Janeiro, he was at once informed that he

might possibly meet the Spanish squadron unless he took an out-of-the-way course. Even then he might be caught, as the Spanish cruisers were fast, while the battleship could not be expected to make much better than ten knots an hour. But Captain Clark was made up of material similar to that in other American naval officers. He intimated that he did not wish to be hampered by instructions, and added: "I am not afraid of the Spanish fleet."

The possibility that Cervera would sail northward and suddenly appear at some poorly-defended, yet important, port of the Atlantic seaboard, was grounded simply in the belief that Spain would be naturally inclined to stab us in the back, so to speak; that she was too crafty to risk her fleet in an encounter with the strong squadron Admiral Sampson had in Cuban waters, but would confine her hostility to spiteful efforts to inflict damage to American coast cities, withdrawing in time to run away from any ships sent northward to attack her fleet, and possibly adopting the opportunity to make Havana, when the blockade force had been weakened by vessels sent to the defense of the coast. In other words, by such a policy Spain might hope to prevent the concentration of our fleet.

The more general opinion was that Cervera would proceed directly to San Juan, Puerto Rico, and that locality was selected by the strategists of the press for a great naval battle about May 9th, for it was calculated that Cervera would require that time to make the voyage. This opinion evidently predominated in the government strategy board; at least it was held by Admiral Sampson, to whom, as commander of the United States naval forces, was committed the important task of meeting and destroying Spain's fleet, for when informed of its departure from St. Vincent, he gathered his larger vessels at Key West to be coaled, and prepared to proceed to Puerto Rico. The dispatches from the seat of government at this time were to the effect that it was proposed to take Puerto Rico, an operation which the government could hardly



Engraved by Chas. A. Wall, N.Y. from a photograph expressly for this work.

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W. F. Carpenter

have contemplated without sending an army along with Sampson. His instructions were to locate and destroy the Spanish fleet, which was supposed to be making its way either to San Juan or to intercept the *Oregon*. These instructions left him free to use scouts and to go in any direction in which he had reason to suppose the Spanish fleet lay; if possible, he was to prevent the fleet from entering San Juan and departing with fresh supplies, and under no circumstances was he to endanger his ships by a fire on forts till Cervera's fleet should have been destroyed or captured.

Accordingly, at daybreak on May 4th, Admiral Sampson left Key West, sailing eastward with the flagship *New York*, the battleships *Iowa* and *Indiana*, the two monitors, *Amphitrite* and *Puritan*, the protected cruisers *Detroit*, *Montgomery*, and *Marblehead*, and the torpedo boat *Porter*, and other smaller vessels. Thereupon, the United States waited breathlessly for the great naval battle of the war. It was calculated that Cervera would arrive near Puerto Rico about the 9th and that Admiral Sampson would arrive there at about the same time.

The *Oregon* and her consorts left Rio Janeiro on the same day Sampson's fleet left Key West, and the opinion was that she would not reach the waters of Puerto Rico for at least twelve days, or too late to participate in the great battle, unless Cervera went after her.

Nothing further was heard of the fleets till the 8th, when the cruiser *Montgomery*, which was acting as a scout for Sampson's fleet, put into the port of Cape Haytien, on the island of Haiti, sending dispatches to Washington, and receiving messages for the admiral. The fleet had been making very slow progress, because of the monitors, which, while expected to give a good account of themselves in close fighting, had small coal capacity, and were being towed by nimbler vessels, the others accommodating themselves to the reduced speed. The date of the anticipated battle was, therefore, postponed; it was then expected that Admiral Sampson's fleet

would arrive off Puerto Rico by the 11th, and that the battle might take place the following day, but nothing was being heard of the whereabouts of the Spanish ships, which were already ten days out from St. Vincent. The exciting mystery was further enhanced by the orders of the Navy Department that nothing concerning the movements of the vessels should be given to the public for the time being.

Two days more passed, and nobody was able to answer the question which everyone was asking as to the whereabouts of Cervera. The *Oregon* and her attendants arrived at Bahia, Brazil, on the 9th, having seen nothing of the Spaniards. The New England coast became concerned because it was reported that a Spanish fleet had been sighted off Nova Scotia, heading for the Maine coast. Key West became anxious because it was reported that Cervera had sailed for the Florida coast. There were many reports of battles and of Spanish fleets, not all of which could possibly be true, and none of which proved to be true.

It was evident that Washington was working in the dark. On the morning of the 10th the ships were all at sea and so was our strategic board. As the hours passed and nothing definite was heard of the Cape Verde fleet, the strategists inclined to the theory that it had after all gone to intercept the *Oregon*, and at once the speculations as to the fate of that vessel became active, and news from Brazil was breathlessly awaited, for if Cervera had gone in that direction, he must now be in striking distance of our battleship and gunboat.

The possibilities of such a contest could not but be regarded with some concern by our government. It was true that the *Oregon* was one of the most powerful of her class afloat, but there were plenty of naval experts in this country and abroad who declared that we had no ships in our navy equal in real efficiency to the swift armored cruisers of Cervera's fleet. The *Oquendo*, *Maria Teresa*, and *Vizcaya* were sister ships of a class not found in the American navy — cruising battleships. They carried battleship armor, 12-inch side belts and 10-inch

gun protecting armor. The armor was much inferior in quality to the *Oregon's*, but sufficiently heavy to keep out all but the heaviest shells. The armament of these ships was much superior to that of our cruisers, but inferior to the *Oregon's*. Each ship mounted a pair of 11-inch guns, ten 5.5-inch guns (the *Vizcaya's* being rapid-fire), in addition to sixteen small guns, similar to those on the *Oregon*. The *Colon* was a less formidable ship, but she, too, was a fighting cruiser. She carried 6-inch armor and her heavy guns were a pair of 9.8-inch rifles. She was remarkably strong in rapid-fire guns, mounting ten 6-inch and six 4.7-inch guns of this type. She had been built but a short time, and was regarded as one of the finest cruisers afloat.

What damage to our ships might be wrought by Spanish torpedoes in an engagement off the South American coast could only be conjectured. Certainly, four heavily armored cruisers, carrying two dozen torpedo tubes, would be a formidable fighting force against the battleship *Oregon*, the unarmored cruiser *Buffalo*, and the little unarmored gunboat *Marietta*, with but ten torpedo tubes on all three. The unarmored boats would be of little value in a fight against armor-clads. The *Oregon* would bear the brunt of the fight, and upon the fighting qualities of her officers and men would depend the issue of the battle.

But late on the 10th, when Admiral Sampson was supposed to be drawing near to the port of San Juan in Puerto Rico, and when Admiral Cervera was supposed to be very close to Captain Clark off the coast of Brazil, came the surprising announcement from London that Cervera's fleet had returned to Cadiz! As the newspapers agreed in putting it in enormous headlines, the Spanish fleet had "turned tail." Cervera had apparently been afraid to cross the Atlantic, and, after skulking about, avoiding the frequented lanes of commerce, so that no one might tell tall tales of his cowardice, had at length, when in need of fuel, been compelled to swallow his pride and go home to Spain.

This report was promptly accepted by the newspapers and by the government, apparently with little skepticism at first. The State Department authorized the announcement: "Official information has been received that four Spanish cruisers and three torpedo-boat destroyers have returned to Cadiz." As nothing but important announcements were allowed to break the secrecy of the government, there was every reason to suppose that the information was correct, and to the satisfaction of the government. Indeed, it transpired that our ambassador at the court of St. James, Mr. Hay, had cabled his assurances to the State Department at Washington that he had unquestioned information from private sources in Cadiz to the effect that Admiral Cervera's ironclads were lying in the harbor. The London papers published similar reports and presumably from similar sources.

The statement made by Admiral Bermejo, Minister of Marine, denying that Cervera's fleet had returned to Spain, and declaring that it was actually where it ought to be in accordance with the instructions given to its commander, had little effect, because of the general belief that the crafty Spanish strategists deliberately misrepresented everything, and owing to the close watch kept in Spanish ports it was impossible, apparently, to verify the reports from Cadiz. No one in Madrid knew or, knowing, dared to say whether the fleet was really in home waters or not, but the opinion was general that the government was seeking in every way to delay operations so that the troops of the United States would not make a landing in Cuba till the summer should be well advanced and the dangers of sickness increased many fold.

Relying, apparently, upon the news from London that the Spanish fleet had wholly deserted the western side of the Atlantic, the government formed the opinion that there was no longer reason for delay in proceeding to occupy Cuba with a large force of men. A few days previously the plan had been to begin occupation with a small advance guard to co-operate with General Gomez and other Cuban commanders,



START OF THE AMERICAN ARMY OF INVASION FOR CUBA FROM CHICKAMAUGA.

to whom it was also intended to send a large quantity of repeating rifles and ammunition, so that they might be prepared for rendering assistance when the real invasion should come.

But in view of the improbability of naval interference from Spain, preparations were at once begun for moving the regulars and the available volunteer troops to convenient places for embarking. Chickamauga was abandoned as a place for receiving the greater part of the army, and instructions were given on the 10th for mustering in the volunteers as rapidly as possible and sending them to Tampa and other points on the Gulf for speedy transportation to Cuba. It was announced that General Miles would himself go to Cuba, General Wesley Merritt, who, it had been supposed, would be the leader of the forces in Cuba, having been selected to lead the expeditions to the Philippines. It was proposed to send General Shafter with a force of regulars in his command to secure a base on the Cuban coast, which he should hold till reinforcements enough to warrant an attack upon Havana could be taken over. There was the greatest excitement at the camps at Tampa, Mobile, and New Orleans, and hurry orders were sent to some of the state governments for mustering in troops. On the 11th everyone was looking for the immediate movement of the army.

But all this was changed in a single day. The plans of invasion were suddenly and indefinitely postponed. Just before midnight of the 12th the Navy Department received a cipher dispatch from Captain Cotton of the *Harvard*, from Fort de France, Martinique, and dated the day before, saying that the Spanish fleet was off that place. An intimation that the fleet might be in those West Indian waters had come to this country early on the 12th in the form of a dispatch from Madrid giving an official statement of the Minister of Marine to the effect that the Spanish fleet had that day touched at the French Island of Martinique, which is one of the Windward Islands forming the eastern fringe that encloses the Caribbean Sea. The fast cruisers, *Yale*, *Harvard*, and *St. Louis*, had

been patrolling the waters about Windward Islands for days, and were doing so at the time Cervera was approaching Martinique, but, unfortunately, just at that time none of them were in that particular vicinity.

The authorities had considered Guadaloupe the most likely place for Cervera to put in for news, if he put in at all, and for that reason the *St. Louis* had cruised in those waters. Commander Goodrich remained about the islands till the 11th, and, indeed, steamed by Martinique a little before Cervera's fleet came into sight. Martinique has good cable connections, and thus Admiral Cervera was at once in communication with Madrid, and also, presumably, with the very active Spanish agency which ex-Señor Polo had been maintaining in Canada since his retirement from service as Spanish Minister at Washington. It was, of course, fair to suppose that Admiral Cervera's dispatches, which had been received and held for him by the Spanish consul at the port in Martinique, duly informed him of the position of the United States squadrons, of the exact condition of the Cuban blockade, and of the fact that Admiral Sampson had called for him with some rather good fighting ships at Puerto Rico, and not having found him as expected, had shelled the forts of San Juan on that very morning of May 12th.

CHAPTER XLII

ADMIRAL SAMPSON'S BOMBARDMENT OF SAN JUAN— THRILLING SCENES DURING THE ACTION—SKILLFUL AMERICAN GUNNERY—SAMPSON'S WITHDRAWAL.

Admiral Sampson's Cruise to Puerto Rico — The Gallant Sailors Expect a Great Fight — Approaching San Juan — Preparations for the Combat — San Juan Learns of Sampson's Approach — The *Iowa* Becomes the Flagship — Peculiarities of San Juan Harbor — Admiral Sampson's Plan of Attack — Running up the Stars and Stripes — Speeding into the Bay — The Duty of the *Wompatuck* — Sampson, Finding Cervera Absent, Decides to Shell the Forts — The First Shot — The Music of the Projectiles — Spaniards Return the Fire Vigorously — Bravery of a Spaniard at an Old Gun — Some Dangerous Guns on the Forts — Marksmanship as Worthless as Spanish Promises — "Threaten, Puff, Splash!" — Cruising by the Forts Three Times — Shells Land on the *New York* and *Iowa* — One Man Killed — The Withdrawal — Admiral Sampson's Official Report — Spaniards Think They Have Driven Him Off — Not Even a Spanish Gunboat in the Harbor — Criticism of Admiral Sampson's Attack.

THE cruise of Admiral Sampson to Puerto Rico seems to have been undertaken in the confident expectation of meeting Cervera and destroying his ships in those waters. San Juan being a well-defended Spanish port, the nearest point for Cervera in western seas, and being well supplied with coal, the admiral, not without good reasons, supposed that Cervera would certainly try to make that port about the 9th of May, and he planned to make his own appearance there at about the same time. After making preparations to leave Key West on the afternoon of May 3d, the fleet was held till midnight, and the flagship did not start till the next morning. Going direct to the blockading squadron off Havana the admiral was there joined by the battleships *Iowa* and *Indiana*, and, proceeding westward, they arrived off Cardenas at dark, where they came up with the rest of the fleet, including the cruisers *Detroit* and *Montgomery*, the monitors *Amphitrite* and *Terror*, the torpedo

boat *Porter*, the tug *Wompatuck*, and the collier *Niagara*. In order to make better time the *Iowa* took the *Amphitrite* in tow, and a little later, the *Terror's* speed proving too slow, she was taken in tow by the *New York*. From at least one important point of view Admiral Sampson's cruise was a naval absurdity. He had set out to capture a 20-knot Spaniard with a 10-knot fleet. Not one of his vessels excepting the *New York* could steam 20 knots, and having taken the slower vessels in tow, the admiral necessarily moped along for over 1,000 miles at an average speed of 7 knots, the gallant sailors believing that they were creeping nearer and nearer to the great naval battle of the war, when they should riddle the flower of Spain's navy and eclipse the wonderful victory of Dewey at Manila. On approaching the port of Cape Haitien the *Montgomery* was sent in to receive any dispatches from Washington, but, obtaining only the information that Cervera had not been reported anywhere, the 8th and 9th were spent in filling some of the exhausted coal bunkers of the fleet, the sea being remarkably smooth and making the operation more than usually easy. Some inquiry had been made as to coal at Cape Haitien, but the price was extremely high, and the admiral determined to depend upon his own reserve. Meanwhile, preparations were going on aboard the fighting ships for a battle. The sailors pitched through the portholes all sorts of movables, and over the sides into the sea flew doors and parts of wooden bulkheads. Piles of sand-filled bags were also arranged to give increased protection to some of the gunners against the fragments of Spanish shells that were expected to fly about the decks a little later on.

But it seems that while lying off Cape Haitien the shipping lookout on top of the mountain west of the town had seen the squadron and reported the fact at once, and the Spanish consul immediately and faithfully wired the information to Puerto Rico and Madrid. When, on the 9th, Admiral Sampson learned this he turned the squadron about and headed conspicuously for Key West again until the Cape Haitien moun-

tains were well out of sight, then he put out to sea, and gradually headed back for San Juan, hoping that the Spaniards had been thereby deceived; but whether they were or not made very little difference, as a cruel chance ordained that Sampson should appear at San Juan just in time to have the fact known to Cervera as he sailed into the waters of Martinique.

Admiral Sampson led his fleet on without further interruption till about five o'clock on the afternoon of the 11th, when, about fifty miles northwest of San Juan, the flagship hove to in a smart sea, the jackies watching for what was to happen. A boat was lowered from the flagship, the admiral and his staff climbed down the iron ladder on the side of the *New York*, his two-starred blue flag disappeared from the fore and appeared set to the jackstaff of the small boat, which was rowed to the *Iowa* lying about a quarter of a mile to the leeward, and the flag soon fluttered from the top of her military mast. The admiral had concluded to make the battleship *Iowa*, instead of the armored cruiser *New York*, his flagship, and every one knew from this that he soon expected to smell powder. Thereafter the *Iowa* led the procession until night-fall, with the *Indiana* next in line, and the *New York* third. The monitors worked along under their own steam, while another line lay north and abreast of the *New York*. That afternoon the admiral distributed among his vessels the plan of procedure he had adopted, based, as will be seen, upon the expectation, or probability at least, of finding the Cape Verde fleet in the harbor of San Juan, which is a bay projecting into the north shore and is formed by a small island which runs along the shore, ending in Morro Castle at the mouth of the harbor. This island, which at its eastern end is separated from the mainland by a tidal stream only, and is, therefore, more of a peninsula, is something in the shape of a human leg, having a stubby foot at the west end, on which San Juan lies, Morro being at the extremity of the toes. This old castle, with its thick frowning walls, has stood here since the days of the old corsairs, but the Spaniards have in the course of time

run another line of defense along the sea — on the shin-bone of the leg, so to speak — ending in another old fort. The sole of the foot also has another line of defense enclosing the town on the west.

Across the mouth of the harbor on the opposite point of land is Fort Cañuelo, and between Morro and this fort, and a little out to sea, is Cabras Island. Several miles further west on the main shore is Point Salinas, behind which the American vessels were steaming up.

The admiral's instructions were that the squadron was to pass near Salinas Point and then steer about east to pass just outside the reefs off Cabras Island, the column to be formed with the flagship *Iowa* in the lead, followed by the *Indiana*, *New York*, *Amphitrite*, and *Terror*. The *Detroit* was to go ahead of the *Iowa* about 1,000 yards, and the *Wompatuck* was to keep on the *Iowa*'s starboard bow about 500 yards off, both to sound constantly after land was closed, and to immediately signal if ten fathoms or less were obtained. The *Montgomery* was to remain in the rear of the column on the lookout for torpedo boats, and if Fort Cañuelo fired she was to silence it. The *Porter* was to take a station under the cover of the *Iowa* on the port side.

While approaching, a close watch was to be kept on the coast for torpedo craft, and when near Cabras Island the *Porter* was to rapidly cross the mouth of the harbor and stand close under Morro to the westward, screened from the fire of Morro's western battery, and if the old guns on the north side of Morro were opened she was to have the enjoyment of silencing them. Both the *Detroit* in front and the *Montgomery* in the rear were also to keep a sharp lookout for any torpedo boats coming out of the harbor.

There were to be two objects of attack, the instructions went on to say, the batteries upon Morro and the men-of-war. If it was clear that the Spanish vessels were lying in port, fire was to be opened upon them as soon as they were discernible over Cabras Island, the action of the flagship being followed in

this regard. If, however, it should be evident that neutral men-of-war were in line of fire, a flag of truce would probably be sent in before fire on the vessels was opened, and the *Porter* was to hold herself in readiness for this service. Care was to be used to avoid striking the hospitals on Cabras Island, and if it became necessary to silence the Morro batteries a portion of the fire would be directed with this object, but the principal object was to destroy the ships.

Then followed instructions as to the course of maneuvers. If nightfall came with the port in the enemy's hands and the ships inside, the cruisers were to take up positions just outside the harbor, the *Montgomery* to the eastward, and the *Detroit* to the westward, with the batteries ready, and the men at their guns, and showing no lights. The other ships were to sweep the entrance to the harbor and the channel leading into the anchorage with searchlights, to keep the torpedo craft from coming out. In case the enemy should attempt to escape from the port, fire was to be concentrated upon the leading ship, and should the attempt be made at night, the searchlights were to be turned on her bridge and conning-tower and kept there.

It will be observed that Admiral Sampson had worked his plans out with extreme care and a definiteness which had been entirely impossible for Commodore Dewey in searching about the great bays of the Philippines for Admiral Montijo; they were worked out in the faith, shared by his gallant captains, that Cervera would by that time be in the harbor of San Juan, and the admiral would apparently have been greatly surprised had he been able to communicate with Washington, which at this very hour was in receipt of reliable assurances that Cervera had turned tail and run back to Cadiz.

With the first flush of color in the eastern sky on the morning of the 12th and while the ornamental bows of Cervera's cruisers were courtesying to the shores of Martinique 500 odd miles away, the *Detroit* ran into her place 1,000 yards ahead of the flagship, and the *Wompatuck* began to take her's to

the westward of the *Detroit*. The voices of the boatswain's mates calling the crews to quarters were heard along the column, the guns were manned and loaded, the decks sanded, the implements of the surgeons laid out in their proper places, and the fleet steamed slowly on in perfect silence, and pointed right into the harbor where a few lights were glimmering, and where half of San Juan were still in bed; but the forts were evidently expecting them, for the lights in Morro's tower were dead. The smart easterly breeze of the day before had lasted during the night, and enough sea was rolling into the coast to make each battleship roll until the thin iron plates beneath the armor belts were intermittently awash. Such a sea was hardly favorable for the aiming of large guns, and it served to expose somewhat the weaker parts of the ships to the enemy. The monitors, however, pushed along through it with hardly a suggestion of a roll, and the waves which ran over their decks were not sufficient to interfere with the working of the guns.

The *Detroit* and *Wompatuck* led the way in unmolested, while the torpedo boat *Porter* ran off to the eastward about a half-mile, as arranged, and stopped about a mile from the shore. About 1,400 yards from Morro the *Detroit* turned eastward and steamed slowly along the beach, while from the *Iowa* fluttered the signal for the hoisting of the American ensign on every ship. Up to every masthead and every staff-head slid the Stars and Stripes, a picture worth a long voyage for any American to see. For a few minutes the vessels sped in towards the bay, and shortly after 5 o'clock the little *Wompatuck*, having accomplished her purpose of fixing a small boat at the proper place to indicate the depth of the water, a mark to steer by later if the smoke obscured the marks ashore, scurried back to where the non-combatants lay. By this time, Admiral Sampson, standing on the bridge and peering anxiously into the harbor through his glasses, saw that Cervera's fleet was not there. He still believed, however, that Cervera would try to make the port, and he concluded

that the best thing to do was to test the batteries with which he should have to contend if he later fought the Spanish in that harbor. If he could destroy them, so much the better. So, at 5.17, the admiral gave Captain Evans of the *Iowa* the word to fire and a long 6-pounder at the starboard end of the *Iowa's* bridge was fired at Morro. The battle was on. The forward turret had already been turned so that the great 12-inch guns pointed directly at the old castle walls, and very soon after the order, with a mighty report and a roar like that of an angry lion, a great projectile flew towards one of the batteries, and then another and another, with such deadly aim that no shots were fired from that battery during the remainder of the engagement.

Then while the big guns smoked, as the eye-witnesses describe it, the 8-inch guns took up the work, and sent their lean projectiles with an eager, whining cry to hunt for Spaniards. The little *Detroit*, unarmored though she was and with only 5-inch guns in her battery, joined in. For days the gunner in charge of a rifle on her quarter deck had carried a tiny flag over the breach of his gun, to the joy of every one who saw it; but he took it down now, rolled it up, shoved it into his shirt, and, bending low over the breech, he looked clear-eyed through the sights, pulled the trigger, and drove a shot straight into the porthole on the face of Morro. In quick succession his ship-mates of the other guns, six clean, 5-inch rifles, followed his lead. The boom of the huge guns had awed, but the sound of these rifles was like the music of "Yankee Doodle" played on a snare drum; and it thrilled the spectators on the non-combatant's boats till they involuntarily shouted aloud for the glory of the flag and the honor of the American gunner.

Then came the *Indiana* with the solemn thunder of her 13-inch volcanoes to take the place of the flagship that, with her stern turret hurling winged death to the fort, was by this time steaming out to sea. Her 8-inch guns took up the cry as well. Indeed, every gun of whatever caliber that would reach from either vessel was engaged.

Soon after our fire began, the forts began to reply vigorously on the squadron. On top of the front wall of Morro and near the west end, stood an old-fashioned gun, under the charge of a man worthy of a better training and of a more generous nation. His was a useless task, for no shot from his old smooth-bore could harm the battleships; but there he stood, aimed, fired, swabbed, loaded, aimed, and fired again, while the shots splashed in the water half-way to the ships, as a rule, though now and then one exploded in the air because the time fuse was short. Never but once did they come near a ship, but save for brief intervals, when the rapid-fire batteries afloat drove him to the bomb-proofs, this Spaniard worked on with delirious energy and spirit.

But there were other guns of a less innocuous character. In the Morro itself were pieces which could not be counted because the smoke kept the wall so obscured. Moreover, they were worked irregularly because the gunners on the American vessels, having rapid-fire cannon, had the range of the embrasures and portholes, and at times made it too uncomfortable for the Spaniards. On the crest just east of Morro and back of the cemetery two 10-inch guns were diligently worked. At the barracks a little further east was another battery, and over at the east end of the town was an old stone fort, its face towards the west, and there were at least four modern rifles of large calibre, and still further east, on a point, were other large guns. All these batteries, save the last, opened on the fleet within five minutes after the first gun from Morro.

But the marksmanship was Spanish. "Never," wrote an eye-witness, "will an American see hostile guns make a more pleasing spectacle than these; for they stood on emplacements forty to sixty feet above the sea on the crest of a hill, whose lower slopes were green and the upper slopes house-covered. The green sea was below and the fleecy trade wind clouds above and behind them. They gleamed like wicked Spanish eyes and then puffed white like Spanish cigarette smoke. The song of the projectile was like the music of the fandango, and

the marksmanship as worthless as Spanish promises. Threaten, puff, splash! Not since modern rifles with gun sights were invented has any one seen such shooting as from these crest batteries. Shot after shot, dozens and scores, and at last the count rose into hundreds, were fired with never a hit, and, indeed, with every shot flying above and beyond huge targets. High as the *New York* stood above the water when she rounded to before Morro, third in the moving line; broad as the *Iowa* lay on the water as she headed the procession, not a shot struck them as they passed before the fort. Even the *Detroit*, lying, perhaps, 1,200 yards from the nearest battery, and too busily engaged firing to think about getting hit, remained wholly untouched. Quite as interesting as the position of the *Detroit* was that of the torpedo boat *Porter*. She was recognized, of course, soon after the engagement became general, and the guns at the eastern end of the island began sending greeting. The gun on the point at the extreme east end of the Spanish works was so placed as to be unable to reach either the *Detroit* or the line of battleships, but it found the *Porter* within easy range, and with deliberation that indicated a sober desire to hit something, the captain worked the piece. He was aided at times by the guns from the higher fort near by, but for hours he kept his eyes on the *Porter*. As a rule, no shot fell more than a half-mile wide of the target, though now and then one would strike as much as a mile short or three-quarters of a mile beyond. At rare intervals a shell would by accident get within 200 or 300 yards, and then Captain Freemont would turn his little 1-pounders loose and fire back as John Paul Jones fired his pistol at British batteries at White Haven."

The marksmanship of the American squadron on the first round was not on the whole up to target records, for while a majority of the shots hit Morro, some fell considerably short, but there was no more of this after the first round. After passing the forts the column turned to the left and made a complete circle. The *Iowa* came in again as the monitors were passing out, so that there was a constant fire. As the

Iowa came down the second time the Spaniards worked their guns with increased fury and with increased wretchedness of aim, until she reached the turning point and once more began her 13-inch practice with the *Indiana* following. Shell after shell passed through or over Morro to land in the city behind it, and many of the Spaniards fled from their guns, while the Americans were as cool as at target practice.

One of the first shots to fall over into the city struck the huge barracks east of Morro, and a cloud of brick-dust rose high in the air, obscuring the building till flames were seen to burst from it. Within ten minutes a half-dozen other shots had fallen elsewhere in the town, and by the time the *New York* had turned out to sea on the second round, as many different fires were seen in the western portion of the city. The forts were now more obscured by the bursting of American shells than by the firing of their own guns, for most of the Spaniards had by this time fled for shelter. The guns at the east of the city, however, continued to work, as they received only occasional attention from the ships.

Meantime, the *Detroit* had turned away to the westward, and, running close under the guns of Morro, attacked a new earthwork built on an island on the west side of the channel. Two 8-inch guns there might have destroyed the cruiser at the first round had they been properly handled, but she ran in to a range of less than 1,000 yards, firing as she went; and the Spaniards scampered away from their great guns. There was no more trouble from that battery. It was an impressive lesson in the effectiveness of rapid-fire guns intelligently and bravely handled. Undoubtedly, the work of the cruisers was risky with such large guns on the forts, and they were then ordered to follow the battleships out, and to stay out after the second round; but they fired as long as they could, and their sailors were evidently disinclined to give up the dangerous sport. The *Porter* also reluctantly withdrew.

A few minutes after seven o'clock the *Iowa* opened fire on the third round, and the others followed in another blaze



IN THE FORWARD TURRET OF THE BATTLESHIP "IOWA" IN ACTION.

of fire and smoke. As the *Iowa* turned away she aimed her last shot at the big fort east of the city and knocked a hole in it. Five guns had been working steadily from this fort, but only two continued after the *Iowa*'s shot, and these were silenced when the *New York* came along and fired her broadsides; but about eight o'clock, just as the *New York* finished, and was setting out to sea, a 6-inch shell from the eastern batteries came aboard over the port quarter, struck the top awning stanchion and exploded in the cutter, which was in the port after-cradle on the superstructure deck. The fragments killed one man and wounded two, all members of the port waist 6-inch gun crew. Parts of the shell went in all directions; the cutter was an absolute wreck, parts of it flying higher than the smoke stack. A searchlight was destroyed and some damage was done to other small boats. At about the same time a 10-inch shell struck a gallows frame on the *Iowa* and burst, hurling fragments in all directions, slightly wounding several sailors. Both these shots were plainly accidental, coming on board at long range and being apparently aimed at vessels which were still nearer in action. No damage was done the *Indiana* nor the monitors, which had maintained a destructive fire during the three rounds, and though shells had burst over them they were not in the least injured.

Admiral Sampson's purpose in attacking the fortifications were, according to his official report to the government, simply to learn their character. "Upon approaching San Juan," he said, "it was seen that none of the Spanish vessels was in the harbor. I was considerably in doubt whether they had reached San Juan and again departed for some unknown destination, or whether they had not arrived. As their capture was the object of the expedition, and as it was essential that they should not pass to the westward, I decided to attack the batteries defending the port in order to develop their position and strength, and then without waiting to reduce the city or to subject it to a regular bombardment, which would require due notice, turned to the westward. I commenced the attack as soon as

it was good daylight. It lasted about three hours, when the signal was made to discontinue the firing, and the squadron stood to the northeast until out of sight of San Juan, when the course was to the westward with a view to communicating with the department at Port Plata and learn if the department had obtained information as to the movements of the Spanish vessels."

Whether Admiral Sampson could have continued the attack and taken the city then is a question which has been disputed, but as he still had Cervera's four armored cruisers and torpedo-boat destroyers to meet he naturally avoided doing anything to weaken his own vessels. It was the general opinion among the officers of the fleet that it would be a difficult matter to reduce the forts with ships alone; but, according to reports which came from San Juan later, they had done much more damage than they supposed, and the Spaniards could not understand why they should have withdrawn, unless they had been compelled to by losses. They were, therefore, inclined to rejoice. Impartial witnesses from San Juan said that several of the large guns in Morro were completely disabled. It is a curious fact, in view of the general understanding of the superiority of smokeless powder, that the Spaniards excused their poor marksmanship on the ground that the Yankee ships were so enveloped in smoke that it was impossible to get a good aim at them.

When one of the monitors ran in close to Morro with her decks awash, the Spanish gunners, occasionally getting a glimpse of her through the smoke her big guns were making, supposed that she had been hit and was sinking, and they set up a great shout of joy. But they were puzzled when the same vessel continued to pour enormous shells into the forts with deadly effect. The loss of life in the city was not great, though considerable damage was done to buildings and a little to shipping.

It is a curious fact that Sampson not only missed the Spanish cruisers he had gone on his long cruise for, but missed

the Spanish war vessels which were supposed to be stationed there. It appears that the troop vessel, *Alfonso XIII.*, had been sent over from Cadiz, and was expected to arrive at Puerto Rico at about the time the Cape Verde vessels did. A few days before Sampson arrived the Spanish men-of-war, *Isabella II.*, *Concho*, and *Ponce de Leon*, had left San Juan eastward to meet the troop ship and conduct her in. She arrived alone, however, the day before the bombardment, having missed the gunboats, which came steaming in shortly after Sampson had finished the bombardment and turned westward.

Some criticism was made of Admiral Sampson for attacking the forts when he knew the fleet he was looking for was not there, and when he had no intention of taking the city. The Spaniards complained that he had bombarded the city without the notice which is customary in war, and they were able to construe the attack and Sampson's withdrawal as a Spanish victory. It seems to be true that the admiral's action contributed nothing towards facilitating hostilities, and it is quite possible that, had he waited outside and out of sight till he had sent scouts in to discover whether the ships were in San Juan harbor, Cervera might have endeavored to make that port after leaving Martinique. Then Sampson would have had the Spanish fleet where he had expected to find it. As it was, he left the forts just as two of his vessels had been struck, left the Spaniards supposing that they had driven him away, and convinced Cervera that it would be wise for him to sail for Cuba while Sampson was waiting for him at Puerto Rico.

CHAPTER XLIII

INCIDENTS ON THE BLOCKADE LINE — FIRST AMERICAN BLOODSHED AT CIENFUEGOS — THE BRAVE AND BLOODY FIGHT OF THE *WINSLOW* AT CARDENAS — SWEEPED BY SHOT AND SHELL.

The Blockade in Early May — The Capture of the *Lafayette* — Recklessness of Some of the American Vessels — Work of Cutting the Cables — Eager Volunteers for a Dangerous Task — Advancing Close to Shore in Launches and Cutters — Fire from the Spanish Masked Batteries — Men Drop at their Oars — Ship's Guns Drive the Spaniards to Shelter — Dead Men in the Cutters — Shelling the Lighthouse — First Adventure of the Torpedo Boat *Winslow* — Laying a Trap for the Spaniards — In a Nest of Red Buoys — A Spanish Trap — Deadly Fire Pours in on the *Winslow* — The *Hudson* to the Rescue — A Fatal Shell — Death of Ensign Bagley and his Men — Terrific Fighting — Brave Act of the *Hudson* — Getting the *Winslow* Out — Spanish Gunboats Disabled — Scattering a Spanish Garrison.

DURING the weeks following the inauguration of the blockade of Cuban ports there was little of incident except the early capture of prizes till attempts were made to cut cables in different ports and to tempt out some of the Spanish gunboats, which timidly remained behind the protection of the forts and mines.

The most important incidents of the blockade during the first week in May were a renewed short bombardment of the fortifications outside of Matanzas and the capture and release of the French vessel *Lafayette*, which was boarded, told that a blockade had been established, and forbidden to enter Havana. But as soon as she was released she made all haste for the harbor, and again was brought to and taken as a prize to Key West. The government, however, ordered her immediate release, as the State Department had promised the French embassy to give her a safe conduct, a fact unknown on the blockade line. Thus the danger of arousing French

antagonism was averted. One of the amusing features of the chase for Spanish prizes was the capture of the steamship *Panama* by the little *Mangrove*. The *Panama* was trying to run the blockade and had a valuable cargo. The *Mangrove* happened to fall in with her, and the ridiculous thing about it was that the *Panama's* guns were superior to those of the *Mangrove*, but the latter's commander boldly dashed in and the Spaniard surrendered without firing a shot. At about the same time the *Argonauta*, a Spanish ship with supplies, 100 soldiers, and General de Corlejo and staff, was captured while trying to run the blockade at Cienfuegos by the *Nashville*.

Many of the American vessels had acquired such a contempt for Spanish gunnery from such exhibitions of it as they had seen that they somewhat recklessly ran within close range of some of the fortifications, and as our sailors were brave and eager for action which should distinguish them they welcomed any orders which would take them into the line of danger. One of the tasks devolving upon the blockading fleet as well as upon some of the scouting vessels was the cutting of the various cables which afforded Havana communication with Madrid and the other Cuban ports. In pursuance of this object, an attempt was made on the 11th of May to cut the cables running out of the harbor of Cienfuegos on the south coast to Santiago, which was connected with European lines, an attempt which resulted in the first loss of life among American forces.

The vessels in the neighborhood of Cienfuegos were the cruiser *Marblehead*, Captain McCalla commanding, the gunboat *Nashville*, and the converted revenue cutter *Windom*. This blockading station had been a quiet one, except for an occasional brush with some Spanish gunboats when venturing down towards the mouth of the harbor, but they always quickly retired when fired upon. Commander McCalla instructed Lieutenant Anderson of his command to call for volunteers to cut the cable early on the morning of the 11th, and practically the whole of the crews of both the *Marblehead* and the *Nashville*, to which the call was confined, expressed an eagerness

to undertake the service, even after a warning that it would be especially dangerous.

"I want you men to understand," said the lieutenant, "that you are not ordered to do this work, and do not have to unless you want to."

But they did want to and, in the end, the lieutenant had the pick of the men on both ships. A cutter containing twelve men and a steam launch containing six were manned from each ship and a guard of marines and men to man the 1-pound guns of the launches were put on board. In the meantime the *Marblehead* took a position 1,000 yards off shore opposite the Colorado Point lighthouse, which is on the east side of the narrow entrance to Cienfuegos's harbor and just to the east of the cable landing, and with the *Nashville* a little further to the west began shelling the beach, which at that point is low and covered with a dense growth of high grass and weeds. The lighthouse stands on an elevation behind which, hidden in the long grass, were known to be a large number of rifle pits, and some masked machine and 1-pound guns. These the Spaniards deserted as fast as the ships' fire reached them, and, as their answering fire slackened and died out, the boats were ordered in shore.

Advancing in double column, the launches under Lieutenant Anderson and Ensign McGruder of the *Nashville* went ahead with their sharpshooters and gunners looking eagerly for targets, and were followed by the cutters with the grappling irons out, their men peering into the green water for a sight of the cable. At a distance of 200 feet from shore the launches stopped, and the cutters worked ahead, covered as far as possible by the launches. The first cable was picked up about ninety feet off shore, but no sooner had the work of cutting it begun than the Spanish fire was renewed, the soldiers skulking back to their deserted rifle pits and rapid-fire guns through the high grass. The launches replied to this fire, and the fire from the ships quickened. But, though the Spanish fire slackened momentarily, every now and then it became stronger.

The men in the boats succeeded in cutting the first cable and coolly proceeded to grapple for the next. Meantime, the Spaniards were firing low in an evident endeavor to sink the cutters, but many of their shots fell short. The second cable was finally grappled. Several men were kept at the oars to hold the cutters in position, and the first man wounded in the fire was one of these. No one else in the boat knew it, however, till he fainted in his seat from loss of blood. Others took the cue from this and there was never a groan or complaint from the two boats as the bullets, coming thicker and faster, began to bite the flesh every now and then. The men simply possessed themselves in patience and went on with their work with not even the satisfaction of being able to return the Spanish fire. But the marines in the stern of the boat kept their guns busy. Again and again they expressed approval as the living targets their sights had covered dropped.

The second cable was finally cut, and the third, a smaller one, was grappled and hoisted to the surface. The fire of the Spaniards had reached its maximum; it was estimated that 1,000 rifles and guns were speaking, and the men who handled them grew incautious and exposed themselves here and there.

"Use shrapnel," came the signal for the ships, and then can after can exploded over the Spaniards, who broke and ran to cover, a sort of fortification behind the lighthouse, and to this place they dragged a number of the machine guns and again opened fire on the cutters. This fire could not be answered so well from the launches, and the encouraged Spaniards fired the more rapidly. Man after man in the boats was hit, but not one let a sound escape him. Like silent machines they worked, grimly hacking and tearing at the third cable. For a half-hour they had worked on it, but the fire from behind the lighthouse was becoming too deadly, and, reluctantly, at Lieutenant Anderson's signal, the cable was dropped and the boats retreated.

The work had lasted two hours and a half, two men lay dead in the cutters, two were fatally wounded, and four seri-

ously so. The loss among the Spaniards was much greater. As the boats withdrew, the *Windom* was ordered in to shell the lighthouse, which had not been fired on before according to the usages of international law, though it had been used as a shelter by the Spaniards. The revenue boat's rapid-fire guns quickly riddled it, and soon a shell from a 4-inch gun struck it fair and toppled it over. With the collapse of their protection the Spaniards scampered away to escape the screaming shrapnel.

On the day following, or the day on which Admiral Sampson was shelling the forts of San Juan, a similar and somewhat more bloody engagement occurred on the opposite side of the Cuban coast. In the bay of Cardenas there were three Spanish gunboats, which the Americans hoped to capture, but their commanders carefully kept them out of reach within the harbor. On the 8th the torpedo boat *Winslow* had been ordered to steam in and, if possible, entice the gunboats within reach of the United States gunboat *Machias*. The little torpedo boat steamed boldly into the channel, where the *Machias*, drawing more water, could not go, and succeeded in rousing one of the Spanish gunboats, whereupon the *Winslow* hurried back, followed by the Spaniard. At the same time the enemy at the signal station on Chalupa Key, thinking an opportunity was offered for overcoming the two American vessels signaled to two other gunboats to come out. The little *Winslow* fired sixty rounds from her 1-pounders and succeeded in getting one of the Spanish gunboats far enough out so that the *Machias* hit her with a 6-pounder. This was too much for the courage of the Spaniards, and they put back into the harbor, while from the shore a small submarine mine was exploded near the torpedo boat, but not sufficiently near to do any damage.

But this little affair whetted the appetites of the Americans for a better chance at the gunboats, and plans were laid to force them out. The Spaniards, evidently mistrusting that the attempt would be made, laid traps of their own, by placing concealed batteries along the shore of the entrance at night, while the operation could not be discovered by the blockading fleet.

Early on the morning of the 12th, while the *Winslow* was coaling from the gunboat *Wilmington*, Commander Merry of the *Machias*, the senior officer of the station, conferred with the other officers as to cutting out the Spanish gunboats, and the *Winslow*, with the revenue cutter *Hudson*, was ordered to sound the little-used channel between the Romero and Blanco Keys. The other channels into the harbor were known to be mined, but this third was sounded and dragged, and found to be safe and deep enough for all except the *Machias*. When this was reported to the *Wilmington* it was resolved to make the attempt in the afternoon. Therefore, at about one o'clock the three vessels started up the bay, the *Winslow* to the east, the *Wilmington* in the center, and the *Hudson* to the west. When about a mile and a half from the city one of the Spanish gunboats could be plainly seen lying alongside the wharf amid a lot of shipping.

The *Winslow* was ordered by Commander Todd of the *Wilmington* to run in and cut out this gunboat with the heavier guns of the other American vessels to protect her from the distance. So Lieutenant Bernadou of the *Winslow* ordered his little vessel ahead, while the *Hudson* followed some distance behind. There was no thought of real danger, for no batteries were supposed to exist at that point. When within 2,000 yards of the longed-for prize the men on the *Winslow* noticed bobbing about them a number of red buoys which were supposed to mark the channel, but in reality they were range buoys which had been put there for the guidance of the masked batteries on a jutting point a little to the left of where the Spanish gunboats lay, and suddenly these guns, six 10-pounders, opened fire.

The gallant little crew on the *Winslow* were taken entirely by surprise. The very first shot struck among the buoys near them, and the next went through the bow of the boat, setting a paint locker on fire. Then they came thick and fast, churning the water about them into a foam.

The Spanish trap had caught its victim; the decoy gun-

boat had lured the brave little fighter to the very point where the Spaniards had deliberately calculated the range. It was then a fight to the death, and the three little 1-pounders of the torpedo boat, whose steel shell was but a quarter of an inch thick, began to pour their missiles into the shore and into the gunboat, which had also opened fire ahead of them.

But it was a sadly unequal contest. Again and again shells crashed into the little *Winslow*. One went through the top of the forward conning tower, a fragment or a splinter striking the brave commander of the little craft just below the groin in the right leg. He tied a towel about the wound and went on with his duties. Another shell cut the wheel ropes, and knocked the wheel from the helmsman's hands. At that moment a water-tender came up from below and reported that a shell had pierced the forward boiler. It had exploded in the boiler, destroyed seventy of the tubes, thrown open the doors, and filled the boiler-room with steam and dust. Steam was already pouring from the hatches, and the men were coming up from below. Another shot wrecked the port engine. Others struck the deck, cut steampipes, went through the smoke pipe, and disabled the forecastle gun. But the brave men kept firing away with their remaining 1-pounders. Help was coming, for the *Hudson* was steaming ahead at full speed, and the *Wilmington's* 4-inch guns were dropping shells into the murderous battery ashore.

So far, although the *Winslow* had been completely disabled, not a man had been killed in the terrible rain of shot and shell. Amidships near the ammunition stand was Ensign Bagley calling down to the engineer to back and go ahead with the one remaining engine in an effort to spoil the Spanish aim. All the electrical contrivances had been wrecked, so orders had to go by word of mouth, while the screeching shells were filling the air about them. By the ensign were standing a half-dozen of his crew. Then came the fatal shell. It struck the hose reel on the deck a little aft of midship, glanced, and exploded. The *Hudson* was then so close that her crew

could plainly hear the words of the brave men as they went to their death.

"Save me! Save me!" shouted one poor fellow, whose face was partly torn away, as he staggered back and nearly fell into the sea. Someone reached an arm to him, caught him by a leg, pulled him back, and laid him on the deck dead. Ensign Bagley threw his hands into the air, tottered forward, and fell against the signal mast, around which he clasped his arm and sank slowly down in a heap. They did not know he was dead until they went to carry him below.

Two others were killed outright, an oiler and fireman. Two others, a fireman and a cook, were so badly injured that they died within an hour. They had come up on deck to see the fight. Had they staid below, they might have escaped.

The *Hudson* had by this time reached a position to extend aid to the *Winslow*. Her gunners were doing nobly, indeed, while in that trying position endeavoring to get the *Winslow* out, her guns fired 135 rounds in a half-hour. Barring a few scratches, none of her men were hurt, though the water about them was continually lashed by shells. "Every man and boy on board," said one of the *Hudson's* gunners afterwards, "acted with coolness, and placed each shot just right, until the time when trying to get the *Winslow* in tow, and the fatal shot fell in the group about Ensign Bagley. Then they cried and yelled, and the way the shells flew into the guns was terrible. It was a wonder the shell man's hands were not cut off by the way No. 2 threw the breech lock in and out. The gun became so hot it could not be touched. Cartridges began to jamb, and they were pushed in by main strength."

A long line was thrown from the *Hudson* to the *Winslow* and made fast, but the latter being disabled would not tow easily, and as the *Hudson* backed away the line parted. Another line was made fast after twenty minutes' work, under the constant fire of the enemy. This line held, but still the *Winslow* would not tow because she could not be steered, and at last the *Hudson* made fast alongside.

Though crippled and bloody, the little torpedo boat was still able to fight, and, with flag flying, and her two remaining guns puffing away at the enemy, she was dragged away. The *Hudson* was fighting fiercely as she had been all the time. The bravery of her captain and crew in rescuing the *Winslow* from her perilous position was unsurpassed even by that of the men on the torpedo boat.

The *Wilmington*, in the meantime, had played havoc with the city of Cardenas. By the time the smaller vessels were in safety, the town along the shore was on fire; the Spanish gunboats also caught fire, and soon the shore batteries ceased to answer the *Wilmington's* guns. Many of their guns were wrecked and their artillerymen were killed.

When the firing ceased, Lieutenant Bernadou signaled to the *Wilmington*. "Many killed and wounded. Send boat."

A surgeon at once put off in a boat and took the wounded into it. Among them was the cook, terribly mutilated, but brave, and while his comrades were rowing him across the bay from one ship to the other, he died with these last words: "Tell them I died like a man."

Another wounded man died soon after, being put aboard the *Wilmington*. Of the crew of twenty-one men, five were killed and five were wounded.

While all this was going on in the bay, the *Machias* was knocking to pieces the signal station on Diana Key, where there was a blockhouse and a small battery. This was two miles southwest of where the vessels entered the bay. The Spaniards fled to the mainland and Commander Merry sent a boat crew ashore on the key, and, having searched the blockhouse and found a quantity of arms and some official papers of the Spanish commandant, they set it on fire. The American flag was unfurled from the key and remained there undisturbed.

The Spanish reports, of course, claimed the day as a victory, and the Cardenas garrison was warmly congratulated by Blanco and eulogized at Madrid. The usual complaint was

made as to the town being fired on without a notice, but in this case the fire was abundantly justified. Notwithstanding the loss of life and the damage to the *Winslow*, it was really an American victory, for the Spanish gunboats were disabled by the fire, and one of them was made a hopeless wreck.

The lesson of the day was a rather wholesome one, in that it made the blockading fleet more cautious. Torpedo boats were not intended to run in under the heavy guns of hostile shores, and there had already been much criticism of the unnecessary daring displayed by the commanders of these frail craft about Cuban shores. After some of the larger vessels were withdrawn from the blockade about the north shore to join Admiral Sampson in his cruise to Puerto Rico, the Spanish gunboats at Cardenas had become venturesome in the face of the smaller craft left. They had interfered with the reconnoitering of the United States vessels, and it was thought that their capture or destruction would be of decided benefit. This was happily accomplished by a brave, but bloody, deed.

During the second week in May an attempt was made to put a large quantity of arms and ammunition into the hands of the insurgents, one of our daring army officers having secretly made his way to the insurgent headquarters and arranged for a meeting place. The expedition sailed in the steamer *Gussie*, under Captain Dorst, with two companies of United States regulars, and a landing place was made west of Cardenas bay under the protection of the gunboats. Evidently, the Spanish forces had received warning of the expedition, for when our soldiers landed a lively fight ensued, and the enemy were driven back with considerable loss, while our soldiers were uninjured. But the insurgents failed to put in an appearance, and our forces finally re-embarked and returned to Key West.

CHAPTER XLIV

CHASING CERVERA'S FLEET—DAYS OF EXCITEMENT AND UNCERTAINTY—SAMPSON AND SCHLEY AT KEY WEST AND CERVERA AT SANTIAGO.

Cervera Raises another Question for the Strategists — Schley Receives Orders to Leave Hampton Roads — Cervera Reported at Curaçoa — He Seeks Coal and Supplies — Sampson a Day's Sail from Santiago — More Days of Uncertainty — Cervera and Sampson Both Sailing in the Same Direction — Sampson and Schley Arrive at Key West and Cervera at Santiago — Cervera's Luck as a Dodger — How He Entered Santiago while our Scouts Were Away — Schley Hurries to the South Coast of Cuba — Unaware of Cervera's Arrival at Santiago — Schley Prepares to Attack Cervera at Cienfuegos — Finds Cervera is not There and Pushes on to Santiago — Doubt as to Whether Cervera is Really There — Sampson Turns Back — Schley Steams up before Santiago.

THE authentic information that Cervera's ships were in the waters of Martinique settled for the time the question of where he was, but raised another as to what port he was bound for. How soon this country would have received information of his arrival in the West Indies had not Captain Cotton's auxiliary cruiser, the *Harvard*, injured her machinery and put in to a Martinique port for repairs is uncertain, but as it was the United States did not receive official information till some hours after Cervera had taken on board some required supplies and a full complement of advices and departed. Although Captain Cotton's dispatch was delayed for some reason for twenty-four hours, it was officially denied by the French government of that island that it had been unfairly detained. The problem presented by Captain's Cotton's dispatch, which arrived near midnight of the 12th, constituted a very fascinating strategic puzzle, and the navy strategists were credited with a rather sleepless night.

To the best of their information, Admiral Sampson was cooling his guns somewhere off San Juan, which is about 520 miles from Martinique, 1,100 from Havana, and 700 from Santiago. Commodore Schley was still in Hampton Roads, where he had been impatiently waiting with steam up for nearly a month; he was over 1,000 miles from the Cuban coast and about 1,000 miles further from Martinique than Sampson; Commodore Watson was about Havana and the other blockaded ports of Cuba with the smaller unarmored craft which Sampson had left him, and which was no match for Cervera's armored cruisers and large guns.

The general opinion of the naval strategists was that Cervera had left Martinique with the intention of either proceeding along the southern route to Cuba, putting in at Santiago or Cienfuegos, hoping to catch some of the weaker blockading vessels there, or of moving through the Windward Passage between Cuba and the island of Haiti to strike the blockading fleet on the northern coast of Cuba. It was not thought that he would run to San Juan, though he, doubtless, would have done so had he not heard of Sampson. Cervera's ships were all fast and hampered only by the torpedo-boat destroyers, which might have to stop to be coaled, and it was calculated that he could probably reach Cienfuegos by the evening of the 15th, or the blockading vessels on the north by the morning of the 16th. He might reach Santiago the 14th, but little thought was given to that port. Admiral Sampson's fleet was, on the other hand, slow, unless he should leave the monitors behind. As Cervera had already started and would be nearly two days out before the government had the good fortune to get word to Sampson, it was not probable that the latter would catch Cervera unless he happened to run upon him. Schley's squadron hardly deserved the name of flying squadron, as it was hampered by the battleship *Massachusetts*, which could make but about thirteen knots an hour, but it might reach the north coast of Cuba at about the time Cervera would arrive there, supposing that was his purpose.

In this state of affairs, the authorities promptly abandoned the plan for the immediate dispatch of a large expedition to Cuba. As that had been hurried forward on the supposition that Cervera had returned to Cadiz, there was a good reason for not hurrying when the Spaniard was somewhere in the West Indies, and neither American squadron was near Cuba. Early on the morning of the 13th Sampson's dispatch from St. Thomas telling of the San Juan bombardment and of the non-appearance of Cervera there reached the naval board, which immediately returned to the waiting *Yale* information of the appearance of Cervera, who might at that moment be steaming through the Caribbean within 200 miles of Sampson. With this startling information and instructions the *Yale* hurried back after Sampson's squadron, which was well off the coast of Haiti. Early that same morning sailing orders were sent to Commodore Schley, whose sailors jumped with joy when told that their long idleness was over, and that evening, the 13th, the squadron was off southward with instructions to call the government up at Charleston. Then the government waited with the most intense interest and some anxiety while the problem was figured out in various ways by the people of the country. "Extras" appeared with rumors of big battles and heavy cannonading heard at sea, but for some hours the public was in complete ignorance, not simply as to Cervera's whereabouts, but as to those of Sampson and Schley.

Assuming that Cervera had been fully informed at Martinique of the location of the American squadrons, his best policy would seem to have been to have sailed direct for either Santiago or Havana, the latter if he had been disposed to inflict any damage on our blockading fleet while the armored vessels of the United States were away. With a start of over 200 miles he would have stood a fair chance to have broken the blockade about Havana, and even if Schley caught him in the act of breaking it, Cervera had four armored ships to Schley's three. If the Spanish admiral was informed of the speed of Sampson's squadron he must have seen that his chances of

getting through the Windward Passage before Sampson could arrive there were excellent. But Cervera's movements were evidently directed from Madrid and it was the apparent purpose of the Spanish government to as long as possible postpone the operations of the United States against Havana by diverting attention to other points till the rainy season approached, for in that season the difficulties of offensive action were greatly increased, while the advantages of defensive action were correspondingly increased. On the other hand, the United States authorities desired to prevent Cervera from getting under the strong guns of Havana.

Whatever his purpose or the purpose of his government, Cervera was on the 14th reported at the Dutch island of Curaçao, which is about 500 miles further west than Martinique, but three degrees further south, indeed, it is about fifty miles from the coast of Venezuela. On the same day Sampson, returning westward along the north coast of Haiti, and making the best time possible, having left the monitors behind, sent the torpedo boat *Porter* into the harbor of Puerto Plata, San Domingo, for news, but the government not being certain then as to the location of Cervera, the *Porter* put in the next day at Cape Haitien, about a hundred miles further westward. By this time the reports were that Cervera's ships were surely and still at Curaçao taking on coal and supplies.

On the evening of the same day Schley's fleet arrived off Charleston, S. C., or less than half the distance from Hampton Roads to Havana. Running into a fog soon after departing, the squadron had made but nine knots. Dispatches had been sent to him at Charleston and were taken out to him on a revenue cutter, so that there was a delay of only an hour, and as night fell the squadron was cruising on southward.

It was certain by this time that Cervera could not reach Commodore Watson's fleet about Havana before Commodore Schley did. Assuming that Cervera intended to make for a Cuban port, it was calculated that he could hardly cruise through the Windward Passage to the north coast without

being in danger of encountering Sampson, and he could hardly pass westward through the Yucatan channel without encountering Schley, though it was possible for him to pass either fleet at some distance away without being detected, even though both American commanders made the best use of their scouts.

It seems to be clear that Cervera's fleet was in a bad way; at least he desired to pick up all the coal and supplies he could before making for a Cuban port. He had asked permission from the Dutch governor to bring his whole fleet into the harbor for coal and provisions. The United States consul had protested, though in doubt at first, considering that it might be best to allow them to come in while Washington had a longer time to plan the capture. The governor had finally decided that he would allow two of the vessels to come in for necessary provisions, and at noon of the 14th the *Maria Teresa* and the *Vizcaya* dropped anchor in the harbor. The other vessels were two and a half miles out.

The consul set about learning all he could concerning the condition of the Spanish squadron, and heard that they were so short of rations that the officers had been living on beans for four days, and the crew had been put on half rations. The vessels stood very high out of the water, indicating that they were short of coal. The torpedo-boat destroyer *Terror* had been left behind at Martinique for repairs.

The Spanish officers started at once to get in all the coal and provisions they could, but all the fuel to be had was 300 tons of slack coal, condemned by the Dutch government, and it had been lying there for about two years waiting for a purchaser. They took this and an enormous stock of provisions, all to the value of \$16,000, which they were required to pay in gold or drafts on London. All day Sunday they worked loading up. Towards night a cable dispatch was received by the Spanish officers, and they began to make preparations for immediate departure. They got away at 6 o'clock in an evident hurry, for they left two lighter loads of coal and some

provisions they had purchased behind. They left behind also a story that they were bound for Puerto Rico. It transpired afterwards, according to Admiral Cervera's reports, that this cablegram came from General Blanco, ordering Cervera to hurry at once to the port of Santiago. Apparently alarmed by the approach of Schley's squadron, Blanco considered Santiago the best port for Cervera to hide in while taking on supplies. Cervera thought otherwise and disliked the order.

On the same day, therefore, and indeed at about the same hour, that Sampson left Cape Haitien westward, and Schley left Charleston southward, Cervera left Curaçoa, and, according to reports, westward. Thus Sampson was about 500 miles from Cervera; Schley about 1,500. Sampson and Schley were each about 600 miles from Havana; Cervera nearer 1,000. Cervera was about 600 miles from Santiago; Sampson only about 200, and Schley considerably over 1,000 by either route. The *Oregon*, though well-nigh forgotten in the excitement of the moment, was actually about where Cervera had been four days before, off the Windward Islands. The public had the impression, and naturally so from this arrangement, that Schley was simply going to the relief of the blockading squadron, the danger to which had been greatly lessened by Cervera's trip to Curaçoa, while Sampson, who had been looking for Cervera for two weeks, and was now so near him, would with little difficulty find the Spaniard and have his desired encounter.

Had Sampson sailed westward a day through the Windward Passage along the south coast of Santiago province, and there quietly dropped his anchor and waited, Cervera would have come sailing directly into his presence. But Sampson appears to have been of the opinion that Cervera intended to make for Havana, and that if he was to have the honor of measuring guns with him he should make haste back for those waters which he had left a fortnight before, in the hopes of meeting Cervera at Puerto Rico. Moreover, in his fruitless cruise he had nearly exhausted his coal,

If Cervera's immediate destination had been Havana, however, he would hardly have lost the opportunity he had of reaching there before either of the American squadrons could have prevented. It was strongly suspected that one of Cervera's objects was to land munitions of war for General Blanco, but this he could accomplish by running into Cienfuegos on the south coast, and joined by railroad with Havana. But, as already related, the cable at Cienfuegos had been cut on the 11th, and that left Santiago as the most available point for him to touch for further advices from Madrid. It would have been natural to suppose, therefore, that he would, on leaving Curaçoa, at least look in at Santiago, although Sampson had his magnificent fighting ships within a day's sail of that port.

Then followed four days of the most exciting uncertainty and rumors of battles. The government advised all its consular offices in West Indian and South American ports to make every investigation possible and report at once any information of the Spanish squadron. Scouts were sent to watch different ports. Admiral Sampson was supposed by some to be lying in wait in the Windward Passage. Schley was supposed to be hurrying about the western end of Cuba to guard the Yucatan channel.

As a matter of fact, both Cervera and Sampson were sailing in the same direction — to the northwest, with Cervera's bows pointed towards Sampson's sterns. On the 17th, while Cervera was in the middle of the Caribbean, Sampson was in the Old Bahama Channel off the north coast of Cuba. On the 18th, when Cervera was sailing between Jamaica and Haiti, Sampson had reached the blockade fleet, where all was well, and the *Oregon* and her consorts were plowing their way westward off Haiti, where Sampson had been five days before. On the afternoon of the 19th Sampson arrived off Key West, where he found Schley, who had arrived from the north that morning. On the 19th also Cervera sent the following message to Madrid:

SANTIAGO, 19.

This morning I have, without incident, entered this port, accompanied by the squadron.

CERVERA.

Had Madrid made a shrewd use of this information, by carefully keeping it a state secret, it is impossible to say when Cervera would have been found. Owing to the conditions of the harbor of Santiago, it was impossible for a ship on the outside to have any idea of what was inside. Cervera had entered a blind pocket unobserved by the enemy, and, if Madrid had kept still, our ships, having not the slightest clue to his whereabouts, might have sailed around the whole Cuban coast and been none the wiser, until, possibly, Cervera saw his opportunity to slip out. But the fact that he had been able to get into a Cuban port without incident was considered at Madrid as too good news to keep. The Minister of Marine immediately called at the residence of Sagasta, and then at the palace to lay the dispatch before the Queen Regent; but her Majesty had retired, and the news was conveyed to her by the Infanta Isabel. The Queen at once dispatched her congratulations to Cervera, and the whole proceeding was given the greatest publicity.

While there was much less cause for rejoicing over Cervera's tactics, as the Madrid authorities seemed to suppose, his remarkable maneuvers could not fail to put Admiral Sampson's trip to Puerto Rico in a somewhat ridiculous light, whether advised by the strategy board or by Sampson himself. Sampson had steamed about 1,150 miles to meet Cervera, who had arrived on time, but a little south of the rendezvous we had anticipated, and then Sampson had steamed 1,150 miles back, covering as many miles, therefore, as Cervera had in crossing the ocean from the Cape Verde Islands. He had emptied his coal bunkers and bombarded San Juan.

The naval strategists, who had become somewhat sensitive over the thoughtless criticisms of their conduct, were not sure whether they should be pleased or otherwise with Cervera's

alleged appearance in Santiago. They could not fail to be a little nervous over his possible escape from that place as soon as he had coaled, for with nearly all the American naval vessels at the other end of Cuba, Cervera had ample opportunity to make another quick movement with his fleet ships, and be out of reach of either Sampson or Schley before either could get to Santiago. The opinion still prevailed that he would endeavor to come to Havana's relief, possibly by sending munitions from Cienfuegos, or, probably, by watching his chance to steam direct to Havana.

It could hardly be said that Cervera's movements were skillful, for he certainly ran the risk of meeting the enemy. He could have had no good reason for supposing that Sampson, who was so near to Santiago, would, by the time he reached those waters, be 1,000 miles away. However inconsequential the Caribbean Sea may look upon the map, it is a large place to dodge in or even to miss a foe in, whether anxious to meet him or not. Cervera, at this stage, was blessed with a rounded measure of good fortune, as may be seen from the fact that he arrived at Santiago at just the time when he could slip in without being observed by our scouts.

The cruiser *St. Louis*, which, under command of Captain Goodrich, had been scouting about West Indian waters since May 1st, had met Admiral Sampson on the 14th, while he was hurrying westward off Haiti, and, receiving orders, had arrived off Santiago on the 18th, without any intimation that Cervera's four armored cruisers were at that time pointed for the same port and not a day's sail away. The *St. Louis's* orders were to cut the cable connecting Santiago and Jamaica. She began the search with the armed tug *Wompatuck*, commanded by Lieutenant Jungen, who had escaped from the *Maine* disaster, at about six o'clock on the evening of the 18th, gradually working nearer the forts at the mouth of the harbor, expecting every moment to draw their fire. About noon, having reached a position less than two miles from Morro, the grapnel caught the cable, and the Spaniards seem to have then dis-

covered the purpose of the Americans, for a battery on Morro opened fire, which was returned by the *St. Louis's* 6-pounders. The engagement became quite fierce and the *St. Louis* was in some danger of the fire from a mortar battery which her guns could not reach; but, fortunately, the cable was brought up and cut in time to allow them to get away uninjured, and that night she steamed off eastward to cut the cable from Guantanamo, about thirty miles east of Santiago, to Mole St. Nicholas, Haiti, a work at which Commander Goodrich was engaged when Cervera slipped into Santiago, and this gave rise to the Spanish report, so joyously received at Madrid, that the American warships had disappeared on Cervera's approach. Had the *St. Louis* and the little *Wompatuck* loitered about Santiago a few hours longer they would have had early information of the whereabouts of Cervera, and possibly more than they could have successfully carried away, in view of their lack of armor and their inferior guns, though they were commanded by skillful and vigilant officers.

Acting upon the news of Cervera's arrival at Santiago, the *Harvard*, which had run into Martinique to repair her machinery, thereby giving to Washington the first official information of Cervera's appearance on this side, as already related, was ordered to go at once to Santiago and watch for the possible departure of the Spanish fleet, so that the government might be informed at once of the fact and his probable course, though the government was by no means sure that Cervera was actually there or even that he had been there, the sources of information being so far entirely Spanish; indeed, as soon as the government at Madrid perceived that our naval board were proceeding to work on the supposition that Cervera was at Santiago, fresh batches of Spanish reports began to arrive, reports that Cervera had departed, that he had been sighted off Costa Rica and even that he had not been at Santiago at all. Nothing was wanting to make it one of the most uncertain and exciting problems of naval strategy, entirely without precedent in history, and, if anything were lacking to give the

finishing touch to the exciting mystery, it was the remarkably varying reports of the movements of the American squadron under the stress of enterprising journalism hampered by the censorship at the convenient cable stations.

When Sampson arrived at Key West on the 19th he found Schley throwing coal into his ships with all the haste possible. As his flying squadron approached Key West he had picked up orders which had been hurried out to him from Washington to prepare with all haste for an immediate cruise. His flag ship *Brooklyn* put at full speed and quickly came to an anchorage and began to take in coal at a rate which astonished even the veterans along the shore. Soon after came the *Texas*, *Massachusetts*, and the torpedo boat *Scorpion* of his squadron — all for coal in a hurry. No dispatches telling of these sudden movements were, of course, allowed to pass the censor, and the public outside of Key West were in entire ignorance of them, while even the sailors had no idea of where they were going, unless it were to reinforce Sampson, who was supposed to be after the enemy somewhere in the Caribbean. But while they were speculating they were surprised to see Sampson's flagship *New York* come rushing into the harbor, also after coal, and the Admiral was so impatient that he sent back the *Dupont* to hurry in the laggards of his squadron. When the last of Sampson's ships dropped anchor, the first of Schley's pointed out for the Cuban coast and vanished in the gathering darkness.

But it should be understood that Schley did not know when he sailed that Cervera had reached Santiago. That information had been reported late in the day, reached Washington soon after Schley had departed in the expectation that he would most probably find Cervera at Cienfuegos, and in the hope that he might find him cruising into the Yucatan channel, and there settle which was the best man.

Admiral Sampson, having now the information which Schley did not possess, again prepared some of his ships for action, and departed with them to the blockade line in

front of Havana, where he spent the 21st and 22d in reassembling his fleet, which came in one by one, starting some of the slower ones on ahead for another cruise eastward. In order to receive the latest news from Washington he waited till Monday morning when, with his fleetier vessels, he started on after those he had sent ahead. During the night the fleet came up to the monitors *Puritan* and *Miantonomoh*, and two torpedo boats which had been sent on ahead, and later in the day others joined, so that it was an imposing array of fighting vessels which lined into the Old Bahama Channel. In the central group, with the flagship *New York*, were the *Indiana*, *Puritan*, *Miantonomoh*, and the torpedo boats; a flying division, composed of the cruisers *New Orleans*, *Montgomery*, and *Marblehead*, formed a group two miles to the north, while the gunboats *Newport*, *Vicksburg*, and *Wasp* steamed along on the south, and the *Wilmington* and *Machias* in the rear.

Meanwhile, Schley, still without any information that Cervera had been reported at Santiago, was making his way around by the longer route through the Yucatan channel, expecting to meet the Spaniard at any moment. Guns were loaded and the men slept at their stations. The east end of Cuba was sighted on the afternoon of the 20th, and shortly afterwards, while bearing through the channel, the squadron felt sure the enemy was at hand. Men were sent to quarters, and the ships were cleared, but the vessels turned out to be friendly. As the squadron approached Cienfuegos early on Sunday morning, Commodore Schley signaled "We will blockade Cienfuegos. Have steam up to-night and be ready for anything. Do not know if enemy is in port."

Just as the flagship passed the promontory at the entrance to the harbor, the rest of the squadron being about two miles off, five shots were fired from the shore. They were apparently rifle shots, but the commodore signaled to clear for immediate action. Everything movable went overboard to the sharks, guns were manned, and up went the battleflags. But as the squadron swung by the mouth of the harbor, nothing

could be seen from the foretops but the masts of three sailing vessels and the gray funnel of a steamer. A small coast steamer came out towards the mouth of the harbor, but quickly turned and hurried back out of sight. Somewhat disappointed, the vessels swung out from the coast, the men were dismissed from the guns, and the battleflags were hauled down. The commodore was not disposed to waste any ammunition in bombardments unless the Spanish fleet were really there.

Whether there or not, Schley could not make certain by a simple reconnoiter, for the topography of Cienfuegos is somewhat similar to that of Santiago. Both harbors have long, narrow entrances, protected by high land, and a whole fleet can lie in the inner harbor and be invisible from the outside. But Schley determined to make sure, and found a way to communicate with some Cubans ashore on the following day. The result was that by the 24th he was satisfied, though disappointed, that Cervera was not there. He dispatched a vessel to the nearest cable station to inform Washington, and headed his ships for Santiago.

Meanwhile, the swift *St. Paul*, which, having arrived at Key West on the 18th, in advance of either Schley's or Sampson's squadrons, and having received orders there to proceed to Cape Haitien, had on the way picked up the *Yale*, and together they reached the cape on the 21st, where the *St. Paul* was ordered to hurry to Santiago to watch for the possible escape of Cervera from Santiago, that is, if he were there. Reaching the waters off Santiago, she fell in with the *Harvard*, which had arrived there shortly after Cervera without seeing him, and the *Minneapolis*, which had been cruising about the Caribbean for several days with similar results. For the next four days, or from the 22d to the 26th, they cruised about the mouth of the harbor hoping to catch a glimpse of what was within, sometimes running in close, and again running far out to sea in the hopes that the Spaniard, if he were there, would be bold enough to show himself. But all their maneuvers were apparently in vain. They could only assure themselves

that if Cervera had gone in there he had not come out while they were there.

As soon as the Washington strategists learned that Schley was approaching Santiago on the south, while Sampson, they were aware, must be about the same distance away on the north, they appear to have become alarmed over the fact that pretty much the whole strength of the fighting navy was concentrating on the eastern end of the island, when they had not the slightest official assurance that Cervera was there at all. The government was not disposed to put any credence in Spanish reports after the Cadiz rumor, and felt anything but sure that the reserve Spanish squadron, under Camara, which had been reported so persistently at Cadiz by Spanish advices, might not be approaching the Atlantic coast at some point or seeking Havana by some out-of-the-way route. With Sampson and Schley both converging on Santiago, therefore, the strategists became alarmed at the serious possibility that either Cervera or Camara might break the blockade and upset all the plans of war.

The result was that Sampson came about again. When night closed in on the 24th, or the day Schley sailed from Cienfuegos, Sampson's magnificent fleet of fifteen vessels was plowing its way eastward off the coast opposite Santiago; when the sun came up on the 25th the fleet was plowing its way along the same coast — but to the westward, back towards Havana, where he arrived at about the same time that Schley steamed up before Santiago's frowning Morro. The unfortunate admiral had steamed another 1,000 miles, about 3,500 in all since May 4th, and again emptied his coal bunkers. The slow-going monitors had been towed back and forth for the service they might render in a battle which could not be brought about, and when at last the battle did come, neither the admiral nor the monitors had a part in it.

CHAPTER XLV

THE HARBOR OF SANTIAGO — ADMIRAL CERVERA'S ALLEGED STRATEGY — COMMODORE SCHLEY MAKES SURE HE HAS THE ENEMY — CERVERA "BOTTLED UP."

A Beautiful Harbor — Morro Castle — Background for Many Bloody Scenes — The Winding Channel and the Bay — Doubt as to Whether Cervera was Actually There — Irrational Movements of the Spanish Admiral — Guided Largely by Necessities — Opportunities which He Refused to Embrace — Evidence of Cervera's Presence in the Harbor — All Doubts Removed — Schley's Attack on the Forts — Cervera's Ships Fire at Random over the Hills — Remarkable Reports from Madrid — Too Late for Falsehoods — Cervera "Bottled Up" — The Government at Once Takes Steps to Send Forces to Santiago — Admiral Sampson Arrives Back at Key West and Prepares to Join Schley — The Monitors Left Behind — Remarkable Trip of the *Oregon* — Thirteen-Thousand-Mile Run and then to Battle — Admiral Sampson Takes Command — Organizing the Army — Found Unprepared at the Last Moment — The Departure at Last.

THE harbor of Santiago has often been called one of the most beautiful in the world, but it must be admired from the inside, not from without. Approaching from the sea, it is utterly impossible to make out the mouth of the entrance even from comparatively close quarters. A long range of high and steep mountains seem to make an impenetrable front. But coming near the coast a rift appears in the ramparts, disclosing a passage only 180 yards wide, with a picturesque castle on the eastern bluff, a relic of the sixteenth century. Like Havana and San Juan, Santiago has its Morro, but it antedates all others. It is an antique, yellow, Moorish-looking stronghold, with crumbling honey-combed battlements and queer little flanking turrets, grated windows, and shadowy towers. Built upon the face of a lofty dun-colored rock, upon whose precipitous side the fortifications are terraced, the light and shade formed by the time-stained walls make a strikingly artistic picture. A flight of well-worn

steps winds from the water's edge up the side of the grim old walls, while the moat, drawbridge, and other surroundings make up the charming picture, more suggestive of the days of gallant knights and imprisoned maidens than of modern sea-coast fortifications.

It was a formidable defense in the days of the buccaneers, but its old guns have lain there in the sun, wind, and rain of the tropics for years and years, and for as many years Morro has been little used except as a prison for political offenders. Those who visited Santiago before the war with the United States could, as they sailed past its frowning walls, see pallid faces at the grated windows; but prisoners generally remained there but a short time. They were either taken out on the ramparts, shot, and thrown into the sea, as the morning sun streamed along the picturesque shore, or were carried off to the African penal colonies. Old Morro has been the background for many a bloody scene in the pages of Spain's history of bloodshed and torture.

On the mountain to the left of the entrance is the Castle La Socapa, also presenting a very picturesque appearance, while a little further inland and on Morro's side is a small fortification resembling a star in shape, and for that reason called the *Batteria de la Estrella*. Still further in to the left is a little island, on the hillside of which is built the hamlet of Cayo Smith, of late years patronized by the best families of Santiago as a watering place. Then comes a narrow winding channel, a mile in length, between the mountains and broad meadows covered with rank verdure, cocoanut groves, and little fishing hamlets. Thrifty laurels, palms with their graceful plumes of foliage, and banana trees line the way, while here and there upon the banks appears a pleasant country house in the midst of a pretty garden of flowering shrubs. Then a sharp angle in the hills is passed, from which look the guns of the Punta Gorda battery, and the broad sheltered bay of Santiago lies in full view, with the quaint rambling old city on a hillside at the northern end.

It was in this unique harbor that were fought many bloody battles in the old days; here was the three-days contest between a French corsair and Spanish vessel, related in an early chapter; here, too, was brought the *Virginus*, and here were slain the members of her crew; in these regions began the Cuban struggle for independence, and here it was that the United States, because of Cervera's alleged strategy, was to first plant its flag.

For, as a matter of fact, Cervera *was* at Santiago, and as a matter of fact, also, no one in the United States was sure of it. Neither was Schley sure of it as his ships steamed in from Cienfuegos and lay off the narrow mouth of the tortuous harbor, rolling in the swell of the glistening Caribbean. The Cadiz fleet, moreover, was really at Cadiz, though the dispatches from Cadiz said it was off for the Philippines, and the dispatches from Madrid said it was off for the West Indies, and other dispatches from sources which were usually regarded more reliable, reported a large Spanish squadron off the New England coast. The only reasons thus far for believing that Cervera was at Santiago were the reports from Madrid, and these were considered at Washington as excellent reasons for believing that he was not there, till Madrid began to report that he was not there. That seemed to strengthen the possibility that he was there, and official opinion, or a part of it, veered that way. Another reason for thinking he was there was the fact that he had not been seen elsewhere, which was a very unsatisfactory reason in view of the fact that the Caribbean is a large sea and the Atlantic is a large ocean. One of the main reasons for believing that he was not there was that Cervera could hardly be so foolish as to pocket himself in such a harbor, for with but a small part of the American fleet before its mouth, he could not possibly escape except under the most disastrous disadvantages. His ships would be compelled to emerge singly and they could be attacked and destroyed singly.

Assuming that Cervera had brought his armor-clad vessels over for the practical purpose of fighting, his entrance into

Santiago was deemed a reckless or irrational move, but his continuing there for a week without anything to bar his way except two or three converted merchantmen and liners, was considered inexplicable, and, therefore, improbable. Spain was manifesting considerable elation over the notion that her fleet was accomplishing great things. Some of the expert nautical critics of Europe wrote learnedly of the way Spain was out-maneuvering us. Cervera acquired a brief reputation as a strategist, when, as a matter of fact, he does not seem to have been able to exercise sufficient option to make strategy possible. The reduced conditions of his supplies compelled him to adopt a certain course, and its effect upon the Washington strategists was largely incidental. He had steamed from Martinique to Curaçoa and from Curaçoa to Santiago, and it was due more to his good fortune for the time than to any strategy he exercised that every American vessel in those waters happened to miss him. Guided largely by his necessities, he acquired the reputation of an artful dodger, much to the disparagement of his reputation as a brave fighter; for it was fair to suppose that he had brought his armored vessels over here to fight, not to incapacitate them in a land-pocket; and had he had the inclination to fight, the favorable opportunities were not lacking. In view of the swiftness of his vessels, he could readily have engaged either Sampson or Schley while separated, and especially Sampson, who was laboriously towing monitors back and forth through the Bahama channel. How he would have come out of such a fight with either of the American commanders, it is impossible to say, but if he stood any chance at all of success it was in taking the American naval forces when separated. But these opportunities, which chance afforded him, he took good care not to embrace even after he had entered the harbor of Santiago, "without incident"; for eight days his exit was opposed only by ships, all of which any one of his cruisers, properly handled, could have sunk, if they had ventured any opposition. There was coal at Santiago, as it turned out, and he could in two days

have filled his bunkers. With his four fast cruisers he could have run to Puerto Rico while Sampson was running to Key West; having coaled at San Juan he could have run back to Cuban waters, or, possibly, have intercepted the *Oregon*, which he could not fail to know must by this time be approaching Cuban waters. But, for some reason, which must, perhaps, remain a mystery until some future historian has the privilege of delving among the archives of the Spanish government, Cervera remained in the trap as if indifferent to the possibility of its closing upon him. As a good sailor he must have known that on the 27th, when the lookouts on the forts saw Schley's squadron steaming by the entrance to the harbor, the trap had closed. It seems probable that Cervera had really intended to send out a couple of vessels for the attack upon the unarmored scouts, for the log of the *Cristobal Colon* shows that the vessels moved down to the mouth of the harbor on the 25th, and on the 27th, as Schley steamed by he saw through his glasses at least one vessel, which he took for a member of Cervera's fleet, the *Cristobal Colon* having a peculiar construction, a military mast between the smoke pipes.

"He will never get home again," Schley is reported to have remarked as he took his glasses from the tell-tale mast; but while the American commodore was pretty well satisfied himself that he had the Spaniard in a pen, he needed more evidence to convince the strategists at Washington, or Sampson, who had arrived back off Havana. There was the possibility that even if one or two of the enemy's vessels was in the harbor the others might be elsewhere; that Cervera had left them there as a decoy, and gone elsewhere, possibly to effect a junction with the Cadiz fleet, whose real whereabouts appeared to be as uncertain as anything in this life, and with the intention of dropping on the blockade line when all the American fighting vessels had concentrated before the Santiago decoy. The authorities were taking no chances with the wily Spaniard, who seemed to be enjoying a reputation he did not in the least deserve. But by the 28th Schley was able to report to Wash-

ington that he had made out three of Cervera's fleet in the lower part of the harbor, and Washington began to make its plans accordingly.

Schley, however, manifested a disposition to have it out with the enemy then and there if possible. On Sunday, the 29th, or the day when his first dispatches reached Washington, he ordered the *Marblehead* to run in close to Morro in order to see as far as possible into the winding entrance. The cruiser started, and as she approached within range of Morro's guns, she was going at a speed which would have required far better marksmanship than the Spaniards had yet displayed to hit her. She kept a course that carried her well clear of the shoal water which extends from Morillo Point, and, as she went by the entrance, those aboard of her obtained a fair view of the harbor nearly as far as Punta Gorda, and caught a further glimpse of Spanish cruisers. To make assurance doubly sure, Commodore Schley had the benefit of the services of Lieutenant Blue, who went ashore, and, without guard, bravely worked his way to high ground, till he was enabled to secure a full view of the harbor, and to clearly see the four Spanish cruisers and two torpedo boats. He returned from his dangerous trip unharmed. It was one of the most daring and successful deeds of the war. All doubt having been removed, Commodore Schley determined to draw the fire of the forts in order to discover their position and the locality of any masked batteries, and also, if possible, to draw out Cervera. If he had crossed the ocean with the desire of fighting for his country, Schley determined to gratify it.

At noon of the 31st the Commodore left his flagship *Brooklyn*, which was coaling from the collier *Merrimac*, two miles out to sea, where lay also most of the other vessels occupied in routine duties, and hoisted his flag from the battleship *Massachusetts*, which soon headed for the entrance of the harbor, followed by the cruiser *New Orleans* and the battleship *Iowa*. Near the mouth of the channel could be seen the *Cristobal Colon*, lying with her port broadside towards the

American ships, and flying an immense ensign. The Spaniards had their awnings up fore and aft, and the crew were moving lazily about the decks, apparently taking the movement of the American ships for another parade by the forts, such as had taken place before. Behind the *Cristobal Colon* could also be distinguished the *Vizcaya* and the *Almirante Oquendo*, while close by were the destroyers *Pluton* and *Furor*.

As the *Massachusetts* passed the entrance she opened fire upon the *Cristobal Colon*, using her forward 8-inch guns on the port side and her 13-inch rifles. The Spanish cruisers and four batteries, two on the east side of the entrance, one on the west, and one on Cayo Smith, began to reply. Some of the guns on the batteries were 10 and 12-inch Krupps, and the fire on both sides was so well sustained and the reverberations were so thrown back by the mountains that hardly an interval in the roar could be distinguished. Both sides showed bad judgment in getting the range, as the American ships made their first manuever past the fortifications, but on the second round the Americans showed a decided improvement, and ancient Morro was struck again and again, each shell tearing great rents in the yellow walls and sending skyward masses of masonry, which had lain undisturbed for three centuries. The Spanish artillerymen also began to show a surprising accuracy of aim on the second round. Several of their shells burst over the *Iowa*, and three fell dangerously near the *New Orleans*. The Spanish vessels seemed to be firing over the hills at random, but they did not venture out. After the cannonading had lasted for a half-hour three of the batteries ceased firing, having been badly demolished, and a few minutes later the American ships desisted and worked contentedly away. But the *Cristobal Colon* and the battery on the western shore kept up a weak and harmless fire for about twenty minutes longer. Altogether, the firing lasted less than an hour, but it satisfied Schley still further of the presence of the Spanish cruisers near the mouth of the harbor. One of the shells of the *Iowa* had struck the *Cristobal Colon* and started a fire, which was, how-

ever, quickly extinguished. The latter fired the last shot, and the Spanish reports claimed in the customary manner that the Americans had been driven off. Señor Aunon, Minister of Marine, declared in the Senate that the news was a good augury for further victories that would be gained by the courage and merit of the Spanish sailors, and the Senate unanimously adopted an expression of satisfaction at the striking victory gained by the Spanish fleet. Thus were the exigencies of domestic politics in Spain met. But what was more remarkable was the official information from Madrid the same day that only the *Cristobal Colon*, which was repairing her boilers, was at Santiago, the others had gone!

But the time for manuevering under cover of false reports had passed. Satisfied of the correctness of Schley's reports, the United States government was already preparing for the campaign. The troops which had been hurried to the southern ports two weeks before in the expectation of striking at Havana, were now to be headed for Santiago. Cervera had changed our plans of invasion by allowing himself to be, in the popular expression of the day, “bottled up.” Finding ample field for the exercise of his genius, the cartoonist represented the Spaniard in traditional garb crouching at the bottom of a bottle, labeled “Santiago Preserves,” while over the mouth of the bottle hung Uncle Sam's old beaver hat, and Uncle Sam himself, resting after a long and somewhat arduous chase, was seated close by, looking contentedly at the agonized Spaniard within.

Admiral Sampson, having arrived back to Key West at about the time Commodore Schley had assured Washington of the presence of the Spanish ships in Santiago harbor, he at once made preparations for joining Schley and taking command of the naval operations. But in this trip he left the monitors behind. Having been helped back and forth in search of Cervera, these unfortunate vessels were in the end denied the opportunity of showing their efficiency in a real naval battle, while the *Oregon*, which had been steaming for

three months, and had arrived at Key West a little ahead of Admiral Sampson, was destined to proceed at once to the scene of operations and take a glorious part in the destruction of Cervera's fleet. Her cruise and successful arrival excited the admiration of the world. It spoke volumes for the efficiency of a battleship which could make a 13,000 mile run, throw in fresh coal, and steam off ready for battle without even stopping to tighten a crank pin. Her achievements were among the most notable in the whole war, and no crew of American sailors had more right to be proud than the crew of the *Oregon* when she set out with Admiral Sampson for Santiago, before which they arrived on June 1st.

Had the government of the United States arranged the movements of Cervera in its own way, it could have hardly distributed them to better advantage for its own convenience; for not simply was the Spanish fleet placed where it could neither help the Spaniards in Cuba nor hurt the Americans outside, but the weeks of uncertainty in locating him had been of considerable advantage to the army department. It was one of the peculiar features of the situation at this point that while the steps had been taken to mobilize a large army as soon as war was declared, and while the government had planned an immediate invasion of Cuba in the middle of May, when Cervera was supposed to be at Cadiz, the army was actually far from ready to move by the 1st of June, when its presence at Santiago became an imperative necessity, the harbor of Santiago having been fixed so that Cervera could not get out nor Sampson get in. It had been supposed that the army had been waiting for the navy; but when the navy had Cervera "bottled up," it had to wait for the army.

In preparation for the organization of the army, both regular and volunteer, it had been decided during the first week in May that it should be divided into seven army corps, and that into these should be put both regular and volunteer regiments. In order that there might be a sufficient number of major-generals and brigadier-generals to officer these corps.

the President had on the 4th sent to the Senate, which had promptly confirmed it, a long list of nominations. For major-generals he named for promotion eight regular army men and four civilians; the former being Joseph C. Breckinridge, Elwell S. Otis, John J. Coppinger, William R. Shafter, William M. Graham, James F. Wade, and Henry C. Merriam. The civilians raised to this high rank were General Fitzhugh Lee, Congressman Joseph Wheeler of Alabama, J. H. Wilson of Delaware, and Senator Sewell of New Jersey. This list, as well as the longer list of nominations for brigadier-generals, was notable as containing, so far as could be seen, no political nominations, though great stress had been brought upon the President to secure such appointments. Of the four civilians who became major-generals, two served in the Union and two in the Confederate army during the Civil War. The appointment of two Confederate veterans was conclusive evidence that sectional feeling had become a matter of past history, and the wisdom of the President in securing trained leaders had, doubtless, been derived from his own four years' experience in the Union army in the field. The North had spent two years in learning how to fight and in discovering and educating its generals, and at the end every man who had secured a first place in either army was a graduate of West Point. The President proposed to secure the results without incurring the perils of a season of education. He, therefore, selected men of expert training and experience, not amateurs and politicians. The great majority of men were graduates of West Point, who had spent all their lives in the profession of arms, and those who were not graduates, and who came from civil life had had the training of one of the most terrible wars of modern times.

Up to the latter part of May no thought had been given to Santiago, which, while an important port, was in a province largely controlled by the insurgents, and there the reconcentrado order had not taken effect. Miss Clara Barton had arrived at Key West in a very few hours after the declaration

of war with over 2,000 tons of provisions, ready to advance with the army, and, finding that there was no army there at that time, nor likely to be for some time, she sought permission of Admiral Sampson, who was maintaining the blockade, to take her provisions to the starving reconcentrados. But the admiral pointed out to her that it would be useless for him to blockade Havana if the Red Cross took in provisions for the people, who, however much they needed it, would be thrust aside by the Spaniards, the supplies being taken for the maintenance of the Spanish army, to cut off which the blockade was proclaimed. She appealed to the President, but, while he sympathized with her purposes, he agreed with the admiral, that nothing in the way of relief should be done. So Miss Barton whiled away the time about Key West, feeding Cuban refugees and prisoners on the prize boats. And as time went on the public interest became absorbed in Cervera, the reconcentrados slipped out of mind and, to a large extent, out of this world and into the next.

And now Havana itself was to lose its importance in the public interest, except to the weary lookouts on the blockading fleet, which had been rolling in the sea for a month with nothing more exciting on hand than the chase of an occasional fishing smack. Santiago had become the center of operations. But while the delay in definitely locating Cervera had been of considerable convenience to the Department of War engaged in the monumental and novel task of not simply recruiting an army, but of providing for its sustenance, it was at once apparent that a little longer delay would have been useful. The regulars had been moved up promptly, had taken to camp life naturally, and a large part of them had been at Tampa for weeks, "marking time." Gradually, as the volunteers were mustered in and equipped, they had been moved up from state encampments to Camp Alger, across the Potomac from Washington and Chickamauga, the volunteers moving in as the regulars moved out for Tampa in the days when Cervera was supposed to be back in Cadiz. As the volunteers were

moved on to Florida, the operation of amalgamating them with the regulars proceeded, and a new camp was fixed at Jacksonville, under the command of General Lee.

As the number of troops sent to the Philippines was much larger than was originally contemplated, and as many of the regiments of the volunteers under the first call remained incomplete, it was deemed advisable to have more men mustered in, and on May 26th the President issued a call for 75,000 additional. Up to the 1st of June about 118,000 of the 125,000 called for in the first proclamation had been mustered in and recruiting for the regular army had raised it 30,000, making 155,000 in all. Including the 10,000 men authorized to be enlisted as immunes, this provided for an army, when fully mustered, and the regular army when increased to its legal limit, of over 260,000.

Yet, when the campaign was suddenly transferred to Santiago and the order came for an expedition of about 12,000 under General Shafter to invest the city, it was found impossible for it to get away promptly. The men were ready, had been ready for some time, but when it came to the point of putting them on transports, it was found that the commissary department was weak. Line after line of freight cars loaded with supplies came into Tampa, but for a time there seemed to be no one who knew what was in the cars or where it was to go. On account of the censorship prevailing at the Florida headquarters, the public was supposing every day that the expedition was ready to start or was actually under way, when, as a matter of fact, it was engaged in the difficult work of bringing order out of chaos. Not having had a war for nearly forty years the officers in charge of the commissary arrangements had not risen to the emergency, however efficient they were in the routine of times of peace. The little, but very important, problems of fitting out even a small army with all essentials, uniforms, ammunition, tents, picks, spades, shovels for throwing up intrenchments, food, medicines, and so on to the end of a very long list, had been unfamiliar to our army

officers, and, while it was disappointing, it was not surprising. It was fortunate that we were dealing with an enemy no livelier than Spain, and it provided a very profitable lesson to be kept in mind in a future.

But the officers worked untiringly, and with such results that by the 8th the troops were on board the transports, and the expedition had actually set out under the convoy of the *Indiana*; but it had gone but a little distance when it was peremptorily recalled, much to the disgust of the troops, who were crowded into rather close and warm quarters. At the last moment the War Department considered that it would be rash to set out without a stronger convoy. There had been repeated rumors that Spanish ships of war had been seen in the neighborhood of Cuba. They had generally been regarded as only new editions of similar rumors and reports that had been circulated from the very beginning of the war. These rumors gave Spain the credit of having a fleet almost everywhere on the Atlantic coast; but at just the moment the expedition was to set out for Santiago, where the navy was impatiently awaiting, came a circumstantial story declaring positively that a Spanish battleship, a cruiser, and two torpedo boats had been sighted sneaking about in the proposed path of the expedition. It was difficult to see where such a fleet could come from, unless the Cadiz fleet had slipped over unannounced; but the department proposed to take no chances, and back the expedition came, to await other war vessels.

At last, however, on the 15th, the expedition got under way for good. It consisted of sixteen infantry regiments of the regulars, two volunteer regiments (the Seventy-first New York and the Second Massachusetts), detachments of heavy and light artillery, engineer and signal corps, and a part of the First Volunteer Cavalry, under Colonel Wood and Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt, a division of expert horsemen and sharpshooters, which had been organized by Roosevelt, and which was popularly known as the "Rough Riders."

CHAPTER XLVI

THE BRAVE DEED OF LIEUTENANT HOBSON AND HIS CREW — GOING INTO THE JAWS OF DEATH — FEARFUL EX- PERIENCES AND A WONDERFUL ESCAPE.

Plans for Destroying or Capturing Cervera's Fleet — Hobson Presents a Plan to Prevent His Escape — Admiral Sampson Gives His Consent — Preparing the *Merrimac* for a Dangerous Trip — Asking for Volunteers — Drawing Lots — Details of Hobson's Plans — Preparations Made at Last — The Crew as Selected — Hobson Speaks of His Chances of Success — Battleships Take up Position at Sunset — Hobson Appears on the Bridge — Everything Ready — The *Merrimac* Moves in — Watching in Breathless Interest — Disappearing in the Mist of the Shore — A Blaze of Fire — The Search of the Little Launch — Hobson Given up for Lost — How He Steams into the Sheet of Flame — A Mine Explodes under the *Merrimac* — On the Deck in a Hail of Shot and Shell — Slipping Overboard and Clinging to the Catamaran — A Spanish Launch Appears — An Offer to Surrender — "It was Admiral Cervera" — Prisoners in Morro — Their Fate Made Known.

FROM the time the authorities at Washington became confident that Cervera was at Santiago, plans for tightening the cork of the bottle, so to speak, were considered. Having the Spaniard there, every effort should be made to prevent his escape. Realizing his situation, as he certainly must have done, it might fairly be expected that on a dark, foggy, or stormy night he might work his way out sufficiently far to escape before being recognized. The Caribbean is noted for the fierceness and suddenness of some of its tropical storms, and in one of these the American fleet might be separated, or at least obliged to lie off at a great distance from the shore to ensure safety. At once, therefore, inquiries had been set afoot for some available old vessel which might be taken to Santiago and, possibly, sunk in the channel. In view of the defenses at the entrance, however, the dangers of the proposed operation seemed to render it impracticable, but Admiral Sampson kept it in mind when he set out for Santiago, hoping

that when he had looked over the defenses a way might be found for such an attempt, and one of the first persons to claim an audience with him on his arrival on June 1st, was Assistant Naval Constructor Richard Pearson Hobson, a native of Alabama, twenty-seven years old, a graduate of the Naval Academy in 1889, a student of naval construction abroad at one time, and at this time holding the rank of Lieutenant in the navy, and attached to the *New York*.

He had looked over the mouth of the harbor and laid before the admiral a plan which he claimed would effectually block the channel, so that a large part of the fleet would be at liberty to cover the landing of the expected troops elsewhere. It was a daring expedition which he proposed, and with true courage he offered to lead it himself, indeed, he desired the privilege of doing so. His plan was to select a volunteer crew of just sufficient number to navigate the collier *Merrimac*, to strip the old ship of everything of value except the coal remaining in her, and then under cover of darkness, while the fleet engaged the forts, to run her straight towards the narrowest part of the channel, swing her across it, and sink her by firing explosives in her bottom. He and his crew would jump overboard as she sank and endeavor to make their way out so as to be picked up by the torpedo boat *Porter* or a steam launch from the *New York*, which should lie in close to shore for that purpose. It was a startling proposition, an expedition which the admiral could not feel justified in ordering, as it would seem like sending men to certain death; but when one of his subordinates offered and begged to undertake it and urged the plan in eloquent and persuasive language, the admiral determined to put it into execution if possible. He had seen evidences of the cool bravery of Hobson at San Juan, where he had stood at the *New York's* range-finder throughout the bombardment.

Hobson was ready to act that night, and he received his commission to immediately prepare the *Merrimac* for the ordeal. While the officers of the collier were contentedly eat-

ing their lunch, Hobson appeared on board and made the startling announcement that he was going to sink their ship that night in the channel, and he proceeded to fit her for the emergency. The four transverse bulkheads were located and their positions marked on the outside at the rail. A line was run along the port side of the ship parallel to and under the water line, and supported by other lines running over the rail. Along this suspended line in 8-inch copper cases were hung six charges of powder, each weighing about eighty pounds. An igniting charge of brown powder was attached to each, and the whole covered with pitch for protection against the water. The wire and battery for exploding the charges were made ready, and as far as possible all stores were removed, leaving little in the ship, except 2,000 tons of coal. The anchor chains were laid out on deck so that they would run out without hitch. The men worked merrily, singing as they prepared the collier for her fearful mission. At sunset a thunder storm blew up, covering the mountains about Santiago with dense clouds, which were rifted by brilliant flashes of lightning. The echoes of the thunder peals rolled off to the fleet in dull rumblings, like distant cannonading, and in the intervals could be heard the voices of the men on the *Merrimac*, as they sang "The Star Spangled Banner," and "Home, Sweet Home."

These preparations took time, and Hobson and the crew were busy all that afternoon, and far into the night. Meanwhile, the admiral was making other preparations. Shortly after Hobson had gone to the *Merrimac*, the ships' crews of the fleet saw the following signal flying from the *New York*:

"An attempt will be made to-night to sink the collier *Merrimac* at the entrance to the harbor. One volunteer, an enlisted man, is requested from each ship."

Immediately the men were mustered on the quarter decks, and the captains laid the plan before them, carefully explaining the unusual risks that the volunteers would incur, but practically the entire companies of the ships volunteered for

the dangerous work. On Commodore Schley's flagship, the *Brooklyn*, alone, 150 men volunteered; on the *Texas* 140 signified their desire to go; Hobson and the admiral really had the pick of the men of the fleet. Sailors, machinists, firemen, engineers, petty officers, junior officers, all begged to be allowed to go. Commander Miller and the crew of the *Merrimac* were particularly anxious to go, and a formal order was necessary to get them off the ship. The *New York's* launch was selected to run in shore and pick up survivors. There was intense rivalry for places in the launch. Cadets Palmer and Powell disputed for the command. They settled the dispute by drawing cigarettes from a box. Powell drew the odd one and won.

About five o'clock the *Vixen* went around to the different ships and picked up the volunteers, their comrades envying them as they departed for a task that meant certain glory, but almost as certain death. They were taken to the *Merrimac*, where Hobson and a large force were busily at work, and where the admiral came aboard to examine the preparations. The squadron was moved down to the entrance of the harbor, lying off in a semicircle, and there they awaited the *Merrimac*. Hobson and his men worked away with a will. He had one man stationed at the wheel, another to stand by with an axe to cut the lashings to the bow anchor; another similarly to cut the lashings of the starboard quarter anchor; another was to explode the charges on a signal. Two signals only were to be sent to the engineer, at first to knock out the props from over the bonnets of the sea valves, and to cut the small sea pipes, while a man was to haul in the life-boat; at the second, the engineer was to stop the engines, run on deck and jump over the starboard side. Realizing that in such a hazardous undertaking, a mistake might prevent success, every detail was worked out with precision.

It was Hobson's purpose to creep in and approach the entrance from the westward until he could shape his course as near as possible directly for Estrella Point. He wished to

put the bow of the boat near this point and then swing her across the channel. When the ship was sufficiently near, in his judgment, the bonnets were to be knocked off the sea valves, and the engines stopped. The helm was to be put hard to port, and the starboard bow anchor let go. This, he thought, would swing the ship across the channel and stop her headway. When she had swung far enough, the quarter anchor was to be let go to check her and the mines exploded. The strong flood tide was to be relied upon for assistance. The powder charges were about thirty-five feet apart and ten feet below the waterline.

The signals to the men at the anchors were to be given by ropes attached to their wrists and leading to the bridge, where it was Hobson's purpose to stand till he felt the ship settle. The other men, as soon as they had done the duty assigned to them, were to jump over the side and make for the lifeboat. Life preservers were served out, as well as revolvers and ammunition. Each man was carefully instructed in the duty he was expected to perform, and the necessity of his remaining at his post until he had completely performed his duty, was impressed upon each. They fully appreciated the desperate nature of the undertaking.

At last all preparations were completed, but by this time it was dawn. Hobson headed his ship in at about a 10-knot speed, but had been running but a few minutes when she was signaled to make for the flagship. This recall was a great disappointment to Hobson, and, in answer to the admiral's order, he signaled, requesting that he be allowed to make the attempt, late though it was, feeling certain that he could succeed. But the admiral feared that daylight might spoil the chances of success, and a positive order was given Hobson to stop.

So the fires were banked, and it was decided to postpone the attempt till the following night. The men left their stations and the vessel steamed further off shore. The strain had been very great on the men, who had nerved themselves for the trying moment, but they were resolved to carry out

the undertaking, and only slight changes were made in the crew. It was made up as follows:

Lieut. Richard P. Hobson.

Osborn Deignan, a coxswain of the *Merrimac*.

George F. Phillips, a machinist of the *Merrimac*.

John Kelly, a water-tender of the *Merrimac*.

George Charette, a gunner's mate of the *New York*.

Daniel Montague, a seaman of the *Brooklyn*.

J. C. Murphy, a coxswain of the *Iowa*.

Randolf Clausen, a coxswain of the *New York*.

Hobson had selected but seven men for his crew, but at the last moment, when those preparing the ship were withdrawn, Clausen declined to leave, his desire to participate in the adventure being so great that he practically deserted his ship.

The men lay around the *Merrimac* most of the day, attempting to secure a little rest, and some slight changes were made in the plans. Additional batteries were obtained, and an additional powder charge was made ready on the port side. The large catamaran of the ship was slung over the side by a single line. Hobson decided that it would be safer to explode each charge separately, and directed that the men below, as soon as their duties were performed, should assist in this work before jumping overboard.

Hobson, who had spent most of the afternoon on the flagship, boarded the *Merrimac* again at seven o'clock, went below and tried to secure a little rest, of which he stood sadly in need.

"You expect to come out of this alive?" he was asked.

"Ah! that is another thing," he replied. "I suppose the *Estrella* battery will fire down on us a bit, but the ships will throw their searchlights on the gunners' faces and they won't see much of us. Then if we are torpedoed we shall even then be able to make the desired position in the channel. It won't be so easy to hit us, and I think the men should be able to swim to the dinghey. I may jump before I am blown up, but I don't see that it makes much difference what I do. I have a fair chance of life either way. If our dinghey gets shot to pieces we shall then try to swim for the beach right under

Morro Castle. We shall keep together at all hazards. Then we may be able to make our way alongside and, perhaps, get back to the ships. We shall fight the sentries or a squad until the last, and we shall only surrender to overwhelming numbers."

At sunset the fleet again took up its formation before the entrance to the harbor, in an arc of a circle of five miles radius, with Morro Castle in the center. Beginning to the westward they stood in this order: *Vixen*, *Brooklyn*, *Marblehead*, *Texas*, *Massachusetts*, *Oregon*, *Iowa*, *New York*, *New Orleans*, and *Mayflower*. The other boats remained outside the circle, while the *Dolphin* and *Porter* acted as dispatch boats. The evening wore away slowly. A full moon bathed the quiet waters of the Caribbean in a splendid lustre of silver, and the high mountains in front of Santiago lay in a robe of white mist. The scene was beautifully peaceful.

On the decks of the ships lay the crews, with only rubber blankets beneath them. The men are numbered, and when in the presence of the enemy, the even and the odd numbers sleep alternately, two hours at a time, with their guns and small arms at their sides. In the event of a torpedo attack each man slaps on the shoulder the man next to him who is sleeping, and then the guns are turned on the enemy. So they were sleeping on the moonlight night of the 2d of June, into the moonlight morning of the 3d.

At about 1.30 A. M., Hobson came up on the bridge of the *Merrimac*. All the men who were to go with the ship were called up and given final instructions. Everything was made ready below. The relief crew was then sent aboard the *Texas*, Hobson's men took their positions, and at about 2.30 o'clock the ship began to steam slowly towards the entrance.

Every man on the fighting ships, odd or even, was awake now, and the progress of the big black hulk of the *Merrimac* was watched with breathless interest. On towards the misty entrance she moved, followed by the launch of the *New York*, with a crew of five, in command of Cadet Joseph W. Powell.

The moon sank behind a bank of clouds near the horizon, and then the *Merrimac* could no longer be distinguished from the ships. The lower shore line was indistinguishable in the haze which hid the entrance; still the crews on the big ships watched and waited, expecting to see a burst of fire from the forts.

The crew in the steam launch had a nearer view and saw the *Merrimac* heading straight in; Lieut. Hobson stood on the bridge in full uniform; the other six men were at their posts, clad in tights to aid in their escape if they should be compelled to swim a long distance. The watchers saw the old collier head straight for Estrella Point, saw her swing across the channel, apparently undiscovered, for not a sound had as yet broke the stillness, heard five of her seven charges explode, and then began a screaming, flashing, death-dealing fire from the Spanish ships and batteries. The rest was hidden from the view of the ships and the launch.

It was about 3.15 when the first gun flashed out in the misty entrance, but it was followed by a fusilade of rapid-fire guns. Some of the batteries near the entrance directed their fire at the little launch, but in the face of it all, Cadet Powell and his crew continued to wait and search for Hobson and his gallant heroes. They saw the guns of the *Cristobal Colon* and the *Reina Mercedes*, which had been supposed to be gunless, turned on their launch and thundering in their ears. Still they searched and waited. Those on the line of battle-ships could see only the sheet of flame ahead. At last the fire slackened somewhat, and by the light of the dawn, now tingeing the sky and land, the little launch was seen steaming from west to east near the mouth of the entrance.

Then she steamed back from east to west and began skirting the coast to the west of the entrance. The batteries were still firing at her, but she went as far as a small cove on the shore, then put about and steamed for the flagship.

It was broad daylight by this time. As the launch came alongside Cadet Powell shouted:

“No one has come out of the entrance of the harbor.”

His words seemed like the death knell of all who had gone in on the *Merrimac*, but as it grew lighter they could see the tops of the old collier's masts in the center of the channel, about where Hobson said he would sink her.

It seemed incredible, almost impossible, that any of the *Merrimac's* heroes could have lived through that awful fire. There were few men in the fleet who did not think that all of the eight men had perished. Still they hoped.

But we must return and follow the *Merrimac* as she disappeared from the view of the ships first in the mist and then in the blaze of fire which broke out from both sides. Hobson, standing on the bridge, kept his eyes fast fixed on the channel ahead, every nerve strained, waiting for the time when he could sink the ship. That was the work before him. He could pay no attention to the fire and he was not there to answer it. The shells from the large guns on the hills first roared about the ship and then the rapid fire from the Spanish cruisers joined in, their shots screaming through the rigging; troops from some of the camps in the hills came rushing down, and as the collier approached the Estrella battery the soldiers lined the foot of the cliffs; rifle bullets whistled above them, but Hobson could see that they were firing wildly at him; the Spaniards were actually killing each other with their cross fire, those on one bank shooting down those on the other.

The *Merrimac's* steering gear broke when she reached Estrella Point, somewhat interfering with her management, and but three of the torpedoes on her side exploded when Hobson touched the button, but a large submarine mine, fired by the Spaniards, caught her full amidships, hurling the water high in the air and tearing a great rent in her side. Her stern instead of her bow ran on Estrella Point and she began to sink slowly. She was just across the channel, going just where Hobson wished her to, but as she settled the tide drifted her around a little in spite of all efforts.

After firing the torpedoes and getting the ship in place, Hobson and his men all ran aft and lay down on the deck wait-

ing for the water to reach it. Shells and bullets were making a terrific din about them. The air seemed full of fire. Six-inch shells from the *Vizcaya* came tearing into the collier, crashing into the wood and iron, while the plunging shots from the forts broke through her decks, riddling it all about them.

"Not a man must move," shouted Hobson to those lying beside him; and it was largely owing to the splendid discipline of the men that they escaped the terrific fire. As the shells rained over them, minutes seemed hours of suspense; the old vessel seemed to sink very slowly. The men's mouths grew parched, but they dared not move.

"Hadn't we better drop off now, sir," a man would say as he lay prone on the deck expecting the next shell to come their way.

"Wait," said Hobson. "We must wait till daylight, perhaps."

Wait in that hail of shot and shell! But Hobson knew it would be impossible for them to escape on the catamaran to any place but the shore, and there stood the soldiers still shooting. He hoped that by daylight some of the fleet might rescue them. Fortunately, the Spaniards fired mostly at the bow of the old *Merrimac*. It was being riddled and she was sinking faster. Still Hobson and his men lay there motionless. Finally, the water came to the decks where they were. It had become daylight; the Spaniards thought no life remained on the *Merrimac*, and the firing had ceased except on the launch of the *New York*. Then the men slipped off into the water and clung to the catamaran, which was floating amid the wreckage but still fastened to the old hulk. Only their heads were above the water, and the Spaniards seemed to have overlooked them.

As it grew lighter they noticed a Spanish launch coming towards the *Merrimac*, and they agreed that, if possible, they would capture her and run out of the harbor; but as she came closer the Spaniards saw them; half a dozen marines jumped up and pointed their rifles at their heads.

THE BLOWING UP OF THE "MERRIMAC" ACROSS THE ENTRANCE OF SANTIAGO HARBOR, AND
ESCAPE OF LIEUTENANT HOBSON AND HIS CREW.



"Is there any officer on that boat to receive a surrender of prisoners of war?" shouted Hobson.

An elderly man leaped out from under the awning and waved his hand. It was Admiral Cervera. The marines lowered their rifles; they came up and Hobson and his men were helped into the launch, objects of admiration and awe to the Spanish marines. They were taken ashore and put in cells in that Morro upon which they had looked so often from the sea, and now through their barred windows they beheld their fleet where officers and crews were wondering and perhaps despairing of their fate.

The day dragged on. Hobson and his men were given up for lost. Finally, in the afternoon, a Spanish launch flying a flag of truce was seen coming out of the harbor. Had it come to tell them that Hobson and his men were dead? Or had it come to tell them that they were alive? Out went the *Vixen* to meet the tug; a Spanish officer was taken on board and the *Vixen* hurried off to the flagship. Then every man's eyes were on the *New York*, and at last they read a signal:

"Collier's crew prisoners of war; two slightly wounded. All well."

A mighty cheer went up. The Spanish officer informed the admiral that the prisoners were confined in Morro Castle and that Admiral Cervera had considered their adventure an act of such great bravery and desperate daring that he deemed it proper to notify the American commander of the safety of the men. Whatever the motive for sending out the officer under a flag of truce, the act was considered a very graceful and courteous one, though the suspicion at once crossed the minds of the American officers that the prisoners might have been placed in Morro to save the fort from attack. The Spanish officer is reported to have said in reference to the sinking of the *Merrimac*: "You have made it more difficult, but we can still get out."

From bearings taken of the *Merrimac*, whose masts and smokepipes only could be seen, it was plainly evident now

that she had swung around so that she was not lying across the channel; so far as completely blocking the channel, the attempt had not been wholly successful. Still, the event deserved a place in history as one of the bravest and most daring deeds in naval annals.

No parallel to the achievement could be found in naval warfare. Somers had shown a magnificent daring when he blew up the ketch in the harbor of Tripoli and Cushing's dash upon the *Albemarle* was likewise heroic. But both of these crept to their destination in little vessels. Hobson steamed into a narrow channel with a huge 4,000-ton ship, in plain view of the batteries, almost under the muzzle of their guns; he moved to a particular spot, manœuvred his vessel in a particular way and worked to sink her in a particular position, under a hail of shot and shell, which rendered the chances of success infinitely remote. To conceive that the thing could be done was an inspiration; to be willing to do it was the highest heroism; to do it coolly, deliberately, and with professional skill under the fearful fire was marvelous. The men who went with Hobson should not be forgotten, and when it is recalled that hundreds of others were ready to follow his lead, were disappointed that they could not, there need be no anxiety about American character.

CHAPTER XLVII

LANDING OF MARINES IN GUANTANAMO BAY — SUR- ROUNDED BY HIDDEN ENEMIES — SPANIARDS CAUGHT AT LAST — SHARP NAVAL FIGHT AT SAN JUAN.

Spaniards Strengthen Their Position — Bombarding the Forts at the Harbor Mouth — The *Reina Mercedes* Wrecked — Looking for a Possible Place for the Army to Land — Pluck of the Naval Reserves — Landing the Marines — Preparing Camp McCalla — Its Peculiar Position — Fatal Search for the Enemy — No Sleep for the Marines — Mauser Bullets Continually Whistling through the Camp — Bravely Facing the Foe — Untenable Position of the Camp — Spaniards Fire upon a Funeral Cortége — Driving Them Back and Resuming the Services — Attacked from a New Quarter — A Critical Situation — The Enemy Caught in a Trap — Slaughtered without Mercy — The Camp Moved to a Less Exposed Position — The Blockade of San Juan — Arrival of the *St. Paul* — The *Terror* Makes an Attack — A Broadside from the *St. Paul*.

DURING the long wait for the appearance of the army upon which it was proposed to place the burden of taking the city, the navy was much of the time lying idly off Santiago, and Cervera's ships were apparently as idle within the harbor. The Spaniards, however, being fully informed of the intended military expedition and of the purpose of the United States to reduce the city and capture the Spanish fleet before doing anything more, became very busy in strengthening the land fortifications, so that altogether, from a theoretical point of view, their position was impregnable. Admiral Sampson, who was opposed to any rash experiments endangering his fleet, endeavored to make some preparations likely to be of advantage when the army arrived. He was compelled to bear in mind the fact that Cervera might at any time seek to escape, for it was now understood that Hobson's heroic act had not been entirely successful. Either in a battle with Cervera at the entrance of the harbor or in co-

operating with General Shafter, who was to command the army, the forts might give some trouble, and he, therefore, set out to weaken or reduce their batteries on June 6th. Having received information that Hobson and his men had been transferred from the Morro prison to the military prison outside the city, he no longer felt any delicacy as to breaking down the historic walls of the old castle.

The fleet was formed in a double line about six miles from shore — in one the *New York*, *Iowa*, *Oregon*, *Dolphin*, and *Yankee*; in the other, the *Brooklyn*, Commodore Schley's flagship, *Massachusetts*, *Texas*, *Vixen*, and *Suwanee*. They approached to within 4,000 yards of Morro, pouring in a tremendous fire for an hour with generally fine marksmanship, driving the Spaniards from their guns, crushing down masonry and earthworks, and receiving unharmed the fire of the Spanish Krupp and Armstrong guns. Only one man on the fleet was injured, and he but slightly. During part of the engagement American vessels went within 1,000 yards of the forts and drove the Spaniards from the guns. The *Reina Mercedes*, which lay near the mouth of the harbor, was practically wrecked, but the Spaniards had already removed most of her guns and mounted them on shore.

In searching for a favorable place for the expected troops to land, Admiral Sampson's attention was attracted towards the harbor of Guantanamo, about forty miles east of Santiago. To clearly understand the problem which General Shafter was to meet when he came to consider the landing of his troops, it should be borne in mind that the coast of Cuba between Santiago and Guantanamo is in a general way formed of three parallel ranges of hills. First there is the rampart on the sea-front, a high flat-topped ridge very steep in most places, and broken into terraces by outcropping ledges of limestone; behind this are foothills rising out of the wooded valleys, and behind that and another line of valleys or ravines, are the high mountains of the coast range, about six miles from the shore. In the vicinity of Santiago the rampart or outer ridge along



THE INVASION OF CUBA.
United States soldiers embarking on transports at Tampa, Fla.

the sea front is about 300 feet high, stretching eastward and westward like a great stone wall. At two places this wall is cut down to the sea level in two narrow clefts or notches about 100 yards wide at the bottom, and these appear to be the only openings through which the interior of the country is accessible to an invading force. In one of these and the nearest to Santiago lies the village and railway station of Siboney, and in the other the village which takes its name from the Baiquiri River emptying at that point.

But it could not fail to appear to Admiral Sampson or to anyone that a landing in either of these places would be difficult, perhaps impossible, if opposed strongly by a daring enemy. Even without artillery, 1,000 men with Mausers on the heights surrounding the notches and the approaches might keep back a strong landing force for days, for, if driven from the tops of the bluff, the Spaniards could fortify the foothills beyond and be out of reach of the heavy guns of the warships.

If General Shafter should, upon examination, prefer not to land his troops in Guantanamo Bay, because it would imply a march through the foothills of forty miles to Santiago, the harbor would at least be very useful as a naval rendezvous and coaling station. The ships had lain out to sea a long time, and at times had been obliged to coal under extremely unfavorable conditions. Guantanamo Bay afforded a splendid shelter for the fleet, and it was believed that a small party of marines could establish themselves there and control the entrance.

On the day after the attack on the forts about Morro, therefore, Admiral Sampson sent the *Marblehead*, with the *Yankee* and *St. Louis*, to shell the defenses of Guantanamo Bay, cut the cables, and prepare for a landing. The Spanish fortifications were battered to pieces, and, while the Spaniards stood by their guns for a time, they soon retreated. The naval reserves, which manned the *Yankee*, acquitted themselves with great credit under the fire. A Spanish gunboat had the temerity to come down and fire upon the American ships, but the *Yankee's* guns quickly drove her back, and soon afterwards

the *Marblehead* took a position to hold the harbor till the landing party should arrive.

It arrived on the 10th, a body of 600 Brooklyn marines on the *Panther*, and with them came the *Oregon*, *Dolphin*, and *Yosemite* to protect their landing. The marines, which had been chafing under inaction for nearly a month, joyfully jumped into the boats and were landed without a shot being fired. The Spaniards had apparently deserted the landing point, which was chiefly occupied by the huts of the Guantanamo fishermen and pilots, and these huts, as well as the blockhouse, which had been partially destroyed in the previous bombardment, were burned as a precaution against yellow fever. The Stars and Stripes were quickly raised on the bluff by Color Sergeant Silvey, and the marines set merrily to work getting their tents and other appliances ashore and laying out a camp to be called Camp McCalla, in honor of the commander of the *Marblehead*.

All the land, except that on the top of the bluffs selected for the camp, was covered with woods and thick tropical bushes, and the only road was a mule path skirting the mountain. The landward approach was on the south side, and here the hill fell away to a foothill, backed up against the high ridge or rampart running along the shore of the Caribbean. West of the camp was the bay, to the north was Fisherman's Point, where the landing was effected, and to the east was a lagoon putting into the foothills above mentioned. All that night and the next day the marines worked with energy in establishing their camp, and incoming sentries on the morning of the 11th reported that none of the enemy had been seen. The worst foe they had encountered were the mosquitoes, which abound in the chaparral or thickets.

But at about 5.30 o'clock that afternoon a weather-beaten old insurgent rushed into camp from the road leading from the valley over to the tall hills three miles distant, and reported that a skirmish line of Spaniards was advancing. He was not a moment too soon, for a bullet from a Mauser rifle came hot

on his trail. Before the camp could make any preparations, the Spaniards were making a fierce attack on the outposts from the bushes near the lagoon.

Fully fifteen minutes of lively firing followed. Every marine in the camp wished to dash into the bushes and at once chase the hidden foe, but Col. Huntington and his officers kept their men in check, and prepared to resist the attack on the camp. Trenches had not been dug and the only shelter for the few sick men and non-combatants was in the ruins of the block-house. So fierce was the firing that Commander McCalla of the *Marblehead*, thinking the Spaniards were attacking the camp with a large force, hurried his marines ashore, and fifty or sixty of the camp marines, who had been refreshing themselves by a bath in the bay, ran half-naked up the hills, caught up their guns, and went to the aid of their comrades. For nearly three-quarters of an hour shots were exchanged, now brisk, then a scattering fire across the lagoon, or out of the thickets. It was nearly dark when the outermost sentries came in, hot, wearied, and panting. Three of their men were missing, but one of them appeared later all right. Two had been killed in the bushes.

There was a hasty meal of hardtack and coffee, but no sleep for the men that night. The enemy continued to harass the sentry lines, and Mauser bullets constantly whistled through the camp. Commander McCalla kept the search-lights of his vessel trained upon the dense thickets, but the Spaniards concealed their movements. At least a dozen different attacks were made on the camp between dusk and dawn, the heaviest and the best organized being made about one o'clock in the morning. Then, apparently, the Spaniards had completely surrounded the camp, and they poured in volley after volley. But the marines, though hemmed in, bravely kept their faces to the foe, and maintained a lively return fire. At no time was it possible for the marines to see objects twenty yards away, and only by the flash of the enemy's guns could the whereabouts of the attacking party be learned.

During the hottest of the fighting, four of the little camp force were killed, including Dr. Gibbs, a New York physician, who was picked off by a guerrilla as he stood near the hospital tent. The enemy's loss proved to be heavy, but the marines at the time could judge nothing of the effect of their volleys, as the bushes seemed to be full of Spaniards, maintaining an exasperating fire, first from one side and then the other. The *Marblehead* and other vessels in the harbor dropped shells into the thickets from which the Spanish fire seemed to come, and this caused its temporary cessation from that quarter, only to be soon and suddenly renewed from another.

At last the officers were convinced that the camp was untenable; while it was on high ground and ought to be advantageous in case of attack, little could be done against the Spaniards hiding in the surrounding thickets and having a full view of the exposed camp. It was decided to remove it to another location on the hillside near the sea, and this work was vigorously prosecuted on Sunday, the 12th, while the Spaniards maintained their pestering attacks, well illustrated by their fire upon the little party attending the funeral services of those who had been killed the day before.

The bodies of the dead marines were wrapped in black oilskins taken from their tents. Graves were dug on the edge of a hill overlooking the bay to the northward of the camp. A squad of marines from the *Texas*, under command of Lieutenant Radford, acted as escort to the cortége as it passed slowly along to the field where the dead were to be laid to rest. It was impossible for all the men to attend the funeral. They had other work to do, work on which depended the safety of every man ashore. While some of the marines took the bodies of their comrades to their graves, the others proceeded with the main work, some continuously on the lookout for the enemy, others busy with the details of removing the camp.

There had been a lull for a few minutes in the firing, and the men had a chance to look about and see what was going on. One by one, as they observed the little funeral procession

stumbling over the loose stones on the camp ground, those who could do so hurried forward, fell in behind and grouped themselves about the empty graves. The stretcher bearing the bodies was lifted to its place, and Chaplain Jones of the *Texas* was about to begin the reading of the burial service, when the Spaniards, who could see plainly what the men had gathered for, gave a remarkable exhibition of their boasted chivalry. Concealed in the bushes and trees of the western thickets, they began shooting at the party, and this action convinced the marines, if conviction were needed, that the stories told of Spanish barbarism were true.


“Fall in! Company A! Company B! Company C! Fall in! Fall in!” was the word from one end of the camp to the other.

The graves were deserted by all save the chaplain and the little escort, who still stood unmoved. Everywhere men sprang to arms and placed themselves behind the rolled tents, their knapsacks, the bushes in the hollows or boxes and piles of stones with rifles ready and eyes strained into the brush. The little Colt's guns which had been brought up from the ships began their clatter, howitzers roared, blue smoke arose where the shells struck and burst in the chaparral and rifles snapped angrily. There was trouble for the Spaniards in that particular place whence their bullets came, and shortly the firing ceased everywhere in the brush and the funeral was resumed. The *Texas* kept using her smaller guns on the chaparral near the camp, and once more the men gathered about the grave and Chaplain Jones began reading the Episcopal service. He had nearly finished when the rifles of the enemy again cracked, this time to the east.

A dozen men in the pits by the old blockhouse answered and the chaplain kept right on with the solemn service. When he had finished, the men again took their rifles and resumed their watching, and the *Panther* shelled the brush to the east. From that time on less trouble was experienced. In the afternoon, the tents were all struck and carried to the low stretch

of land rising from the beach, but were not again pitched, because they made too good targets while the Spaniards were in the brush.

The situation for a time seemed decidedly critical. The marines were obliged to forego all sleep and the skirmishing was incessant day and night. The vessels in the harbor



ENTRANCE TO HARBOR OF GUANTANAMO.

(Showing Camps of the Marines.)

dropped shells into the bushes, but the Spaniards kept reappearing at different places. In the end, however, the incomparable superiority of the Americans in marksmanship, in coolness, and steadiness of nerve was triumphant. On Tuesday, the 14th, Colonel Huntington abandoned defensive tactics and sent out four scouting parties with orders to make an aggressive fight. This they did in a most effective manner. Each



THE FIRST BLOODY ENGAGEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TROOPS ON CUBAN SOIL.

United States Marines at Guantanamo repelling a midnight attack of Spanish soldiers with the aid of the searchlight of the

Marblehead Sunday Morning, June 12, 1898.

detachment fell in with the skulking Spaniards and gradually worked them between their fires. Early in the afternoon, Captain Elliot drove the main body of the Spaniards over the crest of the third hill, where Lieutenant Magill had another division, which poured a deadly fire into them as they descended. They ran back to the crest of the hill, and this the *Dolphin*, which was in position, swept with a murderous fire of 4-inch shells. The Spaniards rushed down the hill again, and again fell into the clutches of Captain Elliot's men, including some Cubans, who fought their old enemies like demons. Spaniards were falling all along the line, and they rushed back, endeavoring again to escape along the crest of the hill, and there they were again met by the *Dolphin's* shells. Turn which way they would, they were face to face with an American fire that had no mercy in it. As the Spaniards rushed along the crest of the hill, they came face to face suddenly with a third scouting party under Captain Spicer. Then in desperation they turned back and ran into the marines under Captain Elliot and Lieutenant Magill. Thus they fought desperately, refusing to surrender till more than 200 lay dead on the hill. And the only casualty that day on the American side was one Cuban killed. The Americans left their Cuban allies to pursue the remnant and returned to camp with a score of prisoners and a large quantity of arms and ammunition. They had no more serious trouble with the enemy at Camp McCalla. In view of the dangers to which the camp had been exposed for five days, almost constantly under fire, it is certainly remarkable that no more than five lives were lost.

On the 15th, the *Texas*, *Marblehead*, and *Suwanee* steamed up the bay and attacked the fortifications at Caimanera, about three miles above Camp McCalla, and a bombardment of a few minutes was sufficient to drive the Spaniards from their guns, and an hour completely destroyed the forts and earthworks which formed the main defense of the inner bay.

But it was plain to the eyes of the officers that the place

was not a good one for the landing of an army for the investment of Santiago forty miles away. No roads existed, and it would have been a difficult undertaking to have handled heavy artillery in such a mountainous country, which had been so well adapted to the Cuban guerrilla warfare. It was near Guantanamo, it will be remembered, that Goulet and his bands had their early successes in the Cuban revolution.

Little was left for Admiral Sampson to do until the army arrived, but he did not leave the Spanish forces at Santiago unoccupied. On the 16th, he again shelled the enemy's batteries and battered down some new earthworks within his reach. Again the wretched marksmanship of the Spaniards saved the fleet from any damage. One of the most interesting features of the work before the harbor at this time was the successful practical trial of the so-called dynamite gunboat *Vesuvius*. This boat, which, as a matter of fact, throws through her pneumatic guns charges of guncotton instead of dynamite, went close to the mouth of the harbor on the night of the 13th and fired three shots, each containing 500 pounds. They wrought havoc where they struck, and the performance was repeated several times, much to the terror of the Spaniards.

The war was not without some important and interesting incidents in other quarters at this time. From the beginning it had been the purpose of the government to operate in Puerto Rico, and arrangements for sending an expedition to that island were under way even while the one to Santiago was causing so much trouble and delay. In accordance with this plan, a blockade had been declared against the port of San Juan, and the *St. Paul*, commanded by Captain Sigsbee, was sent to institute it. In the interval between Cervera's arrival at Santiago and the beginning of operations against Santiago, the torpedo boat-destroyer *Terror*, which Cervera had left at Martinique for repairs, had made her way to San Juan, and as there was no way of her reaching Cervera then, there she remained. The *Isabella II.*, an old cruiser, and one or two gunboats, were also in the port.

When the *St. Paul* arrived before the harbor on June 22d, the Spanish lookouts took her for the *St. Louis*, which they knew was lightly armed, and the commanders of the *Terror* and *Isabella II.* figured that they could run out and destroy the former liner before they were within reach of her guns. So confident were they that they boastingly made public their plans, and as a result the Spanish people in the city gave the officers a great ovation, and the commander of the *Terror* made a speech in the public square, declaring that he was going out to engage the Yankee warship and inviting the people to ascend the hills and watch the fight. This they did, and the cloud of witnesses were noticed through the glasses of the officers on the *St. Paul* before they knew what it meant.

About 1 o'clock, when the men were at mess, the lookouts discovered a steamer coming out of the harbor. The *St. Paul* was then about seven miles out, but she was turned towards the approaching vessel and steamed at full speed to meet her. The character of the vessel had not been made out as yet, but the prospects even of holding up a merchantman was sufficient to bring every man to the deck. The strange craft wasted little time in informing the *St. Paul* of her character, for she dropped a shell within a thousand yards of the liner, which was immediately put around so that the *Isabella II.*, for she it was, might have the benefit of a broadside when she approached near enough. But the Spaniard decided to come no nearer, much to the disgust of the men at the guns of the *St. Paul*. It was at this moment that the lookout reported the little destroyer sneaking out of the harbor under cover of the cruiser. Under all the recognized rules of naval warfare, it was rather dangerous for the converted liner to attack a cruiser reinforced by so dangerous a craft as the *Terror* was supposed to be, but our sailors were eager for a fight.

The *Isabella II.* continued to throw shells in the direction of the *St. Paul*, but Captain Sigsbee paid little attention to her at this time. Instead, he worked along with the *Terror*, endeavoring to separate her from the cruiser and to keep her

in the trough of the sea if she undertook to run for the *St. Paul*. This she did when her commander saw that the *St. Paul* was thus maneuvering. It was a dangerous moment, for everything depended upon the gunnery of the *St. Paul's* men. Unless stopped by well-directed shots, there was nothing to prevent her from getting close enough to launch a torpedo, and then no one of the *St. Paul* might live to tell the tale. But Captain Sigsbee and his men were perfectly cool; they allowed the *Terror* to get within 6,000 yards, and then they let go the whole starboard battery.

The *Terror* had evidently been hit, and both Spanish vessels began to act as if they were rather sorry they had come out. The *St. Paul* worked up closer, and the Spaniards at once made preparations to retreat. After putting two shots into the *Terror* and knocking her after smokestack into the sea, Captain Sigsbee turned his attention for a moment to the *Isabella II.*, which had been wasting hundreds of dollars worth of ammunition in a wild fire. Then another gunboat came out of the harbor and the *Terror* began to show further signs of fight. Her gunners were beginning to get the range, and were dropping a few shots uncomfortably near to the *St. Paul*. But as soon as the latter's guns were again trained on the saucy torpedo boat, she turned about and started full speed for the harbor. At this juncture a remarkable shot was made from one of the *St. Paul's* 5-inch guns. A shell struck the retreating *Terror* on the port side near the stern, and went clear into the engine-room, killing the engineer and wounding several others, wrecking the machinery, and placing the boat in a sinking condition. Her propellers stopped working, and she drifted in a westerly direction, signaling for help. In a few moments a vessel came out and took her in tow, but it was too late to run her into the harbor; she was taken ashore and beached in shallow water. The people on the cliff who had come out to see the Yankee sunk were at a loss to understand just why she still floated, while the *Terror* lay on the sands.

CHAPTER XLVIII

LANDING OF THE TROOPS AT BAIQUIRI AND SIBONEY — THE ADVANCE THROUGH CUBAN THICKETS — A MAG- NIFICENT CHARGE AND A DECISIVE VICTORY — CAMARA'S PHANTOM FLEET.

Arrival of the Transports with General Shafter's Army — Admiral Sampson and General Shafter Consult — Meeting the Cuban Leaders — Enthusiastic Cubans — Baiquiri Selected as a Landing Place — Plans and Preparations — Anticipating an Attempted Escape by Cervera — Incidents of a Difficult Landing — Unfurling the Stars and Stripes — On the Road to Santiago — Yankee Ingenuity — The Enemy's Retreat to Guasimas — General Wheeler Decides to Attack — Moving Ahead on Difficult Trails and under a Burning Sun — The Music of a Mauser Bullet — Rough Riders Attacked — A Fierce Battle is On — Deploying through the Thickets — Death in the Ranks — A Relentless Advance — Victory and a Well-Earned Rest — The Dead and Wounded — Camara Leaves Cadiz — His Trip to the Suez Canal.


WITH flags flying and the guns of Admiral Sampson's flagship booming a salute to General Shafter commanding, the army of invasion steamed grandly up almost to within range of the guns of Morro, or what was left of them, at a little after noon on June 20th, just two months after the opening of the war, and one month after Cervera had entered Santiago harbor without incident. The great transports and their convoys presented an impressive sight, stretching out over eight miles of the Caribbean Sea and gently moving with the heavy ground swell as though courtesying to the grim warships which had so long awaited their coming. The decks were thronged with soldiers gazing at the remarkable scene before them. The line paraded in single file past the warships, each vessel dipping her flag to the admiral as she passed. The battleship *Indiana* was in the lead, followed by the gunboats *Bancroft*, *Castine*, *Machias*, and *Annapolis*. Then followed the transports, while the rear was

brought up by the cruiser *Detroit* and several other smaller convoys. General Shafter was immediately taken to the flagship, where he informed the admiral that the trip had been without incident of note, and plans were at once considered for the landing of the troops, eager to leave the crowded transports.

The admiral had already made arrangements for a consultation with the Cuban leaders, and that afternoon a preliminary landing for this purpose was made at Aserraderos, a point about twenty miles west of Santiago, which the Cuban General Rabi had occupied a few weeks before and was still holding. But about twenty people went ashore, and they certainly made one of the most striking pictures of the war. Admiral Sampson and General Shafter, with but a small escort, were rowed to the beach in a small boat, which was met by a mounted force of Cuban officers. As the blue jackets drove the boat towards the shore, the Cubans dashed into the surf, cheering and shouting. The party was conducted to General Rabi's headquarters, where a conference was held, General Garcia, the Cuban commander in the province, being present. The camp was a very picturesque collection of shelters made of palm leaves after the Cuban fashion, situated on the crest of a rugged hill and containing something over a thousand soldiers newly equipped and furnished with stores from the fleet.

It was evident that Aserraderos was no place for a landing, for the so-called road leading to Santiago was only a mule path over which it would require many days of hard work to transport artillery, and the city was on the opposite side of the bay. Guantanamo, on the east, Shafter considered equally bad, and still further away. It was agreed that Baiquiri, about fifteen miles east of Morro, would be the best place, though it was admitted that it would be difficult to land there if the Spaniards made a very stout resistance. With the aid of the ships and a plan for diverting the attention of the enemy to other points, however, General Shafter thought it could be done without great loss.

The plan as finally agreed upon was to begin the landing



INVASION OF CUBA. FIRST UNITED STATES TROOPS TO LAND ON FOREIGN SOIL.
Landing of the first American Army of Invasion at the pier at Badquiri, near Santiago.

at Baiquiri soon after daylight the 22d. General Castillo was ordered to bring a thousand Cubans to flank out the Spanish on the east of the landing, while four vessels were to shell the beach and blockhouses, the *Detroit* and *Castine* on the westward flank and the *New Orleans* and *Wasp* on the eastern flank. In order to deceive the enemy, feints were arranged for other points; vessels were to take positions at daylight in front of Siboney and Aguadores, both to the eastward of Morro and somewhat nearer than Baiquiri, and also in the bay of Cabañas to the westward of Morro. In the latter place a feint of landing would be made, ten transports lying off that point and lowering boats and pretending to make ready to row ashore. The *Brooklyn*, *Massachusetts*, *Iowa*, and *Oregon* were to retain their positions in front of the mouth of the harbor. The last clause of Admiral Sampson's order to his vessels was significant. It read:

"The attention of commanding officers of all vessels engaged in blockading Santiago de Cuba is earnestly called to the necessity of the utmost vigilance from this time forward — both as to maintaining stations and readiness for action, and as to keeping a close watch upon the harbor mouth. If the Spanish admiral ever intends to attempt to escape, that attempt will be made soon."

The plan as outlined worked at first with satisfactory success. The feints deceived the Spanish; the bombardment by the ships was described in the Spanish reports to Madrid as terrific and insupportable; the Cubans did their share in distracting the enemy, which fled from Baiquiri's blockhouse to posts along the coast towards Sevilla, a town about six miles east of Santiago and about three miles from the shore. Before they fled from Baiquiri an attempt was made to burn the town and the supplies, but much of it was left unharmed, even food was found cooking for the Spaniards' breakfast. The only damage suffered by the fleet in the engagement was on board the *Texas*; a shell from Socapa battery happened to strike her, killing one sailor and wounding eight.

When the signal for landing was given, scores of rowboats, steam launches, and dispatch boats crowded with soldiers

made for the little pier belonging to the Spanish-American Iron Company. The men at the oars pulled hard in a desire to be the first to land, the steam launches rolled and pitched and puffed, while over them flew the shots from the gunboats, tearing off the roofs of the huts and battering the blockhouses to pieces. The waves ran high and as the first of the launches approached the pier it was suddenly lifted and the men, in attempting to spring out, were thrown violently to the wharf; others were scrambling out of rowboats through the surf; then a cheer arose and was caught up by the sailors on the warships and the soldiers on the transports; men waved their hats, jumped up and down and yelled. But the noise was even greater a little later when four men were seen scaling the sheer face of the mountain up the narrow trail to the highest blockhouse; for a moment they were outlined against the sky in a bunch by the side of the blockhouse and all was still; then up went a flag, out flashed the Stars and Stripes against the blue sky at the very top of the ridge. Sailors, Cubans, and soldiers, on land and on sea, shouted and cheered again, and every steam whistle for miles around shrieked and tooted and roared in a pandemonium of delight and triumph.

The landing recalled the pictures of naval maneuvers of long ago, when armed boat crews and boarding parties were in vogue. Throughout the day smoke was issuing from the burning buildings of the town. Outside were the transports, ranging from the huge coastwise steamer to side-wheelers and nondescript vessels. All were constantly moving to overcome the drift of the current. Among them and spread out to either shore were the convoys whose keen-eyed lookouts scanned the beach and hills beyond. Small boats were everywhere. They came and went singly, in pairs, in groups, in long lines, rowed and towed. They clung to the ships, they lined the landing wharf, and they filled the space between.

The men, after landing at the low wharf inside the iron pier, straggled up a level bit of sand beyond it. Then they fell into companies, and, marching away, were soon lost to

view in the tangle of tropical underbrush. Of the thousands who landed not more than 200 were in sight at any time on shore.

All day long and all the next day the boats went back and forth, landing the soldiers at Baiquiri without resistance, and the Spaniards having evacuated Siboney, that place was taken for the landing of other troops and the horses and mules; the latter were pitched overboard in the expectation that they would swim ashore, and most of them did so, though a few swam directly out to sea and were drowned. Landing 15,000 men, with arms and equipment and all the paraphernalia of war on such a beach without the aid of lighters was a long and difficult undertaking even when unresisted. If the Spaniards had made a bold stand at the first it would have been much more difficult, if not impossible, but they feared the guns of the fleet and fell back to the hills.

General Lawton, who was in command of the advance landing party, occupied the town of Baiquiri the first night, posting sentries about in the hills, and General Young's troops had advanced some distance on the road to Santiago. The next day the head of the column was pushed further on. One road runs along the coast behind the cliffs for some distance, but it was found to be hardly more than a wood path overgrown with bushes and shut in on either side by the chaparral. Another road, but no better, runs to the north of this to Juragua and Seville, where the Spanish general, Linares, had assembled his forces for resistance. Either road was a dangerous one to follow and artillery could be moved up but slowly. Yet the men worked bravely on, the line moving ahead on the roads as it was landed from the transports without a challenge from the enemy.

An interesting incident of the march through the village of Demajayabo on the 23d was the capture of a locomotive left by the Spaniards standing on the track with steam up. Before they scampered away they attempted to disable the engine, but their efforts merely served to again illustrate Span-

ish lack of mechanical skill and the ingenuity of the Yankee. The railroad employes had hurriedly taken off the connecting rods, throttle gear, and other important pieces of the machinery, concealing them behind fences and under cars, and even burying some of them. Then, after blocking the piston guides with pieces of wood, they ran off in the firm belief that they had put the locomotive permanently out of commission.

But in the Yankee forces were half a dozen old railroad engineers and mechanics who shouted with joy when they saw the engine. In a few moments they were clambering all over the machine, and it took them but a minute to discover its condition. A search was started for the missing parts, some of which were found; clever makeshifts were resorted to in place of those not found, and in a short time the locomotive was puffing away in the direction of Juragua drawing a train of ore cars filled with Yankee soldiers.

On the 24th the end came to this peaceful prologue and war began in earnest. The hot sun came up from behind the mountain peaks, lifted the curtain of morning mist and revealed the advance line of the army scattered along the narrow valley which traces irregular paths between Baiquiri and Sevilla. Two miles to the rear were the tents of the second division marking with a white line the road to Demajayabo, to which General Wheeler had moved and established headquarters during the night.

General Lawton's headquarters consisted of a cluster of half a dozen huts two miles inland from Siboney, whose little harbor was crowded with transports, launches, and small boats still engaged in landing troops. The third division was clustered about the beach, some bathing, others gathering the scattered equipments, and still others making preparations for breakfast. Far to the front was the thin line of Castillo's Cuban outposts, their flags faintly moving in the morning air.

According to reports brought to General Wheeler, who was in command of the forces which had already landed, while General Shafter was still on his ship, the Spaniards, after their



BLOCK HOUSE AT SIBONEY WHERE THE AMERICAN TROOPS FIRST HOISTED THE UNITED STATES
FLAG; AFTERWARDS MADE A BASE OF SUPPLIES.

evacuation of Siboney, had retired to a point three miles away near Sevilla, and had intrenched themselves at a junction of two roads or trails called Guasimas. From that point a single road leads to Santiago. General Wheeler had in this locality the Twenty-third Infantry, four troops of the First Cavalry, four of the Tenth Cavalry, and the troops of the Rough Riders — in all about 1,000 men. After making an examination of the country in which the enemy was supposed to have halted, he returned to his headquarters and notified his officers that he proposed to attack. Colonel Wood of the Rough Riders was ordered to approach the enemy from the left while the force under General Young followed the road to the right, the two meeting at Guasimas.

Gradually the sun chased the lingering shadows out of the ravines and began to scorch the hillsides. Camps were broken, columns of soldiers were formed, and the advance was resumed. Blazing blockhouses here and there indicated that the enemy was still in full retreat, hastening to the shelter of the entrenchments nearer the city. Not a Spaniard could be seen, although hundreds of field glasses scrutinized every part of the landscape in a vain effort to penetrate the thickets. Early in the morning General Young started towards Guasimas with the First and Tenth dismounted Cavalry, and, according to the agreement of the night before, he took the trail to the right of the Rough Riders, who as yet had not come into possession of their horses and were therefore dubbed the "Rough Walkers." They left their camp at 5 o'clock, and at 7 entered the village of Siboney. After a short halt they began a long climb up the steep western trail toward the rendezvous. By this time the heat of the sun was beginning to be keenly felt by the men. Laden with full marching equipment, they toiled slowly up the rocky path in single file. Not enough air was stirring to make a leaf flutter. Along the hillside several halts were necessary before the men could reach the mountain. A dozen mules carried the reserve ammunition and the scanty hospital supplies. The beasts were se-

riously affected by the heat also, but despite these obstacles the toilsome ascent was finally made and a refreshing sea breeze afforded a trifling relief. Before the Rough Riders stretched for nine miles a comparatively level plateau half a mile in width, dotted with chaparral thickets and frequently broken by small ravines.

Meanwhile, Young's men were slowly winding their way along about a half mile to Wood's right, but the bushes were so thick in every direction that neither line could see the other. Skirmish lines had been sent ahead to prevent a surprise. The men advanced in high spirits, remarking upon the scenery, but the heat was so intense that some began to fall out of the ranks and drop exhausted under the shade of convenient bushes.

Still no sign of the enemy. The columns labored along over the narrow uneven path for an hour and a half, when Wood called another halt and rode forward to meet Captain Capron, who had been sent on ahead and who was now coming back. He had gone within sight of the enemy's outposts, and the officers knew that a battle was at hand. The Rough Riders had not been ambushed, but they had been ordered ahead to attack the enemy, whose position was known in a general way, but it is doubtful if such a battlefield was ever seen before. The place where the Rough Riders were halted was where the trail narrowed and proceeded downward. On one side of it was a stout barbed wire fence and on both sides was a dense chaparral, which in places was absolutely impenetrable. Wood and Capron came back and said to Roosevelt: "Pass the word back to keep silence in the ranks," and then they disappeared again towards the front. The men had no knowledge of what was ahead and merely welcomed the opportunity for a little rest and a chance to shift their packs. As a matter of fact they had little expectation that an enemy which had made no resistance to their landing would oppose the march very seriously till in force before Santiago.

After waiting about ten minutes, Wood returned and gave orders to deploy the troops at either side of the trail. Ca-

pron's troops were ordered down the trail itself; Troop G into the bushes on the right, and K and A were sent down into the hollow to connect with Young's column across the valley, which had also come up with the enemy and had begun firing. Troops F and E were deployed in skirmish line to the left.

But the movement had hardly begun when, with surprising unexpectedness, there was a sharp crack which seemed very near, and the peculiar music of a Mauser bullet sounded over the Rough Riders' heads. There was no more gossip in the ranks, but the men scattered in the directions in which they had been ordered, Roosevelt leading the men to the right and Wood down the grassy slope to the left. The music of the bullets at once became constant; the enemy's fire was heavy. While the Rough Riders had not been strictly taken by surprise, the lay of the land placed them at a terrible disadvantage. But no one seemed frightened. Though a moment before they had scarcely been able to realize that they were actually at war, they now rushed forward with an excitement which amounted almost to ecstasy. Whether the Spaniards could see our men or not, our men could not see the Spaniards, and yet the fire was not more than eighty yards away and was so hot that our men could only lie in the grass and fire in that position. As they rose up to rush a little further towards the enemy, some dropped not to rise when the next order for an advance came. The advances were made in quick, desperate rushes, and sometimes the ground gained was very slight. There was but an occasional glimpse of the enemy, and our men could only fire their volleys into the places whence the shots seemed to come, but they fired with perfect discipline and the advance was steady. Gradually the line became divided by the trail into two wings, that in the valley and that on the left, swinging around on the enemy's right flank.

When the fighting had lasted about an hour, the line reached a more open country in front of a slight hill. Meantime, the troops that had pushed out in the direction of Young had joined his line, which was meeting a desperate re-

sistance and which had thus far been unable to dislodge the enemy from his rifle pits. By this time also the troops in the rear, the Tenth Cavalry and the Twenty-second Infantry, hearing of the battle ahead, had hurried forward to reinforce their comrades. Both Wood and Roosevelt led their men in a charge up the incline, and the enemy, thinking that the whole army was behind them, retreated. The Rough Riders, reinforced by the men hurrying up from the rear, pressed their advance relentlessly, throwing away everything that could impede their progress and rushing on regardless of danger. Such an advance in the face of terrific volleys was past the comprehension of the Spaniards. "When we fired a volley," said one of the prisoners later, "instead of falling back they came forward. That is not the way to fight, to come closer at every volley." Many striking incidents occurred. One private continued firing after being hit by three bullets and retired only when the fourth had disabled him. One who had been sent to the rear seriously wounded, caught up a rifle, and, running back, joined in the charge. It was a magnificent dash, and when the enemy had disappeared towards Sevilla, the Rough Riders and their comrades rested on the ground they had gained and where some of their bravest men had fallen. The Spanish force engaged has been variously estimated, but numbered at least 2,000. When the battle began, the American force at the front was less than a quarter of that of the enemy, which, moreover, had a marked advantage in position. The Rough Riders had made a night march the evening before, had secured but about three hours' sleep on the wet ground, and had been marched under a burning sun and over a difficult trail right into action. Few of them had ever fired a Krag-Jorgensen rifle before, as they had secured their arms but a short time before leaving Tampa, and probably not over 80 per cent. had been under fire before. Of the Rough Riders eight were killed and thirty-four wounded, and of General Young's force there were eighteen killed and eighteen wounded. Among the officers killed were Captain

Capron and Sergeant Fish, a grandson of the Secretary of State under Grant. Both Wood and Roosevelt were in the thick of the fight, and walked calmly about the lines encouraging their men, but neither was hit, though they had many narrow escapes.

The Spaniards had not simply lost many men, but their courage. From this time they acted simply on the defensive. In their retreat they passed beyond many places where they might have secured a terrible advantage over our advancing troops and devoted themselves entirely to an ingenious defense of the outer intrenchments of Santiago.

Shortly after General Shafter's expedition had departed from Tampa, it was announced that Admiral Camara's fleet had left Cadiz. Having derived some satisfaction from the manner in which Cervera had eluded Sampson the month before, much to the anxiety of people on the coast, Spain apparently decided to use similar tactics at this important time, when the better part of the American navy was engaged in holding Cervera. Admiral Camara's ships departed after the most solemn ceremonies, the blessing of flags by the bishops and a brilliant procession. For some days its destination was mere guess-work. It was considered probable that Camara was coming to the relief of Cervera. While the number of the ships was considerable — sixteen altogether — but two were really formidable, even in theory. These were the battleship *Pelayo* and the armored cruiser *Carlos V.* With them were three new torpedo-boat destroyers and two auxiliary cruisers. The remainder were gunboats and colliers.

On the 25th, Sagasta announced that the fleet was bound for the Philippines, and the movement was considered as of little importance except as a sop to public opinion in Spain, for the people complained that the government was weak in not relieving Governor-General Augusti at Manila. They were still supposing that Cervera was preventing the United States from doing anything in Cuba, and were inclined to think that Camara could easily redeem the Philippines. On

the 26th he reached the north end of the Suéz Canal and acted as if he intended to go on. While the United States government saw nothing to seriously fear in the Cadiz squadron, as the *Monterey* and *Charleston* would arrive at Manila before Camara possibly could, it announced on the 27th that an American squadron under Commodore Watson would prepare for immediate cruise to the coast of Spain. The Spanish coast cities at once became alarmed and fortifications were strengthened in a hurry. But Watson's fleet did not sail "at once." The government kept reiterating its intention to have it sail, but there were delays in getting the ships ready and there were other excuses. Indeed, the announcement seemed to be mainly intended to divert Camara's ships from the Philippines and back to Spain. If such was the strategy, it proved entirely successful, for after hovering about the entrance of the canal for some days, paying toll money amounting to \$250,000, and, after taking the fleet to Suez, he turned about, paid return toll, and eventually started homeward, to the amazement and bewilderment of everybody. This return movement, however, did not occur till after Cervera's fleet had been destroyed and the capitulation of Santiago had become inevitable.

CHAPTER XLIX

CONTINUED ADVANCE OF THE AMERICAN TROOPS—GENERAL SHAFTER ARRIVES AT THE FRONT—PREPARATIONS FOR A GENERAL ATTACK—INGENIOUS SPANISH DEFENSES.

Advancing the American Lines—The Spanish Retreat—Trials of the Trail—Soldiers Pushing Ahead Faster Than Supplies Could be Brought Up—Impossible to Land Heavy Guns—Cutting a Way through Tropical Jungles—General Shafter Leaves the Ship—The Cuban Soldiers—A Remarkable Collection of Warriors—Famished and Naked Patriots—No Understanding of Organized War—Their Value as Scouts and Guides—Their Aversion to Spades and Picks—Good Reasons for an Immediate Attack—Dangers of the Climate—Stretching the Line Northward—Position of the Different Divisions—Within Rifle Range of the Enemy—Traps Laid by the Spaniards—Disguised Sharpshooters in the Treetops—Rifle Pits Trained on the Openings through Which our Troops Must Advance—Riflemen Placed Like Machine-Guns—The Block Houses and Masked Batteries—Expecting to Take Santiago in a Day—Inadequate Hospital Arrangements—The Greatest Land Battle of the War.

AFTER the engagements of the 24th, General Wheeler pushed forward his command through the valley and Generals Lawton and Kent with their commands occupied the adjacent hills as fast as troops were landed. By the night of the 25th there were about 8,000 American and Cuban troops in and about Sevilla, which the Spaniards had evacuated without resistance. On the following morning the advance guard, led by the Seventh Infantry under Colonel Benham, pushed forward about three miles, halting and camping near San Juan on the Guamo River about four miles from Santiago. During the day the entire First Brigade moved forward and camped within two miles of the Seventh Infantry, while the Cubans, whose knowledge of the country surpassed that of the Spaniards themselves, were kept a little in advance of the most advanced American lines. They were indeed within two miles of the Spanish outposts in the hills, a short distance east of the city. The scouts had explored the terri-

tory between the head of the column and the Spanish outposts and no considerable body of Spaniards was reported. The remainder of our army was camped along the hills between the front and the landing places at Baiquiri and Siboney. These detachments were being moved forward as rapidly as possible, but in the face of the most unfavorable conditions. No opposition was met from the Spaniards, however, who seemed to have been dazed by the rapidity and daring of the American advance. They had abandoned position after position with scarcely a show of resistance. If they had fought every inch our army would have been in a very difficult position. One who has not gone over the trails in this section of Cuba in a pouring rain or burning sun cannot understand the sufferings to which the American troops were subjected and the heroism with which they bore it. These infantrymen from cool northern climes toiled hour after hour along these so-called roads and paths, through jungles of cacti, poison vines and high grass which cuts like a razor, in a blistering sunlight which made the horizon waver before the eyes, or in a torrent of rain which drenched to the skin, while from the stagnant pools gray mists arose, and everywhere vultures with outstretched wings looked greedily down.

And yet all the men were anxious for the fighting to begin, many of them as yet without any adequate idea of what real fighting was like. They chafed at the delay caused in bringing up supplies, which was, of course, a very hard task in such a country, especially when the commissary department had been mismanaged. General Shafter had hurried forward the light guns as fast as he could and did not wish fighting to begin till he had the batteries in position, but the heavy guns were still on the transports. There was only one lighter to take off supplies. The spirit of the men was such that they would have rejoiced at an order to carry the city by assault, big guns or not. But General Shafter had no intention of attacking till the subsistence department had become able to provide three days' rations for the soldiers' knapsacks, and it appeared

impossible to work the provisions along as fast as the eager soldiers advanced. With a high sea running it was dangerous work even to land the supplies, and yet the soldiers at the front, often obliged to wait a disagreeably long time for their rations, were ready to throw away their knapsacks and rush upon Santiago. Tired, footsore, drenched as they were, they were eager for any orders involving some daring deed without any consideration of what might follow.

On the 26th, General Shafter left the ship on which he had made his headquarters during the work of landing the expedition and went along the road and among the camps, consulting with his generals and the Cuban leaders. He was informed that General Linares, who was in command at Santiago, was about to be reinforced by a division from Manzanillo, and he decided to send a detachment of Cuban troops to intercept them, or at least keep them at bay till the city could be completely surrounded. When General Shafter reached the front on the 29th, having had abundant opportunity on the way to observe the obstacles under which the transportation of military supplies had been made, he found that a large part of his troops had reached a position so close to the Spanish lines before Santiago that only the intervening hills remained to be taken. In view of the difficulties of the country, General Shafter had reason to feel proud that in a week's time his army had made such headway. The soldiers were in good form; the Cubans added greatly to the numbers, and while they had not as yet been tested in regular battle, they had proved of great advantage in scouting. General Garcia was working cordially with him and seemed to be ready to do whatever was ordered.

Up to this time the Cuban soldiers had been regarded with something like enthusiastic interest. They were the most remarkable collection of warriors which our army officers had ever seen. On the morning of the 29th, for instance, one of the transports had landed at Siboney 2,000 insurgents which had been brought around from Aserraderos under the

command of General Sanchez. They were landed through the heavy surf and lined up emaciated, half naked, and in some instances almost entirely nude; but, weak as they were, they stood up proudly and shouted "Cuba Libre" much to the astonishment of the foreign military representatives, who were utterly at a loss to understand the enthusiasm of men in their miserable condition. These famished men fell to devouring the rations served to them like starving wolves; some of them ate so much that they nearly died, but then they cheerfully prepared to march to the front among the Cuban scouts. The American officers soon found, however, that the value of these allies was mainly confined to their scouting. In a certain way their bravery was phenomenal, but they had no understanding of organized war or discipline. In the excitement of the fighting they paid no attention to orders; they would lacerate the treetops with their bullets, then fling down their rifles and rush through the bushes at a few Spaniards with their machetes. All the work of making intrenchments, of widening the roads for bringing up guns or food was to them a puzzle. They would cheerfully scout, but they would not work with spades and picks; and naturally the Americans became indignant when they saw the Cubans sitting around munching the food brought up with so much difficulty, while hard digging in trenches was to be done. These half clad, lean, and dusky fellows would sneak through the underbrush up under the noses of the Spaniards, and when hit with a bullet would throw up their arms, shout "Cuba Libre," and drop dead; but all the Cubans in Cuba could not have taken Santiago. Our soldiers could readily understand why the Spaniards had never been able to drive them out of such a country, and why the Cubans had seldom shown a disposition to fight in the open. Gomez's plan of wearing out Spain was the only one in which his picturesque forces had any chance of success.

But leaving the possible assistance of the Cubans out of the question, General Shafter took an optimistic view of the



AN ALARM NEAR THE SPANISH LINE AT SHIRONEY. CUBAN SCOUTS RALLYING AROUND A UNITED STATES DESPATCH BEARER.

situation as he found it at the front. So weakly had the Spaniards resisted his landing when they might have made it exceedingly difficult, so quickly had they abandoned strong positions and fallen back on their intrenchments, that Shafter thought they could be easily beaten out of their last defense. Nearly everything went to confirm him in this opinion. Deserters from Santiago told him of the desperate condition of the Spaniards in the city. It had been expected that they would make a strong defense of Aguadores near the coast and on the left of the American line, for they had strongly intrenched it and had some artillery there, but on the 30th they deserted it and moved to the seaward fortifications a little to the west and containing the strongest batteries on the coast. But they were within reach of the fleet, and therefore the left of the American line was ordered to move up to the position the Spaniards had deserted.

But while General Shafter had his army within rifle range of the enemy, his heavy guns were still on the transports; his soldiers had forged ahead over roads which could not be made passable for heavy guns for days. It is not strange that the question whether he should wait for the heavy guns occurred to him nor is it altogether strange that he decided not to wait for them.

The country was such that inactivity might prove more fatal to the soldiers than action; sickness due to climatic conditions might in a few days weaken and demoralize such an eager army; in their desire to push on rapidly they had thrown away much that they were likely to need when waiting in their position. They were still in excellent form, but as one or two of the officers had become ill and General Shafter himself began to feel the effects of the climate, prompt attack seemed wise. Moreover, reinforcements were hurrying to Linares from the west and the Spanish near Guantanamo might take advantage of delay to seek a position on the American right. Everything tended to convince Shafter that it might be fatal to wait. Later experience justified his conduct. The risks

of the Cuban climate to Northern men, exposed to the furious sun during the days and compelled to sleep through the damp, chill nights with no shelter, were at least as great as could be expected, even from stubborn Spanish resistance. At first the weather had been very good, but rains had begun during the advance and the men suffered discomforts which finally told on their health. But this was after the fight had been won. When they fought they were fresh and vigorous. Had Shafter waited for the heavy guns there might not have been as many lives lost in the furious assault, but he might have had a discouraged and enfeebled army. His decision, which seemed to some so unwise, was really the critical move upon which everything depended. It meant bloodshed, but it also meant victory and a speedy termination of the war.

To the north of the American position lay the fortified village of Caney, which it was deemed necessary to reduce lest the enemy threaten the rear. The garrison there was supposed to number about 800 men. To the south was Aguadores, where the Spaniards had already abandoned better fortifications than were supposed to exist in Caney. Directly in front and all that prevented the Americans from marching up to the city intrenchments was the fortified hill of San Juan. General Shafter considered that Caney would make but slight resistance and that Lawton's (the Second) division of 6,000 men could take it, while Kent's (the First) and Wheeler's cavalry were advancing in the valley towards San Juan hill. Having reached Caney, Lawton would be able to return and co-operate with Kent and Wheeler before San Juan, which appeared to be the strongest defended. At the same time General Duffield, in command of the Thirteenth Michigan Volunteers, a battalion of the Thirty-fourth Michigan, and with 2,000 Cubans, could make an attack on the Spanish near the coast and prevent their going to the assistance of those at San Juan and Caney.

During the 30th the troops gradually assumed the positions convenient for such a general movement. Lawton's

division, which stretched northward towards Caney, consisted of two brigades, the Seventh, Twelfth, and Seventeenth under General Chaffee, and the Eighth and Twenty-second Infantry and Second Massachusetts Volunteers under General Ludlow, and the First, Fourth, and Twenty-fifth Infantry under Colonel Miles. With General Lawton were Capron's and Parkhouse's batteries of light guns, the former being in the lead. Captain Grimes's battery was moved forward to a commanding position in front of General Kent in the center, and he had also Captain Best's battery. Kent's second and third brigades, the former composed of the Second, Tenth, and Twenty-first Infantry under Colonel Pearson, the latter of the Ninth, Thirteenth, and Twenty-fourth Infantry under Colonel Wickoff, were moved forward about two miles to a point on the Santiago road near corps headquarters, where they bivouacked. His first brigade under General Hawkins, composed of the Sixth and Sixteenth Infantry and Seventy-first New York Volunteers, remained in its camp a little in the rear of the corps headquarters. General Bates had the Third and Twentieth Infantry back near the coast, while General Duffield had the Thirty-third and a part of the Thirty-fourth Michigan before Aguadores with a force of about 2,000 Cubans. Admiral Sampson was prepared to open fire on the shore battery to which the Spanish on the south of our line had taken refuge, while the land division at Aguadores attacked from that side. Neither Admiral Sampson nor General Garcia agreed with General Shafter on the weak resistance likely to be expected from the Spanish. Garcia said that in their final intrenchments they would fight desperately, and he was right. But Shafter was justified in hastening operations as much as possible.

The American officers had no idea, nor could they have even after the most effective work of scouts, of the ingenious character of the Spanish defense. While they had been weakly surrendering outside positions, they had been working persistently at devices which they had planned as traps,

So, indeed, they were. Against a less courageous and aggressive army, their effect would have been practical annihilation. According to all military rules, the Spaniards had made themselves impregnable and had craftily led the Americans on into the jungle to fall a victim to their devices.

The Spanish plan was to stop our advance by three different methods and at three different stages of attack. It must always be remembered that the roads and trails in this vicinity had all been cut through dense tropical jungles, in some places so wild and tangled with vines and creepers as to be almost impenetrable. Here and there were openings or glades of high grass dotted with clumps of bushes. The first or outer line of Spanish defense consisted of sharpshooters posted in the tree tops along these roads and trails. It was the business of these men to harass and, if possible, demoralize our troops by subjecting them to galling cross fires from a series of petty ambushes. Such a scheme could never have been thought of except by a Spaniard and could never have been carried out except in a country of this kind. But it was carried out with thoughtful attention to every detail. These sharpshooters were hidden in carefully prepared nests of leaves in the tops of dense trees; some of them had tunics of fresh palm leaves tied around their bodies from the shoulders down, so that at a little distance they could not be distinguished from the foliage in which they were concealed. They could neither be seen, driven in, nor dislodged; they used Mauser rifles with smokeless powder and they were posted in the trees in the confident expectation that they could pick off our soldiers as they advanced. After our men had passed by, these skirmishers could still fire at them, shoot them in the back, worry them by an unseen fire, shoot those bringing up supplies or carrying back the wounded.

But failing, as they doubtless expected to fail, in the attempt to check our troops by these petty ambushes, the Spaniards had made careful and elaborate preparations to slaughter them in the glades or openings through which the

troops must pass on the way to the city. Almost every one of these openings was within range of either a line of rifle pits or of a substantial log blockhouse, placed in a commanding position on a knoll or hill. The distance between the rifle pits or blockhouses and the openings had been carefully measured and large sheets of what appeared to be metal roofing had been set up back of the glades to serve as aiming guides. Machine-guns had been accurately trained on these sheets of metal and given the proper elevation. In some of the blockhouses firing boards consisting of slightly inclined tables or shelves with deep grooves cut in them for rifle barrels had been prepared as a means of directing the fire of the soldiers to the particular opening in the road which was to be swept when the American troops appeared in it. The inclination of these boards was such that all the Spaniards had to do was to load and blaze away, thus preventing wild random firing in the excitement of battle. It was virtually equivalent to turning a file of riflemen into a machine gun, the range for which had been accurately calculated and which waited only for Americans to appear in front of the target, as they inevitably must if they advanced.

The third and final line of Spanish defense consisted of the blockhouses with a few open or masked batteries of light guns and a net work of connecting or encircling rifle pits and the barbed-wire entanglements intended to prevent a rush assault and detain our troops under a murderous fire. These intrenchments were not continuous along our whole front, but they were at all points in such a way as to command all the easy and natural approaches. It is not strange that the Spaniards after such preparation confidently counted on resisting the American troops before which they had so weakly retired, and as these devices were not suspected by the American officers, it is not strange that they advanced confidently to take a position which, technically, it was impossible for them to take.

So general was this sanguine feeling that when dawn

broke they would begin a march which would in a few hours end within the walls of Santiago, that preparations for remaining outside were neglected and preparations for possible fatalities or reverses were inadequate. One small field hospital with equipments had reached the front on the 29th and been placed in one of the glades of high grass near the road and surrounded by a jungle. It provided tent shelter for but about a hundred wounded men. The supply of blankets was very short; and, indeed, no cots or mattresses had been brought forward. So rapid had been the advance of the brave army that it had been impossible to follow up with all the requirements for severe fighting, but as General Shafter apparently did not expect this, nor the army fear it, too little thought was given to it.

Under such conditions was begun the battle of July 1st, the greatest land battle of the war. It was really three battles in one, for the taking of Caney occupied Lawton's division so long that it was unable to co-operate in the center before San Juan as expected. As the line of battle was so extended and the whole country was so covered with woods and chaparral, those fighting in any one place had little idea of what was going on elsewhere, and it was not till the sun went down that the army knew what a great day it had been. It will be impossible to describe the battle as one general engagement, but the fighting at the three different points must be described separately, the reader remembering that the troops were simultaneously engaged all along the line and all day.

CHAPTER L

THE FIERCE BATTLE OF JULY FIRST AT SAN JUAN, CANEY, AND AGUADORES — GALLANT CONDUCT AND HEAVY LOSSES OF SHAFTER'S ARMY — INADEQUATE PROVISION FOR THE SUFFERING WOUNDED — A DARK OUTLOOK.

The Morning of July First — Grimes's Battery Opens Fire — The Spanish Reply — The Advance in the Center towards San Juan — A Tell-tale Balloon — Critical Position of the Seventy-first New York — Storming the Hill — General Hawkins' Brave Charge — Capturing the Spanish Position — Roosevelt Leads the Charge up San Juan Hill — Lawton's Attack upon Caney — Desperate Defense of the Spaniards — The Dash of the Colored Troops — Storming the Fort — Caney Falls — General Duffield's Attack at Aguadores — Inadequacy of Hospital Arrangements — Terrible Suffering but Brave Endurance of the Wounded — Provisions Run Short — General Shafter Sick and Disheartened — A Dark Outlook — Looking to the Fleet for Help — The Spaniards also in Despair — Cervera Receives Orders to Escape.

THE morning of July 1st was hot with tropical intensity. Thickets and overhanging palms were wreathed in vapors. To the north of the forces in the center of the line rose a range of verdant peaks. Along the road leading to El Poso were silently marching the troops. Beyond El Poso was a dense Cuban forest into which regiment after regiment was marching, and, somewhere in that thick undergrowth, was forming a line of battle. Further on rose the green hill of San Juan capped by its blockhouse, and to the right and left along the crest were Spanish intrenchments. Over the uneven valley floated the buzzards waiting for the carnage — "all in a hot and copper sky." On a little hill to the left of El Poso ranch house, an artistic old building with tiled roof, was posted Captain Grimes's battery of four guns, and at twenty minutes to 7 Grimes gave the order:

"Number one, ready! Fire!" This was followed by one gun after another with solid shot and shrapnel, making a

very exhilarating spectacle in the bright sunshine. In the intervals could be heard the boom of Capron's battery, which had opened on the defenses of Caney far off to the right, and above the palms rose a cloud of smoke marking his position. Grimes's guns had boomed a few times when a voice down in front called out, "Here it comes!" Men instinctively ducked their heads and the first Spanish shell came screaming over the artillerymen and throwing shrapnel into the ranks behind. Another came and burst among our men near the ranch house, wounding several; another exploded in a dip under the hill, where twelve Cubans were torn to pieces. The music of shrapnel is anything but pleasant, but Grimes's voice was as clarion-like as ever, the "Ready! Fire!" coming as regular as clockwork. One of his shots tore through the roof of the blockhouse, others damaged the Spanish battery, and finally their fire ceased. Grimes continued to fire a little longer, and then for a moment all was still, excepting for the occasional crack of a Spanish rifle — no one could tell where.

Far to the front the war balloon was slowly moving down, keeping pace with the firing line of infantry, and suddenly a volley crashed from the Spanish rifle pits; there was an answering crash from the rifles of our men and the great battle of San Juan had fairly begun.

Wheeler's dismounted cavalry had been ordered off the hill to the front, while Kent's infantry moved similarly on the left, but the road narrowed, crossing several fordable streams, and Kent received orders to allow the cavalry the right of way. But, compelled to wade the river and other streams to get into line, the progress was necessarily slow, and it had to be made under a galling fire not simply from the Spaniards on San Juan hill but from sharpshooters in the treetops. The fortunes of the Signal Corps' war balloon were not conducive to the belief in the efficiency of such means in warfare, especially in such an engagement. As it kept pace with the movements of the division, it only indicated its line of march and drew upon it the enemy's fire. Soon the balloon itself be-

came a target for the enemy's gunners and riflemen; it was pierced many times and the occupants of the car gave themselves up for lost. It was finally brought down to the bed of a stream and abandoned.

Whenever the men waded the streams the enemy's fire fell among them like hail, and they went down dead, wounded, and dying on every side without having even seen the face of a Spaniard. The fire increased steadily, coming from all directions, even from the sharpshooters in the rear and from the shrapnel aimed at the balloon. At this point General Kent was informed that a trail or narrow way had been discovered by the signal men in the balloon, leading to the left to a ford lower down the stream. Into this he turned the Seventy-first New York Regiment. General Kent, in his official report of the battle, says:

"This would have speedily delivered them in their proper place on the left of their brigade, but under the galling fire of the enemy the leading battalion of this regiment was thrown into confusion and recoiled in disorder on the troops in the rear. At this critical moment the officers of my staff practically formed a cordon behind the panic-stricken men and urged them to go forward. I finally ordered them to lie down in the thicket and clear the way for others of their own regiment who were coming up behind. This many of them did, and the second and third battalions came forward in better order and moved along the road to the ford. One of my staff officers ran back waving his hat to hurry forward the third brigade who, upon approaching the forks, found the way blocked by men of the Seventy-first New York. There were other men of this regiment crouching in the bushes, many of whom were encouraged by the advance of the approaching column to rise and go forward. As already stated, I had received orders sometime before to keep in the rear of the cavalry division. Their advance was much delayed, resulting in frequent halts, presumably to drop their blanket rolls, and due to the natural delay in fording the stream. These delays under such a hot fire grew exceedingly irksome and I therefore pushed the head of my division as quickly as I could towards the river in column of files or twos, paralleled in the narrow way by the cavalry. This quickened the forward movement and enabled me to get into position as speedily as possible for the attack. Owing to the congested condition of the road the progress of the narrow columns was, however, painfully slow. I again sent a staff officer at a gallop to urge forward the troops in rear. The head of Wickoff's brigade reached the forks at 12.20 P.M. and hurried on the left, stepping over prostrate forms of men of the Seventy-first. This heroic brigade (consisting of the Thirteenth, Ninth, and Twenty-fourth United States Infantry) speedily crossed the stream and were quickly

deployed to the left of the lower ford. While personally superintending this movement, Colonel Wickoff was killed, the command of the brigade then devolving upon Lieut.-Col. Worth, Thirteenth Infantry, who immediately fell severely wounded; and then upon Lieut.-Col. Liscum, Twenty-fourth Infantry, who, five minutes later, also fell under the withering fire of the enemy. The command of the brigade then devolved upon Lieut.-Col. E. P. Ewers, Ninth Infantry.


It was a trying place for volunteers and even for regulars. On the whole, the New York soldiers did not flinch, though thirty or forty fell in a neck of the woods before they had seen a Spaniard, for the cover from which the sharpshooters fired was as dense as a jungle; many of them were firing from the rear while the bullets poured in from the intrenchments on the hill.

The Seventy-first were at a great disadvantage because they were fighting with the old Springfield rifles — “ old smoke guns,” as the soldiers called them. Every time they fired a volley the Spaniards could easily locate them, and the Mauser bullets would pour a perfect torrent upon the New York boys, doing terrible execution. It was not strange that strong hearts grew faint. It is to their credit that with few exceptions they did not flinch in that terrible ordeal.

In what was afterwards christened the Bloody Angle, a piece of grassless ground at a ford which encompassing trees made an ideal hiding-place for sharpshooters, even cool-headed officers occasionally sought a sheltering bush. In doing so one of them called out to Colonel Roosevelt: “ Colonel, better get down or they’ll pot you.” To which the acting colonel of the Rough Riders, grimly biting the stump of a cigar, replied:

“ I’m not going to lie down for any confounded Spaniard,” and he stalked about, fortunately uninjured.

No time was lost in deploying from right and left, but it was clear that the advance was confused, and it was inevitable in such a country. Looking at San Juan hill from El Poso, it appeared to consist of but one very high hill, whereas it was a series of hills, steep and difficult and forming a veritable Gibraltar against an assault by infantry. From the first the



INFANTRY ON THE WAY TO THE BATTLE OF SAN JUAN.

From a photograph taken just twenty minutes before the battle opened.

Spanish had every advantage of position. As our men advanced they were met by an ever-increasing cross fire poured from the wooded eminences on both flanks which could not be seen from the road even by the skirmish line. Every little mound, every inch of the country was perfectly known to the enemy and had been measured and filled with sharpshooters. When the Americans had to cross one of the glades or clearings it seemed as if the whole Spanish fire was concentrated upon it; yet the same thing was happening in different places. The Americans were in a continual ambush. Where the volleys came from and why the bullets reached them in such showers they could not realize. It was like being shot at in the dark and yet seeing men fall like tenpins. It was no wonder that in such a deadly labyrinth some heart weakened and commands got mixed up and orders went astray.

The division had been feeling its way along in this way for two hours when the word was passed along to halt, and there was an impression that it was the intention to go into camp on the plain below San Juan, and within range of the Spanish batteries and even of the trenches. But there were but two things to do: to retire or to storm the trenches. A retreat would have demoralized the army and postponed the taking of Santiago indefinitely. An advance was again ordered, and the troops went doggedly on, driving the Spanish outposts back and into their trenches.

At last the little foothill below San Juan was reached and the emergency developed the indispensable hero, in the person of General Hawkins, a tall, well-knit old man with a white moustache and pointed beard. With him were the Sixth and the Sixteenth Infantry; the other regiment of his brigade, the New York Volunteers, was not yet up. Hawkins rode out in front of his regulars, and, drawing his sword, pointed to the hill, and called upon them in ringing tones to follow him.

Then he turned and set his face to the enemy who had marked him for slaughter and were volleying viciously. The regulars dashed forward with a cheer in which the old rebel

yell could be distinguished. Withering was the fire on them, and men reeled and dropped in their tracks. There was some straggling, as there always is in a charge up a steep slope, but the body of men moved on and up. Volley after volley was blazed at them. The Spaniards were now in plain sight. Our men fired as they ran forward — fired at Spanish faces, peering and strained. In a moment it was all over, for the enemy scrambled out of the trenches and ran back to San Juan without looking behind. This was at 1.30 P. M. Gal-lant old General Hawkins did not get a scratch, but his losses were heavy. Lieutenant Ord, son of the distinguished general of that name and a lieutenant of the Sixth, had been killed by a wounded Spaniard after he had bidden his men to spare the fellow, and Lieutenant Michie of the same regiment had also fallen. Before the end of the day the Sixth lost 100 killed and wounded, and the casualties of the Sixteenth were also serious. To General Hawkins belongs the honor of taking the key of the position and the heart out of the Spaniards.

But in the confusion or mixed condition in which the troops were, owing to their difficult advance, it appears that other regiments of regulars joined in the assault and participated in the glory of the achievement, particularly the Ninth, Thirteenth, and Twenty-fourth, or Ewer's brigade. In fact, in the difficult work before them the brave men did not wait for orders. They rushed ahead wherever they could. One colonel found himself on a ridge with the fragments of six cavalry regiments, and he was the ranking officer. One troop of the Tenth Cavalry was found a half mile from the rest of the command.

Under the brow of the hill they had stormed there was a place where a large number of men could lie in safety, and it was soon black with them. During the afternoon the ridges to the right and left of this hill were occupied by our regiments as fast as they could come up, the Spaniards offering diminished resistance, but steadily retiring to their strong intrenchments. Two Gatling guns were finally brought into

play on the right of the enemy's second line of defense, and Best's battery also moved up and opened fire on the enemy.

At a little before 4 o'clock occurred the second thrilling episode of the day. Under the brow of the little hill a council of war had been held, the question being whether they should push on and take the main hill where the Spanish blockhouses were. Colonel Roosevelt volunteered to head the charge. It seemed a mad rush. A foreign officer standing near the position when the men started out to make the charge was heard to say:

"Men, for Heaven's sake, don't go up that hill. It will be impossible for human beings to take that position. You can't stand the fire."

But with a terrific yell they rushed up to the enemy's works, and the Spaniards, whose courage had fled after the first charge, retired, and when night came they had been driven back upon the city. But it had been a hard experience for our men. They had become drenched not simply from fording streams but by a rain which had set in. Notwithstanding their exhausted condition, they labored during the night digging trenches, furnishing details to bury the dead and to carry the wounded back in improvised litters, often being shot down by some dastardly Spanish sharpshooter left in the rear.

As the sun went down the men in Wheeler's and Kent's divisions fell to wondering what had become of Lawton's and what fighting they had had to capture Caney. As already stated, it had been thought that after Lawton had taken Caney a part of his forces could turn and assist the center; but Lawton did not advance on San Juan that afternoon because he had found that he had all he could attend to in taking Caney. It is no secret that General Lawton expected to dispose of Caney at one blow, and General Chaffee was to have the honor of capturing the place and Lawton was to earn his laurels in an attack on Santiago afterwards. He may have indulged in a hope of reaching the Spanish defenses ahead of Kent and

driving the enemy back on the city. At any rate, both Lawton and Chaffee thought Caney would be an easy nut to crack.

The start was made at dawn, and the march was made as rapidly and quickly as possible to prevent a hasty exit from Caney, for there would have been no glory in capturing an evacuated town. The Spaniards, numbering over 1,000, as it turned out, had no notion of running away. They did not come out to give battle, but fought mainly in trenches surrounding the fort and blockhouse and in those buildings. From a hill a mile and a quarter from the stone fort, Captain Capron opened the attack with shells fired at 6.35 A. M. at a body of Spaniards who were falling back to the trenches. The infantry was distributed as follows: Chaffee's brigade advanced from the east; Colonel Miles's brigade attacked from the south, and Ludlow's was sent around to make the approach from the southwest. General Chaffee rode up and down behind his firing line encouraging his men. "Now, boys, do something for your country to-day," he frequently said. Chaffee did not think the Spaniards would hold out very long. Ludlow's men made slow but steady progress through a tract of woods running from bush to bush and shooting at a Spaniard whenever they could see one.

The Second Massachusetts Volunteers of this command behaved splendidly, exposing themselves freely and displaying fine marksmanship, but, like the Seventy-first New York, they were at a disadvantage with their "smoke guns."

The Spaniards, shooting from their trenches and from loopholes, kept up a galling fire upon our men wherever they showed themselves. They fired an immense amount of ammunition. It was a continuous fusilade. If not the most brilliant, it was perhaps the most desperate battle of the Santiago campaign. It was demonstrated that the Spaniards were hard fighters in defense. In one little line of intrenchments were fifty or sixty with a young officer constantly exposing himself to our fire as he commanded his men. Time after time, for hour after hour, at his word these Spaniards

rose and delivered volley after volley into our advancing ranks. Time after time our men were thrown against the defenses, always gaining ground, but always with terrible losses. So the battle went on all day, none of our soldiers flinching and the Spaniards fighting like demons. Gradually our lines closed in on three sides of the town, driving the Spaniards out of their trenches.


Two companies of the colored Twenty-fifth Infantry, led by Lieutenant Moss, had the honor of storming and taking in two rushes the blockhouse. Many Spaniards in it were killed and the survivors made a rush for the stone fort in Caney under a hot fire. A company of the Twelfth Infantry, with a newspaper correspondent in advance of it, ran up and took possession of this fort after Capron's shells had made a wreck of it and all but three of its defenders had been killed. These, bespattered with blood and exhausted by the tremendous strain of their defense, were glad to surrender. The Spanish flag was hauled down at 5 o'clock and the American colors went up and floated out bravely. One hundred and fifteen prisoners were taken; wounded were lying about everywhere. The Spanish loss at Caney embraced most of its defenders, and among them General Linares; the Americans lost some valuable regimental officers and their list of wounded was large.

While the severe fighting had been going on before San Juan and Caney, General Duffield and his forces had not been idle on the left near the coast. In accordance with the plans he made a feint before the Spanish garrison near Aguadores, consisting of 4,000 Spaniards strongly fortified, and the *New York* and a few other war vessels bombarded the fort from the sea, but doing little damage. The Spaniards selected Duffield's advancing force as their target, and the first shell they fired killed seventeen Cubans on the hill above the railroad. Another shot mowed down two files of fours in the Michigan Twenty-third, killing two men and wounding several others. Duffield fired several volleys into the fort and accomplished

his purpose of preventing the Spaniards there from co-operating with the intrenched army at San Juan.

The Cubans with Kent did no fighting, or, rather, the situation was such that there was no fighting for them to do. Lawton was to have had the assistance of several thousand Cubans, but the truth is that they kept well out of danger, fired their ammunition into the treetops and called for more.

At daylight on the morning of the 2d the enemy resumed



POSITION OF OUR TROOPS AFTER THE BATTLES OF CANEY AND SAN JUAN—
LINE OF SPANISH RETREAT.

the battle, and firing continued throughout the day all along the line, part of the time in a drenching rain. There were many casualties from bullets clearing the crest of our intrenchments and striking men as they were moving up to position or going back and forth with supplies or caring for the wounded. At nightfall the firing ceased, but later in the evening another vigorous assault was made all along the line. This was completely repulsed, and the enemy retired to his trenches, and the almost impregnable nature of his last defenses was beginning to dawn upon our men. According to

the official report of casualties for the three days' fighting 231 were killed, 1,283 wounded, and 81 were missing. The Spanish loss, especially at Caney, was much heavier.

In even a brief history of the fighting before Santiago notice must be taken of an unfortunate condition of things which became conspicuous a little later. Mention has been made of the single field hospital which had been brought up to the advance lines the day before the battle began. Possibly, the hospital equipment would have been complete and adequate had the Spaniards made little resistance, as our generals expected, but with our severe losses the condition of the wounded became deplorable. The first of the wounded, most of whom had received aid at bandaging stations just back of the firing line, began to reach the hospital as early as 9 o'clock. As the hot tropical day advanced, the numbers constantly increased, until at nightfall long rows of wounded were lying in the grass in front of small operating tents, without awnings or shelter, awaiting examination and treatment. The small force of field surgeons worked without either rest or food for twenty-one hours, and yet hundreds of seriously wounded men lay on the ground for hours. No organized provision had been made for feeding them or giving them drink. At sunset, the five surgeons had operated upon and dressed the wounds of 154 men; still long lines of suffering men lay waiting, and the number brought in constantly increased. A few more surgeons arrived and the force worked all night, partly by moonlight and partly by the light of flaring candles, which occasionally drew a shot from sharpshooters still nesting in the treetops not far away. These cold-blooded and merciless guerrillas fired all day on the 1st at our ambulances, and it was two days before they were finally driven out of the trees. After being operated upon, there was no place for the suffering but out under the trees, where, weak and shaken from agony under the surgeon's knife, they had to lie in the wet grass, with no one to look after them, no one to give them food or water, no blanket for them, for only a few had been brought

to the front. The scenes of the 2d were like those of the previous day, but worse. Many of the wounded brought in from Caney had had nothing to eat or drink for twenty-four hours, for they had started with but one day's rations, and some of the boys had shared that with those who had foolishly thrown theirs away so that they might advance faster. And yet these brave fellows uttered no complaint; some would yield their turn with the surgeon to a comrade who seemed to be worse off. Those in charge of the supplies on the transports or at the landing places were working night and day to unload them and hurry them to the front, but over such a country it was slow, difficult work. Soon provisions began to run low, for a strong sea had set in and it was impossible to take off the supplies. The mistake had been made of pushing too rapidly to the front with soldiers and articles needed in fighting, provisions and medical supplies taking second place, and when the attempt was made to move them up the pack trains were cut off by the dastardly Spaniards in the trees, who shot the mules. Men were under fire for forty-eight hours, with scarcely any food, and with but little water.

As he had been optimistic before the battle, so now General Shafter became disheartened at the prospect. He had a brave army, but improperly supplied; firing at his army constantly were the Spaniards in defenses such as few armies ever faced. He needed heavy guns, but it would be days before they could be brought up. He was suffering from fever himself, and at any time it might break out in an army in such a trying position, with insufficient food, without shelter, in trenches flooded with rain or steaming in the sun. He had heard that Spanish reinforcements had broken past Garcia sent to head them off. On the whole, the outlook could not have been darker.

At this critical time it became a serious question whether the fleet could not do something to assist the land forces. There was the Spanish fleet in the harbor, where it had been for nearly six weeks, and our forces were in a position where



ARRIVAL OF THE WOUNDED FROM THE BATTLEFIELDS OF SAN JUAN AND CANEY AT THE
FIELD HOSPITAL.

they might be liable to a terrific fire from the ships. Even if our army could succeed in storming the city, there was the Spanish fleet ready to make the city a desert as soon as it fell into American hands. There was Admiral Sampson's fleet, which had for two months been longing for a chance to train its guns upon Cervera's vessels, and it had lain outside the mouth of the harbor for weeks with nothing but a narrow channel in the way, a channel mined, to be sure, and guarded by guns so mounted as to threaten a strong plunging fire. But with the army in such a serious position, had not the time come when the risk of running the channel must be taken? If Sampson could only run past the forts, which he had already partly demolished, dispose at once of Cervera's fleet, the enemy in Santiago could not hold out long.

Admiral Sampson seems to have faced the requirements of the situation somewhat reluctantly at first. Naturally, he did not wish to subject his ships to such serious dangers. Educated to a nicety in all the technical points of naval warfare, he had not that almost reckless bravery which was shown by Dewey, and which a technical proficiency sometimes spoils. He would have welcomed nothing so much as an open contest with the Spanish cruisers, and since the army had landed he had hoped that the Spaniard would attempt to escape; he had expected it and had issued explicit orders as to what the fleet should do in case of such an attempt. But as Cervera was still entrapped, the probability of his attempting to escape steadily dwindled and the hope faded. Admiral Sampson had thought of sending in torpedo boats, but this intention had been abandoned because of the unsuitable condition of some of the small craft, and he then made up his mind that he must force an entrance, and this he was planning to do with two battleships to head the line. He had worked the plan out with skill, had ordered the *Massachusetts* to Guantanamo to coal up and had arranged to meet Shafter and his generals at army headquarters on the morning of Sunday, the

3d, to secure a perfect understanding between the land and naval forces for the combined attack.

But neither Shafter nor Sampson dreamed of what was going on over the Spanish lines, where the desperate condition of the Americans was not understood. The Spaniards themselves were in despair; they realized that their game was lost; their outer defenses had been taken by a dash that took their hearts away. Blanco had telegraphed Cervera that he must make his escape at all hazards, for Santiago could not hold out; he must escape and run to Havana if possible. Otherwise he must lose his ships with the fall of Santiago, and that would be to lose all. Cervera had not forgiven Blanco for the order which six weeks before had placed him in the Santiago trap, but Blanco's purposes were shrewd enough and would have perplexed us considerably had Madrid kept the news of Cervera's arrival at Santiago secret, as Blanco had expected. But however much Cervera disliked the orders to escape, he must needs obey, and he planned accordingly at the very time that Sampson was at last contemplating the prospect of running in at all hazards.

CHAPTER LI

ADMIRAL CERVERA'S ATTEMPTED ESCAPE—THRILLING INCIDENTS OF COMMODORE SCHLEY'S PURSUIT AND VICTORY—THE RESCUE AND SURRENDER OF CERVERA AND THE REMNANTS OF HIS CREWS.

The Waiting American Squadron—Admiral Sampson Departs to Consult with General Shafter—Watching Suspicious Smoke beyond the Ridge—The Enemy Appears—Commodore Schley's Prompt Action—The Spanish Cruisers Emerge from the Harbor—Pictures of Smoke and Fire—Network of Bursting Shells—Cervera's Tactics—Pouring Shells upon the Spanish Cruisers—The Chase Begins—Appearance of the *Pluton* and *Furor*—Wainwright's Handling of the *Gloucester*—His Quick and Fearless Advance—Destruction of the Destroyers—Admiral Sampson Turns Back from Siboney—The *Maria Teresa* and the *Almirante Oquendo* Run Ashore—The *Brooklyn* and *Oregon* Have a Running Fight with the *Vizcaya*—Another Spanish Cruiser Beached—Gallant Rescue of the Spanish Crews—Chase of the *Colon*—Working the Spaniard into a Trap—The Surrender—Admiral Sampson Arrives—Schley's Splendid Command.

SUNDAY morning dawned bright and warm, with the American warships slowly rocking in the swell before the harbor of Santiago. During the night the *Massachusetts* had gone to Guantanamo, and shortly before 9 o'clock the flagship *New York* steamed away towards Siboney, where Admiral Sampson was about to land with several of his staff and proceed on mule back to the headquarters of General Shafter. The *Oregon* moved up and took the *New York's* place in the blockade line. To the east of her stood the *Indiana*, and between them and a little nearer the shore, indeed almost under the guns of Morro, stood the little *Gloucester*. West of the *Oregon* were the *Iowa*, *Texas*, *Brooklyn*, and *Vixen* in the order named. The distance of the vessels from the mouth of the harbor was from two and a half to four miles, and the arc of the circle formed was about eight miles long.

At 8 o'clock a signal boy on the *Iowa* went on deck as

usual for signal watch. The night before this sailor lad had noticed three distinct lines of smoke beyond the hills to the left of the harbor entrance, and had reported it to the officers. It had also been noticed from other ships. That it came from the Spanish fleet there was no doubt, but by this time little hope that the ships would come out remained. As this signal boy came on deck in the morning, he observed the smoke again and kept his eyes intently on it, watching every feature of it as it rolled up. At 9 o'clock he reported that the smoke seemed to be coming up nearer the entrance. He had a belief that the enemy's ships were moving out, improbable though it seemed in broad daylight. As he watched he saw the smoke work nearer and nearer the entrance, and at 9.15, of his own accord, he bent on the signal, "The enemy's ships escaping," and laid it on the bridge ready to hoist at the very instant it was beyond doubt, for the navigator had sometime before promised ten dollars to the signal boy who should first give the alarm. With his signal ready, he watched the smoke as a cat would watch a mouse. Fifteen minutes more passed, and then he saw the bow of a cruiser just appearing in the entrance; he reported it to the navigator, who had just come on deck and who shouted back, "Bend on the signal." Before he had the words out of his mouth, he was surprised to see the signal running up to the peak. A warning gun was fired. Then orders came thick and fast. The watches on the *Oregon*, *Texas*, and *Brooklyn* had discovered the enemy at the same time that he was discovered on the *Iowa*, but the latter's signal, being already bent, first fluttered in the breeze.

Commodore Schley, on whom in Admiral Sampson's absence the command fell, acted instantly. From his flagship flew the signal: "Close in and attack the enemy." On every ship routine discipline showed itself with precision. Orderlies and messengers rushed here and there carrying orders. Men cheered as they sprang to their guns. There was a jingle of bells in the engine rooms; fires were spread, the smoke began to roll up; soon the *Oregon* was under way; others began to

move in slowly; every man was at his post, clear-eyed and alert.

The Spanish vessels came filing out of the harbor at a speed of about ten knots, the flagship *Maria Teresa* leading and followed by the *Vizcaya*, *Cristobal Colon*, and the *Almirante Oquendo*. The distance between them was about 800 yards, which means that from the time the first one became visible in the upper reach of the channel until the last one was out of the harbor an interval of twelve minutes elapsed. Following the *Oquendo* at a distance of about 1,200 yards came the torpedo-boat destroyer *Pluton*, and after her the *Furor*. The Spanish cruisers, as rapidly as they could bring their guns to bear, opened a vigorous fire upon the American vessels, which had got under way and were closing in, but chiefly on the *Brooklyn*. They emerged from the channel shrouded in the smoke of their guns, while above them thundered the guns of the forts. Then they turned westward in column, increasing their speed to the full power of their engines and in a storm of fire which had opened from the American vessels.

What followed is not easily described. Of the thousands of men who took part in the action or witnessed parts of it, few agree as to details. It is doubtful if a complete story of that momentous morning will ever be written. There had never been anything like it in the world before, and, where such great fighting machines and so many guns are brought into their fearful play, even one so fortunate as to have been a witness from the distance fails to appreciate what he saw, much less to secure any adequate idea of the fierceness and the glory of the details.

This remarkable panorama of modern warfare had for its background the high green hills which skirt the shore of Cuba; in the foreground was the Caribbean shimmering in a summer sun. Out from the little crevice in the hills crept the line of Spanish battleships, forming a great wall of smoke from under which angry streaks of fire shot out towards the

American ships, from the prows of which the sea was rolling in foaming folds; another line of foam followed in their wake, and over them hung the black clouds thrown up from the furnaces. Then their guns answered the terrific thunder of the Spanish guns, and great heaps of whiter smoke rolled away and mingled with the black above. Across the sea there arose a lattice work of water columns raised by splashing shells. Innumerable, they sprang up and fell slowly back, while more slowly there drifted away from each a little spurt of smoke, and these, gradually accumulating, formed a haze on the water in which the flashes of the guns assumed a deeper red while the location of the ships became more and more indistinct. At the eastern end of this fearful picture of smoke and fire, as it moved westward, came the smaller streams of smoke from the torpedo-boat destroyers, their low black forms more distinctly seen than those of the cruisers ahead. More distinct, too, were the columns of water made by the shells landing near them, nearer and nearer, till the miniature flashes of their own guns was joined by the deeper glare of shells exploding right upon them. And over all steadily deepened the dark overhanging canopy of smoke.

Cervera, whatever his motives for remaining so long in Santiago, committed a fatal blunder in coming out in daylight. He should have done as Dewey did at Manila — perfected his formation under cover of the night. Dewey, without pilots or trustworthy charts, safely took his ships by the Spanish guns and over the Spanish mines; and Cervera, free to choose his own time, able to make all his own plans in his own port, with plenty of pilots at hand, nevertheless neglected the opportunity to rush out at night, when he would have stood a fair chance of breaking through the blockade. The American searchlights doubtless would have discovered him, but their gunners could not have made anything like the effective practice they did in daylight.

But according to his subsequent statements he feared to run the obstructed channel unless the American searchlights

lit it up, and he claims that the night before, when he had prepared to make the attempt, the blockading squadron left the channel in darkness. His scouts on the hilltop in the morning notified him of the absence of the *Massachusetts* and the departure of the *New York*, and so he concluded that his chance had come. He gave orders to destroy the *Brooklyn*, ram her if possible, making westward at the highest speed. But even in attempting a daylight escape he erred in keeping his ships in a single line. Had they scattered, it is possible that some of them would have got away.


The reader will understand that as the blockading line of American ships formed an arc before the harbor eight miles long, and as the Spanish vessels turned westward, the American vessels were not all at equal points of advantage. The escaping vessels turned directly away from the *Oregon* and *Indiana*, which were off to eastward of the entrance, but on the other hand turned in the direction of the *Texas* and *Brooklyn*, which were standing to westward. The *Iowa* was almost directly in front of the harbor entrance. Cervera, presumably, had the hope that by turning westward his vessels, emerging at full speed, could quickly run out of the range of the heavy battleships *Oregon* and *Indiana*, that after a time he could shake off the *Iowa* and *Texas*, and, though the *Brooklyn's* speed equaled that of any of his cruisers, he could dispose of her easily when out of reach of the blockading vessels left behind. In theory this was all possible, for every one of Cervera's vessels were capable of steaming 20 knots, and only Schley's flagship was credited with any such speed. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that Cervera appeared under full headway and had evidently taken the American vessels by surprise and at a dead standstill, some of them with only steam enough up to make five knots.

Nevertheless, inside of eight minutes after the Spanish flagship's prow became visible at the entrance of the harbor, and before the third ship emerged, every one of the American ships was under way closing in, and their projectiles, great and

small, were flying at the Spanish admiral from east, south, and west. The *Indiana*, *Gloucester*, and *Oregon*, which had been off to the eastward, headed westward, pointing in towards the entrance; the *Iowa* started straight north, while the *Brooklyn*, in pointing for the entrance, took a course northeast, using her port battery. In other words, the ships simply converged

upon the leading Spanish ships so far as possible, and by the time they were in close range the three leading Spanish cruisers were steaming along close to the shore and the fourth was emerging from the harbor.

While all of these cruisers were subjected to the fire of the American vessels, the first fury of the American shells naturally fell upon the *Maria Teresa*, which was in the lead. The *Brooklyn*, after firing from her port batteries for about ten minutes, wore around, and, taking a course alongside the *Teresa*, emptied her starboard batteries as the vessels plowed along.



APPROXIMATE POSITIONS OF THE OP-
POSING VESSELS SOON AFTER THE
SPANISH CRUISERS HAD EMERGED
FROM THE HARBOR.

Commodore Schley stood coolly on the bridge, and his men were encouraged to their best efforts by his cheery words: "Fire steady, boys, and give it to them." The *Texas*, which had rushed in from her position east of the



COMMODORE SCHLEY ON BOARD HIS FLAGSHIP DURING THE BOMBARDMENT OF SANTIAGO.

Brooklyn, quickly became engaged first with the *Vizcaya* and then with the *Colon*. The *Iowa*, which had begun firing at the *Teresa* at a range of 6,000 yards, speedily diminished this as she rushed straight for the harbor entrance, until the range was considerably less than a half mile; but when it was certain that the *Teresa* would pass ahead of her and that the *Brooklyn* was to engage her at close range, the *Iowa* turned and delivered her starboard batteries at the *Teresa*, then turned to head off the *Vizcaya* and fired her port batteries, joining with the *Texas*. As the *Vizcaya* drew ahead, the *Iowa* turned again and gave her a broadside from the starboard; after a few minutes of this, she executed similar tactics on the third Spanish ship, while her secondary batteries were turned on the *Pluton* and *Furor*, which had by this time emerged and were at once in a circle of terrific fire.

In the chase which had now developed at the head of the fleeing line, the *Iowa* and *Texas* were dropping astern a little, and the fire of the three Spaniards was concentrated on the *Brooklyn*. But meantime the battleship *Oregon*, coming in from her position to the southeast, had adopted different tactics. Quickly getting under rapid headway, she steamed directly west, pouring in a fire from her guns upon one ship after another as she came up in the most glorious and gallant style, outstripping all her sister battleships. She was an inspiring spectacle, with a large white wave before her bow, her smokestacks belching forth great puffs of smoke from her forced draft, her guns thundering at the escaping ships ahead. She quickly passed the *Iowa*, while her secondary batteries took a share in the fire on the torpedo-boat destroyers, and, gaining every moment on the *Texas*, pushed on to the assistance of the *Brooklyn*.

But while the chase was in this condition, or about forty minutes after the alarm had been given, one of the most exciting and glorious features of the engagements was taking place at the rear of the escaping line near the mouth of the harbor. The destroyers *Pluton* and *Furor* were among the

finest vessels of their class in the world, and were considered particularly dangerous because of their high speed and their torpedo equipments. Cervera's plan had been to have the fire of his large ships concentrated upon the *Brooklyn* as the only vessel supposed to be able to keep abreast of him, while the *Pluton* and *Furor* were to take advantage of the confusion and the nearness of the attacking vessels to launch their torpedoes. But while the cruisers were concentrating their fire on the *Brooklyn*, now over a mile west of the entrance, the torpedo-boats became the center of a fire from other American ships, which made it impossible for their crews to work their torpedoes, and very quickly destroyed them completely.

Commanding the entirely unprotected *Gloucester* was Lieutenant-Commander Richard Wainwright, who had been executive officer of the *Maine*, and who had pleaded so well for active service against the Spaniards that the department had put him in command of the converted yacht. But the moment he saw that the Spanish vessels were escaping, Wainwright determined to make a spirited attack upon the Spanish torpedo craft when they should appear. Rushing in at full speed, the little *Gloucester* poured an accurate and deadly fire from all her guns upon the destroyers. Her advances were straight, quick, and fearlessly undertaken. The little vessel was a target for every gun mounted on shore, and for the broadsides of the *Colon*, *Oquendo*, *Pluton*, and *Furor*, all at easy range, and the shells flew around her on all sides, but she was not hit. Her skillful handling and gallant fighting excited the wonder and admiration of all who witnessed it, for while other ships were firing their secondary batteries at the destroyers, the *Gloucester*, pushing inside the course of the cruisers, at much closer range, practically rendered the destroyers unmanageable; her gunners could not remain at their posts; they fell in bloody groups about the decks, which were riddled by the *Gloucester's* rapid fire. Seeing the terrible plight of the destroyers, the batteries on Socapa opened fire on the *Gloucester*, but she kept her guns hot regardless of danger.

Within twenty minutes from the time they emerged the careers of the *Pluton* and *Furor* were ended, and two-thirds of their people killed. Both destroyers were total wrecks. Rough-edged wounds of all sizes showed on the low dark hulls and superstructure. There had been no time to note the flight of minutes, but there were two of the most powerful torpedo-boat destroyers in the world, of supposedly twenty-eight or thirty knots speed, cut down, riddled, and wholly disabled in a run of less than three miles, and while they had been fired upon by the battleships as they pushed by after the Spanish cruisers, their destruction was largely due to the terrible, rapid, and accurate fire poured in at close range by an unprotected yacht. Both had struck their colors, and those of the *Pluton* had been secured by Commander Wainwright. He was engaged in saving the Spanish crews when the *New York* came steaming in at her highest speed from the east.

At the time the Spanish cruisers came out of the harbor, the flagship *New York*, bearing Admiral Sampson, was about to put in at Siboney. At the first boom of a gun every one knew that the long-expected was happening at the entrance, and that the *New York* had lost a chance to participate in the game. Orders were at once given to bring the ship about, and she was started back with all the speed she could muster from the two boilers which were in readiness. As she flew along, her disappointed sailors could see the ships come out, watch the sharp attack of the American fleet under Commodore Schley, and by the time she arrived at the mouth of the harbor shortly after 10 o'clock, where the gallant *Gloucester* was engaged in the work of rescue, the chase of the cruisers had set far to the eastward. The *New York* did not stop, but forged ahead with ever increased speed in a vain effort to reach a point where she could participate. But the admiral was to have only the enjoyment of seeing one cruiser after another run helpless upon the beach before he could get within range. It was Schley's battle.

But we must now turn to the point in the chase at which


our attention was temporarily diverted to the battle between the destroyers and the *Gloucester*. As already stated, the first rush of the Spanish squadron had carried it past the *Iowa* and *Texas* before they could work up to their best speed, but the Spaniards suffered heavily in passing and the first in the line, the *Maria Teresa*, and the last, the *Oquendo*, were set on fire by shells during the first fifteen minutes of the engagement. The very first shot had cut the main water supply pipe of the *Teresa*, and the second that landed set her afire astern. Several large shells swept through her, and countless of smaller caliber burst within her. As the *Oquendo* was the last to come out of the harbor, and the other vessels had run ahead of some of our battleships, she at once received their concentrated fire. One of the first shots exploded in her after torpedo apartment, setting a raging fire, and the guns' crews were driven from their guns by the American shells.

During the fight with the destroyers, the *Teresa* had fallen behind with the *Oquendo*, and the *Vizcaya* was leading, followed by the *Colon*, the fire of the *Brooklyn*, *Oregon*, and *Texas* being largely concentrated upon the former. The *Iowa* was still in the chase and still firing at long range, but was dropping behind. The *Texas* was gaining speed, but the *Oregon* was coming up with a mighty rush. With flames arising from the after-decks of the *Teresa* and the *Oquendo*, both vessels gave up the fight, the former at about 10.15 running on the beach about six miles west of Santiago harbor entrance; the latter a few minutes later was beached less than a mile beyond. Just before this occurred the *Oregon* came up with the *Texas*, and passed inside so that the latter's guns were blanketed for a moment. The *Colon* had now forged ahead of the *Vizcaya*, towards which the *Oregon* and *Brooklyn* were now aiming their guns with destructive results. The *Oquendo* having been beached, the *Texas* also turned her guns at long range on the *Vizcaya*. So the chase continued for about a half hour, when the *Vizcaya* was seen to be in flames, and she ran on the beach at Aserraderos, fifteen

miles from Santiago, at about 11 o'clock, torn by a terrific explosion as she sank. She was still flying the Spanish flag from the gaff, and it was not hauled down till almost burned down by the flames mounting up from the riven hull. Some idea of the storm of iron may be gathered from the fact that the *Brooklyn* alone fired about 2,000 shots during the engagement.

Meanwhile, the *Harvard* and little *Gloucester*, having settled the fate of the destroyers, had run up and were engaged in the work of rescue about the wrecks of the *Teresa* and *Oquendo*. Some were rescued as they swam; a few were taken directly off the burning *Pluton*, and some from the beach, where they were glad enough to fall into their hands rather than into those of the Cubans, who manifested a disposition to shoot them down. Nearly all the prisoners were clad only in underclothes at most. Such was the case with Admiral Cervera, who, with a small party, had reached the beach near the stranded *Teresa* and were surrounded by an exultant band of Cubans. Cervera surrendered himself gladly and was transferred to the *Iowa*. On a signal from the *New York*, which was now coming up, the *Iowa* proceeded to the same work near the *Vizcaya*. This rescue of prisoners from the burning ships was the occasion of some of the most gallant conduct of the day, for they were burning fore and aft; some of their guns and reserve ammunition was exploding, and it was not known at what moment the fire might reach the main magazines. In addition to this, a heavy surf was running just outside the Spanish ships, but no risk deterred our officers and men; the work of rescue was complete. The *Iowa* picked up 38 officers and 238 men from the *Vizcaya*. The *Harvard* rescued 35 officers and 637 men. The *Indiana* was ordered back to the blockade line when overtaken by the *New York*, and on her way rescued over 200 men from the wrecks of the *Oquendo* and *Teresa*.

Shortly after the chase there was a terrific explosion in the forward part of the *Oquendo*, caused by the fire reaching



APPROXIMATE POSITIONS OF THE OPPOSING VESSELS AT THE CLOSE OF THE BATTLE.

the magazine. It bulged out the plates in every direction. The results were altogether different from those on the *Maine*, and the *Oquendo* lay there as mute evidence of the Spanish treachery in Havana harbor five months before. The wrecks were pitiful sights. As fine armored cruisers as there had been in the world lay covered with scars and smouldering. Charred human bodies lying about told the story of the fierce fight.

Of the Spanish ships only the *Cristobal Colon* remained, and she was their fastest ship. She had been so fortunate as to escape the concentration of fire which had riddled the other vessels, and by the time the *Vizcaya* was beached she was at least six miles ahead of the *Brooklyn* and the *Oregon*. Being thus far out of effective range, it looked as if she might escape. Her funnels belched out great columns of smoke and her forced draft even carried flames at times

from her stacks. The *Brooklyn* was hot on the chase, standing well out, the *Oregon* a little astern but inside and gaining fast; the *Texas* was some distance behind but running nobly with the little *Vixen* abreast. The guns were still now and the interest had centered entirely in the contest of speed. If the *Colon* could maintain her superior lead she might escape. But she was forced by the situation to hug the shore; if she pointed out the American vessels would come up into firing range before she could get out to sea. Far ahead the dim blue outlines of Cape Cruz were growing more and more distinct on the horizon, and straight towards this steered the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon*, while the Spaniard was running in close. It was evident by noon that he could not make the point without passing the bows of his pursuers, which were steadily gaining, coupling on more boilers as the steam was got up.

After 12 o'clock Commodore Schley saw that the Spaniard was in a trap and could not get out, but the chase continued till ten minutes before 1, when the *Brooklyn* and *Oregon* were alongside, and the latter dropped a large shell beyond the *Colon*. A moment later one from the *Brooklyn* struck close to her bow. The Spanish commander saw that his game was up, and he began to hunt for a convenient place to beach. He did not think of fighting. He evidently had no heart for it, though but one man had been killed on board and no fire had been started on the ship. The only object of the Spaniards now was to destroy their ship. The breechblocks of the guns were torn out and thrown overboard, and every possible inlet for water was opened. At 1.20 she hauled down her colors and ran ashore at Rio Torquino, about forty-eight miles from Santiago. A boat from Commodore Schley's flagship went alongside to receive the surrender, while the gallant commodore ordered the signal to the *Oregon*: "Cease firing. Congratulations for the grand victory. Thanks for your splendid assistance." The commander of the *Colon* was very polite and surrendered unconditionally to Captain Cook, who remained on board about fifteen minutes, observing the con-

dition of the ship. As he was returning, Admiral Sampson came up in the *New York*, took charge of matters and ordered the vessels to report their casualties. But there was only one to report. A man on the *Brooklyn* had been killed and another wounded. Acting on Cervera's orders, the Spanish ships had concentrated their fire on Schley's flagship, fully expecting to sink her and then run away from the remaining ships. The marks and scars show that the *Brooklyn* was hit twenty-five times, and the ensign at the main was so shattered that when it was hauled down it fell in pieces.

Soon after the *New York* came up, the *Vixen* reported to the admiral that two strange cruisers were in the distance. The *Brooklyn* was signalled to investigate, although she had borne the brunt of the fighting, and Commodore Schley was obliged to leave his prize to Admiral Sampson and hurry away. The stranger proved to be an Austrian, and it was after midnight when the *Brooklyn* reported at Santiago with one of her compartments filled with water, where a 11-inch shell had pierced her side.

After sinking six ships, killing and wounding over 600 men, and making hundreds of prisoners without the loss or serious injury of a single vessel, and with casualties limited to one man killed and a couple wounded, and having dispatched the whole business within five hours after the Spanish flagship had poked her nose out of the entrance, the Americans took a well-earned rest, and on the next morning awoke the Cuban echoes with such a celebration of the Fourth of July as history had never before recorded.

Commodore Schley's instant decision and the dash and vigor with which he met the emergency, and the splendid seamanship with which he headed off and caught the *Colon* in a race which will be famous as long as naval history is written, leave him entitled to the lion's share of the credit. It was he who discovered the elusive Spaniard in Santiago; it was he who bottled him there; and there was a poetic justice and possibly a just providence in that fortune which enabled him to



ANNIHILATION OF ADMIRAL CERVERA'S SPANISH FLEET BY THE AMERICAN SQUADRON UNDER THE
COMMAND OF COMMODORE SCHLEY, OFF SANTIAGO, JULY 3, 1898.

destroy it when there was no one at hand to deprive him of the honors of command. Success in war is always more or less a matter of opportunity. It was no disparagement to the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sampson, whose absence was in pursuance of duty and without fault, to yield to Commodore Schley the full measure of reward.

A few days after the battle the Spanish prisoners, numbering 746 and including 54 officers, were sent to Portsmouth, N. H., on the cruiser *St. Louis*. They were dressed in clothing of every description, having come on board practically without clothing of any kind. Admiral Cervera showed signs of the terrible mental strain under which he had been for weeks. The Spanish seamen frankly declared that they had no further desire to fight with Yankees. Every provision was made for their comfort, and Admiral Cervera became quite a popular hero with the people, because of the nobility of his conduct and the many evidences of his appreciation of the treatment accorded to him and his officers, who were kept in comfortable quarters at Annapolis, the prisoners of the crews remaining at Portsmouth.

CHAPTER LII

THE SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO—TRYING POSITION OF THE ARMY—RELEASE OF HOBSON AND HIS CREW—OCCUPATION OF THE CITY—THE PUERTO RICO CAMPAIGN.

General Shafter Calls upon Gen. Toral to Surrender — Refusal of the Spanish Commander — Refugees from the City — Fruitless Negotiations — The Exchange of Hobson and His Crew — Their Warm Welcome — American Lines Advanced — Strengthening the American Position — The Truce Ends — Bombardment of the City — Another Demand for Surrender — A Council of Officers — Arrival of General Miles — Alarming Condition of Our Army — Insufficient Provisions — Suffering of the Sick and Wounded — Toral Asks for More Time — An Agreement Reached — Conditions of the Capitulation — The President's Message to General Shafter — Occupation of the City — Looking over the Spanish Defenses — "Yellow Jack" Appears — Obstacles Which Our Army Overcame — Shafter and Garcia — The Campaign in Puerto Rico — General Miles's Easy and Triumphal Advance — Ponce Welcomes American Troops — Last of the Fighting.

THE news of Commodore Schley's great victory soon reached Siboney and was carried along the lines, occasioning great enthusiasm among the soldiers whose position, as they lay in their wet trenches in constant danger of Spanish bullets, was anything but pleasant. The lines were being gradually extended, Kent working his division northward, and Wheeler's cavalry moving southward, and this made the formation somewhat thin. But the fortitude of our army in its difficult position and the willingness and enthusiasm with which it joined in the work of hemming in the Spaniards was the admiration of every spectator of the campaign.

On the day following the destruction of Cervera's ships, General Shafter summoned the city to surrender under threat of bombardment, but he received a curt refusal from the Spanish commander, with a request that the bombardment be postponed till the foreigners and the women and children

could leave the city. Action was, therefore, deferred till noon of the next day, and thousands of people took advantage of the situation to come out of the city, where the food situation had become desperate. While General Shafter could not object to such a step, it increased the difficulties of his situation, even more seriously than was at first realized. Within a few hours it was estimated that 15,000 people from the city became dependent upon the Americans for food, when the subsistence department was by no means in shape to provide rations at the front sufficient to meet the wants of the army alone. But the soldiers in many cases shared their meager rations with half-starved refugees, who came into our camp not simply dependent but bearing germs from a disease-stricken city. This reception of refugees proved to be the worst blow which our brave army received before Santiago.

Before the time allowed by General Shafter for this purpose had elapsed, General Toral, who had succeeded Linares, wounded at Caney, in command of the city, requested another postponement of the bombardment in order that he might communicate with the authorities at Madrid, and to do this he was obliged to ask permission to use cables in American hands. Upon one excuse or another the truce was extended from day to day till the 9th.

During these negotiations one of the interesting events of the war took place. On the 7th the Spanish agreed to effect an exchange of prisoners, the only Americans they held being Lieutenant Hobson and his crew. The scene of the exchange was a tree between the lines in front of the Rough Riders. Hobson and his men came forth accompanied by a Spanish officer, and were met by Colonel John Jacob Astor and a few prisoners captured at Caney. A Spanish officer was given for Hobson and fourteen Spanish privates for his seven men. The exchange was in full view of both armies, and as Hobson and his men neared the American lines they were welcomed with cheer upon cheer. Ranks were broken, officers' orders passed unheeded, and the men were simply

borne from one part of the line to another. Even more enthusiastic, if possible, was their reception by the fleet on board the *New York*. The prisoners spoke cordially of their treatment, and said they had suffered no real hardship. Lieutenant Hobson modestly protested against the warmth of his reception, both in the field and on the *New York*, declaring again and again that the men who were greeting him would have done the same thing in his place. He was the idol of the hour and the contagious enthusiasm which greeted him was a striking expression of that genuine admiration for heroism so characteristic of the American soldier and sailor in this war.

Shortly before the expiration of another truce on the 9th, Toral sent to Shafter a letter offering to evacuate the city, if allowed to march out with all his troops. This would have meant simply a withdrawal to join the Spanish army further west, ultimately to help Havana, and the offer was promptly rejected by Shafter, who demanded an unconditional surrender.

General Toral then asked that the terms of evacuation he had offered be submitted to the authorities at Washington, and Shafter complied with the request, again postponing hostilities a day, or until a reply could be received from the President. It came at noon of the 9th and was an unqualified approval of Shafter's demand, with instructions to accept no terms but unconditional surrender of the city, the fortifications, and the Spanish forces. As a matter of fact, the Spanish commander was anxious to make the best terms possible, but Madrid was unwilling to allow him any discretion, and was determined, for domestic reasons, to insist upon the defense of the city to the last extremity. From the standpoint of the Spanish government, the situation had become desperate, for, if the fall of Santiago followed swiftly after the destruction of the navy, it might mean disaster to the government. Some resistance was essential to the dynasty.

Meantime, Shafter had taken advantage of the delay to



A HAND-TO-HAND FIGHT IN THE INTRENCHMENTS OF SANTIAGO.
Planting the Stars and Stripes within the enemy's lines.

strengthen the American position, dig new trenches, and to advance the American lines to within 400 yards of the Spanish lines. Streams were bridged over, roads were put in condition, reinforcements were landed and brought up, and the heavy siege guns were at last worked to the front and put in position. On the 10th, the truce having expired, the Spaniards again opened fire, but it was soon silenced. Another request for time having been asked by Toral and refused, Shafter began an attack at five o'clock of the afternoon of the 11th, and, though continued less than an hour, it was sufficient to demonstrate to Toral the futility of holding out much longer. Not only did heavy guns and mortars pour in shells from the field, but the fleet outside threw destructive shells over the ridge into the city and bay. The Spanish reply was spiritless and weak. The reinforcements had enabled General Shafter to stretch his lines entirely about the city, and its investment was complete. After the bombardment and when the town was on fire in several places, General Shafter sent another note to Toral, again demanding unconditional surrender, but no reply was made to it till the following morning, the 12th, when Toral wrote a terse reply, saying that he had communicated the demand to his "superior government."

General Shafter then decided to call a council of officers to determine what should be done. General Miles had arrived the day before, not to supersede Shafter in immediate command, but to observe the conditions before the city. The severe losses in the battle of the 1st had made the government anxious, and Miles had been hurried to the scene in consequence. He attended the council, and so also did Lieutenant Hobson, representing Admiral Sampson. Many of the army men had declared that it was now the duty of the navy to force its way into the harbor, and it was agreed that such an act would bring the Spaniards to terms at once. But Sampson believed that, on account of the mines, it could not be done without the loss of some of the ships. It was agreed by the army officers that the city could be taken in three hours

by an assault, but it would cost, possibly, a thousand men, and, naturally, all desired to avoid losses whether of ships or men. The troops were becoming impatient over the delays, and argued that if the slow process of starving the city into subjection was adopted, more men would be lost in sickness than in storming the place. The officers were much worried over the condition of the army, for the heavy rains on the 11th and 12th had resulted in much sickness, and this was being aggravated by the intense heat which followed. Besides this the landing of supplies had become so difficult at times that only half-rations could be served at the front, and if a storm came up so as to prevent the landing of supplies for any length of time the situation would become terrible. The condition of the sick and wounded was already deplorable. The hospital service had broken down completely under the strain put upon it. Wounded soldiers were lying about on the grass with insufficient attendance, and often they had to be carried to the rear over rough roads in jolting ammunition wagons. They endured it bravely, but their sufferings were terrible.

Any great delay in taking the city was, therefore, out of consideration. On the 13th an interview was arranged between Shafter and Toral, and the former again impressed upon the Spanish commander that longer delay on his part could only result in the further slaughter of Spanish troops. He must surrender, or a continued bombardment would be begun from all sides, while the fleet would make an attack from the sea. Toral declared that, whatever his personal wishes might be, he would be unable to give up the city till so instructed by his superiors. He asked for more time in which to communicate with Blanco. After consideration, Shafter granted him till noon of the 14th. But, on the morning of that day, an actual agreement for surrender was accomplished, Shafter modifying the terms in some small particulars. Toral was inclined to haggle further, desired his soldiers to keep their arms, and to have the action considered

more like an evacuation; but the American generals informed him that he must accept the terms or there would be a general attack, to end only in an unconditional surrender.

The conditions of capitulation included all forces and war material in the territory east of a line from Aserraderos, on the south, to Sagua de Tanamo on the north, General Luque's force of 10,000 men at Holguin, being a little outside the territory. For the United States, General Shafter agreed to transport, with as little delay as possible, all the Spanish troops in the district to Spain, the embarkation being near the points oc-



EASTERN PART OF CUBA.

Showing portion surrendered to the United States at the fall of Santiago.

cupied. Officers were to keep their side arms, and both officers and men were to retain their personal property. The Spanish were authorized to take the military archives belonging to the surrendered district, and all Spanish forces who wished to remain in Cuba might do so under parole, giving up their arms. The Spanish forces were to march out of Santiago with honors of war, depositing their arms at a point agreed upon, to await the disposition of the United States government. This left the question of the return of the arms entirely in the hands of the government. This surrender affected about 12,000 soldiers, against whom not an American shot had been fired, and the troops in the whole district were estimated at about 25,000.

President McKinley gave expression to the feeling of the whole people over the event, when he cabled General Shafter:

The President of the United States sends to you and your army the profound thanks of the American people for the brilliant achievements at Santiago, resulting in the surrender of the city and all of the Spanish troops and territory under General Toral. Your splendid command has endured not only the hardships and sacrifices incident to the campaign and battle, but in stress of heat and weather has triumphed over obstacles which would have overcome men less brave and determined. One and all have displayed the most conspicuous gallantry and earned the gratitude of the nation. The hearts of the people turn with tender sympathy to the sick and wounded. May the Father of Mercies protect and comfort them.

Formal possession of the city was taken on the 17th, an immense concourse of people being present. As the chimes of the old Cathedral rang out the hour of twelve, the infantry and cavalry presented arms. Every American uncovered, and Captain McKittrick hoisted the Stars and Stripes. As the brilliant folds unfurled in a gentle breeze, against a fleckless sky, the cavalry band played "The Star Spangled Banner." At the same instant the sound of the distant booming of Captain Capron's battery, firing a salute of twenty-one guns, drifted in. When the salute ceased, from all directions along the line came floating in across the Plaza the strains of regimental bands and the cheers of the troops.

When the American officers had an opportunity to observe the nature of the entanglement of defenses of the city, they were convinced that General Shafter's patience and moderation in dealing with General Toral's exasperating delays and excuses were wise. Fighting as the Spaniards did the first day, it would have required a loss of 5,000 men to have taken the city. Indeed, in the face of a determined and well-drilled enemy, it is doubtful if the city could have been taken by assault.

But if the strength of these defenses furnished a sufficient reason for putting up with some delays, there was another development of the case which provided abundant reasons, not simply for declining to haggle further, but for making some apparent concessions to soothe the Spanish pride. Towards the latter end of the truce the dreaded "yellow jack" began to make its appearance in the American camps, and



CREEPING UP TO A LINE OF SPANISH SHARPSHOOTERS.
A United States trooper accompanied by Cuban scouts nearing the Spanish Intrenchments at Santiago.

while soldiers had not quailed before Spanish bullets, they feared the prospect of such a contagion in the ranks. The conditions under which the soldiers fought, lying in wet trenches, exposed to a fierce heat or to the deluges of the rainy season of a tropical climate, made the appearance of fevers almost a certainty. Toral, undoubtedly, kept hanging off in the hopes that yellow fever would appear in the American camp and enable him to secure better terms. Santiago itself was in a dirty condition; typical Spanish indolence and disregard of common sense in time of peace had left the city undefended against disease, and when the refugees left the city and mingled with the Americans, Toral felt certain that the contagion would be introduced among them. But when he saw no indications of it and he was completely hemmed in, he had no recourse but to yield.

Neither in the Spanish lines nor in the United States was there a realization of the discouraging condition in which our army was placed. It was extremely difficult to get food and medicine. Not only were the facilities for lightering supplies from the transports inadequate, but the road to the front was almost impassable, the mud at times being two feet deep, although Shafter had 1,000 men constantly at work on it. The difficulties almost baffled description. It is doubtful if ever in history an army has encountered such obstacles and accomplished so much. It seemed to some in this country that Shafter was making a mistake in temporizing with Toral, but, in reality, he is entitled to the greatest credit for the manner in which he met the terrible obstacles and won one of the three great victories of the war, the victory which really decided the issue and compelled Spain to hasten a suit for peace. Less than four weeks had elapsed since the first soldier of Shafter's army set foot on Cuban soil, and he had secured the surrender of a city, a large part of the province, and an army of 25,000 men. It would be hard to name a siege of a strongly-defended city carried out more quickly to a conclusive issue. Despite the sufferings of our men, they had shown the

highest soldierly qualities — courage, tenacity, cheerfulness, patience.

General McKibben was given the temporary command of the city, and for a few days the surrender of arms and ammunition, the clearing the harbor of obstructions, and the listing of prisoners went rapidly on. Soon the Red Cross steamer entered the harbor and relieved the conditions as to food. American rule was accepted quietly by the people. General Wood of the Rough Riders succeeded to the military command in a few days and carefully looked after the health of the city. Meantime, Spanish commanders from other parts of the district came in and surrendered, the prisoners eagerly awaiting their return to Spain.

Soon after the fall of Santiago, two naval victories were gained — minor actions as compared with Manila and Santiago, but both accomplished with the thoroughness which marked those events. On July 18th, at Manzanillo, Commander Todd of the *Wilmington*, in command of a squadron of six vessels, one a gunboat and the others auxiliary cruisers, approached the harbor, remaining beyond the range of the shore batteries, burned three Spanish gunboats, drove two others ashore, destroyed three transports, and blew up a store ship and a pontoon. All this was accomplished without the loss of a life on our side. This left Manzanillo in a condition to be easily taken if the campaign should require it.

Equally complete was the work of our ships at Nipe, a port on the northeast coast of Cuba. It was proposed to take this place as a convenient harbor for use in the expedition to Puerto Rico, and our naval force consisted of four gunboats — the *Topeka*, *Annapolis*, *Wasp*, and *Leyden*. In about an hour after they entered the harbor on the 21st the batteries of three forts had been silenced, the Spanish troops driven out, a Spanish gunboat larger than any of the attacking ships sunk, and the harbor occupied.

The relations between the Cuban officers and our generals came to a crisis with the occupation of Santiago, and the ex-

aggerated notion the Cuban leaders had of the part they were playing was apparent. A letter alleged to have been written by Garcia was published, in which he complained of not being invited to take part in the ceremonies of the surrender, that his army was forbidden to enter the place, and that the Cuban leaders had been ignored in every way by General Shafter. He protested against leaving the Spanish civil authorities in the city, and said the officials should be elected by the Cuban people. At the same time he withdrew his forces from the vicinity of Santiago. General Shafter replied in a courteous note, reminding Garcia that he had been invited to witness the surrender, which was made to the American army alone, and he referred him to President McKinley's proclamation as the law for the provisional government of Santiago. This proclamation continued in operation the municipal officers and regulations guaranteeing private and property rights.

In a later dispatch to the government General Shafter said that Garcia had refused to have anything to do with the surrender if the Spanish authorities were left in power, in spite of the fact that he was assured it was but a temporary arrangement. General Shafter then added:

The trouble with General Garcia was that he expected to be placed in command at this place; in other words, that we would turn the city over to him. I explained to him fully that we were at war with Spain, and that the question of Cuban independence could not be considered by me. Another grievance was that, finding that several thousand men marched in without opposition from General Garcia, I extended my own lines in front of him and closed up the gap, as I saw that I had to depend upon my own men for any effective investment of the place.

The Cuban Junta in this country seemed content to leave the future of Cuba to the American sense of justice and fair dealing, and Garcia's action received no endorsement.

A campaign to Puerto Rico had from the first been a part of the government's program, and it would have been begun long before, had not the War Department been seriously overtaxed to provide for the expedition to the Philippines, and for the operations about Santiago. The destruction of

Cervera's fleet made it possible for the navy to co-operate in Puerto Rico, and preparations were at once made for a prompt and energetic movement. There was the further reason for haste in the fact that Spain was showing a disposition to sue for peace, and our government wished to establish its authority in Puerto Rico before any armistice came, as it proposed to take that island among others in lieu of an indemnity which it was well known Spain would not be able to pay.

Profiting by the experience in the Cuban campaign, the military authorities decided to send a much larger army to Puerto Rico than was used before Santiago; but this was afterwards shown to have been bad judgment, for, while a large army was seriously needed before Santiago, it was not needed in Puerto Rico, whose people were ready to welcome American control. It would have been better if a part of the Puerto Rican force had been sent to Santiago to relieve those who had endured that campaign, and were soon to show the serious results of it. There was but a comparatively small Spanish force in Puerto Rico, and yet it was proposed to send there about thirty thousand troops under the command of General Miles himself. To Puerto Rico where less resistance was to be expected and where less than expected was really encountered, was sent a well-equipped army; to Santiago was sent a force inferior in numbers, and yet too large for the commissary arrangements which accompanied it. General Shafter had been compelled to meet difficulties without a parallel in warfare, without that support which was sent to Puerto Rico, where Miles simply led a triumphal march in a healthy country and without any serious resistance.


The Puerto Rican expedition, with the *Massachusetts*, *Columbia*, *Gloucester*, *Dixie*, *Yale*, and eight transports, left Guantanamo Bay July 21st. There were about 3,500 troops in the first detachment. The second expedition sailed from Tampa on the 23d, and the third, under command of General Brooks, embarked in the next three days from Tampa, Newport News, and Charleston. General Miles landed on



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the 25th at Guanica, a small town on the south coast not far from Ponce, and advanced eastward, meeting with no resist-



THE ISLAND OF PUERTO RICO.
Showing routes and distances to other points.

ance, except a slight Spanish force at a place called Yuaco. Meanwhile, the *Dixie*, which had been sent to Ponce, was welcomed effusively by the people of that place. The civil

authorities showed no antagonism, and the military commander quickly withdrew his troops towards San Juan. When the leading detachment of General Miles's army reached Ponce, therefore, it found the Stars and Stripes already floating and the people cheering them. His troops were received with an enthusiasm which made the extensive preparations to take the island almost ridiculous. The natives fraternized with our soldiers, loading them down with presents, and thousands of them expressed a wish to enlist against the Spaniards. General Miles issued a proclamation assuring the people of the continuance of public security and property rights and offering them.

Before the armistice had been declared General Schwan had gained possession of the town of Mayagüez, on the western coast of Puerto Rico; about twelve hundred Spanish troops were in the vicinity, and were driven back after brisk fighting, in which we had two men killed and fourteen wounded. The main advance of the army under General Wilson continued on the road to San Juan, beyond Coama toward Aibonito, while General Brooke advanced northward from Guayama. A demand for the surrender of Aibonito had been refused, and both General Wilson and General Brooke were about to begin a vigorous attack, when the order came from Washington to suspend hostilities.

The military operations of the last week of the war were of a character to convince Spain that delay in agreeing to our terms of an armistice would be foolish. In Cuba on the afternoon of the 12th, our cruiser *Newark*, with four gunboats, began the bombardment of Manzanillo, and it was continued into the night. A demand for the surrender of the place was refused and the bombardment would have been renewed on Saturday had not news reached the commander of the *Newark* that an armistice had been declared.

But news of the armistice could not be so promptly sent to the far-off Philippines, which continued without direct cable communication.

CHAPTER LIII

THE SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES—CONDUCT OF AGUINALDO—PHILIPPINE EXPEDITIONS—ANNEXATION OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS—FALL OF MANILA.

Hostilities Begin and End in the Philippines—The Philippine Question at Home—Policy of Expansion—.A Complicated Situation—General Merritt Designated to Lead the Expeditions—Apprehension of Trouble with the Germans—Dewey's Tactful Management—The Insurgents Threaten Trouble—Aguinaldo's Conduct—Insurgents Invest Manila—The First Expedition under Way—Manila's Desperate Condition—Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands—Arrival of the First Expedition under General Anderson and the Departure of General Merritt—Taking Possession of the Ladrone Islands—The *Irene* Incident—Organizing for Attack—A Spanish Assault—A Demand for Surrender—Preparing for Bombardment—The Battle of Malate—Fall of the City—Merritt's Proclamation.

OUR hostilities with Spain began and ended in the Philippines. Commodore Dewey opened them there before we fairly realized that the Orient was involved in the war, and Admiral Dewey and General Merritt closed them before the information that an armistice had been declared had reached them. In pursuing the course of events in Cuban waters, the reader's attention has necessarily been diverted from the state of affairs prevailing at Manila after Dewey's brilliant victory, and it will be essential to return to the time when the smoke of that engagement was clearing away and notice the development of a situation possessing something of a fascinating novelty to the people of the United States. An exceedingly lively discussion at once arose as to what we should do with the Philippines, although, as a matter of fact, we, as yet, held none of the soil of the islands except at Cavité. But with an unerring intuition our people at once realized that a new question and one of transcending importance had en-

tered into the war and that in the end, whenever it came, a responsibility for the future of the islands would rest upon this government, in some way. Two parties naturally arose, the so-called expansionists, who argued that we should keep the islands, that we could not drop them if we would. To leave the oppressed and rebellious islands to Spain seemed out of the question; to sell them to Great Britain or any other power would raise perilous complications; to divide them up would be equally dangerous; to establish a stable and peaceful native government hardly seemed possible, and to keep them might embroil us in an Asiatic question with jealous powers and certainly would mark a decided change in the policy of the government. We need not enter into a more extended notice of this discussion, for wholly outside of that the situation was such as to give the government some concern and immediate opportunity for action.

Manila still remained in the control of the Spanish governor-general, while camped about it, and gradually increasing their advantage were the insurgents under Aguinaldo. It was perfectly true, as Dewey had reported, that he could take the city at any time, but it would be useless to do so until troops could be sent as an occupying force, sufficient to assume control and jurisdiction. A bombardment simply would have only complicated Dewey's position, which was perfectly safe as far as it went.

Although it had been perfectly understood at Washington from the day when war and operations in the Philippines became inevitable, that Dewey's little fleet, even if successful over Montijo's, could spare no men for the occupation and administration of a country so large as the Philippines, and although plans for sending a force to co-operate with Dewey had been early discussed, it was not till the reports of Dewey's prompt victory came that active steps were taken to send assistance. The possibilities of complications in the far-off islands, in the very region which was the cause of so much concern and jealousy among the European powers, was

at once appreciated and the government determined to advance in that direction with as much discretion as energy. In designating Général Merritt, who had before been spoken of as the probable leader of the important military operations in Cuba, to take command of the proposed expedition, the government revealed its desire and purpose to deal with the new problem ably and to send sufficient forces to reduce to a minimum the possibility that some European power might find an excuse for attempting to take our new obligations and opportunities in the Orient off our hands.

From the very first some concern was felt as to the attitude of Germany. Simultaneously with the sending of the ultimatum to Spain in April and before any power had signified an intention to declare its neutrality, the State Department received information that Spain had made a proposition to Germany, under which the latter would furnish troops for the suppression of the Philippine rebels in consideration of large concessions in the islands. The advantages thus offered to Germany were very tempting in view of the conditions in the East, and there was a fear that the Kaiser might not pass them by, and that complications of a serious nature might arise. Immediately after Dewey's victory all the European powers sent warships to Manila, and Germany seemed inclined to keep a much larger naval force there than her commercial interests warranted.

Admiral Dewey's tact and ability as an administrator under difficult circumstances were quickly demonstrated. While maintaining a vigorous blockade he willingly gave permission to a delegation of British and German merchants to remove their families to Cavité, where he placed United States Consul Williams in charge. The consequence was that wealthy families placed their houses at Cavité at the Admiral's disposal. He made himself popular among the foreign shipmasters, and aided and facilitated them in carrying on their business so far as it did not interfere with his duties. His praise was in every port in the East.


The Spanish papers and clergy did all they could to undermine his influence by false reports and sensational stories. The Archbishop, late in May, issued a proclamation, in which he said that Spanish battleships were hurrying on their way to Manila, and stated that God had informed him that in the next engagement the armies of Christian Spain would be victorious. It seemed as if the world had gone back three centuries, and as if we were living in the time of the bloody Philip II., after whom these unfortunate islands were named.

Fully three weeks elapsed after Dewey's victory before troops for his support were actually embarked, and as time went on the more apparent it became that the government had entered upon a difficult undertaking. The number of men to be sent was gradually increased; the number of regulars was augmented, for General Merritt was too wise to endanger the expedition by hastily dispatching only an army of untrained volunteers, such as were recruited in the militia of some of the Western states.

The first expedition sailed from San Francisco with the cruiser *Charleston* on May 22d, and it was followed a few days later by the *City of Peking* with two transports. In all the first detachment consisted of about 2,500 men under the command of General Anderson. The monitor *Monterey* was also ordered to make ready to proceed to the Orient, a fact which indicated a desire to strengthen Admiral Dewey's fleet for possible contact with those of other powers.

That the situation of the Spaniards in Manila was desperate was indicated by the published dispatches of Captain-General Augusti. Aguinaldo had aroused insurgents all over the island and was winning in many skirmishes with the Spanish forces. In a despairing dispatch early in June the Captain-General said: "The capital is besieged by land and sea. I shall try to resist to the last, but I have no confidence in the result. Numbers of volunteers and native soldiers are deserting to the rebels."

One of the important questions which Congress had taken



THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
Showing routes and distances to important points.

up after the disposition of necessary war measures was that of the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands. The question had not for a moment lost its importance since Queen Liliokalani had been deposed early in 1893, and the provisional government had offered to cede the sovereignty of the islands to the United States. The leading men of the island strongly desired annexation, and resolutions had been introduced in Congress to bring it about. The islands assumed a new importance immediately after the battle at Manila, and when preparations were being made for sending expeditions to the Philippines. That the sympathy of the people was strongly American was strongly shown by the enthusiastic and generous welcome that was given the first expedition when it arrived at Honolulu, a welcome which was repeated as other expeditions touched at that point. The debate in Congress was prolonged by a minority opposition, but the resolutions were finally passed early in June, and five commissioners were appointed to arrange for the future administration of the islands. This step was important in many ways; it established a precedent in the manner of arranging our interests outside of the ordinary boundaries of the United States, and, in case it should become our lot to administer affairs in the Philippines, the sovereignty over Hawaii, as a stopping place in the Pacific, could not fail to be of great advantage.

On June 15th the second expedition to the Philippines departed from San Francisco, 4,200 men being taken in four vessels, in command of General Francis V. Greene. It included three volunteer regiments, one each from Pennsylvania Colorado, and Nebraska, two battalions of regular infantry two batteries, engineers, and hospital corps. The third expedition got away the last of June on six vessels, and with it went General Merritt and his staff. It had thus taken two months to dispatch the force which was deemed necessary to support Admiral Dewey in the future exigencies of the islands, and another month was to elapse before General Merritt could be on the spot. This third expedition num-

bered about 5,000 men, making a total of some 11,000 troops sent to the Orient up to that time. Preparations for other expeditions were also made, and upon further secret advices from Admiral Dewey, the monitor *Monadnock* was ordered to the Philippines.

On the day General Merritt set out with the third expedition, the first arrived at Cavité, having stopped on the way to take possession of the Ladrone Islands, which are about 1,200 miles east of the Philippines, and had been in Spanish possession ever since the days of Magellan. The *Charleston* entered the harbor of San Luis Dapia in these islands on the 20th, shelled the fort, and, meeting with no resistance, received the surrender of the town on the following day, taking off fifty-two officers of the Spanish army and ninety-four men. Immediately on the arrival at Cavité a conference took place between the admiral, General Anderson, and Aguinaldo, as to future proceedings.

It was reported that one of the results of the arrival of American forces at Cavité was the withdrawal of a part of the large German squadron which had been assembled to protect the persons and property of a very small group of German subjects in the Philippines, but it appeared later that the German ships had not left the archipelago. The insurgents had, meantime, been preparing to seize Grande Island in Subig Bay, which the Spaniards had been fortifying. The German warship *Irene* entered, and her commander refused to allow the insurgents to attack the place, alleging that as Germany had not formally recognized them as belligerents, he could not, from motives of humanity, allow them to attack the Spanish, as he feared that a massacre might occur. On hearing the situation, Dewey at once sent one of his own vessels, the *Raleigh*, to take the island, and the *Irene's* commander could not very well object to this, as, whatever Germany might think about the insurgents, she had fully recognized that a state of war existed between Spain and the United States. In fact, as soon as the *Raleigh* appeared, the *Irene* withdrew

it. It was another proof that Dewey was cool-headed and quick-witted. What might have grown into a European complication was settled by him very promptly and without leaving the resemblance of a ground for reasonable protest.

This affair was simply one of the culminating incidents in the exasperating conduct of the German commander, Admiral Von Diederichs. He had been one of the most disquieting elements in the bay from the time the foreign ships had appeared there. Sitting on the quarter-deck of his flagship one July afternoon, Admiral Dewey pointed towards the distant wrecks of Montijo's fleet, and said to a visitor:

"The little fight out there was one of the least difficult things I have had to do here," and he added after a minute: "We shall be glad enough to see the *Monterey*. I warrant she will get a cheering when she comes in."

The German admiral seemed to take an especial delight in violating the regulations which Dewey had established for the blockaded bay. The latter had issued orders that there should be no movement of ships or boats about the bay at night, but the Germans sent launches about the bay as if there had been no such regulations, and when they were stopped and sent back, friction resulted. Von Diederichs protested, and Dewey quietly insisted that his orders must be observed. Dewey occasionally felt it necessary to turn his searchlights in the direction of the German vessels, and Von Diederichs disliked it, but Dewey replied that, while he deeply regretted the necessity of these precautions, he proposed to keep himself informed of what went on in the bay, and intimated that the German commander was acting as if he thought he was blockading the port instead of the Americans.

So matters went on, and, if anything, grew worse, till finally Admiral Dewey took occasion to say to the German Flag Lieutenant that certain things meant war and the Germans were approaching dangerously near them. He added, in substance, that if the Germans wanted war they could have it. Von Diederichs then became more pacificatory.

The uncertainty of German intentions in the Philippines occasioned much concern and feeling in this country for a time. There were many reports, particularly from English sources, of Germany's determination to take advantage of the situation to gain a foothold in the islands to the extent at least of securing a coaling station; there were rumors of an agreement between Germany, Austria, and Russia in regard to a common line of policy to be pursued by the three countries in the disposition of the Philippines. Several of the Russian newspapers were going so far as to urge the necessity of some kind of intervention at this stage of the war. On the other hand, the official relations of these countries to the government of the United States was all that could be asked for. Russia intimated quite clearly that she would not interfere with us in the islands; Germany continued in every way to express its friendship for us, and, while it was doubtless true that the appearance of the American navy in the Orient had made the European diplomats extremely nervous, to say the least, none of the governments could afford to give offense to this country, even if for no other reason than that it might tend to precipitate an understanding between England, Japan, and the United States for showing influence in the East.

But the conduct of the Germans in Manila Bay was not the only troublesome feature of the situation. As the American forces began to arrive, the attitude of Aguinaldo, the young insurgent leader, became more and more unsatisfactory; and the American commanders quickly found that they had a most astonishing character to deal with. He had begun active life as plain Emilio, the servant boy of a Jesuit priest, and the priest had been so treacherous, from a Spanish point of view, as to kindly give to the smart native lad the foundations of an education. In course of time the lad went to Hong Kong, studied medicine, saw men, began to realize the difference between Spanish rule and British rule. Returning to his native islands, it was not long before the Spanish masters learned that he had become an educated Filipino with energy and ambition,

and therefore a dangerous character. He was exiled; then he sought his revenge, and during the insurrection he had risen to the leadership. Plain Emilio had become Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Fauray. He was still a very young man, and his stature was extremely slight, but he had a cold, impassive face, and all the shrewdness, energy, and dash of a born leader; and he had besides an ambition as boundless as Napoleon's. Dewey was well aware of the character of Aguinaldo and his men, and government to nothing as to its ultimate purposes in the islands. But until an American army should arrive the admiral could only offer no serious objection to the pretensions of the ambitious Filipino, and he discreetly allowed him to proceed, harrassing the pent-up Spaniard and thus indirectly hastening the fall of the city. Thus it was that while the American reinforcements were making their way across the Pacific, Aguinaldo was keeping up a desultory war with the Spaniards, and by the first of July the lines of the insurgents were stretched all about the city to the shore front and within a short distance of the Spanish intrenchments. A constant fire was going on day and night, while Dewey, who was, after all, the real master of the situation, kept his ships quietly in the harbor and an eye on the Germans. He knew very well that the Spaniards would never surrender to the Filipinos; they would burn the city and die in the flames first; and for this reason he calculated that by the time the American forces arrived, the Spaniards would be in a mood to quietly surrender to the advance of the Stars and Stripes. Thus all the powder the insurgents were using, and the spectacular authority which Aguinaldo was indulging in, were really the smooth operations of a very clever campaign on the part of Admiral Dewey. It was a sort of automatic campaign, which Dewey quietly watched, ready to interfere if anything went wrong. But Aguinaldo's opinions of the part he was playing grew into absurd proportions.

CHAPTER LIV

ARRIVAL OF GENERAL MERRITT AT MANILA—[CONDUCT OF THE WILY AGUINALDO—FIGHTING BEFORE MANILA—THE COMBINED ATTACK UPON THE CITY AND ITS FALL—RAISING THE STAR-SPANGLED BANNER.

Aguinaldo Proves Troublesome to General Anderson—The Diplomacy of the Filipino Leader—Arrival of the Second Expedition—The Humiliating Silence of the Spaniards—General Anderson's Curt Note to Aguinaldo—Obstacles Placed in the Way of the American Troops—General Merritt's Narrative of the Situation in which he Found Matters—He Avoids Aguinaldo—Working in Front of the Insurgent Lines—The Night Attack of July 31st—Planning for a Combined Attack upon the City—The Joint Demand for Surrender—Dewey Begins the Bombardment of the City—The Position of the Fleet—The English and German Flagships—The Advance of the Army—Entering the City—Trouble in Keeping the Insurgents Out—Striking Scene as the American Colors Rose above the People—Weeping Spaniards—A Burst of Sunlight.

THE unsatisfactory attitude of Aguinaldo manifested itself as soon as General Anderson's troops landed at Cavité on July 1st. The insurgent was in full possession beyond the navy yard gates. The first unpleasant indication of his presence was when Lieutenant Clark, General Anderson's aid, while walking about Cavité, was told by a Filipino soldier that Aguinaldo wished to see him at once at his headquarters. Clark went there and Aguinaldo asked him what he was doing in Cavité. Clark said he was on General Anderson's business. Aguinaldo said that was very well, but he would have to give him formal permission to go about the place. That night General Anderson sent word to Aguinaldo that he was in command at Cavité and that his men must not be interfered with. Soon after the 4th Aguinaldo made a formal call on General Anderson, who thought best to receive him with military honors. He was evidently pleased, but he was also very cautious and reserved. Finally



Engraved by H. G. Smith from a portrait by H. G. Smith, painted for the artist.
A. D. WORTHINGTON & CO. PUBLISHERS, HARTFORD, CONN.

W. Meritt

he asked what the Americans intended to do in the Philippines. He construed General Anderson's reply to mean that the Americans were there only to permit the Filipinos to set up an independent government. But he had hardly returned to his headquarters when he received a letter from General Anderson informing him that another American expedition was expected, and that Cavité would be needed for these soldiers. There was more correspondence, in which Aguinaldo kept hinting at the question of American intentions, but he finally moved out of Cavité to Bakor. A little later General Anderson decided to send a battalion of the First California into camp near the shore of the bay south of Manila and practically between Aguinaldo's headquarters and the insurgent lines. Aguinaldo did not dare to show a too unfriendly attitude, but he set about to do all he could to block this movement of American troops. They were landed at Parañaque, about two miles below the proposed camp, and Aguinaldo was informed that the Americans needed labor and material for transportation of men and supplies to the camp. The natives would not work without Aguinaldo's consent, and he did not give his consent. When asked for carts he said there were none. But the American officers found them and took them and finally got into camp.

This was only the beginning. There were similar incidents when General Anderson undertook to move more men into the camp. Meanwhile, the second expedition under General Greene arrived on July 16th and 17th, and preparations were at once made for the debarkation of the troops. It was decided to put all the second expedition, except a few regulars and one battery of the Utah Artillery, into the camp with the Californians without landing them at Cavité. As the stores and ammunition had been loaded into the ships without much regard for the probable order in which they would be needed, and as the landing had to be done in caecos through the surf, it was slow and laborious work. The American camp was not far from the old stone fort at Malate, where the Spaniards had

some good guns, including 8-inch Krupps, but the Spaniards simply stood by and watched the American army gathering before them. They knew that if they trained their guns on the camp, Dewey would open his guns on Manila. They had no intention of knocking "the chip" off American shoulders. Indeed, they seemed to regard the gathering of the American forces under their guns as a hastening of the time when they would gladly make a theatrical surrender to the United States to save their honor and to save themselves from the tantalizing Filipinos. An enemy was never in more humiliating straits.

They regarded the spectacle with far more complacency than did Aguinaldo. Now that native assistance and carts and horses were needed to move the expedition into camp, the Chief Quartermaster decided to have them without any more palaver. He called on Aguinaldo, but the insurgent general was "indisposed." He waited a while and called again, but Aguinaldo was reported asleep. Then the Chief Quartermaster wrote him a letter as follows:

"General Anderson writes me to say that, the second expedition having arrived, he expects to encamp in the vicinity of Parañaque from 5,000 to 7,000 men. To do this, supply this army, and shelter it, will require certain assistance from the Filipinos in this neighborhood. We shall want horses, carts, buffalos, etc., for transportation, wood to cook with, etc. For all this we are willing to pay a fair price, but no more. We find so far that the native population are not willing to give us this assistance as promptly as required. But we must have it, and if it becomes necessary we shall be compelled to send out parties to seize what we may need. We should regret very much to do this, as we are here to befriend the Filipinos. Our nation has spent millions of money to send forces here to expel the Spaniards and to give a good government to the whole people, and the return we are asking is comparatively slight.

"General Anderson wishes me to inform your people that we are here for their good, and that they must supply us with labor and material at the current market prices. We are prepared to purchase five hundred horses at a fair price, but cannot undertake to bargain for horses with each individual owner.

"I regret very much that I am unable to see you personally, as it is of the utmost importance that these arrangements should be made as soon as possible.

"I will await your reply."

The reply did not come, but one of Aguinaldo's aids hastened to General Anderson to know if the letter had been written by authority. General Anderson replied that it was not only by his authority but by his order, and said further that when an American commander was indisposed or asleep, someone was left in authority to transact business of importance. The next day Aguinaldo replied formally to the letter. He was surprised that there should have been any suggestion of unwillingness on the part of the Filipinos to aid the Americans, for the Filipinos knew that the Americans "did not desire a colony," and were only there to drive out the Spaniards. He said the Filipinos did not have as much material as the Americans asked for and again asked for a definite statement as to American intentions. General Anderson acknowledged the note and said it would be referred to General Merritt when he arrived. The next day it was found that Aguinaldo had caused to be made a list of all the horses and vehicles in the district, and had notified the owners that they were not to engage in any service for the Americans which would interfere with any service for Aguinaldo. They understood, took the wheels off their carts and hid them. Thus our soldiers had to work their supplies up from the beach as best they could, pushing heavy boxes end over end for a long distance. But they succeeded, and Aguinaldo saw what the American soldiers were made of.

In this way matters went on till the 25th, when General Merritt arrived, having gone straight through on the *Newport*. The other transports and the monitor *Monterey* arrived a few days later. The latter was warmly welcomed, much to the astonishment of the natives who, because of her low freeboard, decided that she was sinking. General Merritt at once set to work organizing his forces, and as to his impression of the work before him we can do no better than to quote from his report. He says:

"Immediately after my arrival I visited General Greene's camp and made a reconnoissance of the position held by the Spanish, and also the opposing lines of the insurgent forces, hereafter to be de-

scribed. I found General Greene's command encamped on a strip of sandy land running parallel to the shore of the bay and not far distant from the beach, but owing to the great difficulties of landing supplies the greater portion of the force had shelter tents only and were suffering many discomforts, the camp being situated in a low flat place, without shelter from the heat of the tropical sun or adequate protection during the terrific downpours of rain so frequent at this season. I was at once struck by the exemplary spirit of patient, even cheerful, endurance shown by the officers and men under such circumstances, and this feeling of admiration for the manner in which the American soldier, volunteer and regular alike, accepted the necessary hardships of the work they have undertaken to do has grown and increased with every phase of the difficult and trying campaign which the troops of the Philippine expedition have brought to such a brilliant and successful conclusion.

"The Filipinos, or insurgent forces at war with Spain, had, prior to the arrival of the American land forces, been waging a desultory warfare with the Spaniards for several months, and were at the time of my arrival in considerable force, variously estimated and never accurately ascertained, but probably not far from 12,000 men. These troops, well supplied with small arms, with plenty of ammunition and several field guns, had obtained positions of investment opposite to the Spanish line of detached works throughout their entire extent, and on the particular road called the 'Calle Real,' passing along the front of General Greene's brigade camp and running through Malate to Manila, the insurgents had established an earth-work of trenches within 800 yards of Powder Magazine fort. They also occupied as well the road to the right leading from the village of Passay, and the approach by the beach was also in their possession. This anomalous state of affairs — namely, having a line of quasi hostile native troops between our forces and the Spanish position — was, of course, very objectionable, but it was difficult to deal with, owing to the peculiar condition of our relations with the insurgents.

"As General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival, nor offer his services as a subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the President fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by the American land forces, and stated that 'the powers of the military occupants are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants,' I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I would not until then be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce my authority in the event that his pretensions should clash with my designs. For these reasons the preparations for the attack on the city were pressed, and military operations conducted without reference to the situation of the insurgent forces.

"The Spanish, observing this activity on our part, made a very sharp attack with infantry and artillery on the night of July 31st."

In this engagement the Spaniards, with a considerably superior force, undertook to surprise our troops and turn their right. It appears that there had been a conflict between the Spanish party, which was inclined to surrender without much opposition to the Americans, and the party which urged the most desperate opposition to the last. To the former party belonged Captain-General Augusti and to the latter the archbishop and General Jaudenes. Soon after Dewey's victory, Augusti had shown a disposition to show the white flag, and for a time Jaudenes has assumed the command. Now he came to the front again, was placed in command, and the Spaniards began fighting vigorously. But our forces gallantly repelled the attack of the night of the 31st. Not an inch of ground was yielded by the Tenth Regiment, Pennsylvania, and the batteries of the Utah Artillery stationed in the trenches, while the first California moved forward to their support under a galling fire with courage and steadiness. Thirteen of our men were killed and several were wounded; the Spanish loss was believed to be about 500. The enemy was driven back upon the city.

General Merritt's report continues:

"Our position was extended and strengthened after this and resisted successfully repeated night attacks, our forces suffering, however, considerable loss in wounded and killed, while the losses of the enemy, owing to the darkness, could not be ascertained.

"The strain of the night fighting and the heavy details for outpost duty made it imperative to reinforce General Greene's troops with General MacArthur's brigade, which had arrived in transports on July 31st. The difficulties of this operation can hardly be overestimated. The transports were at anchor off Cavité, five miles from a spot on the beach where it was desired to disembark the men. Several squalls, accompanied by floods of rain, raged day after day, and the only way to get the troops and supplies ashore was to load them from the ship's side into native lighters (called 'cascos') or small steamboats, move them to a point opposite the camp, and then disembark them through the surf in small boats, or by running the lighters head-on to the beach. The landing was finally accomplished after days of hard work and hardship, and I desire here to express

again my admiration for the fortitude and cheerful willingness of the men of all commands engaged in this operation.

“Upon the assembly of MacArthur’s brigade in support of Greene’s, I had about 8,500 men in position to attack, and I deemed the time had come for final action. During the time of the night attacks I had communicated my desire to Admiral Dewey that he would allow his ships to open fire on the right of the Spanish line of intrenchments, believing that such an action would stop the night firing and loss of life, but the Admiral had declined to order it unless we were in danger of losing our position by the assaults of the Spanish, for the reason that, in his opinion, it would precipitate a general engagement, for which he was not ready.”

Admiral Dewey had entertained the hope that the surrender of the city might be secured without a serious risk of life, and he had counseled postponing the demand for the city till the Spaniards were in the most desperate straits, and until the monitor *Monadnock* arrived, for there seemed to be always the possibility that the Germans would interfere when the gauntlet was thrown down. But the nightly Spanish attacks on our trenches put a different face on affairs, for it occasioned some loss of life. Then too, some intimation that peace proposals were under way reached the American commanders at about this time, but the Spaniards were ignorant of it apparently. Through the informal assistance of the Belgian consul, the American commanders were able to obtain a clear idea of the Spanish purposes. They would surrender, but there must be a show of fighting. Spanish honor must be satisfied.

General Merritt says in his report:

“Under date of August 6th, Admiral Dewey agreed to my suggestion that we should send a joint letter to the Captain-General notifying him that he should remove from the city all non-combatants within forty-eight hours, and that operations against the defenses at Manila might begin at any time after the expiration of that period. This letter was sent August 7th, and a reply was received the same date to the effect that the Spanish were without places of refuge for the increased numbers of wounded, sick women and children now lodged within the walls.

“On the 9th a formal joint demand for the surrender of the city was sent in. This demand was based upon the hopelessness of the struggle on the part of the Spaniards, and that every consideration of humanity demanded that the city should not be subjected to bom-

bombardment under such circumstances. The Captain-General's reply of same date, stated that the Council of Defense had declared that the demand could not be granted; but the Captain-General offered to consult his government if we would allow him the time strictly necessary for the communication by way of Hong Kong. This was declined on our part, for the reason that it could, in the opinion of the Admiral and myself, lead only to a continuance of the situation, with no immediate result favorable to us, and the necessity was apparent and very urgent that decisive action should be taken at once to compel the enemy to give up the town in order to relieve our troops from the trenches and from the great exposure to unhealthy conditions which were unavoidable in a bivouac during the rainy season.

"The seacoast batteries in defense of Manila are so situated that it is impossible for ships to engage them without firing into the town, and as the bombardment of a city filled with women and children, sick and wounded, and containing a large amount of neutral property could only be justified as a last resort, it was agreed between Admiral Dewey and myself that an attempt should be made to carry the extreme right of the Spanish line of intrenchments in front of the positions at that time occupied by our troops, which, with its flank on the seashore, was entirely open to the fire of the navy. It was not my intention to press the assault at this point, in case the enemy should hold it in strong force, until after the navy had made practicable breaches in the works and driven out the troops holding them, which could not be done by the army alone, owing to the absence of siege guns. It was believed, however, as most desirable and in accordance with the principles of civilized warfare, that the attempt should be made to drive the enemy out of his intrenchments before resorting to the bombardment of the city."

The army was actively engaged in preparation during the 12th, or the day on which Secretary Day and Ambassador Cambon were signing the peace protocol at Washington, and on that day General Merritt issued his order for the combined attack. The general plan was for the fleet to satisfy "Spanish honor" with a spectacular bombardment till such time as the way seemed clear for the army to advance with the least amount of resistance. The chief concern was not in the work of getting in to the city, but in keeping the insurgents out.

The morning of the 13th was like so many others in the Philippines; the wind blew and the rain fell, and a heavy mist lay along the shore, giving a false outline to the range-finders on the fleet. It was about 8.45 when the ships got under way,

and at about the same time the foreign vessels began to move in behind to witness the fall of the oldest Spanish city in the Orient.

At about 9.30 the *Olympia* opened on the Malate fort with her 5-inch guns, and the other ships quickly joined in, but the shots fell far short — altogether too short to satisfy Spanish honor. The little *Callao*, a Spanish gunboat which had steamed into Manila Bay a few days after Dewey's great victory unaware of what had taken place, and which was quickly surrendered and been converted into a more serviceable American gunboat, stood in nearer the shore line, and, unaffected by the mist, did some accurate shooting with her small guns. The bombardment had continued but a few minutes when the shots began to fall in the forts and the Spanish lines, and at 10.25 Dewey ceased firing. At this point we may well take up again the narrative of General Merritt's report.

"At 10.25, on a prearranged signal from our trenches that it was believed our troops could advance, the navy ceased firing, and immediately a light line of skirmishers from the Colorado regiment of Greene's brigade passed over our trenches and deployed rapidly forward, another line from the same regiment from the left flank of our earthworks advancing swiftly up the beach in open order. Both these lines found the powder magazine, fort, and trenches flanking it, deserted, but as they passed over the Spanish works they were met by a sharp fire from a second line situated in the streets of Malaté, by which a number of men were killed and wounded, among others, the soldier who pulled down the Spanish colors still flying on the fort and raised our own. The works of the second line soon gave way to the determined advance of Greene's troops, and that officer pushed his brigade rapidly through Malaté and over the bridges to occupy Binodo and San Migueka, as contemplated in his instructions.

"In the meantime the brigade of General MacArthur, advancing simultaneously on the Passay road, encountered a very sharp fire coming from the blockhouses, trenches, and woods in his front, positions which it was very difficult to carry, owing to the swampy condition of the ground on both sides of the road and the heavy undergrowth concealing the enemy. With much gallantry and excellent judgment on the part of the brigade commander and the troops engaged, these difficulties were overcome with a minimum loss, and

MacArthur advanced and held the bridges and the town of Malaté, as was contemplated in his instructions. The city of Manila was now in our possession, excepting the walled town, but shortly after the entry of our troops into Malaté, a white flag was displayed on the walls, whereupon Lieut.-Col. C. A. Whittier, United States Volunteers, of my staff, and Lieut. Brumby, United States Navy, representing Admiral Dewey, were sent ashore to communicate with the Captain-General. I soon personally followed these officers into the town, going at once to the palace of the Governor-General, and there, after a conversation with the Spanish authorities, a preliminary agreement of the terms of capitulation was signed by the Captain-General and myself. This agreement was subsequently incorporated into the formal terms of capitulation as arranged by the officers representing the two forces. Immediately after the surrender the Spanish colors on the sea front were hauled down and the American flag displayed and saluted by the guns of the navy. The Second Oregon Regiment, which had proceeded by sea from Cavité, was disembarked and entered the walled town as a provost guard, and the Colonel was directed to receive the Spanish arms and deposit them in places of security. The town was filled with the troops of the enemy, driven in from the intrenchments, regiments formed and standing in the streets, but the work of disarming proceeded quietly and nothing unpleasant occurred."

Thus the 350 years of Spanish sovereignty in Manila was ended.

The insurgents made every effort, doubtless by Aguinaldo's orders, to get into the city, and once or twice sharp conflicts were narrowly averted. Small bands of 100 or 200 worked their way in behind some of the American troops in the lead, but were caught and disarmed. A few got into the suburbs with arms and did some looting. That night General Anderson sent to Aguinaldo a preëmptory order to remove all his men from the city, and for an answer Aguinaldo sent forward one of his generals with 1,000 men. They were surrounded and disarmed, and Aguinaldo protested. He asserted that the American troops had landed by his permission, and, therefore, he was entitled to some of the spoils. Such was the situation when General Merritt left to confer with the peace commission. The cable which Dewey had cut when he destroyed Montijo's fleet was reunited and Manila was again in communication with the world.

CHAPTER LV

SPAIN SUES FOR PEACE — SIGNING OF THE PROTOCOL — STORY OF THE PARIS PEACE COMMISSION AND ITS LABORS — THE FINAL TREATY OF PEACE — END OF THE WAR.

Spain's Reluctance to Yield — Her Embarrassed Condition — Symptoms of Revolution — Don Carlos and Weyler — Cortes Dissolved in Disorder — Waiting for Spanish Public Opinion — Overtures at last through the French Minister — Reply of the United States — Terms of the Protocol — The Philippine Problem — Condition of Our Army in Cuba — Commissions for the Evacuation of Cuba and Puerto Rico — The Peace Commission and its Work — The Spaniards Yield to Our Terms — Examples of Genuine Heroism in the War — Credit to the Private and to the Sailor — The Patriotic and Prudent Policy of the President — A Rich Legacy for the Future — After War, the Responsibilities of Peace — The Problems of Better Government in the Conquered Territory — The Beginning of a New Historical Period in our National Life.

MUCH of the time since the war began Spain had been passing through a ministerial crisis. The defeat at Manila had been followed by symptoms of revolution and anarchy. In the long debates in the Cortes the most bitter attacks had been made on the ministry for its failure to meet the situation. Several provinces were placed under martial law. The premium on gold rapidly advanced and the Bank of Spain was becoming seriously crippled in its efforts to financier the government. The ministry held together because every one feared the result of its disappearance. It became no longer possible to secure credence in reports of Spanish victories or to conceal Spanish defeats. By the first of July the Spanish people were beginning to face the facts. There were petitions for peace from several sections. But Don Carlos was threatening trouble, and Weyler, with characteristic perversity, was inflaming the military spirits. The Cortes was dissolved the last week in June amid great disorder and with outspoken

attacks upon the dynasty. To have sued for peace then, while it would have been better for Spain, might have endangered the Queen, so Sagasta held off with nothing to gain. He was required to wait till the Spanish mind was prepared for peace. The pressure of the war was felt more and more, and after the fall of Santiago peace proposals were daily expected.

The overtures finally came on July 26th, or three days after General Miles landed in Puerto Rico. The French Minister at Washington, M. Cambon, called upon the President and presented a letter from the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, asking upon what terms the United States would be willing to make peace. President McKinley at once called his cabinet into consultation for the purpose of framing a reply. The result was that on the 30th a reply was sent to Madrid to the general effect that this country would enter into negotiations for peace provided Spain agreed to certain conditions. This answer Spain received on the 31st. On the following day some explanation was asked as to some of its terms, and the Spanish cabinet finally accepted the conditions on August 7th. With the signing on the 12th by Cambon on the part of Spain, and Secretary Day on the part of the United States, of a formal protocol as a basis for peace, the war begun on April 21st was brought to a close. The protocol, embodying the conditions above mentioned, was as follows:

His Excellency M. Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Republic at Washington, and Mr. William R. Day, Secretary of State of the United States, having received respectively to that effect plenary powers from the Spanish Government and the Government of the United States, have established and signed the following articles, which define the terms on which the two governments have agreed with regard to the questions enumerated below and of which the object is the establishment of peace between the two countries, namely:

Article 1. Spain will renounce all claim to all sovereignty over and all her rights over the island of Cuba.

Article 2. Spain will cede to the United States the island of Puerto Rico and the other islands which are at present under the

sovereignty of Spain in the Antilles, as well as an island in the Ladrona Archipelago, to be chosen by the United States.

Article 3. The United States will occupy and retain the city and bay of Manila and the port of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control and form of government of the Philippines.

Article 4. Spain will immediately evacuate Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the Antilles. To this effect each of the two governments will appoint commissions within ten days after the signing of this protocol, and those commissioners shall meet at Havana within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, with the object of coming to an agreement regarding the carrying out of the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Cuba and other adjacent Spanish islands; each of the two governments shall likewise appoint within ten days after the signature of this protocol other commissioners, who shall meet at San Juan de Puerto Rico within thirty days after the signature of this protocol to agree upon the details of the evacuation of Puerto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the Antilles.

Article 5. Spain and the United States shall appoint to treat for peace five commissioners at the most for either country. The commissioners shall meet in Paris on October 1, at the latest, to proceed to negotiations and to the conclusion of a treaty of peace. This treaty shall be ratified in conformity with the constitutional laws of each of the two countries.

Article 6. Once this protocol is concluded and signed hostilities shall be suspended, and to that effect in the two countries orders shall be given by either government to the commanders of its land and sea forces as speedily as possible.

Done in duplicate at Washington, read in French and in English by the undersigned, who affix at the foot of the document their signatures and seals, August 12, 1898.

Thus, in all points but one or two, Spain was absolutely pledged in advance to yield to the demands of the United States. It left the formulating of instructions to the peace commissioners in regard to the Philippine question, the most important matter before the two governments.

Thus, after less than four months of warfare, ended a conflict which drove Spain from the last of her once great possessions in the Eastern world, which gave the promise of independence to the struggling Cuban, which established the United States as a world-power of the first magnitude and enlarged its territory in both hemispheres, which opened to

the American people new opportunities and new responsibilities. An English paper called it "one of the most swiftly decisive wars in history." It is true that when the protocol was signed, Spain was still in possession of Havana, Manila, and San Juan. But Manila, as we have seen, fell the day after, San Juan would have been taken in a few days, and Havana, Spain well knew, must surely fall into our hands in the end. It was, however, one of the peculiar features of the war that the Cuban capital, to which all eyes were directed when war was declared, in which was the main strength of the Spanish army, around which it was supposed our armies would at once gather, and into which our navy would first throw its shells, escaped all actual hostilities and almost escaped notice. The blockade had been continued from the beginning and the condition of the people had become more and more desperate. Relief from the sufferings of the blockade mitigated the bitterness of defeat among the Spaniards, who had once been so boastful and had treated our interests so contemptuously. As they looked upon the wreck of the battleship *Maine* in the harbor, they must have felt that the penalty for that treachery had been swift and harsh.

As was the case after the Mexican and civil conflicts, the cessation of hostilities was followed by severe criticisms of the management of the war. There seemed to be provocation for this in the condition in which the army in Cuba found itself soon after the taking of Santiago, though it is a question if such a quick and severe campaign could have been carried out in such a country in such a time without the epidemic of sickness which followed, and it is not strange that in such an emergency the provisions for the troops were not all to which they were entitled. The truth at the bottom was that the government had been hurried into a war in a condition unprepared, that the very nature of the war compelled prompt and aggressive action at two points on opposite sides of the world. But the state of being unprepared "is one of the penalties which republics pay more than any other form of government for the

want of precedent military organization sufficiently large to embrace all the purposes and cover all the requirements of war." Late in August the greater part of Shafter's command was brought north to Camp Wikoff on Long Island, and the persistence of the demand from some quarters for an investigation into the management of the campaign led the President to appoint a commission of well-known and responsible men from both parties for such an investigation. The agitation could not fail to make the work of the Peace Commission more difficult.

In accordance with the provisions of the protocol, the joint commissions for the Spanish evacuation of the West Indies were appointed within ten days. As members of the Cuban Commission, President McKinley appointed General James F. Wade, who had been in command of the great encampment at Tampa, Admiral Sampson, and General M. C. Butler. The Spaniards had sought the service of General Blanco as the head of their commissioners, but he refused to serve, being indignant at the surrender his government had made, and so General Parrado was appointed in his place. The other members were Captain Landera and the Marquis Montoro. The American members of the Puerto Rico Commission were General Brooke, who accompanied General Miles to the island next in command, Admiral Schley, and General Gordon; the Spanish members were General Ortega, Captain Vallarino, commander of the naval station of Puerto Rico, and Senor Sanches Anguilla.

Our commissioners met with few difficulties in Puerto Rico. The Spanish associates were sensible and business-like, and the Spanish soldiers were repatriated as fast as transportation could be secured. On October 18 General Brooke took absolute command of the island. The evacuation of Cuba was beset with more obstacles. The Spanish commissioners claimed that it would be impossible for them to remove the soldiers before the first of February, and the American commissioners were instructed to insist upon the occupation by

our troops by December 1st, and that the Spanish evacuation should be completed by the end of the year. In spite of Spanish delays, the American commissioners succeeded in carrying out their plans before the end of the year.

Meantime, the commissioners appointed to arrange the terms of peace assembled at Paris and began their sittings on October 1st. The American members consisted of William R. Day, who resigned his office of Secretary of State, Senators Cushman R. Davis, William P. Frye, and George Gray, and Whitelaw Reid, editor of the *New York Tribune*.

In Mr. Day, the head of this important commission, the President had the confidence derived not simply from a long acquaintance at home, but from the able and judicious manner in which the difficult affairs of the State Department had been managed throughout the preliminary diplomacy and subsequent struggle with Spain. A small man physically, his strong intellectuality manifests itself in his acts and words. As chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Mr. Davis was also well-equipped with knowledge and experience for the work of the commission. Senator Frye, who is a good example of New England enterprise and trustworthiness, had taken a progressive attitude in reference to the questions raised by the war during the struggle in the Senate, and he became a natural exponent of the President's ideas. Senator Gray, the Democratic member, was naturally inclined to hold a less progressive policy than Senator Frye, while Whitelaw Reid was credited with holding a middle position. But whatever their individual views, they cheerfully followed the instructions of President McKinley as given from time to time during the negotiations, on the nature of which Mr. Day reported.

The Spanish commissioners were among the ablest men in the kingdom. Señor Don Montero Rios, the president, held the exalted position of president of the Spanish Senate, and was one of the most eminent jurists in Spain. He had been an advocate of reforms in the Spanish colonies for a long time,

seeing with a clearer eye than most of his countrymen the inevitable result of the policy Spain was pursuing. General Cerero was also a progressive Spaniard who had charge of the coast defenses of his country. Señor Don Buenaventura Abarzuza had served his country in various capacities, among them Ambassador to France. Señor Don Wenceslao Ramirez de Villaurrutia, the youngest member of the Spanish commission, was the Minister to Belgium, and was held in high esteem as a diplomat. Perhaps the strongest member of the commission next to Señor Rios was Señor Don José Garnica, who enjoyed a wide reputation as a political economist and as a master of international law.

The secretary of the Spanish commission was Señor Don Ojeda, Minister to Morocco, and of the American commission Professor J. B. Moore of Columbia University, who had had a long training in international law and had held the position of First Assistant Secretary of State during the war. Both commissions employed several clerks, messengers, and other assistants.

Through the courtesy of M. Delcassé, the French Foreign Minister, the commissioners were permitted to hold their joint sessions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They occupied two salons in what is known as the *Galerie des Fêtes*, which are nationally and internationally historic. At a large table in the center of one of these rooms sat the peacemakers, the American president at one end and the Spanish president at the other. All communication with the rest of the Palace was cut off and the doings of the sessions were kept absolutely secret. The record of the various propositions and the papers submitted during the long negotiations would alone make a volume, embracing, as they do, all the various arguments, some of them of great diplomatic subtlety.

It at once transpired that the Spanish commissioners were disposed to insist upon an interpretation of the protocol peculiarly their own. While that document apparently left little more than a settlement of the Philippine question to be deter-

mined, the Spanish commissioners took the view that, in renouncing all claims to sovereignty and all rights in the island of Cuba, Spain renounced them to the United States, which therefore became obligated for the Cuban debt of nearly \$500,000,000. That the victor, naturally seeking an indemnity from the vanquished, should be coolly asked to shoulder a debt which had been contracted largely in behalf of Spain, and which amounted to more than the island was worth in its ruined condition, seemed a preposterous proposition, but the Spanish commissioners insisted on it for a long time, even going so far as to assert that an indemnity could not be claimed of Spain because she had not initiated the war. The American commissioners bore patiently with these representations, arguing in opposition that the United States had taken to arms because Spain would not surrender her sovereignty to the Cubans to secure peace, and that now the United States did not propose to assume permanent sovereignty in the island, but as soon as possible to turn it over to the Cubans, and that the United States government would not bind either itself or the Cubans to the payment of a debt which in all justice ought not to be charged against the islands. As a large part of this so-called Cuban debt was held in France, the press at Paris naturally supported the Spanish contention. The Spanish commissioners endeavored to secure some admission from the Americans that the United States would actually assume sovereignty over Cuba, in the hope that they might thus establish a legal responsibility for the debt. But after long discussion and delay, the American commissioners ceased arguing and asserted earnestly that their government did not propose to assume nor in any way to guarantee the Cuban debt. Then the Spanish commissioners quietly accepted the inevitable, pretending to be comforted by the forlorn hope that the debt would still be assumed by whatever sovereignty ultimately prevailed in the island.

The question of the disposition of the Philippines, which was reached about November 1st, also led to a long struggle.

After a careful consideration of the problem as set forth in the reports of Admiral Dewey and General Merritt, who had meantime reached Paris from Manila, the administration at Washington became convinced that the islands must be taken under the sovereignty of the United States. The cession of Puerto Rico alone was not considered a sufficient indemnity; Spanish authority in the Philippines was well-nigh extinguished; the islands were naturally fertile and fruitful, and in an advantageous position for Oriental trade, and it was out of the question to leave the islands to the mercies of Spain with every prospect that they would become a disturbing element in the East. But the Spanish commissioners took the position that the United States could not lay claim to the sovereignty of the islands under the protocol. It was apparent, however, that they were chiefly concerned over the financial side of the question, and it was intimated that Spain would cede the islands provided the United States would assume the indebtedness of \$40,000,000 and in addition give Spain a substantial money consideration. This was another preposterous claim, and the Spanish commissioners were plainly informed that the United States and not Spain were entitled to indemnity as a result of the war. Following tactics employed earlier in the session, the Spanish authorities inspired the report that if the United States did not agree to the Spanish conditions, Spain would withdraw from the conference, declare to Europe that she lay helpless at the feet of a greedy and unjust victor, and implore the powers to come to her rescue. This was her last desperate effort to arouse Europe against us, but it failed. The American commissioners calmly declared that it was the purpose of the United States to take the entire group of the islands, assuming only such proportion of the debt as had been expended for the material improvement. A deadlock of several days followed, in which the Spanish government sought in vain to secure European support against the United States. She asked that the meaning of the protocol be arbitrated, her

claim being that Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines was recognized as the basis of the peace negotiations.

Finally, the American commissioners, under instructions from Washington, presented a formal statement of terms in which a definite answer from Spain was requested by November 28th. According to these terms the proposition for arbitrating the meaning of the protocol was rejected, the demand for the cession of all the Philippines was renewed, the sum of \$20,000,000 was offered as a partial compensation in lieu of assuming the so-called Philippine debt, and explicit avowal was made of the purpose of the United States to maintain "an open door" to commerce at the ports of the islands. It was also announced that the United States wished to treat for the religious freedom of the Caroline Islands, of the acquisition of one of them for a naval station, and also of some other matters not named in the protocol. Spain was informed that if these new terms were accepted it was proposed that there should be a mutual waiving of all claims for indemnity, national and personal, between the two countries, the release dating back to the beginning of the Cuban insurrection. At first the Spanish commissioners gave the public to believe that they would never accept such terms. But by December 1st, despairing of all help from Europe, they completely yielded, President Rios in effect saying that, while the American propositions were, in Spain's opinion, inadmissible on legal grounds, still Spain for "reasons of patriotism and humanity and to avoid the horrors of war resigned herself to the power of the victor."

This practically settled all matters mentioned in the protocol, and after some discussion of minor points a treaty was drawn up and formally signed on the evening of December 10th. It was a historic occasion. To the Americans it was the happy ending of war; to the Spaniards it was evidently a bitter tragedy, marking another step in Spain's long national decline. The document was prepared by Secretary Moore in behalf of the United States commissioners, and by Señor Vil-

laurrutia for Spain. Each copy contained the English and Spanish texts in parallel columns.

The substance of the treaty, omitting diplomatic circumlocutions, is as follows:

Spain relinquishes all claims of sovereignty over and title to Cuba; and, as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States, the latter will, so long as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obligations in respect to protection of life and property which may, under international law, result from its occupation.

Spain cedes to the United States the Island of Porto Rico and the other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, with Guam, in the Mariano or Ladrone Islands.

Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands.

The United States will, for a term of ten years from the date and exchange of ratifications of the present treaty, admit Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as the ships and merchandise of the United States.

The United States will, upon the signature of the present treaty, send back to Spain, at its own cost, the Spanish soldiers taken as prisoners of war on the capture of Manila by the American forces. The arms of the soldiers in question shall be restored to them. Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty, release all prisoners of war and all persons detained or imprisoned for political offenses in connection with the insurrection in Cuba and the Philippines and the war with the United States.

On its part the United States will release all persons made prisoners of war by the American forces, and will endeavor to obtain the release of all Spanish prisoners in the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and the Philippines.

The United States will, at its own cost, return to Spain, and the government of Spain will, at its own cost, return to the United States, Cuba, Porto Rico, or the Philippines, according to the situation of their respective homes, the prisoners released or caused to be released by them respectively under this provision.

The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all claim for indemnity, national and individual, of every kind, of either government, or of its citizens or subjects, against the other government, that may have arisen since the beginning of the late insurrection in Cuba and prior to the exchange of ratifications of the present treaty, including all claims for indemnity for the cost of the war. The United States will adjudicate and settle the claims of its citizens against Spain relinquished under this stipulation.

Spanish subjects, natives of the peninsula, residing in the territory

over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or its proceeds, and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and profession, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners. In the event of their remaining in the territory, they may preserve their allegiance to the crown of Spain by making before a court of record within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of the treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance, in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may reside.

The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territory hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by Congress. The inhabitants of the territory over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of their religion.

Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by this treaty cedes or relinquishes her sovereignty shall be subject in matters of civil as well as criminal to the jurisdiction of the courts of the country in which they reside, pursuant to the ordinary laws governing the same, and they shall have the right to appear before such court and to pursue the same course as citizens of the country to which the courts belong.

The right of property secured by copyrights and patents acquired by the Spaniards in the Island of Cuba and in Porto Rico and the Philippines and the other ceded territories at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty, shall continue and be respected. Spanish scientific, literary, and artistic works, not subversive of public order in the territories in question, shall continue to be admitted free of duty into such territories for a period of ten years, to be reckoned from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty.

Spain shall have the right to establish consular offices in the ports and other places of the territories, sovereignty over which has been either relinquished or ceded by the present treaty.


The government of each country will, for a term of ten years from the exchange of ratifications, accord to the merchant vessels of the other country the same treatment in respect of all port charges, including entrance and clearance dues, light dues, and tonnage duties, as it accords to its own merchant vessels not engaged in coastwise trade. This provision may at any time be terminated on six months' notice given by either government to the other.

It is understood that any obligation assumed in this treaty by the United States with respect to Cuba is limited to the time of the occupation by the United States of that island, but the United States government will, upon the termination of such occupation, advise any government established in the island to assume the same obligations.

Thus from the beginning of the war to the signing of the treaty elapsed 233 days, of which actual fighting occurred for about a half of that period. It was a conflict in which our arms suffered no reverse, though the natural advantages were seldom on our side; a conflict in which the loss of life, both from casualty and disease, was small in comparison with the loss in other wars. Our soldiers proved themselves as valiant after battle in saving other lives as they were heroic in battle in hazarding their own. It was doubtful if in four months of any war that was ever fought could be found so much genuine heroism.

With its heroes the people did not forget to place one man whose work began long before war came and was not lessened by its close. The President who had united all parties in support of his patriotic and prudent policy, whose patient diplomacy deferred war till it could be deferred no longer, whose courage carried it through to a successful issue, and whose gentle firmness at its close secured a peace on honorable conditions with a rich legacy for our future, proved himself the great American statesman of this generation, and amply justified the trust which his people placed in his hands.

With the signing of the treaty of peace we may well close this history of what will ever be known as one of the most important periods in the life of this great nation. Peace, no less than war, has its responsibilities, and the peace now made points the way to expanding duties which we have not heretofore recognized as ours. Having destroyed the only government that existed in Cuba, in Puerto Rico, and in the Philippines, there rests upon us the responsibility and the problem of securing to these islands a better government. This work will not be the work of a moment. It will, henceforth, be a feature of our own government, of our national life. It will be less an appendix to the history of the war than a history in itself — the history of a nation from the time it took its place as a dominating factor in the civilization of the world.





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